

HERMENEUTICS AND LIBERATION <sup>1</sup>

My argumentative strategy will consist in following step by step the thought of Paul Ricoeur (who was born in Valence in 1913), whom we know through being his avid reader, and whose student I was in the Sorbonne during the early sixties, in order to slowly detect the differences and constructive possibilities for a mutually creative dialogue.

*5.1 Following Ricoeur's Philosophical Project Step by Step*

There is nothing better, in order to follow the steps of the development of Ricoeur's thought, than his own testimony:

What are the presuppositions that characterize the philosophical tradition to which I recognize myself as belonging?... I should like to characterize this philosophical tradition by three features: it stands in the line of a *reflexive* philosophy; it remains within the sphere of Husserlian *phenomenology*; it strives to be a *hermeneutical* variation of this phenomenology.<sup>2</sup>

We have, then, three levels, as much of depth as of a certain initial biographic development of the author. From the French philosopher Jean Nabert,<sup>3</sup> Ricoeur takes his "reflexive" philosophy<sup>4</sup>—first level. From Husserl,<sup>5</sup> obviously, Ricoeur inherits phenomenology, which he practices in a uniquely creative manner—second level. Lastly, and this is essential in the philosophical biography of our philosopher, he subsumes phenomenology within a hermeneutical position, which we could call definitive in Ricoeur. This "turn" was made between the first and the second volumes of his *Philosophy of the Will*.

In fact, in the first volume of this work, *Le volontaire et l'involontaire*,<sup>6</sup> it can be seen that we still find ourselves within the reflexive-phenomenological moment of an eidetic description-comprehension of emotional experience, of desiring, of loving, of the living I, of the existing body, of the "vicissitudes of freedom." In the second volume, *Finitude et culpabilité*, part 1, the human, the incommensurability and contradiction between the infinitude of the will and the finitude of intelligence, demands from philosophy that it describe the "piti-

fulness of misery." But it is only in the second part, *La symbolique du Mal* (1960), under the influence of Mircea Eliade, among others, that the phenomenological hermeneutics of the definitive Ricoeur irrupts-third level. "Le symbole donne à penser"<sup>7</sup> will be the motto. Hermeneutics ought to have led to an ethics, a politics, which were promised, but perhaps never accomplished. In this sense, the shorter work, parallel to his larger works, but of a greater resonance at the concrete level, was *Histoire et vérité*,<sup>8</sup> which helped the militant to comprehend history-especially those linked to the magazine *Esprit*, as was my case.

The next systematic step is clearly indicated by Ricoeur, being

the circuitous route [*long détour*] by which I take up the problem left unresolved at the end of my *Symbolism of Evil*, namely the relationship between a hermeneutic of symbols and a philosophy of concrete reflection.<sup>9</sup>

The "circuitous route" of the hermeneutics of "desire," of symbols, of culture, had commenced-against Heidegger's ontological "short route."<sup>10</sup> For this task, Freud was an irreplaceable critical author, whom Ricoeur knows how to use splendidly. It is Ricoeur's *linguistic turn*, "the search of a comprehensive philosophy of language..."<sup>11</sup> In the end, what is of interest is not "the dream... but the text of the dream account."<sup>12</sup>

In 1969 appeared the set of shorter works, such as the "goodbye" to France, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique*.<sup>13</sup> Having structuralism as his interlocutor, and always affirming the importance of reflexive philosophy, as well as the importance of the understanding of the historical context, Ricoeur takes the hermeneutics of language as the hermeneutics of history: hermeneutical phenomenology, phenomenological hermeneutics. The "linguistic model" must be referred to "structural anthropology," through the "semantic problem" of "double sense." Now it is not only Husserl, but also Heidegger, who makes himself present (hermeneutics is also ontological).<sup>14</sup>

When *La métaphore vive*<sup>15</sup> appears in 1975-the same year when my exile in Mexico begins-we can see the richness that Ricoeur's own "exile" has allowed him to accumulate: Louvain, Paris, Chicago. The philosopher himself gives us his background intention:

Three major preoccupations are apparent here. The irreducibility of the various *uses* of language.<sup>16</sup> ...[2] The *gathering together* the diverse forms and modes of the game of storytelling...[3] the text is the linguistic unit we are looking for.<sup>17</sup>

The "metaphor"-as well as *narrative*<sup>18</sup>-beyond the *word* and the *phrase*, and in poetic *discourse*, finds itself at "au service de la fonction poétique, cette stratégie de discours par laquelle le langage se dépouille de sa fonction de description directe pour accéder au niveau mythique ou sa fonction de découverte

est libérée.”<sup>19</sup> By reference to a “double sense,” the metaphor thus opens up a *new world* of meaning.<sup>20</sup> Ricoeur now incorporates the British-North American and analytical philosophers in general (Strawson, Austin, Searle, Grice, Greimas, Propp, Black, Jakobson, Richards) but without losing sight of his own philosophical horizon of the phenomenological question.<sup>21</sup>

The impressive trilogy *Time and Narrative*<sup>22</sup> shows us the mature Ricoeur. In the first volume, from Aristotle to Augustine, following some hypotheses from *History and Truth*, Ricoeur describes, out of temporality, the circle of narrative and temporality, including even quasi-narrative in explicative scientific history. “Time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; a narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience.”<sup>23</sup> The second volume extends itself over the theme of *The Configuration of Time in Fictional Narrative*;<sup>24</sup> that is, over the rubrics of the popular story, the epic poem, the tragedy, the comedy, and the modern novel, all of which are different modes of the *mise en intrigue*. It is a complete *poétique du récit* which allows understanding of the productive moment in the fictitious narrative. Lastly, in volume three<sup>25</sup> Ricoeur articulates both *récits*, namely, the historical and the fictitious, in order to conclude with a phenomenological-hermeneutical result:

Temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect discourse of narration.<sup>26</sup>

If *mimesis I* is what is given in daily human action, the *Lebenswelt* which always already presupposes a pre-understanding,<sup>27</sup> *mimesis II* is the poetics of discourse as an “operation of configuration,”<sup>28</sup> which always departs from *mimesis I*. *Mimesis III*, in turn, is now the return of the work and the produced text toward the hearer or reader,<sup>29</sup> who must interpret meaning hermeneutically (as Gadamer showed in *Truth and Method*). This is the theme of *From Text to Action* (1986).

As a matter of fact, this last work closes the cycle opened by *Time and Narrative, I*. It explains the meaning of a hermeneutical-phenomenology,<sup>30</sup> that is, how it is phenomenology and how it is hermeneutics. It analyzes the transition of language as “discourse,” as “work,” and as “text,”<sup>31</sup> in order to attempt a “return” to or “application” of phenomenological hermeneutics to action.<sup>32</sup> And just as the discourse of the metaphor was the realm of “semantic innovation,” “imagination” plays a fundamental role in creative action (in social imagination, this is the whole question of utopia, of incipiency”, etc.).<sup>33</sup> The work concludes with an opening up toward ideological, utopian, and political questions.<sup>34</sup>

To conclude his work, but now from out of the origin itself of his philosophical project as a “philosophy of reflection,” Ricoeur wrote *Oneself as Another*,<sup>35</sup> which, on the one hand, still remembers Nabert and, on the other

hand, appears as though it were a polemic with Levinas. Without having to reconstruct the entire discourse of Ricoeur, I would like to take up one question so as to be able to come to a conclusion, a question which is suggested by the title of the work:

I should like to show essentially that it is impossible to construct this dialectic in a unilateral manner, whether one attempts, with Husserl, to derive the alter ego from the ego, or whether, with Levinas, one reserves for the Other the exclusive initiative for assigning responsibility to the self. A two-pronged conception of otherness remains to be constructed here, one that does justice in turn to the primacy of self-esteem and also to the primacy of the convocation to justice coming from the other.<sup>36</sup> Now the theme of exteriority does not reach the end of its trajectory, namely awakening a responsible response to the other's call, except by presupposing a capacity of reception, of discrimination, and of recognition that, in my opinion, belongs to another philosophy of the Same than that to which the philosophy of the Other replies.<sup>37</sup>

In any event, at the end, the ethics (of conviction) and the politics (of responsibility), always promised and suggested, are never developed, much less an economics, which was not even attempted. The subject (the *soi même*) of a narrative never arrives at its clarification as a subject of a transforming political action, ethically liberating, but instead provides us with immense hermeneutical material for the description of the *identity of cultures*, still at the popular level, for intercultural dialogue, out of a daily narrativity and metaphorical and fictitious poetics.

### *5.2 Toward a Latin American Symbolics (up to 1969)*

Since 1952 at the National University of Cuyo (Mendoza, Argentina), I traversed, in seven opportunities, a variety of ethical programs (Aristotelian, Thomist, phenomenological, in the tradition of Scheler or von Hildebrand). I read Aristotle in Greek, Augustine and Thomas in Latin, Descartes or Leibniz in French, Scheler or Heidegger in German. Democratic followers of Jacques Maritain—against the fascism of our professors—we soon met Emmanuel Mounier. My doctorate in Madrid (1957-59) on the Common Good (from the pre-Socratics to Kelsen), with Maritain against Charles de Konnick, opened me to political philosophy. The discovery of the misery of my own people, which I had noticed since my childhood in the almost desert-like farm lands, took me to Europe and Israel. I discovered then, as the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea indicated in his work *The Role of the Americas in History* (1957), that Latin America lies outside history. It is necessary, out of this misery, to find its place in world history, to discover its hidden being.

In 1961, returning after two years of manual labor experience in Nazareth

(Israel), where I spoke in Hebrew with the Palestinian Arabs, I began my studies in France. *The Symbolism of Evil* was Ricoeur's first book that I worked on in depth. My project of Latin American philosophizing was transformed to its foundations.

Following Ricoeur's courses at the Sorbonne, I undertook the path of the "circuitous route." I reviewed my doctoral dissertation and wrote, as a hermeneutics of symbols-in view of a hermeneutical phenomenology of Latin American "culture"-*Hellenistic Humanism*.<sup>38</sup> This work was an Indo-European anthropology, ontology, and ethics, where the body-soul dualism, the solitude of contemplation, and the ethics of asceticism (the tragic "Promethean myth" without history), and the monism of being were illustrated and studied. It was an anti-Hellenistic philosophical-hermeneutical critique. In 1964, I wrote my second work, also begun in Israel, *Semitic Humanism*,<sup>39</sup> where, within the same hermeneutical-philosophical tradition, I placed myself within the tradition of Rosenzweig and Buber,<sup>40</sup> following the analysis of a unifying "carnal" (in the sense of flesh, from the Hebrew word *basar*) anthropology, a creationist metaphysics, and a political ethics of engagement for justice. The Semitic "ethical-mythical nucleus"<sup>41</sup> constituted itself thus (from the dramatic Adamic myth which initiates history) in the posterior point of departure for Latin American culture.

In 1964 we organized, with Latin American students who lived in Europe, a Latin American Seminar,-whose proceedings were later published in *Esprit*.<sup>42</sup> Personally, I asked Ricoeur to talk about "Tâches de l'educateur politique." Among other things he said:

Il me semble d'abord que la tâche majeure des éducateurs est d'intégrer la civilisation technique universelle à la personnalité culturelle, telle que je l'ai définie plus haut, à la singularité historique de chaque groupe humain.<sup>43</sup>

These proposals were taken very seriously by us. This was a generational political-philosophical project.

In 1965, in Münster, I wrote a book on Latin American history (I had already written a thesis on the theme at the Sorbonne with Robert Ricard), which was published in 1967, the moment of my return to Latin America (after almost ten years in Europe). In this book I wrote:

Every civilization has a *meaning*, though said meaning is diffused, inconsistent and it may be difficult to make out. This entire system organizes itself around an *ethical-mythical nucleus* which structures the ultimate intentional contents of a group, and which may be discovered by the hermeneutics of fundamental myths of community.<sup>44</sup>

As a professor of philosophy and culture (1967) at the Universidad Nacional de Resistencia (Argentina), I wrote an entire course, still unpublished, on "Latin

America in World History" where I developed integrally a hermeneutical vision of Latin America from the perspective of Asia, in its pre-Columbian history, and from Europe since 1492. My lecture of 1966, which was delivered during a preliminary visit to Argentina, entitled "Hypotheses toward the Study of Latin America in Universal History," was truly a declaration of hermeneutical principles.<sup>45</sup> I carried out, with numerous positive materials, an analysis of universal "civilization," from the perspective of Latin American culture as a whole, and within this, out of national histories.

From accumulated materials, collected during the preceding years, I wrote, in Mendoza in 1968, *Dualism in the Anthropology of Christendom*,<sup>46</sup> subtitled "From the Origin of Christianity to before the Conquest of America." Thus, I closed the trilogy: the anthropological-ethical hermeneutics of the Greeks, Semites, and Christians. Christianity passed thus from the reconquest of Spain to the conquest of America. It concerned the "clash" of world views (of the Semites in the Hellenistic world at the beginning of Christianity, as a propaedeutic of the clash that Christians will have in the colonial world).

It was precisely this clash between the "European" and the "Indian" (Caribbean, Aztec, Chibcha, Inca) worlds that deeply concerned me, and with which I dealt in depth. It was the confrontation between two worlds; the domination of one over the other; the destruction of the Amerindian world by conquest in the name of Christianity. All of these will put in crisis the Ricoeurian world, appropriate for the hermeneutics *of a culture*, but not enough for the *asymmetrical* confrontation between several cultures (one dominating, the others dominated).

### 5.3 Origins of Liberation Philosophy (1969-76)

After my return to Latin America, from Europe, the political situation worsened. Students asked greater political clarity from their teacher. The dictatorship of Onganía in Argentina faced growing popular opposition. In 1969 occurred the "Cordobazo" (the city of Córdoba was taken by students and workers, thus repeating what had already taken place in Mexico, Paris, and Frankfurt the year before). The "theory of dependence" began to make its inroads, showing the North-periphery economic asymmetry, as caused by the underdevelopment of the South. Fals Borda published *Sociology of Liberation* in Colombia; Augusto Salazar Bondy published *Does a Philosophy Exist in Latin America?* where he linked the impossibility of an authentic philosophy to the structural situation of dominated neocolonies. At the time I was lecturing on Ontological Ethics,<sup>47</sup> in the Heideggerian line, at the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (Mendoza), when, as a member of a group of philosophers, I discovered the work of Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. My ontological ethics became *Towards an Ethics of Latin American Liberation*.<sup>48</sup>

The transition happened between the second and third chapters. In the first two chapters I argued the position of an ontological ethics (inspired by the late Heidegger, Aristotle, and others), the "circuitous route" of Ricoeur. Chapter 3 is entitled: "The Metaphysical Exteriority of the Other."<sup>49</sup> Why Levinas?

Because the *originary experience* of Liberation Philosophy consists in discovering the massive "fact" of domination, of the constitution of a subjectivity as "lord" of another subjectivity at the world level (from the beginning of European expansion in 1492, the originary constitutive event of "modernity"), center-periphery; at the national level (elites-masses, national bourgeoisie-working class and people); at the erotic level (male-female); at the pedagogical level (imperial culture, elitist, versus peripheral culture, popular, etc.); at the religious level (the fetishism of all the different levels, as idolotry). This originary "experience" -lived by all Latin Americans even in the halls of European universities, is best indicated by the category "Autrui" (another person as Other), as *pauper*.<sup>50</sup> The poor, the dominated, the massacred Amerindian, the Black slave, the Asiatic of the opium wars, the Jew of the concentration camps, the woman as sexual object, the child under ideological manipulation (or the youth, popular culture, or the market under the imperatives of publicity and advertisement), can never simply depart from the *l'estime de soi* (self-esteem).<sup>51</sup> The oppressed, tortured, destroyed, in her suffering corporeality, simply cries out, clamoring for justice:

I am hungry! Don't kill me! Have compassion for me!-cries out the miserable.

The *radical origin* is not the affirmation of one's self (the *soi-même*), for that one must be able to first reflect, assume oneself as possessing value, that is, discover oneself as a person. We are before all of that. We are before the slave who was born slave and who therefore does not know he is a person. He simply cries out. The cry, as noise, as clamor, as exclamation, proto-word still not articulated, which is interpreted in its sense and meaning by those "who have ears to hear," indicates simply that someone suffers, and that from out of their suffering they emit a wail, a howl, a supplication. This is the originary "interpellation."<sup>52</sup> It is evident that someone ought to have "a responsible response to the other's call"<sup>53</sup>-this is still the question of "ethical conscience,"<sup>54</sup> and for that it must affirm itself. But, it seems to me, the *soi-même* of the responsible-hearer affirms itself as valuable in the measure to which it has previously been affected by the supplication of the other; priority which is anterior to all possible reflection, responsibility for the "taking-charge-of-the-other" is *a priori* to all reflective consciousness. We respond, responsibly before the miserable, when she has already "touched" us. The "self" reflexively comprehends itself as valuable in the "act of justice" toward the Other as an answer, and in the carrying out of the act of justice demanded by the Other. Ricoeur remains modern under the empire of the *soi-même* as origin; Levinas allows us

to localize the *Autrui* as radical origin of the affirmation of the *soi-même*. Liberation Philosophy was, around the end of the sixties, that which Ricoeur required when he wrote: "A two-pronged conception of otherness remains to be constructed here, one that does justice in turn to the primacy of self-esteem and also to the primacy of the convocation to justice coming from the other."<sup>55</sup> The priority of the Other who interpellates constitutes the possibility of the *soi-même* as reflexively valuable, who becomes the foundation of the act of justice toward the Other. It is a circle, but one which is begun by the Other—at least on this point Liberation Philosophy agrees with Levinas.

But it was not only Levinas, it was also Marcuse and the Frankfurt school, when they "politicized" Heideggerian ontology:

The state of capitalist well-being is a state of war. It must have an enemy, with capital E, a total enemy; because the perpetuation of servitude, the perpetuation of the struggle for existence before the new possibilities of active freedom intensify in that society a primary aggression to an extreme that history, I believe, has never known until now.<sup>56</sup>

But, at this moment, and because of a critique of Hegel—which was studied very much during those years since it was the second centenary of his birth, 1770-1970—we discovered the importance of the late Schelling, the Schelling of the *Philosophy of Revelation*, of the lectures from 1841 in Berlin (which were attended by Engels, Bakunin, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard). The post-Hegelians had a sense of reality (*Wirklichkeit, realitas*) which transcended the horizon of Hegel's Being.<sup>57</sup> The Other is beyond-Being, and in this coincided with Levinas, Sartre (of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*), Xavier Zubiri (*On Essence*), and, as we discovered later, Marx himself. Schelling, against Hegel, speaks of the Lord of Being (*Herr des Seins*),<sup>58</sup> the one who creates from and out of Nothingness, metaphysical position which is also found in Marx, for example.<sup>59</sup>

Years later, in a retraction, under the title of "Beyond Culturalism,"<sup>60</sup> I criticized my position prior to 1969 (and thus Ricoeur as well), indicating by "culturalism" a certain blindness to the "asymmetries" of the subjects (a culture dominated by another, a class by another, a country by another, a sex by another), allowing thus a "naive, conservative, and apologetic" view of Latin American culture. In the background, hermeneutical phenomenology places the subject as a "reader" before a "text." Now, Liberation Philosophy discovers a "person in hunger" before a "no-bread" (that is to say, without a product for consumption, because of poverty or because of the robbery of the fruits of labor), or an "illiterate" before a "non-text" (which she cannot buy, or a culture which cannot express itself).

Soon enough, however, I realized that Levinas himself could not address our hopes.<sup>61</sup> Levinas showed us how to formulate the question of the irruption of the Other, but we could still not develop a politics (erotics, pedagogics, etc.)



which placed in question the ruling Totality (which dominates and excludes the Other) and could develop a *new Totality*. This critical-practical questioning of a new Totality was exactly the question of "liberation." With this Levinas could not help us.

The second volume of *Towards an Ethics of Latin American Liberation*<sup>62</sup> focuses on this problematic. It furnished us with many new novelties, that is, the demand to develop "new" categories for the history of political philosophy,<sup>63</sup> and, above all, the necessity to develop a new architectonics. The first of the categories on which we ought to focus our attention is "totality" in an oppressed world. Ontology is to think the foundation, the ground, of the Being of a *ruling Totality*. The project (the Heideggerian ontological *Entwurf*) of the ruling system justifies the oppression of the oppressed and the exclusion of the Other. Little by little, light is put on utopia (*ouk-tópos*: "without place" in the Totality); the project of the liberation of the Other. It is a question of the production of another analogical Totality, constituted with the best of the old one and the exteriority of the Other. From the interpellation of the Other, and as a response to the other, the affirmation of the Other *as other*<sup>64</sup> is the origin of the possibility of the negation of the dialectical negation (this is what I called the analectic method or the originary affirmation of the Other).<sup>65</sup>

Later, we assumed the task of delving deeper into more concrete levels: Chapter 7: "Latin American erotics"<sup>66</sup>; Chapter 8, "Latin American pedagogics"<sup>67</sup>; Chapter 9, "Latin American Politics"<sup>68</sup>; and Chapter 10, "Latin American Archeologies."<sup>69</sup> Each of these "treatises" begins-in a Ricoeurian fashion-with a "symbolics": "A symbolic erotics" (paragraph 42); "symbolic pedagogics" (paragraph 48); "symbolic politics" (paragraph 61); "symbolic archeology" (paragraph 67). In each we began with a hermeneutics of the ruling symbols in the history of Latin American culture (from Amerindian cultures through colonial and contemporary cultures). We used myths, epic narratives, oral traditions, and contemporary novels. At a second level, it was necessary to place the question ontologically, in order to allow for 1) the irruption of Other in the ruling totality (oppressed women in machist erotics; son/daughter-youth/people in the pedagogics of domination; the poor in the political economy of capitalist exploitation in the double dialectic capital/work and North/South; the fetishization of the Totality, atheistically negated in the affirmation of the Other, etc.), 2) the negation of the Totality, and 3) the process of liberation in view of the project of liberation (describing the levels of praxis and the ethos of liberation). This constituted an entire thematics never *dealt with in the European ethics* with which I am familiar. These allowed us to reflect on new problems, both categorically and architectonically.<sup>70</sup>

When repression grew more acute-I suffered a bomb attempt at my home-I was expelled from the university (1975). I was condemned to death by the paramilitary squadrons. I left Argentina and began my exile in a new *patria*:

Mexico. There, during two months, without my library, since this had been left in Argentina, I wrote my *Philosophy of Liberation*.<sup>71</sup> An epoch had ended for me. A new one began.

#### 5.4 From Hermeneutical Pragmatics to Economics

Immediately, in Mexico, it became necessary to clarify the philosophical ambiguities that Liberation Philosophy still contained in its first stage. Among the philosophers of liberation (all of them, more than 30 university professors, were persecuted in the Argentinian universities by pro-North American, neo-liberal, "modernizing" militarism since 1976, which to a certain extent is evidence of the degree to which the movement has become historically engaged), there were some who supported the Peronist right, arriving thus at extreme nationalist positions; others returned to the hermeneutics of popular symbolics, thus falling into a naive political populism; the majority had to maintain silence (because of either internal or external censure). The "populist" question became central. It became necessary to clarify the categories *pueblo* (people) and *nación* (nation) (as well as "popular" and "nationalism"), in order to prevent fascism, as well as the abstract fallacy of either classist Althusserian Marxism or Anglo-Saxon analytic thinking, both of which were in fashion at the time. It was thus that I came to delve deeper into Marx. This would distance me for some years from the hermeneutic enterprise (to which I will return later, but with clear differentiations concerning the existing *asymmetries*).<sup>72</sup>

A note of warning is in order. The systematic return to Marx which I undertook at the end of the decade of the seventies was due to three facts. In first place, the growing misery of the Latin American continent (which has not ceased to become poorer, to the point that it now suffers from a cholera epidemic due to the accelerated malnutrition of the majority of the people). In second place, in order to be able to carry out a critique of capitalism, which apparently was triumphant in the North (a view reinforced since 1989), but which failed unquestionably for 75 percent of humanity, in the South (Africa, Asia, Latin America). In the third place, because liberation philosophy had to construct a firm economics and politics, in order to posteriorly also secure a pragmatics, as a subsumption of analytics (in the sense already indicated). Instead of studying the European commentators of Marx, I imposed on myself the task of an integral re-reading, in university seminars. My first point of verification was to discover the abandonment of the serious, integral, creative study that the investigations on Marx had suffered at the hands of the "great" European-North American philosophers (in recent years Marx has not been read *seriously*<sup>73</sup>). Some "marxiologists" edited too slowly some of his works-at the Marxist-Leninist Institute, in Berlin as well as in Moscow. Marx was agreeable to neither Capitalism nor to Stalinism.

Through the hermeneutical-philosophical and chronological re-reading of Marx's work, we arrived at a moment in which *inverting the hypothesis of traditional readings* imposed itself on us as a necessity. The more anthropological, ethical, and anti-materialist (in the naive sense) Marx was not the young one (1835-48) but the definitive Marx, the Marx of the "four redactions" of *Capital* (1857-82). A great *philosopher*-economist slowly profiled himself before our eyes. Neither Lukács, Korsch, Kosík, Marcuse, Althusser, Coletti, nor Habermas fulfilled our aspirations.<sup>74</sup>

It was necessary to undertake the "circuitous route" of a *philosophy of economics* (just as Ricoeur had transversed the circuitous route of the hermeneutics of discourse, of the text). It was necessary to "reconstruct" the totality of Marx's central work, thus liberating him not only from dogmatic Stalinism, but also from the layers of western Marxism which had begun to bury his own thought from Engels to Kautsky, and afterwards. Our Latin American philosophical goal was to consolidate economics through a "poietics" or "technology," just as Liberation philosophy hopes to do.<sup>75</sup> But at the same time, we had to reformulate the concept of dependence in order to discover the cause of the North/South difference (the "transfer of value" by the different organic compositions of capital of developed and underdeveloped nations in the process of the competition of capital in the world market).<sup>76</sup> This led us to discover that Marx had written *Capital* four times. We took the German published texts<sup>77</sup> and began a close; paragraph by paragraph commentary, with the philosophical-hermeneutical intention of reconstructing the process of the theoretical production of categories and their corresponding "system."<sup>78</sup> In the case of the third (1863-65) and fourth (1866-82) redactions of *Capital*, we had recourse to the unpublished manuscripts, in Amsterdam (with reproductions in Berlin and Moscow).<sup>79</sup> We had obtained, perhaps for the first time in the history of philosophy, a global view of Marx. Now the hermeneutical reinterpretation of his work can begin. This determined a change in the architectonic of the categories of our philosophy of liberation.

In *Philosophy of Liberation* we privileged the interpersonal practical relation; that which in Austin's theory of speech acts is called the illocutionary moment, or, in Habermas, communicative action. However, from Levinas, the *face-à-face* establishes itself even in silence (before developed language, in accordance with Searle's principle of expressibility). The illocutionary is the face-to-face of two persons, or many, or of a community. It is what we call proximity (*proximité*). In fact, in *Philosophy of Liberation*, we dedicate the first section (2.1) to the description of this "original ethical situation." In second place we show the four possible levels of proximity (or the illocutionary moment of every possible speech act): the political practical relation (3.1), erotics (3.2), pedagogics (3.3), or the religious (3.4). At this level, proximity is properly ethical. Levinas has described with masterful hand this "ethical moment." We,

on the other hand, thought that it was on this level that we and see the originality of Marx's economics (against the entire Marxist and anti-Marxist criticism tradition).<sup>80</sup>

At a second level, the ethical community or practical community (to speak with the Kant of Religion within the *Limits of Reason Alone*) has in its "finding-oneself-in-the-world" (Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*) two first, *a priori* moments, always already presupposed: "linguisticity" (Gadamer's *Sprachlichkeit*) and what we could call instrumentality. That is to say, we always presuppose a world where we *speak* (we are educated in culture, by the Other, in and through a particular language), and where *tools are used* (we live in a cultural world as a system of instruments, tools). "Pragmatics" subsumes mere linguisticity in a communicative relation with the Other, in the communication community (the overcoming of solipsism by Apel and Habermas). "Signs" (as Peirce or Charles Morris would say) have a syntactic, semantic, and *pragmatic* dimension. As Such, the sign is a material reality produced by human, cultural, signifying (producing) work (*le travail du texte*, we could say with Ricoeur).


In the same fashion, economics (in the *new* sense we want to give it) subsumes mere instrumentality in a practical relationship with the Other, in the "community of producers/consumers." Products (bread, for example) have a systematic (syntax) relationship among themselves, a cultural or symbolic (semantic, with reference to a need), or *economic* character (with respect to the Other and the community). As such, the product is a material-reality product of labor referred to a human, carnal need in the community. In this fashion we have indicated the parallelism between pragmatics and economics, as the two dimensions of the interpersonal practical relation which is mediated by material-cultural objects: the *communicative* relationship is mediated by signifying (interpretable) signs<sup>81</sup> and the *economic* relation is mediated by instrumental products: of use (utility) or consumption (consumptionability). The *production of the text* (to go directly to a final moment of Ricoeurian hermeneutics) is analogous (non-identical) to the *production of the product/commodity*. The "text" and the "product/commodity" retain independence or autonomy *vis-à-vis* the producer (and no one showed better than Marx how autonomy could constitute the product into a *Macht* (power) which turns against the producer as a fetish). The interpretation of the reader of a text (Ricoeur) is *analogous* to the use/consumption of the user/consumer of the product/commodity (Marx).

Alienation before a text would consist in that. in "the self-understanding before a text," understanding would be alienating, strange, against the ethical interests of the reader. The text would constitute the reader as a mediation of the "thing of the text"; it would be manipulation, propaganda. The reader would only be "public." a market, a "follower" of the content of the text: instrumental mediation of the text. In the same fashion the product/capital can constitute the producer/worker ("living labor" for Marx) as a mediation of

its own product (a thing): "the valorization of value" (the essence of capital). In this way the creator of the text can be transformed into a mediation of the social realization of the text; just as the creator of the value of capital (through accumulated surplus) can be transformed into a mediation of the realization or accumulation of capital. In both cases a "fetishist inversion" has taken place: the person has become a thing (mediation) and the thing (the text or capital) has become as if it were a person.

Liberation Philosophy presents an even more concrete and complex situation, from which there emerges a demand for a new development of hermeneutics and a transition to economics. Take, for example, a real, historical case from the 16th century, from the so-called conquest of America. Alvarado, the white, blond, European conqueror (he was thus called *Tonatiuh*, the sun, because of the shine of his hair), conquered the Mayan world of Guatemala. The Mayas were "readers" of many "texts," one of which was transcribed in the 17th century in Chichicastenango, Guatemala, and is called the *Popol-Vuh*, their sacred book.

*Schema 1, Domination of "Readers" and Their "Texts"*




The *conquistador* (reader 2), who interprets (arrow a) his/her text (Text 2, the Hebrew-Christian Bible, for example), imposed his/her text on the Maya (reader 1), who interpreted (arrow b) his/her text (Text 1, the *Popol-Vuh*). The process which goes by the name of evangelization, for example, was precisely the process of "substitution," through domination, of Text 1 for Text 2 (arrow d), through a military, political, and economic conquest (arrow c). The Maya found herself obliged to interpret (arrow e) a strange text, from another world. In this case the hermeneutic process is complicated by the determination of a situation of "domination" of the *praxis* of a "reader" by another. These types of situations are not considered with care by Ricoeur. For a liberation philosophy this is the *point of departure itself* of the hermeneutical question in Latin America. That is, when Ricoeurian philosophy would seem to conclude its labor, only there begins that of a philosophy of liberation. Its questions are: Can the dominated "interpret" the "text" produced and interpreted "in-the-world" of the dominator? Under what subjective, objective, hermeneutic, textual circumstances can such interpretation be "adequately" undertaken? For someone like Salazar Bondy, in his work *Does a Philosophy Exist in Latin America?* the answer is negative. It is not possible to philosophize in such a situation! For us, from the perspective of a liberation philosophy, it is possible, but only

it the reader, interpreter, or philosopher, engages himself in a *practical process* of liberation-all of this is precisely the theme of a philosophy and ethics of liberation.

In reality, the situation exemplified in *Schema 1* can be related, as mutually conditioned, with the example of *Schema 2*.

*Schema 2. Domination of “Producers” by “Products” in Capital*



By analogy to pragmatics, in economics (in the way it was practiced by Marx, that is, philosophically and not merely as an empirical science, and thus already as “critique”<sup>82</sup>) the producer (as well as reader 1, and in this case “living labor”) produces a product which is already “dominated” (arrow d), out of a “social relation” (arrow c) of domination (the relation capital-labor, which is unknown in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*). The capitalist possesses (arrow a) the value, the product of the work of living labor. In reality, living labor *creates out of nothing* the surplus value (arrow e) which, through successive rotations, will finally constitute the *whole* of capital. The relation reader-text is analogous to producer-product. An alienated reader can understand himself “inauthentically” in the text; the alienated producer does not recover herself at the end of the process of labor, but instead encounters herself as negation: labor “posits itself objectively [in the product], but it posits its objectivity as its *own non-Being* [*Nichtsein*], or as the Being of its non-Being [*das Sein ihres Nichtseins*]: of capital.”<sup>83</sup>

What we want to suggest is that it is possible to treat economics in a similar way to how we treat pragmatics or hermeneutics. The possible relations and similarities between both ought to be studied, within the Habermasian and Apelian categorizations.

For Marx, the ideal situation of every labor act is the community of producers. In the empirical situation of capitalism, relationships are solely “social”-each worker remains isolated, without community. The genuine practical and ethical relation (which Levinas calls the face-to-face) is negated by a relation which stands under the domination of instrumental reason (the capitalist “social” relation). For Marx's economics it is a question of a “critique” of capitalism from the standpoint of an *ideal community of producers* (in the Apelian sense), which is universal (for Habermas) or is simply an economic “regulative idea” from which the relation capital-labor is criticized as defective, non-ethical, and exploitative.

Without an economics, hermeneutics (or pragmatics) remains without carnal (material) content: it is a mere communication community or community of interpretation, without carnality or corporality, without subsuming in its reflection the level of "life." The human being is a "living being who has *logos*," said Aristotle. The *logos* (hermeneutical or pragmatological) responds to and is the autonomous, explicit, self-reflexive, free development of the "logic" of the "living creature." Economics responds directly to the reproduction of *human life*. In this sense a communication community (*Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*) is the development of a community of life (*Lebensgemeinschaft*).

### 5.5 A Philosophy of "Poverty in Times of Cholera"<sup>84</sup>

Let us perform an exercise of "philosophical economics" such as Marx carried out. We will place ourselves at the "originary situation," where the logic of the architectonic of development of Marx's categorical system departs. It is the point of departure, today entirely pertinent and in force in every capitalist society, since the originary situation to be analyzed is so *abstract and essential* that it is also valid whenever and wherever there is capitalism, whatever its degree of development. With respect to this, the 19th and 20th centuries are different not "essentially" but "historically," contingently.

The immediate theoretical framework (which will be modified and inverted, but strictly taken into account) is the last part of the "Doctrine of Essence" of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.<sup>85</sup> Marx was inspired by it, and he took it as a point of reference, as a "philosophical problematic"-against what Althusser used to think some time ago. In fact, Hegel indicates that reality (*Wirklichkeit*)<sup>86</sup> is a moment of the phenomenon (*Erscheinung*), of the thing (*Ding*), which although already with existence (*Existenz*) has not yet developed into exteriority (*Ausserlichkeit*).<sup>87</sup> For Hegel, as for Marx, "being," "existence," and "reality" are three moments in the development of the "entity" (*Dasein*)<sup>88</sup>-for Hegel, furthermore, this is also true of the Absolute.

Reality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward with outward. The exteriorization [*Außerung*] of the real is the real itself.<sup>89</sup>

The question is that of how something becomes real, that is, "posits" itself "outside" the "world of phenomena" as real. For that, it must, in first place, be "possible." Possibility (*Möglichkeit*),<sup>90</sup> not merely "formal,"<sup>91</sup> but as "identity," is what "is essential [*Wesentliche*] to reality."<sup>92</sup> Since that which was "possible" became real, it is said that it is contingent (*Zufällig*).<sup>93</sup>

Possibility and Contingency are the two moments of Reality-Inward and Outward, put as mere forms which constitute the *externality* of the real.<sup>94</sup>

So that the contingency of the “possible” can become “real,” it is necessary that the condition (*Bedingungen*) be fulfilled<sup>95</sup>:

If all the conditions are at hand, the thing [*Sache*] *must* be real.<sup>96</sup>

But a third moment is still necessary so that the “thing” can become “real.”

Activity (*Tätigkeit*) is still necessary:

*a.* The Condition is ( $\alpha$ ) what is presupposed or ante-stated... ( $\beta$ ) The Conditions are passive, are used as materials for the thing, into the content of which they must enter. *b.* The thing is also ( $\alpha$ ) something presupposed or ante-stated... ( $\beta$ ) By using up the conditions, it receives its external existence, the realization of the determinations of its content... *c.* The Activity similarly has ( $\alpha$ ) an independent existence of its own (as a man, a character), and at the same time it is possible only where the conditions are and the thing. ( $\beta$ ) It is the movement which translates the conditions into a thing.<sup>97</sup>

Lastly, the "real thing," having fulfilled its conditions, is now necessary (*Notwendig*): it is substance (*Substanz*),<sup>98</sup> "the totality of the *Accidents*, revealing itself in them as their absolute negativity (that is to say, as absolute power) and at the same time as the wealth of all content."<sup>99</sup> Now we can say that "Substance is *Cause*, insofar as substance reflects into self as against its passage into accidentality and so stands as the *primary* thing, but again no less suspends this reflection-into-self (its bare possibility), lays itself down as the negative of itself, and thus produces an *Effect*, a Reality, which, though so far only assumed as a sequence, is through the process that effectuates it at the same time."<sup>100</sup> We could conclude by saying that this "realm of necessity" (of cause, effect, reciprocal action, etc.) becomes in the end a "realm of freedom." "This is *the Concept*, the realm of Subjectivity or of Freedom."<sup>101</sup>

What does this have to do with the original situation-taking these words analogously to Rawls-described by Marx? This has a lot to do with it, because Marx, although he placed himself at an “economic” level, developed an entire metaphysics of economics (a critique of the ontology of capitalism from the Exteriority of living labor, in Levinas's sense, or better, in Schelling's sense).

The key text is always found at the beginning of Marx's discourse.<sup>102</sup> And I say explicitly at the beginning because it is the absolute beginning of economics such as it is understood by Marx. In fact, the original situation manifests itself in the contradiction between labor and money (which will later become capital). It is the first “logical” possibility of such a contradiction, in an apparent “Eden of the innate rights of man,” à la Rawls.<sup>103</sup> For Marx this confrontation is totally asymmetrical. The possessor of money is *real*; the possessor of work is a *mere possibility*, and it is here where Marx articulated everything we have recollected of Hegel's philosophy on the “modalities” of possibility, contingency,



condition, and necessity, in order to develop a philosophy of economics.

*Separation of property from labour* appears as the necessary law of this exchange between capital and labour. Labour posited as *not-capital* as such is: (1) *not-objectified labour* [*nicht-vergegenständlichte Arbeit*], *conceived negatively* (itself still objective; the not-objective itself in objective form).<sup>104</sup>

Marx takes living labor (*lebendige Arbeit*) as the thing (*Sache*) which, since it has not yet exteriorized itself (in Hegel; "objectified" in Marx) is not real. In order to become real it must fulfill the "conditions." Were it not to have the possibility of fulfilling said conditions, it would simply never become real ("objective" in Marx):

As such it is not-raw-material, not-instrument of labour, not-raw-product: labour separated from all means and objects of labour, from its entire objectivity.<sup>105</sup> This living labour, existing<sup>106</sup> as an *abstraction* from these moments of its *real Reality*<sup>107</sup> (also not-value<sup>108</sup>); this complete denudation, purely subjective existence of labour, stripped of all objectivity. Labour as *absolute* poverty: poverty not as shortage, but as total exclusion of objective wealth.<sup>109</sup>

Marx then takes living labor as the thing which is "pure possibility"; which has no conditions<sup>110</sup> in order to become real. That pure possibility is *economically determined* (this is what interests me today as a Latin American): it is poverty (*Armut*).<sup>111</sup> Before being a "class" (work subsumed "in" capital), living labor is poverty. The *pauper ante festum*-as Marx repeatedly says-is the absolute *negative* condition of the existence of capital. Were there no poor there would be no one who would sell their corporeality, their own person, their own creative subjectivity, for money (which is only "objectified labor," that is, dead in opposition to living labor). The "ethical option for the poor" is, exactly, Levinas's *a priori* responsibility (and not Jonas's *a posteriori*, as well as Marx's. That existing but unreal (non-objective) thing is clearly determined in Marx's view:

Or also as the existing *not-value*, and hence purely objective use value, existing without mediation, this objectivity can only be an objectivity not separated from the *person*: only an objectivity coinciding with his immediate *corporeality* [*Leiblichkeit*].<sup>112</sup>

The person (Is Marx a "personalist"?) presents itself in "the world of commodities" (or of "phenomena," both expressions are frequent in Marx) through her "corporeality."<sup>113</sup> Marx describes, thus, the situation "prior to the contract" between capital and labor, in which the worker is not real but merely possibility, since she possesses no objective conditions for her own realization. Her own being, her personhood, her corporeality is negativity, poverty (economic subjectivity, not a question of the hermeneutic subjectivity of the reader of a text): the immediate subjectivity of a suffering corporeality, without resources, without food, without means to reproduce her life. This is the point of depar-

ture for Liberation Philosophy, as a Latin American “fact,” described phenomenologically as a primary «ethical» fact by Levinas. Now Marx places it within an architectonic and categorical discourse, as a critique of the bourgeois political economy of his time.<sup>114</sup>

Until now living labor finds itself in the Exteriority (*ante festum*, to use Marx's expression, and just as Levinas articulates it), and negatively, as existing thing, as pure possibility, not real, without conditions-poor. It is the not-capital, the non-being, the nothing.<sup>115</sup> But, Marx advances, “positively,” that subjectivity in extreme destitution is a “potency”:<sup>116</sup>

(2) *Not-objectified labour, not-value*, conceived positively, or as a negativity in relation to itself, is the *not-objectified*, hence non-objective, i.e. subjective existence of labour itself. Labour not as an object, but as activity [*Tätigkeit*],<sup>117</sup> not as itself *value*, but as the *living source* [*lebendige Quelle*] of value.<sup>118</sup> [Namely, it is] general wealth (in contrast to capital in which it exists objectively,<sup>119</sup> as reality) as the *general possibility*<sup>120</sup> of the same, which proves itself as such in action.<sup>121</sup>

Before which Marx concludes:

Thus, it is not at all contradictory, or, rather, the in-every-way mutually contradictory statements that labour is *absolute poverty as object*, on one side, and is, on the other side, the *general possibility* of wealth as *subject* and as *activity*, are reciprocally determined and follow from the essence of labour, such as it is *presupposed* by capital as its contradiction and as its contradictory being,<sup>122</sup> and as such it, in turn, presupposes capital.<sup>123</sup>

Philosophically, and taking into account Hegelian ontology at its most abstract and essential moment, namely in its concept of reality, (*Wirklichkeit*), Marx develops an economics of great contemporary relevance. Today, the majority of humanity (the South, the ex-colonial and peripheral world), is sunk in poverty: it has neither the conditions for its realization, nor will it have them in the future due to ecological exigencies. It is sunk in absolute poverty, and it will descend deeper into greater degrees of poverty. Marx is the *only* European philosopher who has developed a relevant economics, albeit the *great* modern European-North American philosophers (without re-reading Marx seriously, because he is not in fashion) have declared him a «dead dog.» For Liberation Philosophy it is not a question of fashion. It is a question of life or death for the majority of humanity. It is a *radical ethical* question, where the universality of reason and the meaning of all hermeneutics are at play.

Once living labor is sold, it is alienated from capital, it is subsumed in the Totality (in the Levinasian or Marcusean sense) of capital. From the ground (*Grund*) or the being of capital (the valorization of value) living labor is posited as a mediation of value: the thing becomes person (value) and the person a thing (the worker), the fetishism of capital.

In fact, "Labour is the substance [*Substanz*],<sup>124</sup> and the immanent measure of values, but it has no value itself."<sup>125</sup> In this is summarized the entire ethical economics of Marx. The person, subjectivity, corporeality, and human activity named living labor is the "*creative source of value from out of the nothing of capital*," and thus, as such it cannot have any value. "Therefore what they [the capitalist political economists] called the 'value of labour' is in fact the value of labour-power, as it exists in the personality of the worker..."<sup>126</sup> When this labor, which is objectified life, does not return to the worker, then its negativity is his own not-being, his own misery:

Finally, the law [of accumulation]... makes an *accumulation of misery* as a necessary condition, corresponding to the accumulation of wealth. *Accumulation of wealth* at one pole is, therefore, at the same time *accumulation of misery*, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital.<sup>127</sup>

Living labor objectifies life as value, which is not recuperable. But, because of a second movement, a more developed capital can appropriate the value of others less developed, just as a more developed nation appropriates the value of a less-developed nation:

From the possibility that profit may be *less than* surplus value... it follows that not only individual capitalists, but also *nations* may continually exchange with one another, may even continually repeat the exchange on an ever-expanding scale... One of the nations may continually appropriate for itself a part of the surplus labour of the other, giving back nothing for it in the exchange.<sup>128</sup>

It is thus that Marx allows us, as philosophers of the periphery of the world system (as Wallerstein would put it), of the South, to think a Philosophy of Liberation for the domination from the North-remaining critical of those philosophers of the North (not all, to be sure) who ignore all of these questions, since they confuse economic philosophy with stalinism, thus washing their philosophical hands ("clean hands," Sartre would say) from the miserable fate of *the majority of contemporary humanity*.

It is because of this reason that liberation philosophy has as its first chapter a philosophy of misery, and Marx (today more than ever, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and George Bush's declaration of the "American Empire," on the 29 January 1991, before the U.S. Congress) must be taken into account in order to develop the circuitous route of an economics without which hermeneutics becomes ideological, idealist, literalist. There are not only *readers* before *texts*; there are many *hungry people* before the *non-bread* (even though they have been the producers of *bread*). Someone said: "I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat!" as the *absolute* criterion of every possible ethics. Therefore,

hunger and food-as was Feuerbach's opinion-are themes of a philosophical economics, an economics which is not merely a system à la Habermas; nor a mere question of "level B " of ethics as is the case in Apel. Economics is a central moment, where hermeneutical-pragmatic is another, of a Philosophy of Liberation, of a philosophy of "poverty in times of cholera."

## Notes

1. This essay was originally presented in Naples, in April of 1991, during a seminar on "Philosophy and Liberation, in Dialogue with Paul Ricoeur," published in *Filosofia e liberazione. La sfida del pensiero del Terzo-Mondo* (Lecce: Capone Editore, 1992), pp. 78-107.
2. Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II* trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), p. 12. Emphasis added.
3. See Ricoeur's preface to Naberes work, *Elements for an Ethic*, trans. William J. Petrek (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969); and the article "Nabert on Act and Sign," which appeared first in *Les études philosophiques*, 17, 1962, pp. 339-49 (reprinted in *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics* ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), pp. 211-22. Nabert, who stands in the tradition which stems from Maine de Biran, thinks, we are told by Ricoeur, that "the operations of active consciousness are not reducible to those which control knowledge and science, and reflective analysis applied to action must be liberated from the hegemony of epistemology (*The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. 212). Ricoeur comments: "Nabert expects the final balance of reflective philosophy from this reintegration of the objective *cogito* with and within active and productive consciousness" (*ibid.*, p. 213).
4. Which traverses Ricoeur's entire philosophical life, from his first works to the last. Thus, in his *Oneself as Another* (which I received from his own hands in April of 1990 in Chicago), at the beginning of the Introduction ("The Question of the Selfhood"), he writes: "The first intention was to indicate the primacy of reflective mediation over the immediate positing of the subject, as this is expressed in the first person singular" (p. 1).
5. Ricoeur's translation, with a long introduction, *Idées directrices pour une Phénoménologie* (Paris: Université de Paris, 1950). This work I also received from his own hands in 1964 at the Sorbonne. This work amply demonstrates his knowledge of the subject matter. Ricoeur remains faithful to phenomenology in the sense of a particular personal depth.
6. The work *La philosophie de la volonté* (Paris: Aubier, 1950-1960), is made up of two volumes, the second of these which is made up of two volumes: *Finitude et Culpabilité*, 1. *L'homme fallible*, and 2. *La symbolique du mal*. Before these works, Ricoeur had written *Karl Jaspers* in 1947, and *Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers*, in 1948. Incidentally, both authors influenced Ricoeur significantly, while, on the other hand, the influence of his friend Emmanuel Mounier is not so evident-at least in the philosophical work of this period.
7. Paul Ricoeur, *La Symbolique du Mal*, (Paris: Aubier, 1960), pp. 323ff.
8. Paul Ricoeur, *Histoire et vérité*, (Paris: Seuil, 1955). English translation, Paul

- Ricoeur, *History and Truth* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965).
9. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University press, 1970), p. xii.
  10. The short article on "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," originally published in *Esprit* and later published in the second edition of *Histoire et vérité* (see *History and Truth*, pp. 271-84) had a great impact on me.
  11. Paul Ricoeur *Freud*, p. 3. Only after his exit from France, posterior to 1968, will Ricoeur have the opportunity to open himself up to British-North American thinking. For the moment, "We have at our disposal a symbolic logic, an exegetical science, and anthropology, and a psychoanalysis and, perhaps for the first time, we are able to encompass in a single question the problem of the unification of *human discourse*" (ibid., pp. 3-4; emphasis added). Here Ricoeur's hermeneutical project can be seen clearly.
  12. Ibid., p. 5; emphasis added. In any event the background project remains in place: "Hermeneutic Method and Reflective Philosophy" (ibid., Book 1, Chap. III, pp. 37ff). I have given an account, part by part, of the thematic of this book in the third volume of my work *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973): "La erótica latinoamericana," pp. 50-122.
  13. Paul Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique*, (Paris: Seuil, 1969).
  14. "New hermeneutical ontology" (*From Text to Action*, p. 19).
  15. Paul Ricoeur, *La métaphore vive* (Paris: Seuil, 1975). This work should be considered in parallel with *Time and Narrative*, Vol. I.
  16. Ricoeur adds: "It can thus be seen that from the start I have affiliated myself with those analytical philosophers who resist the sort of reductionism according to which 'well-formed languages' are alone capable of evaluating the meaning claims and truth claims of all non-'logical' uses of language." (*From Text to Action*, p. 2).
  17. *From Text to Action*, pp. 1-3.
  18. "Metaphor... narrative... the meaning-effects produced by each of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation." *Time and Narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), Vol. 1, p. ix. What was of interest to me, in *Philosophy of Liberation* (Matyknoll, Orbis Book, 1985) is precisely this aspect of innovation, novelty, which frees language.
  19. Ibid., p. 311. This "liberation" of novelty which the metaphor *opens up* is important for a *liberating* discourse.
  20. In this strictly Ricoeurian sense I have, in my work *The Theological Metaphors of Marx* (Las Metáforas Teológicas de Marx) (Navarra, Spain: Editorial Verbo Divino, 1993), dealt not only with the religious "metaphors" in Marx's economic work, but I have also taken all of these metaphors, in their logic, and I have concluded that one can speak of an authentic "metaphorical" theology (an explicit "theology of liberation," but metaphorical in the definitive economic work of Marx of 1857 through 1882).
  21. Ibid., pp. 323ff.
  22. Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1-3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-88).
  23. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1. p. 3.
  24. Ibid., Vol. 2.
  25. Ibid., Vol. 3, *Narrated Time*.
  26. Ibid., p. 241.

27. Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 54ff.
28. Ibid., pp. 64ff.
29. "[*Mimesis III*] marks the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader..." (*Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, p. 71).
30. Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action* First part: "For a Hermeneutical Phenomenology," pp. 25ff.
31. Ibid., pp. 105ff. Those pages on "What is a text?" are magnificent (pp. 105ff).
32. This return begins from page 168: "Imagination in Discourse and in Action," and especially, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" (pp. 144ff.).
33. Ibid., pp. 213-77. I must indicate that for a philosophy of liberation these reflections are of extreme interest, if from the "initiative" we subtract all reference to the "private initiative" of the market and capitalist competition.
34. Ibid., pp. 281ff. Here there are some lines on the question of the relation between ethics, politics, and economics, which depart from the works of Hannah Arendt and Eric Weil (pp. 393ff), and which place themselves in critical opposition to Marx—who neglected the political. It is interesting to note that Domenico Jervolino had anticipated this problem in his work *Il cogito e l'ermeneutica. La questione del soggetto in Ricoeur* (Napoli: Procaccini, 1984), p. 185: "Dalla poetica della libertà è da attendersi un'etica e forse anche una politica della liberazione (una politica come disciplina filosofica): sarebbe anche possibile cercare i precorritivi e le prefigurazioni di tale etica e di tale politica tra gli scritti del Ricoeur."
35. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
36. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 331.
37. Ibid., p. 339. In another place Ricoeur writes: "Let us attempt, in conclusion, to take an overview of the entire range of attitudes deployed between the two extremes of the summons to responsibility, where the initiative comes from the other, and of sympathy for the suffering other, where the initiative comes from the loving self, friendship appearing as a midpoint where the self and the other share equally the same wish to live together," (ibid., p. 192).
38. Enrique Dussel, *Helellic Humanism* was written in France in 1962, but published in Argentina by EUDEBA in 1975, at the time of the military coup d'état. Packages of the recently published work remained hidden in the warehouses of the publishing house. It was only in 1984, when the military dictatorship fell, because of the war of the Malvinas, that the book was delivered to the bookstores. My books were not allowed to be sold under the dictatorship because my name was blacklisted. I had been exiled for nine years in Mexico. In the prologue, I wrote: "Following Paul Ricoeur, we can say that it is not only a theoretical view of the world, but also a concrete existential posture, a way of acting and behaving" (*Ethos*) (p. ix). Our intention was "to deal adequately with the actual pre-philosophical world in our contemporary America, which is the ultimate object of our investigations" (p. xii).
39. Dussel, *Semitic Humanism* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1969), published, paradoxically, before the one that had been written first. In the "Hypotheses of Investigation" we concluded: "We pretend to ground the values of our own culture [a labor] of great need in order to embrace the presuppositions of our own Latin American world" (p. xiii).
40. At that time I was not aware of the roots of this tradition in Schelling and Feuerbach.

41. This concept was used by Ricoeur in "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," which I went on to use in many of my later historical descriptions, and which I even used in the *Documents* of the bishops who gathered at Puebla (1979), without recognizing that I introduced this concept departing from Ricoeur into the Latin American philosophical culture.
42. Under the title "Amérique latine et conscience chrétienne," July-August, 1965. In my article "Chrétientés latino-américaines," pp. 2-20, Ricoeur's influence can be seen when I wrote: "Tout système de civilisation s'organise autour d'une substance, d'un foyer, d'un *noyau éthico-mythique* (valeur fondamentales du groupe), qui peut être mis à jour grâce à l'herméneutique *des mythes de base* de la communauté, la philosophie de la religion étant, à cet effet, un des instruments indispensables" (pp. 3-4), "...Ce travail de discernement phénoménologique n'a pas été réalisé jusqu'à présent" (p. 5). This article, expanded, appeared as a book, (*América Latina y conciencia cristiana* (Quito: IPLA, 1970), along with a new work, "Hipótesis para el estudio de la cultura latinoamericana" (pp. 63-80). In my work *América Latina: Dependencia y Liberación* (Buenos Aires: García Cambeiro, 1974) are collected my articles from 1964, where the influence of Ricoeur can also be seen in my analyses of Latin American culture.
43. *Esprit*, 7-8, 1965, p. 91. During the sessions of this week, there also spoke Claude Trestomant, Yves Congar, Josue de Castro, Germán Arciniegas (although his work was not published), and others. In 1965, in Ortega y Gasset's journal *Revista de Occidente*, I published "Iberoamérica en la historia universal," April 1965, pp. 85-95), along the same lines.
44. Enrique Dussel, "la civilización y su núcleo ético-mítico" in *Hipótesis para una historia de la iglesia en América Latina* (Barcelona: Estela, 1967), p. 28.
45. In rotaprint, Universidad Nacional de Resistencia, 1966. This was later published many times, for example, under the title "Cultura, cultura popular latinoamericana y cultura nacional" in *Cuyo* (Mendoza, Argentina), 4, 1968, pp. 7-40. It also appeared in *Método para una filosofía de la liberación* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1974), pp. 205ff. In August of 1968, I lectured on "Cultura latinoamericana" (Villa Devoto, Buenos Aires), unpublished, which began: "I. Towards a philosophy of culture. Civilization, nucleus of values, ethos and life style" (pp. 33ff).
46. Enrique Dussel, *El dualismo en la antropología de la cristiandad* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Guadalupe, 1974).
47. We had already given a preparatory course, *Para una destrucción de la historia de la ética*, published three years later (Mendoza: Ser y Tiempo, 1972). This was to be followed by two volumes on history never published.
48. Dussel, *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973, Vols. I and II). The third volume appeared in my Mexico exile, through the publishers Edicol (1977). The fourth and fifth volumes appeared in Bogotá (USTA, 1979-80).
49. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, Paragraphs 13-19; pp. 97-156.
50. Levinas speaks of the Other (*Autrui*) as "pauvre," but Marx already had done similarly, as we will see, and within the same tradition (originating in the old Schelling and Feuerbach).
51. See Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 331.
52. See chapter two of this work, pp. 000.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
54. See my *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, paragraph 24, "la conciencia

- ética* como oír la voz-del-Otro" (Vol. II, Chap. IV, pp. 52-58). Simple "moral conscience" applies (*applicatio* or *Anwendung*) the principles of the established system; "ethical conscience" opens itself to the exteriority and has criteria of discernment: "Who will be able to distinguish the master from the executioner, the master who calls for a discipline from the master who requires a slave?" (Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 339).
55. See Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, p. 331.
56. Herbert Marcuse, *Dialectics of Freedom* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1968), p. 190 (cited in *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. I, p. 192, n. 425).
57. This is the thesis which I developed in the second volume of *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, and specifically in *Método para una Filosofía de la Liberación*, already cited, pp. 114ff. On the theme see the work of Anton Peter, *Der Befreiungstheologie und der Transzendentaltheologische Denkansatz. Ein Beitrag zum Gespräch zwischen Enrique Dussel und Karl Rahner* (Freiburg: Herder, 1988), where the transition was made from Hegel to Schelling, by Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Marx, et al., until arriving at Levinas; Roberto Goizueta, *Liberation, Method and Dialogue. Enrique Dussel and North American Theological Discourse* (Atlanta: American Academy of Religion, Schotars Press, 1988); Edgard Moros, *The Philosophy of Liberation of Enrique Dussel: An Alternative to Marxism in Latin America?* (Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1984); Jesús Jiménez-Orte, *Fondements Ethiques d'une Philosophie Latinoaméricaine de la Libération: E. Dussel* (Dissertation, Université de Montréal, 1985); Mariano Moreno, *Filosofía de la Liberación como Personalismo* (Doctoral thesis, Murcia, Spain, 1994).
58. "The Lord of Being (*Herr des Seins*), a much more appropriate notion than that which says that God is Being itself (*to on*)" (*Schelling Werke*, ed. Manfred Schroeter, Vol. V (Munich: Beck, 1958), p. 306. This may have inspired Heidegger to speak of Dasein as the "shepherd of Being."
59. See my work *El último Marx (1863-1882)* (México: Siglo XXI, 1990) Chap. 9.2, pp. 336ff. In his thirteenth lecture Schelling says: "It is said that something has been created *out of nothing* [*aus Nichts geschaffen*], that means that something has its being due to a divine will" (*Philosophie der Offenbarung* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977], pp. 179-80). Marx expressed, on the one hand, that the creation of surplus-value for the capitalist "has all the charms of something *created out of nothing* [*Schöpfung aus Nichts*]" (*Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 325 [MEGA II, 6, p. 226, lines 7-9]. And, on the other, Marx also says of living labor, "in exchange for his labour capacity as a fixed, available magnitude, he surrenders its creative power [*schöpferische Kraft*], like Esau his birthright for a mess of pottage" (*Grundrisse*, p. 307; German [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974], p. 214, lines 29-31), or "What is produced in addition to that [the reproduction of living labour capacities] is not reproduction but rather new creation, and, more specifically, *creation of new values* [*neue Wertschöpfung*], because it is the objectification of new labour time in a use value" (Ibid., p. 359; German, pp. 264, line 44-265, line 1). It reproduces the value of the wage earner, but when working during the surplus labor time, *it creates value out of the nothing of capital*. This theme I have treated extensively in commentaries on the four redactions of *Capital*. This is the unknown, Schellingian current in Marx.
60. In the general introduction to the *Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1983), pp. 34-36.
61. I have written in *Liberación latinoamericana y Emmanuel Levinas* (Buenos Aires: Bonum, 1975), an explicit presentation of this critique.



62. Enrique Dussel, *Para una Ética de la liberación latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973).
63. It is here where the philosopher of the periphery feels sadness, pain, and even anger. It was twenty years ago that I published an ethics in five volumes, in "Spanish." This means it is "unpublished" for the philosophy of the "center" (English, German, or French). Many misunderstandings, could have been prevented if my colleagues had read these volumes. But since it is in Spanish, it is as though it had never been published! In French, one can find part of Chap. VI, Vol. II, under the title "Pensée analéctique et philosophie de la liberation" in *Analogie et Analéctique* (Geneve: Labor et Fides, 1982), pp. 93-120. A new version of this same thematic is now present in works that have emerged from my debate with Karl-Otto Apel; see Fernet-Betancourt, ed. *Ethik und Befreiung* (Aachen: Augustinos Buchhandlung, 1990) and chapter 2 in this volume. Now, however, it is articulated from a pragmatic perspective, and not solely trans-ontological phenomenological, as was the case in 1971.
64. The question of affirmation as origin of the negation of the negation was clearly articulated by Ricoeur ("Negativity and Primary Affirmation" in *History and Truth*, pp. 305ff). The only difference is that, in contrast to Ricoeur and Nabert, I thought of the affirmation of the Other as Other, as possibility and point of departure of negation and the negation that weighs down on the oppressed as oppressed in a system, and on the "I" itself (*soi-même*) as dominator. The analectic moment consists, exactly, in the affirmation of the person of the oppressed as person, and out of said "affirmation" to negate, let us say, his negation as "slave," as "sexual object" (dominated woman), as "wage labor" (in capitalism), etc. Chapter VI, "The Method of Ethics" (*Para una Ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Vol. I, pp. 129ff) deals with this theme. And I return to it in *Método para una Filosofía de la Liberación* (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1974), departing out of reinterpretation of the post-Hegelian Schelling of the *Philosophie der Offenbarung of 1841*. See Anton Peter's thesis, already cited.
65. Later this position was gathered my *Philosophy of Liberation*, pp. 158ff.
66. Dussel, *Filosofía Ética de la liberación* (1973), Vol. III (Mexico: Edicol, 1977), pp. 1-121.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-227.
68. Dussel, *Filosofía Ética latinoamericana*, Vol. IV (Bogota: USTA, 1979).
69. *Ibid.*, Vol. V (Bogota: USTA, 1980).
70. In 1974 appeared my *América Latina: Dependencia y Liberación* (Buenos Aires: Garcia Cambeiro, 1974), which included articles from this period.
71. Enrique Dussel, *Filosofía de la liberación* (Mexico: Edicol, 1977). This work has later editions in Argentina, Mexico, Brasil, the United States, Italy, and Germany. In 1983 appeared my *Praxis latinoamericana y Filosofía de la Liberación* (Bogota: Nueva América, 1983) with articles from this period.
72. The clearest article on this point was "Cultura latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación (Cultura popular revolucionaria, más allá del populismo y el dogmatismo)," published in different places, among them *Ponencias* (III Congreso Internacional de Filosofía Latinoamericana; Bogotá: USTA, 1984), pp. 63-108. In this work I showed the complexity of many cultures in opposition (transnational culture, national culture, mass culture, Enlightenment culture, popular and working-class culture, ethnic and *campesina* culture, etc.), which in certain situations (like Nicaragua at that time) can become a creating "subject" of new cultures. "Revolutionary popular culture" would become the new matrix of a hermeneutics of

- liberation. The "readers" have been differentiated, the "texts" find themselves in contradiction. A philosophy such as that of Ricoeur would need many new distinctions in order to account for the *asymmetrical* complexity of the hermeneutics of peripheral countries, of the South.
73. This becomes patently clear from the citations, the bibliographies, and the weakness of the arguments.
  74. Concerning these philosophers see Chap. 8 of my work *El último Marx (1863-1882)*, pp. 297-332, "Philosophical Interpretations of Marx's Work."
  75. See my *Filosofía de la Producción*, where I developed a whole philosophy of *poiesis* (which ought to be clearly distinguished from praxis).
  76. See Chap. 15, "The Manuscripts of 61-63 and the Concept of Dependency" in my *El último Marx (1863-1882)*, pp. 312ff; see also *El último Marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1990).
  77. Which were: 1) The *Grundrisse* (published successively in 1939 and 1954), 2) the *Manuscripts of 61-63* (published in 1977 and 1982, in the *MEGA* II,3, 1-6 [Marx-Engels *Collected Works*, Second Series, Vol. 3, parts 1 through 6]).
  78. Thus there appeared my three volumes: *La producción teórica de Marx. Un comentario a los "Grundrisse"*, where we carried out a commentary of the first redaction; *Hacia un Marx desconocido. Comentario de los Manuscritos del 61-63*, where we carried out a commentary of the second redaction; *El último Marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana*, already cited.
  79. *El último Marx (1863-1882)* consists of a commentary on the third and fourth
  80. Note the priority of the practical relation to the poietic or technological relation in Marx, in the following example: "The possession of nature is always already mediated through his existence as a member of a *community*... a relationship to other human beings, which conditions his relation to nature." (Karl Marx, *Manuscripts of 61-63* in *MEGA* II, 3.5, p. 1818). On this is based our whole reinterpretation of Marx, and we come to the affirmation that *Capital* is an ethics (see *El último Marx*, Chap. 10.4).
  81. Among the possible positions of interpretability we find the "reader-before-a-text," which has been so magisterially described by Ricoeur.
  82. See my *Hacia un Marx desconocido*, Chap. 14, for a clarification of the meaning of "science" for Marx (pp. 285-311).
  83. Marx, *Manuscripts of 61-63*, in *MEGA* II, 3.6, p. 2239, 20-22; emphasis added. The full German citation reads: "Dieser Verwirklichungsproceß ist ebenso der Entwirklichungsproceß der Arbeit. Sie setzt sich objektiv, aber sie setzt ihre Objektivität als ihre eignes Nichtsein, oder als das Sein ihres Nichtseins-des Capitals." Was not Marx a philosopher?
  84. "Poverty in Times of Cholera" is the title of an article that appeared in *Página Uno* (Mexico), 3 March 1991, p. 4, in which it is said that the *Vibrio cholerae* (the cholera virus) began, in the actual epidemic in Peru, in a neighborhood close to the port, in Chimbote, about which we read: "In the last ten years this locality has had an explosive and disorganized growth, due to which 50 percent of the population lacks the most elemental services of water and drainage.... The microorganism of cholera has found a favourable environment in which it can spread with incredible speed because of the *extreme poverty that affects large groups of the population*."
  85. We will take into account *The Science of Logic: Theorie Werkausgabe*, Vol. 6 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969); English: *Hegel's Science of Logic*, 2 vols., trans. W.

- H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (London: George Allen & Unwin, and New York: Humanities Press Inc. 1929); and the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences: Theorie Werkausgabe*, Vol. 8 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969; English: *Hegel's Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
86. In this text we will use "reality" whenever *Wirklichkeit* appears in the original German, even when translations translate it as "actuality."
87. I note that for Marx the entire problem of exteriorization (*Äusserung*) is translated *economically* as objectification (*Gegenständlichkeit*)—the definitive way of dealing with the question of alienation (*Entfremdung*, *Entäusserung*), in its cultural or productive aspects. The negative meaning of alienation is expressed through "subsumption."
88. "Surplus value," for example, can have "being" in the product, can "exist" in the commodity, but only becomes "real" in the profit obtained through the selling of said commodity. The profit is the *real* surplus value as *realized*. Existing surplus value, for example, is annihilated if the commodity is not sold; it does not become real.
89. *Hegel's Logic*, § 142, pp. 200-01. (translation slightly modified).
90. *Ibid.*, § 143. p. 202.
91. Above all, "But at this point. Real and Possible being formal distinctions, their relation too is only formal, and consists in this only, that the one as well as the other is a positedness, that is, in *Contingency*." *Hegel's Science of Logic*. Vol. 2, p.174.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*, § 144.
94. *Ibid.*, § 145, emphasis added.
95. *Ibid.*, § 146.
96. *Ibid.*, § 147.
97. *Ibid.*, § 148.
98. *Ibid.*, §§ 149-51.
99. *Ibid.*, § 151.
100. *Ibid.*, § 153.
101. *Hegel's Science of Logic*, at the end of the section "Doctrine of Essence," p. 205. The same is said at the end of paragraph 159 of the *Encyclopedia*: "The great vision of substance in Spinoza is only a potential liberation from finite exclusiveness and egotism: but the concept itself realizes for its own both the power of necessity and real freedom" (*Hegel's Logic*, p. 222; see also the *Zusatz* to paragraph 151).
102. In the *Grundrisse*, p. 295-96; German (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974), pp. 203-04; see the commentary in my work *La producción teórica de Marx*, Chap. 7.1. pp. 138ff. In the *Manuscripts of 61-63* (in *MEGA II*, 3, 1, pp. 147-48, also in p. 30; commentary in my work *Hacia un Marx desconocido*. Chap. 3.2. pp. 62ff). In the definitive text of *Capital*, I, Chap. 2, 3 (1867), section 2; Chap. 4, 3 (1873) (German [*MEGA II*. 5], pp. 120ff; English, *Capital*, Vol 1. p. 270ff; Commentary in my work *El último Marx*, Chap. 5. pp. 138ff).
103. *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 280.
104. *Grundrisse*, p. 295. Italics in original. In 1963 Marx wrote: "The autonomy of the *being-for-itself-of-value* in the form of money.... confronts contradictorily the capacity of living labor.... This absolute separation between property and labor, between value and the value-creating capacity [*Wertschaffendenthätigkeit*], and because of that the *alienation* of the content of labor against labor itself,

- manifests itself now as product of labor itself, as objectification of its own moments" (*Manuscripts of 61-63*, in *MEGA II*, 3, p. 2238,3-19). This alienation is no longer that which is given in the original situation, but in the final situation, when labor has become alienated *product*.
105. Without the objective "conditions" of labor it is not real, that is, it does not have objectivity.
106. It can exist, but is not real.
107. Hegel uses this expression explicitly: "For Possibility is not yet real *Reality*—no question has yet arisen of *real* and absolute Reality—it is only that Possibility which first occurred—Formal Possibility, which determined itself to be *only* Possibility. (*Hegels Science of Logic*, p. 177).
108. That is, without "effect."
109. *Grundrisse*, p. 295-96. translation slightly altered.
110. "The *objective conditions* of living labour manifest themselves as values separately autonomous, contradictory to the living capacity as a subjective entity [*Dasein*]... What is reproduced and is produced *anew*, is not only the *entity* [*Dasein*] of said objective conditions of living labor, but the *alienated entity* [*Dasein*] of the worker. The material he worked is now alienated material. Living labor manifests itself as alienated, in contraposition to the capacity of living labor, whose work it is, and from which it is its exteriorized life [*Lebensäusserung*]" (*Manuscripts of 61-63*, *MEGA II*, 3, p. 2284, 5-28). In this case, the "conditions" are not the original ones, but the ones which confront it (living labor) as "capital" every day it returns to work.
111. The theme of the pauper we have developed amply in our commentaries to the four redactions of *Capital*. Consider, for instance, the following citation: "It is already contained in the concept of *free labour*, that he is a *pauper*: virtual pauper. According to his economic conditions he is merely a *living labour capacity*, hence equipped with the necessities of life. Necessity on all sides, without the objectivities necessary to realize himself as labour capacity... He can live as a worker only in so far as he exchanges his labour capacity for that part of capital which forms the labour fund. This exchange is tied to conditions which are accidental *for him*, and indifferent to his *organic* presence. He is thus a virtual pauper" (*Grundrisse*, p. 604; German, p. 497-98). It is interesting that in the *1844 Manuscripts*, Marx uses the same terminology: *gleichgültigen ...zufälligen* (*MEW*, EB I, p. 523). For the worker the conditions that capital proposes are contingent, but they are necessary in order to be real.
112. *Grundrisse*, p. 296; italics added.
113. This is one of the determinations that still appears in the fourth redaction of *Capital I*: "a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a *source of value* [*Quelle von (Tausch-) Werth*], whose actual consumption is therefore itself an objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] of labour, hence a creation of value [*Werthschöpfung*]... existing in corporeality, the living personality [*lebendigen Persönlichkeit*] of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value of any kind" (*Capital I*, p. 270; German, *MEGA II*, 5, p. 120; *MEGA II*, 6, p. 183; italics added).
114. Franz Hinkelammert reproduces this critique against Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman in his work *Critica de la razón utópica* (San Jose: DEI, 1984). In addition, a similar critique is in order against John Rawls.
115. We have underscored this repeatedly throughout our commentaries on Marx.
116. The word possibility can be *Möglichkeit*, *Potentia*, *Macht*, *dynamis* (Marx frequently

- the Greek, as in the *Grundrisse*, p. 297.), *Vermögen*. All have different connotations. In this case real “possibility” would be *potentia* or *Vermögen* (from English: “labor force,” “labor capacity,” and later “labor force”).
117. The function of “activity” as mediation between a “thing” and its “conditions” in order to become “real,” in Hegel, should be kept in mind.
118. We have insisted in our commentaries that the concept “source” (*Quelle*) comes from Schelling and is different from that of foundation (*Grund*) (see my *El último Marx*, Chap. 9.3: “El trabajo vivo como la fuente creadora del valor,” pp. 368-79, in which I use many citations as evidence).
119. Because capital provides labor the conditions of its becoming real, its reality.
120. Labor is possibility, but unreal if the conditions of its realization are not given. On the other hand, capital itself is also unreal without the thing (labor) and activity (labor working); that is, labor itself is the universal (general) possibility of capital's realization.
121. *Grundrisse*, p. 296.
122. “If we consider the original relation, before the entry of money into the self-realization process, then various conditions appear which have to have arisen, or been given historically, for money to become capital and labour to become capital-positing, capital-creating labour, wage labour. (*Grundrisse*, p. 463).
123. *Grundrisse*, p. 296.
124. In the Hegelian sense: entity, thing, real phenomenon which produces effects, has consequences.
125. *Capital* I, p. 677. (German [*MEGA* II, 6], p. 500, 1-3); italics added.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 678; (German [*MEGA* II, 6], p. 501, 11-13).
127. *Ibid.*, p. 799; (German [*MEGA* II, 6], p. 588, 13-22); italics added.
128. *Grundrisse*, p. 872; German, *Grundrisse*, 755.