

PART TWO

RESPONSE BY KARL-OTTO APEL: DISCOURSE
ETHICS BEFORE THE CHALLENGE OF
LIBERATION PHILOSOPHY

8.1 *The Prehistory of the Contemporary Discourse*

Before I can turn to the theme itself, it seems necessary to introduce some preliminary remarks concerning the prehistory of the thematic. In November of 1989 there took place in the Catholic Academy of the Archdiocese of Freiburg a seminar on the "Foundations of Ethics in Germany and Latin America" [*Begründungen von Ethik in Deutschland und Lateinamerika*].¹ This seminar was organized by Raúl Fonet-Betancourt as a continuation of the "First German-Iberoamerican Ethics Session" (Buenos Aires, 1985). I received an invitation to present there the transcendental pragmatic grounding of discourse ethics. I did this with a contribution bearing the title "Discourse Ethics as an Ethics of Responsibility: A Post-Metaphysical transformation of Kantian Ethics."²

One can recognize from the title itself that I, with all innocence so to say, wanted to introduce and explain the theme, as if among ourselves, from the perspective of European intellectual history. In view that the rest of the German participants who dealt with the critical discussions on discourse ethics also presented their argumentation within this same historical frame of reference, what could have resulted would not have been much different from any other seminar of this sort that is organized in Germany. In such a case, the publication of the contributions under the title *Ethics and Liberation* would have been very difficult. I say this, although I am convinced that the exigency of an approximate realization of the ideal communication community (which constitutes, with reservations, the prospective dimension of discourse ethics) certainly has to do with liberation, with liberation taken in a universal sense, and not limited to Europe or the First World.³

We know well, though, that the "informative content" of concepts (and especially the concepts of philosophy and theology), based on *alienation* and *provocation*, stands in need of having to be continuously renewed. This is especially

valid in the case of the informative content of the word *liberation*, in a society in which the actuality of the skeptical-pragmatic attitude of appeasement determines the proper philosophical tone. Obviously we cannot overlook that, around the time that the Freiburg encounter took place, the significant content of the word liberation was the object of a renewal in the concrete political sense in Germany and eastern Europe. I must return later on to this point. But it is necessary to recognize that it was but thanks to Enrique Dussel's contribution that the title "Ethics and Liberation" acquired its particular connotation. Dussel's contribution was presented as a commentary to my own contribution, which was later published under the title "Community of Life and the Interpellation of the Poor."⁴ This intervention constituted, in my opinion, the main and most interesting challenge from the Freiburg seminar. Therefore, after some preliminary remarks, I will attempt to offer an answer to the problems formulated by his contribution.

(In my case, these preliminaries were indispensable because I was forced to disclose gradually the different levels that Dussel's intervention formulated against my own European understanding, especially West German, and, in the last instance, against my transcendental-pragmatic conceptual understanding (this last with the help of other writings by Dussel, and in particular of the synthetic exposition of the *Philosophy of Liberation*.⁵)

In the first part of this attempt at an answer, I will first characterize (from my perspective) the central thematic points of a necessary and possible discussion of the philosophical *pretensions* of Liberation Philosophy. In order to accomplish this, I am forced to introduce certain suppositions (or, if it is preferred, certain *prejudgments*) linked to the philosophical position that I hold. The second part of my work will discuss in greater depth and detail those parts of the text of Dussel's intervention in Freiburg which appear relevant. In a third and final part I will attempt to clarify the consequences of all of this for a continuing dialogue between discourse ethics and Liberation Philosophy.

8.2 *The Themes of the Dusselian Challenge*

My first approach to Dussel's position and to the challenge to discourse ethics formulated by it was determined by two moments that provoked in me two diverse, spontaneous, and in fact contradictory reactions. On the one hand, Dussel's thesis that approximately 75 percent of humanity, precisely those masses who do not belong to the adapted elites of the Third World, find themselves practically excluded from what is called the real communication community, constituting thus the "exteriority of the other" (in Levinas's sense) in relation to our Euro-North American "we" and its "world." On the other hand, Dussel's affirmation that because we read too little, or without care, Marx's *Das Kapital*, we are not prepared to understand the meaning of his theories in relation to a possible liberation of the Third World.⁶

The first of these points appears to me in essence correct and, above all, so important that I want to see in this “interpellation” of the “other” made to our discourse by Dussel the central theme, still pending, of the global application of a discourse ethics, parallel but at the same time fundamentally linked to the ecological crisis (fortunately the theme of the threat of nuclear war that for such a long time occupied a central place in our preoccupations does not appear to be so actual).⁷

Nevertheless, at the same time, I am convinced that the problem of the *interpellation of the excluded from discourse*, as articulated by Dussel as a base for the concepts of a communicative ethics, does not challenge the transcendental pragmatic focus of discourse ethics. On the contrary, I believe that this presents a characteristic problem of *Part B* of discourse ethics.⁸ The central question of this part of discourse ethics is precisely: How should we act under the presupposition (to a great extent realistic) that the conditions of application of an ethics justified (in *Part A*) through an *ideal communication community* (always anticipated counterfactually) are to a great extent not given?

In relationship to this, in Dussel’s articulation of *Part B* of discourse ethics, the question of the adequacy of the maxims of conduct valid for all who have good will is formulated. That is, as much for those who find themselves excluded from discourse (or for their representatives), as well as for those who belong to a privileged communication community, because, in reality, these last ones find themselves obliged in principle, according to the grounding *Part A* of discourse ethics, to an advocacy representation of the interests of *all the affected*, and not only of the *participants* in the discourse (for instance, the representation of the interests of the generations that will succeed us, as it concerns the conservation of an inhabitable planet and the preservation of its resources).

Furthermore, they also find themselves obliged, in view of the grounding *Part B* of discourse ethics, to collaborate in the establishment in the long run of conditions that will allow for the application of discourse ethics. But this means nothing else than: those conditions in which, at the minimum, no adult or mentally healthy person would be excluded from the relevant discourses (discourses in which their own interest could be discussed).

In our discussions in Freiburg, as well as in those in Mexico, Dussel seemed to share the opinion that his preoccupation with the “exclusion of the other” could be considered as a theme of *Part B* of discourse ethics.⁹ However, the formulation of his opinions in relation to this point in the published version of his Freiburg intervention (and even more in the older expositions of the *Philosophy of Liberation*) have given me reason to examine with greater detail the supposition of a dialogue based on discourse ethics. We cannot accept as given, as a “gift,” something that ought to be seen as object of controversy.

In the grounding of theoretical and practical philosophy, I have taken as a point of departure that in *argumentative discourse* (in which humans do not fight against each other, but instead let arguments confront each other) the motives for conflict can be exposed in a more radical manner than is possible in *real* conflicts, that is, than it is possible, through either overt or covert violence, to resolve in the conflicts of the life world.¹⁰ Because of this reason argumentative discourse can also lead, according to the possibility in principle, to more "in depth" solutions of conflicts than are possible in any other sphere or plane of human interaction or communication (for example, in strategic negotiations). This possibility of a post-conventional era of human cultural revolution ought, at the least, to be defended and adopted by philosophers.

With respect to Dussel's *second* thesis, the first impression that I had of it in Freiburg, in November of 1989, was that it was something like an *anachronism*. At this point, the doctrine of *Capital* would appear, even before the eyes of those who in the two prior decades had been its new receptors in Germany, in the sense of a non-orthodox Western marxism, and in the face of the even more evident collapse of the totality of the socialist system, as something definitively discredited. However, through a more detailed analysis of the Latin American background of Dussel's formulations, and a more distanced observation of the eastern European events, it appears to me that Dussel's reference to Karl Marx's work, at first sight disconcerting, acquires a contemporary significance.

With this I am not suggesting that after the following reading of Liberation Philosophy I would come to share the economic-political presuppositions and hopes of its author. However, it appears to me that in his writings, a perspective of alienation or distancing [*Verfremdungsperspektive*] is manifested, which, with respect to the necessary and distanced reconstruction of the history of marxism-leninism, and the evaluation of contemporary global problems, can be of great use for us Europeans. What would be the object of a contemporary reconstruction of the history of marxism-leninism? And where could we locate the significance of the Latin American perspective of alienation and distancing, given the consequences of the failure of this conception which we are forced to acknowledge?

(In the following I am only concerned with a very tentative exposition of the political-economic background problematic of the intended coming to terms with Enrique Dussel, and, thus, in no way does it deal with him directly.¹¹ My concern is to articulate the different *possible* perspectives and positions, rather than to take a stand in terms of a "definitive" position. This definitive position would also, as a *direct* derivation of the justification of discourse ethics, not be possible; for this, as a foundation of ethics, seeks to make explicit the essential normative conditions of the possibility of intersubjectively valid argumentation, conditions that must be presupposed in all life-worldly-*centric*-perspectives in all possible valid-logical questionings.)

8.3 European Perspective on the Collapse of Marxism-Leninism

In first place, it is a matter of formulating the correct questions about the causes of the collapse of marxism-leninism. We cannot, within the context of our problematic, detain ourselves over the question of the possible perversion of eastern state socialism by Stalin and stalinism. This is a difficulty that still determines Gorbachev's conception of *perestroika*. Although one could concede that the history of the Soviet Union would have been different without the elimination of the *kulaks* carried out by Stalin as a continuation of Lenin's "new political economy," what Stalin did was in essence but to carry out the Leninist-Bolshevik program and the politics inherent to the dictatorship of the proletariat through the party. Still, the "voluntaristic" realization of the Russian revolution by Lenin, that is, in a country in which the socioeconomic conditions required by Marx were not present, and the option for a dictatorship of an elite Communist party corresponding to it, cannot be considered as the determining cause of the failure of marxism-leninism. This failure ought to be explained in the sense of the socioeconomic conditions of political history described by Marx as deeper causes. Such causes ought to be looked for, in the last instance, in the Marxist conception of a possible substitution of the capitalist market economy by a socialization of the means of production and the distribution of goods.

Part of this Marxist- social utopia, and its corresponding beliefs, that a market economy based on the exchange of commodities and the private ownership of the means of production can, in the long run, only lead to the destruction of human life and nature, is clearly still shared by Dussel. However, this suffices to weaken Dussel's position, notwithstanding his own assurance that with respect to what is relevant to Liberation Philosophy's recourse to Marx, this has *nothing* to do with "standard Marxism-Leninism."¹² It seems to me that today's attempt at a critical reconstruction of the history of marxism must also include the demand for a certain fairness toward the representatives of "standard marxism," including Lenin. In the last instance, Lenin was through Marx himself confronted with the unavoidable problem of the anticipated superseding of the market economy through a socially "transparent" planned and somehow organized distribution of products under the conditions of the—provisional—dictatorship of the proletariat (according to Marx's intimations, Lenin had to structure this problematic as a theoretical task¹³).

In the following attempt at coming to terms with the Philosophy of Liberation, I would like to consider the essential alternative to the issues at hand, namely, whether today it is possible to hold to the Marxist vision of the dissolution, in the sense of overcoming, of the capitalist market economy (especially with respect to its unquestionably implied *institutional mediation*, and that means the partial "objectification" of interhuman relationships); or, whether

it is a matter of having to understand anew what Adam Smith, and even Marx himself, recognized as the enormously advantageous effectiveness of the (to use contemporary language) functional differentiation of the social subsystem of the market economy; and also in the sense of a *framework order* of the economy, reformable from all sides, which demands democratic acceptability on a world scale, and which is thus subordinated to indirect control through the rationality of the human discursive community.¹⁴ That this last conception, in view of the North-South problematic and the ecological crisis, calls for the drastic task of a, perhaps unrealizable, transformation of today's market economy (with respect to its political-legal framework) will not be debated; rather it would have to be further underscored.

What the history of state socialism has shown in the Soviet Union, and also in China, (in which there was an acknowledgment by the regime itself), would appear to be, above all else: the bureaucratic management of the economy, meaning: the annulment of a market economy directed by "price signals" and its corresponding competition in favor of a command economy, is not able to mobilize the power of humans. State socialism must compensate for this motivation deficit, or, if it is preferred, the absence of the specific and natural brutality of capitalist competition must be compensated for through the direct political means of violence or restrictions of freedom, that is, through recourse to pre-capitalist relations and conditions. In addition, violence from above, as well as its inherent restriction of freedom, must keep under control the growing tendencies toward an informal economy [*Schattenwirtschaft*], as well as the parasitic behavior of the disillusioned "comrades." The political perversion of socialism from above is "explained," then, in great measure by perversion from below, that is, by the absence, the non-appearance of the "new men" anticipated by the communist utopia.

Here we have the key that refers us to the *internal* affinity between the Marxist and Leninist conceptions of revolutionary socialism, even if, in reality, Marx could have imagined not even in his dreams the necessity for the Leninist measures for the realization of the revolution and the dictatorship that these entailed. What is fundamental here is that Marx, imbued with a belief in the historical validity of dialectical laws, considered the capitalist system of market economy as not reformable. What is fundamental is that in his early writings,¹⁵ Marx finds himself disposed to abandon this system (which he considers extremely effective¹⁶) together with its corresponding achievements such as liberal rights, political democracy, and even the bourgeois morality. All of that in favor of a *social utopia* which transcends this system: a society without classes to be realized by the proletariat in a "realm of freedom" in which there is no longer any state monopoly of violence.

Indeed, in the second period, the so-called period of maturity of his thought,

Marx had dedicated all of his efforts to present this conception, which at the beginning only had an ethical-anthropological and eschatological-visionary character, through a dialectical reconstruction, empirically supported, of the necessary development of capitalism as a quasi-value-free result of scientific analysis. However, this scientific transformation, that not even in *Capital* itself is capable of disguising the moral-critical commitment and the utopian-eschatological passion, had as an effect the reinforcement of the determination (as much in Marx as in Lenin) to reject any reformist tendency in the sense of the trade union movement and "social democracy." The belief in a scientifically demonstrated necessity of a revolutionary substitution of capitalism by socialism and, in the last instance, by a "realm of freedom," had no other effect but to reinforce the political will to realize the revolution, as well as the utopian-eschatological hope of a "new man."

In relation to this point, it is necessary to make the anticipatory remark that, at least in Dussel's *Philosophy of Liberation* (originally published in Mexico in 1977), aside from a convincing ethical (or ethical-religious) commitment, there predominates the spirit of an empirically and pragmatically undifferentiated rejection of any possibility for North-South cooperation on the bases of a—possibly reformed—capitalist system. This is what is meant, for instance, on page 173: "The system of the capitalist company, with hereditary ownership of capital by some and the selling of their work by others, which originated slowly in the Middle Ages in the associations of masters and apprentices, and which experienced a fundamental change thanks to the colonial accumulation of capital, and which once again was redefined through the industrial, financial and monopolistic revolution, can no longer be imitated in the periphery. The liberation of the working and farming classes requires a complete economic revolution. The philosophy of economy must clarify this problematic, namely that of the transition to another world system, already without periphery, beyond the capitalist mode of production."¹⁷ Behind this conception is present, as in Marx, an unconditional belief in the possibility of the realization of a concrete social utopia which would include the elimination of all the institutionally created alienating dimensions of human communal living. It is to this context that Dussel's "metaphysics of proximity" (the relation of the face-to-face between humans) belongs, which obviously has to be understood from a Levinasian as well as a Marxian perspective. Proximity means: "The first, archeological proximity [something like the mother-child relationship] anticipates the last, the eschatological. The last is located beyond all aspiration; as the unfulfilled but always desired; as the realized infinite. It is a desire for proximity without distance, without economy, without contradictions, without war.... It is the utopia that keeps us expectant."¹⁸ And, in another place: "When alienated work liberates itself from capital, when it creates the community of *free* humans, face-to-face, human life objectified in commodities

can be subjectified in justice. The feast, the enjoyment, the satisfaction, the singing are now possible."¹⁹

Later on I will return to this problem of utopia. For the moment, I will deal with, in first place, the delineation of a point in relation to which the Marxist critique by Dussel constitutes, even in the actual moment, that is, after the evident collapse of marxism-leninism, a challenge to the philosophical discourse of the First World.

It is possible to arrive at the following summary of the European, and in particular the German, experience with the history of the political confrontation with socialism in this century. The strongest argument against marxism-leninism can be found for Europeans, especially for Germans, not so much in the economic failure of state socialism in the Soviet state. Rather, it is found in the circumstance that, finally, the long-term triumphs of social democracy and of the labor union movements of restructuring the social state of western democracies have not only strengthened it, but have also made it appear, thanks to social services, as something more attractive than the states of "real socialism." We are thus justified in making the following general judgment. The path of *social reform* has been the correct path not only because of the preservation of political freedom, but also because of the interest in the approximative realization of the Welfare State (so as to not say simply: of social justice). This path has not only been able to maintain parliamentary democracy without essential modifications; it has also known how to preserve the market economy system, placing, through a reform of the "political system" of the conditions of the system itself, the efficacy of this system at the service of social politics, instead of directly intervening in the economic system itself.

On the thread of this summary it would be probable to establish in Western Europe a broad and trans-party consensus concerning these opinions. It was precisely this empirically saturated probable consensus that provided the reason why Dussel's "interpellation," and more precisely his appeal to Marx, in the Freiburg seminar, sounded like an anachronism.

However, it is on this point as well that the actuality of the "crucial" arguments of Latin American Liberation Philosophy, inasmuch as they are arguments of the Third World, prove important. It is a matter, in the first place, of an adequate argument in order to question the *eurocentric* perspective of the contemporary discussion, that attempts to make once again valid the Marxist and even Leninist critical perspective on capitalism. I think here of the so-called *theory of imperialism*, initiated by Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, and Lenin—but also by the liberal, Hobson—²⁰ and which was later developed from the Latin American perspective as the *theory of dependence*.²¹

The theory of dependence, which encompasses a varied spectrum of positions, could be characterized through a dual dependency thesis with regard

to the economic development of the Third World, on one side, and with regard to the First World, on the other side. With regard to the Third World it maintains that the causes of continuing under-development are maintained through dependence on the dominating economy (as well as politics) of the First World. Thus, it contradicts the older "theories of modernization" which considered under-development to arise primarily from *internal* causes, in the sense of a theory of developmental phases valid for all societies. However, the theory of dependence maintains—among a series of different important arguments—that one of the causes for the under-development of the Third World is its dependence on the advancement and always growing wealth of the capitalist countries of the "center" of the world market system. To that extent, however, the following objections, formulated pointedly and succinctly, can be derived from the theory of dependence against my own summary of the European experience with the social welfare state within reformed capitalism (for example, in the "social market economy" of the Federal Republic of Germany).

The success of the northern democracies (success from the point of view of the Third World), or to put it more precisely, the development just described which has led through social reforms to a relatively attractive solution to the social question; this success could only have been accomplished thanks to the *neocolonial* exploitation of the natural resources and cheap labor (the real "proletariat" of today) of the Third World. The key to the clarification of this complementarity situation of economic prosperity and social consolidation of the North and the permanent under-development and pauperization of the the Third World may be found, accordingly, in the framework conditions [*Rahmenbedingungen*] of the political order of the global economic system dictated by the North. These framework conditions, it is said, are neocolonial to the extent to which the political-economic elites of the developing countries are led, through violence or corruption, to collaborate at the expense of the exploited masses of the South with the multinational companies which represent the interests of the North.

According to this, it would be impossible, in principle, under the capitalist conditions (and now this means *neocolonial imperialistic*) of a global economic system, to overcome the progressive impoverishment of the masses of the Third World. These conditions determine the *terms of trade* of the exchange of goods between the North and the South, thus both causing and defining the debt crisis. In addition, growing pauperization would have to turn against the First World itself, thus bringing to an end the reprieve that capitalism had won for the metropolises of the North through its exploitation of the South. This last expectation, which reestablishes the connection between the theory of dependence with the older theory of imperialism, is strengthened in our days by two additional arguments. First, through the

northward emigration that the impoverished masses of the South have undertaken. Second, and above all, through the consideration that, due to growing poverty, the South is forced to alter even more its environment, thus making more acute the threat to the ecosphere. How can we begin to answer to this global argument?

8.4 Methodological Gains of the Theory of Dependence

Before I attempt to enter into the arguments of the economists of development—with examples from the relevant literature—I would like to underscore one of the main merits of the theory of dependence, which in my opinion is of fundamental significance for understanding the structural presuppositions of a critical-historical reconstruction of the contemporary situation; and, which is also important—as it will be shown later—for the problematic of a historically dependent application of discourse ethics.

The attempts at a reconstruction of the human cultural revolution²²—and in its context the closely linked attempt by Max Weber at a reconstruction of the *rationalization processes*²³ or *theory of modernity*²⁴—are in a certain sense unavoidably thrown upon an "internal history" (I. Lakatos) of their presupposed object realm and the acknowledgment, in the face of all (empirical) explanation of history through "external" factors, of the methodological priority of this quasi-construct.²⁵ The reason for this methodological necessity lies, so it seems to me, in the situation that the historical-reconstructive sciences must be able to consider the inspection of their own conditions of possibility—in the last instance, the inspection of the normative conditions of the universal validity of their argumentative discourse—as a *factum* or *quasi-*telos** of the history to be reconstructed, in such a way that they must be able to make understandable the state of affairs of this *factum* as result of an "internal" history. Were this necessity to be ignored, and instead were one to want something like an explanation of history totally out of "external" causes (in the sense of a naturalistic or materialistic "reductionism"), this would mean that the historical-reconstructive sciences could not *re-trace* [*einholen*] the historical understanding of their own presuppositions and consequently, in the last instance, would fall into a (performative) contradiction against their own universal validity claims (understandability, truth, truthfulness, and rightness, in the sense of morally fundamental norms of discourse).

I have called this the self-catching-up-principle [*Selbsteinholungsprinzip*] of the critical-reconstructive social and historical sciences,²⁶ and I would defend the thesis that one must, in light of this principle, generalize a thesis that Lakatos made valid for the history of science, namely, the methodological priority of "internal" in opposition to "external" history; and must apply this generalized thesis to the reconstruction of the whole of cultural evolution.²⁷ A

particularly elucidating example of a reconstructive program in this sense is provided by the attempt to apply the ontogenetically dependent developmental logic of levels of moral-judgment competences to the critical reconstruction of phylogenesis, and to that extent, to cultural evolution.²⁸

However, it is to be understood from the outset that all attempts at a reconstruction of the internal rationalization dimensions of human cultural evolution are very problematic. This is even more the case the farther removed the object realm of reconstruction is from the paradigm of a specific rationality type (such as, for example, logical-mathematical rationality; the causal or functional-analytical rationality of science; means-ends rationality as technical-instrumental and as strategic-action rationality, or communicative rationality).²⁹ This distance is unquestionably of a more disproportionate measure, in the case of political or economic history, than with something like the history of science (especially the exact sciences) or the history of technology.

Every program of a purely *internal* reconstruction of a particular process of rationalization is complicated by the fact that the simultaneous consideration of every other type of rationality may appear as a consideration of *external* factors (as is the case, for example, with the explanation of the motivation for mathematical discoveries in a reconstruction of the internal rationalization processes of mathematics in terms of external factors, just as the motivation for the Newtonian theory of "absolute space" is explained through his theosophical speculations or through the religious motivation of a "purposive rational life conduct" of the Protestant founder of capitalistic economy in Weber's sense). Furthermore, every program of an internalistic reconstruction of rationalization processes will be rendered even more suspect by the fact that all *abstractive* forms of rationality (more precisely: all forms of rationality that do not stand at the service of the communicative understanding of validity claims) could place their motivation at the service of non-rational forces and usually do so. This is particularly valid for the forms of means-ends rationality (technical-instrumental and strategic rationality).

The consideration of the motives of human action external to reason must clearly play an essential role in every "materialistically" oriented development theory—and thus also to a *dialectical-historical* as well as in an *evolutionary systems theory* of the economy. Here the scope of the possible internalistic reconstruction of rationality and rationalization processes will always shrink in relation to the realm of only-causally-explainable historical contingency. One could then only go beyond the reconstruction of subjectively describable rationality of action and suppose in a *dialectical* manner processes of objective rationalization (in the sense of the "determinate negation" of existing social contradictions), or in a systems-theoretical manner, suppose processes of objective rationalization of a functional rationality system (something like the "invisible hand" of the market system in Adam Smith's sense).

These methodological complications of the program of an internalistic reconstruction of rationalization processes may be supplemented with general reflection on the situation that every attempt (in the sense of the *Selbsteinholungsprinzip*) at a reconstruction of the teleological process of history's progress is threatened by the danger of confusing the historically contingent conditions (including ethnocentric idiocyncracies) of a particular social situation with the historically realized conditions of the possibility of universal validity claims of scientific discourses. Where someone believes in the reconstruction of a process of progress of human rationality (or at least in the evolution of the systems-rationality of social subsystems), there he/she may in truth only deal with the factual development path of his/her own culture, which was subject to numerous—and still unclarified—non-rational external motivations or even contingent causes.

Out of this critical consideration it does not follow in any way that the *Selbsteinholungsprinzip* of a self-consistent historical reconstruction, or even the presupposition of the universal validity claims of argumentative discourse, would have to be abandoned (as Rorty and the postmodernists suggest³⁰), for that would mean the end of philosophy and science, and with them, the end of rational self-critique. It does follow however, that every reconstruction program must be held open to the *communicative-hermeneutical confrontation with foreign cultures*, and must expose itself to *the self-application of the critique of ideology* with the help of quasi-naturalistic explanation methods. (This is precisely what did not happen any longer, for example, with the orthodox Marxist discourse on historical reconstruction, which immunized itself from all critiques of ideology through its absolutized ideology critique on all positions of "bourgeois science," in which every possible counter-argument was *a priori* reduced to simple historically explainable factors external to discourse.)

After these—very vague—methodological remarks on the problem of the reconstruction of the cultural evolution, it appears possible to make understandable the main service provided by the *theory of dependence* within the problem context of the reconstruction of history. Here is disclosed, in my opinion, if we depart from the exemplary case of the history of economics, a deficit of historical reflection of the eurocentric theories of rationalization and modernization, which, as far as I can see, has determined and characterized the pursuit of science in the North. Two moments of the reflection deficit may be distinguished.

First of all, the rationalization and modernization theories of the North set out implicitly from a non-critical reflection and therefore potentially eurocentrically narrowed version of the *Selbsteinholungsprinzip*. That means, coarsely put: these theories depart, with reason, from the presupposition that Western (better: the in-the-West-factually-developed) philosophy and science are, in principle, in a legitimate position to act as advocates for argumenta-

tive discourses with universal validity claims, and that they have obtained through these discourses a unique advantage over other cultures.

This is even valid in the sense of the modern differentiation of scientific rationality in opposition to Asiatic high cultures, which have in common with Western culture their roots in the “Axial Period” (roots which in our case are traceable to the Greeks, on the one hand, and the Christian-Jewish tradition, on the other),³¹ namely, the breakthrough to philosophy and/or world religion. This is even more valid in opposition to all other cultures which have not reached this breakthrough (for instance, Africans south of the Sahara) or were near this breakthrough when they were rendered “decapitated sunflowers” (O. Spengler), like the Indian high cultures of South and Middle America. It becomes clear here that Latin American Liberation Philosophy's often-assumed claim of “authenticity,” in opposition to Europe, can reasonably be drawn only with reference to the originality (autonomy) of its internal concern, for example, the advocative representation of the “non-white” cultures of South and Central America, and thus cannot link its rationality concept to non-European origins.

The *foreshortening* of the justifiable claims of the *Selbsteinholungsprinzip* by the theories of rationalization and modernization of the North, resides precisely in that the potential eurocentrism of the respective reconstructive formulations would immunize themselves against questioning from non-European standpoints. This came about in particular through the demand that one must always depart methodologically only from a *comparison* between the development of non-European cultures with one's own developmental path, and hence must only measure their development against the European one. In this case, it is a matter not only of the concrete, historical *interdependence* relationship between the cultures, which since the beginning of the so-called modern epoch, and irreversibly, has been determined through the political and economic, but also the scientific and technical, dominance of the North.

However, it is this overlooked interdependence relationship that has to a certain extent made it impossible to compare, and match one against the other, the development path of the North and of non-European cultures, and thus to *objectively* determine the “respectively attained levels” of development. For the “respectively attained levels” of development belong to a complex general situation of global development, which since the time of colonization has been determined through the interdependences between cultures of comparable development.

This—at least partial—impossibility to compare the theoretical levels of the developmental paths, which is brought about through the historical interdependence of concrete developments, points to the *second* moment of the reflection's deficit of eurocentric rationalization and modernization theories.

This second moment—which seems hardly refutable in its core—has been disclosed in an exemplary fashion by the theory of dependence through its reference to the development of a world economic system. At least up to today, there has been no refutation of the possibility that the solution to the social question attained in the reformed capitalism of northern democracies cannot serve as a model, and thus as a prototype, for the development (modernization) of the Third World, because such a development would be prevented by the dependence of the countries of the Third World on the North. Indeed, the economic prosperity of the “prototypical North” may be directly predicated on the maintenance of the world system of economy (for instance, its terms of trade), in which the remedial development [*nachholende Entwicklung*] of the South would be hindered by the North.

This argument against the possibility of a "remedial development" would be considerably strengthened through the ecological argument that the imitation of the northern path of development by the countries of the Third World—something like an economic growth based on similar resource squandering and the emission of noxious substances, as today characterizes the industrialized North—*should* absolutely not take place, because this would not be compatible with the preservation of the general human ecosphere.

(Within this nexus one could find proof for the fundamental insight of the theory of dependence—in the sense of a global interdependence, as I made explicit—in an almost macabre situation, namely, in the fact that the contemporary export industry of the North—a special case would be the German auto industry—plagued by recession, looks hopefully at the growth "boom" of the rising Chinese markets, while ecologists imagine with horror what it will be like when so many millions of people replace their bicycles with automobiles. This is also the case—in a smaller measure—with the positively assessed economic development of Mexico under Salinas Gortary: more jobs, more autos, and more pollution, especially for the 18 million inhabitants of Mexico City. In all such cases, the interdependence of the economy of the First and the Third Worlds appears to be disclosed in a way where even the positive developments, in the sense of "bourgeois" *and* Marxist development economy, allow themselves to be represented as ambiguous in the sense of the ecological assessment.)

However, after this very global and macroscopic appraisal of the basic insights of the theory of dependence, it is time to attempt a more empirical-pragmatic assessment, keeping in mind the recent discussions. The fact that the *theory of dependence* has lost many of its supporters in the last decade, and that "theories of modernization," together with neoclassical economics, disavowed by almost all, have gained a new footing, should be considered with special care.³²

8.5 *The Skeptical-Pragmatic Problematization of the Grand Theories of Political Development*

What has to be done first, to use an expression of Habermas, is to indicate the "new unsurveyability" [*neue Unübersichtlichkeit*] of the discussion on the North-South conflict and the "politics of development."³³ The "grand leftist theories," it is said in the contemporary North in relationship to this thematic, have been shown to be inadequate simplifications of a far more complex problematic. Consequently, the theory of dependence long ago exceeded the highpoint of its plausibility. We can affirm, in fact, that for each of the premises that underlies this theory, counter-examples can be elaborated, for instance, against the global historical-geographic presupposition of its validity claims as a theory of the North-South *conflict*. The relations and conditions of the different Latin American, Asian, and African countries have been and are far more diverse than is suggested by talk of a Third World and of dependence on the First World. This is valid not only in referring to the those aspects of difference that can be explained from the historical reconstruction of the history of colonialism (of the Iberian in Latin America, of the English in North America, Australia, and New Zealand, and of the French in Africa and Oceania, as well as the essentially Russian and English colonialism in Asia; see D. Ribeiro, 1985); it is also valid in relation to those aspects that the theory of dependence does not consider or underestimates.

Thus, for instance, the argument of the North that the crises of the South are in great measure home-made does not entirely lose its force before the theory of the corruption of the elites of developing countries, that is, before the forced and irresponsible political dependency on the North, because, in fact, these minority groups have acted in different ways. The differences rest on ethnic and socio-cultural presuppositions of the greatest variety, entirely independent of the relation of subordination of the South to the North. This is also valid with respect to the differences of ethnic and cultural presuppositions during the colonization period. Such presuppositions ought to be considered in the explication of the different degrees of economic success of the older colonial territories. More precisely: it is necessary to consider the distinct predispositions, existing to our day, toward the successful adaptation to the economic forms of capitalism. With this I also refer to the results of the hermeneutic reconstructions of the economic ethics of distinct cultural traditions, in the spirit of Max Weber.³⁴ Such reconstructions suggest that the functioning of capitalism depends also on a religiously conditioned motivation and on the disposition to a corresponding rationalization; for instance, on the disposition to strictly separate the rule of law from company, private, and family interests.

In an interesting study, the "Ethic of the 'mafiosi' and the Spirit of Capitalism,"

Pino Arlacchi analyzed the differences between the development of North America and Western Europe in this sense, on the one hand, and, on the other, Latin America and Southern Europe (in particular the south of Italy).³⁵ This corresponds partially with the explication (close to the theory of dependence), offered by Darcy Ribeiro, of the differences between poor and rich in Brazil, in the first place, and between Brazil and the United States, in second place. These are phenomena that result from the distinction between two different stages of the colonial period: commercial Iberian capitalism and Anglo-American industrial capitalism.³⁶

Furthermore, there is much to be said in favor of the thesis that the notable economic success of certain territories of eastern Asia (particularly, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), which suffered Japanese imperialistic colonialism, can be explained from the socio-cultural and ethno-demographic conditions peculiar to these regions. Evidently, the success of Japan itself can be explained in terms of the theory of dependence, that is to say, if one departs from the independence that was maintained by Japan during the colonial period, in contradistinction to what took place in India. But, in relation to this, it is also possible to affirm that ethnic and socio-cultural conditions also play a fundamental role.

The relative economic stability of China, which has surpassed the Soviet economy by some years, and that of its satellite states, is also supported in the same measure, by the specific cultural tradition of the family, and the typically industrious character of this numerous people, as by the relative independence (reestablished thanks to the Communist takeover) of the country in relationship to the global capitalist system. Finally, with respect to Black Africa, in conjunction with Bengal, Bangladesh, and the north of Brazil and the indigenous territories of Latin America, which exhibit the greatest impoverishment, we can also speak of the clash of attempts at explaining the notorious failure of the politics of development. On the one hand, we have the argument in relation to economic exploitation during the colonial period and its neocolonial continuation in the states that emerged out of the older colonies—states that, to say truly, are artificially constituted and find themselves frequently divided by tribal conflicts. In opposition to this we have the argument that the impoverishment is due partially to socialist experiments and the successive civil wars (Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola), but, above all, to the insufficient socio-cultural predisposition of tribal societies with respect to the framework conditions of capitalist economic forms. As a support for this thesis is frequently cited the fact that the standard of living of the population, including the Black population, is higher in South Africa, where the control of the state is in the hands of the white population.

With this it is shown, then, that the historic-geographical presuppositions (globally simplifying) of the theory of dependence prove to be problematic.

In a narrower sense, its economic *premises* are equally questionable.

Now, is it necessary to affirm that the economic-structural characteristics put in relief by the theory of dependence (such as the high consumption of luxury goods by the dominant states, the export orientation of monocultures linked to a low integration with the internal market, and, consequently, a higher degree of "structural heterogeneity" of the social economy in its totality, and, above all, the "marginalization" and growing poverty of the majority of the population) constitute a distinctive characteristic of the Third World economy? Or, put differently, Is this "peripheral capitalism" distinguished not only in comparison to the actual economic and social structure of the First World, but also with respect to the *non-dependent* development of Europe once industrialization was initiated? Can we then, on the "diversity conditioned by dependence," base the thesis of the, impossibility (in principle) of a progressive development of the socioeconomic structure of the Third World under the conditions of a global capitalist system dominated by the North?

Interestingly, a critique of the historic-economic premises implicit in the theory of dependence can be found in Thomas Hurtienne, who can be considered a Marxist sympathizer in the questioning of the normal paradigm of the neo-liberal theory of development.³⁷ Hurtienne notes that the structural characteristics of Third world peripheral capitalism, which we have just mentioned, also characterized English economy and, later, the German-Prussian economy of the 19th century. Hurtienne also shows a frequently overlooked fact, namely, "that the great mass of workers and farmers of these regions, had a lasting participation in the 'fruits' of economic growth, but only after a hundred years of capitalist industrialization."³⁸ After reconstructing English development during the 18th and 19th centuries, Hurtienne notes that "as a result we can conclude that the English industrialization, despite its having early achieved a high degree of capitalistically induced production relations and the relative modernity of the social structure (small farmers and craft-persons had lost all social and political weight), is characterized, at least up to the First World War, that is, until approximately 130 years after the initiation of the industrial revolution, by certain central traits of a *structural heterogeneity*: namely, by extreme inequality in the distribution of income, minimal importance of the industrial production of goods of general consumption, absolute and extreme poverty, social marginalization..."³⁹

I cite here the conclusions of a study strongly inclined toward marxism, because it can help us as a point of reference in questioning the position sustained by the theory of dependence in relation to the impossibility of the South's developing within the framework of capitalism. The economist of development Albert O. Hirschmann has reflected, in a pragmatic and non-dogmatic manner, on all the important and relevant theories of this type.⁴⁰ His work contains more detailed questionings and problems of the neo-liberal

and Keynesian presuppositions of the Western politics of development after 1945, as well as of the presuppositions that underlie the theory of dependence. Although Hirschmann on occasion is a participant in the critiques of Western politics of development, he arrives at a positive conclusion about the real possibilities of social reform in Latin America. A very important point of support for his comes from the fact that with the end of the cold war, that is, with the disappearance of the fear of a Communist revolution, the United States finds itself no longer obliged to continue its repressive "backyard" politics. In the face of such positive expectations in Latin America, the panorama that presents itself in the post-Soviet Union countries is naturally extremely obscure concerning economic and social reforms. In these countries the reintroduction of a capitalist social order after more than 70 years would appear to encounter obstacles of a greater magnitude than those in many of the peripheral capitalist countries of the Third World. The social sacrifices after *perestroika* (conceived, in reality, as a reform of state socialism) could be of a proportional magnitude.

What consequences can we extract from these considerations, which are selective and, without doubt, insufficient with regard to the inherent problems, of the theses of the theory of dependence? Do we obtain an entirely negative result with regard to the situational valorization on which Dussel bases his Liberation Philosophy? In my opinion, the answer is negative, in spite of all the arguments that we have offered with respect to the problematic character of the theory of dependence.

8.6 *The Ethically Relevant Facts of the Relationship between the First and Third Worlds*

Dussel's Liberation Philosophy presents itself, above all, as an *ethical* challenge to the philosophy of the North. Therefore, it is not convenient to prejudge the situational valorization that essentially underlies it, from a theoretical point of view (that is, its economics of development and social scientific justification). Instead, it ought to be assessed in terms of empirical facts, which give rise to its "interpellation" in the name of the "poor" of the Third World, and which, in my opinion, justify it fully. To this interpellation there belong, as recognized even by divergent theories, the following facts, which form part of the background of the North-South conflict, especially of its manifestation in Latin America, and which find themselves causally conditioned by the historical expansion of Europe at a global scale during the modern period, and that even in our day have visible effects:

1. Approximately around the year 1500 the indigenous populations of America, Black Africa, and great sections of Asia were uprooted, generally in a violent manner, from their natural and socio-cultural conditions of life, and were decimated or simply exterminated. These cultures were also partly

stripped of their advanced cultures, as well as of their social order. They were enslaved and, in any event, condemned to become an extremely poor marginal group of humanity; a group, in addition, economically and culturally dependent on the North. These observations prove to be particularly appropriate with reference to the aboriginal populations of America and its tribal cultures, who were the object of almost near extermination through violence, forced labor and sickness. In relation to the advanced state cultures of Middle, Central, and South America, the antecedent judgments are fair in the sense of political and socio-cultural control and economic-social corruption, which even today in Mexico, a country where the indigenous populations have been officially vindicated, have not been fully modified.

2. It is important to note in this context that the liberation of the English, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies in America carried out, in the name of the Enlightenment and liberalism, did not improve the conditions of life of the indigenous population nor of the slaves and their descendants (who were used to replace the progressively depopulated natives). In fact, in some cases, liberation worsened their conditions (the European metropolises of the colonial powers had to some extent defended the interests of the autochthonous populations before the exploitative interests of the white colonizers and Creoles). The fate of the last Brazilian indigenous tribes, especially in the Amazon zone, is in our day particularly tragic. Their extermination would appear inevitable to the extent that the proletarian-farmer groups see their only opportunity for survival in the exploitation of the Amazonian forests. In actuality the government seems as incapable of controlling the deforestation of the jungle by immigrants, gold hunters, and rubber gatherers as of dealing with illegal immigration and the construction of *favelas* in the marginal zones of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Understandably, the approximately 50 million poor in the country, the majority of Black origin, constitute, for the government and public opinion, a problem worthier and of greater political importance than the salvaging of the country's last tribes of Indians.

3. The Blacks, more robust than the Indians (it would seem for biological reasons), together with the American and African mestizos, bore the greater weight of enslavement in the Third World, but they survived, thus constituting (thanks to the development of medicine in the North) the principal source (with India, Indonesia, and China) of the ecologically problematic overpopulation of the planet.

4. In what corresponds to the deep socioeconomic structure of the North-South relationship, it is possible to verify, for example, the following facts, leaving aside diverse theoretical and ideological interpretations. The fundamental situation of South-North dependence (to which in our day belong Western Europe, North America, and Japan), created by European colonial expansion, has not been modified in essence; not even in the countries of the

Near East, which through membership in OPEC enjoy extreme wealth. All of this becomes particularly evident in the *framework conditions* of contemporary late capitalism's *terms of trade*, which after the collapse of state socialism maintain worldwide domination. Furthermore, phenomena like the *debt crisis*, the *deterioration of the third world environment*, and, above all, the *internal relation* between both symptoms of crisis, are evidence that these conditions do not constitute, as liberals pretend, *eo ipso* a "social market economy"⁴¹ (a system of exchange that guarantees, thanks to a division of labor and an unconstrained freedom of commerce, the reciprocity of advantages). (In fact, to want to establish the reciprocity conditions of the justice of exchange contracts without consideration for the socially presupposed position of contracting parties, as is the case in contract negotiations, which could be of more or less equality or even of extreme inequality, would amount to a complete philosophical naivete).

In support of what has been presented above, I would like to cite here two recent and synoptic situational analyses free of ideological biases, but nevertheless possessing political pertinence. One is the book of the German-Iranian Hafez Sabet, *Die Schuld des Nordens* [*The Debt of the North*], which is based on economical statistics;⁴² the other is the book by the director of the Institute for European Environmental Politics [*Institut für EuroPäische Umweitpolitik*], Ernst-Ulrich von Weizsäcker, *Earth Politics, Ecological Realpolitik at the Threshold of the Century of the Environment* [*Erdpolitik, Okologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt*].⁴³

Hafez Sabet documents the development of the debt crisis. The sum total of the foreign debt of the South with respect to the North is approximately \$1.3 billion U.S. Under the actual framework conditions, this debt could not be paid in even 100 years. For Sabet, the causes of this crisis have to do with external factors such as: colonialism and its consequences; the shock of the price of petroleum for non-OPEC Third World countries; the weight the interest on the debt and the increase of the interest rates; the slump of the prices of raw materials; the deterioration of the terms of trade, as well as the protectionism of northern countries. On the other hand, however, as internal factors, Sabet lists: errors of political economy in the utilization of foreign credits; corruption and the peculiar behavior of elites, in addition to the flight of capital and talent ("brain-drain"); and excessive expenditure on armaments by the countries of the South. Sabet then makes a counter-assessment to the official version of the debt of the South, registering the interest payments, which have resulted in a flux of resources toward the North between the years 1956 and 1990, based on the framework conditions and the existing terms of trade. From this investigation of the deep structure of the world economic system, Sabet finally concludes that if economic relations had been more just, the North would owe more than 40 times the \$1.3 billion that the South is indebted to the North, that is, approximately

\$50 billion. In view of the consequences, Sabet arrives at the further conclusion that either the actual global economic order must be replaced by a new order, or the crisis of the South will necessarily strike back at the North in the form of a massive northward emigration and through the global consequences of the destruction of the environment brought about by poverty.

The situational analysis of von Weizsäcker has only confirmed and supplemented the results of Sabet, for example, in Chapter 8 of his book, which is dedicated to the Third World as a center of ecological destruction. Here one would have to note, however, in relationship to this point, that the richest part of the global population, which constitutes only 10 percent of humanity, consumes and uses directly or indirectly the greater part of the natural resources (energy, soil, water, air, etc.). Von Weizsäcker also confirms, in relationship to this, the "global division of labor" between the industrialized North and the Southern exporters of raw materials. This relationship has been long an object of praise by economists, but, according to Eduardo Galeano, actually means that "some specialize in gaining, while others specialize in losing."⁴⁴ According to von Weizsäcker, this relationship has led to "the dispossession of nature and of the majority of developing countries":

For, in fact, how do developing countries pay the interests and the repayments? In reality, in addition to the natural resources, these countries do not have anything else that could be sold in the world markets. To an extent, developing countries "sell" also their air, their hydraulic resources, and their soil to the North. This takes place, for instance, when Japanese, European, or North American garbage industries migrate into the Third World, when Europeans import products from the tropics, whose cultivation we consider a loss or extremely expensive for the fertile European soils, or also when we send directly our special despoils to the Third World.⁴⁵

Among the direct consequences of the global division of labor, we also find, according to von Weizsäcker, the fact that due to the "cutting down of entire woods, and the conversion of cultivable surface area into cattle-raising areas and growth of fruits for exportation, rain water can no longer be absorbed as before by the soil, which can lead to floods in the lower regions, while in the dry seasons the aquatic sources dry up, great expanses of territory become sandy."⁴⁶ Finally, basing himself in the Brundtland Report (*Our Common Future*) of the World Commission on the Environment and Development,⁴⁷ von Weizsäcker reports that (approximately since 1985, "circa 40 million U.S. dollars have flowed from the developing countries to the North." Of this quantity, the greater part went to cover the costs of debt, mainly interest, and only a minuscule proportion toward repayment. It has to be noticed that the total transfer of capital from the North to the South, in the form of "development help," is significantly smaller than the flow of capital and values from the South to the North.⁴⁸

The distinctive emphasis of von Weizsäcker's analysis, in contrast to the analysis of the majority of development economists (including the representatives of the theory of dependence), resides in making evident the following point: the objective consequences, regardless of the form of its realization, of a "remedial"[*nachholenden*] development of the countries of the Third World—that is, a development that would pretend to imitate for a population of a 1,000 million the model of the First World—is illusory and self-destructive from a purely quantitative and ecological point of view.⁴⁹ The planet would not be able to sustain an ecological pressure of this type. I will return to this point of view.

After this *Exkurs*, whose objective consisted in making explicit the most important ethical phenomena of the contemporary North-South relationship, we can concern ourselves with the discussion of the situational, socioeconomic, and political presuppositions of the Dusselian challenge to eurocentric philosophy. It ought to be made clear, since nothing is farther from my intentions, that I do not want to trivialize the fact of the "marginalization" and "exclusion" of the poor of the Third World from the community of life [*Lebensgemeinschaft*], as conditioned by the global economic system and the social order. But, obviously, we ought to add that we cannot reflect and elaborate on such facts on the basis of rhetorical-metaphysical simplifications. Instead, the base of our reflection ought to be exclusively the critical collaboration, in an ethically relevant manner, of philosophy with the empirical sciences. In the sketch I have presented only a very incomplete representation of this mediation between philosophy and the empirical sciences was transmitted.

I am in fact of the opinion that with the end of the cold war, and after the reduction of the danger of a nuclear war, *the number one problem* of world politics, and of its corresponding macro-ethics of the co-responsibility of all human beings, is and will be the question of the relationship between the First and the Third Worlds due to the insoluble connection between the ecological crisis and the socioeconomic crisis. (The dissolution of the so-called Second World has but accented this problematic, in addition to having made even more evident that the desperate attempt of the successor countries of the ex-Soviet Union to maintain themselves as industrial states is also intimately linked to a growing lack of concern with problems relating to the environment. This is also characteristic of Third World countries with threshold economies [*Schwellenländer*], such as the industrial center of Brazil, the area of Sao Paulo, or Taiwan.)

Thus far I have wanted to localize, within the limits of my capacities, the perspective of distantiation and alienation which can be brought about through Dussel's questioning of eurocentrism. It appears clear to me that, for instance, every tendency that pretends to reduce (as is frequently the case in the Western world) ethics to a conservation or a reinforcement of the "customary"

[*Üblichkeiten*], reduced to our cultural tradition, in view of the already presented world situation, amounts to irresponsible escapism. At the most minimum, the equal co-existence of different cultures, whose particularities have to be preserved, requires a *universalist* macro-ethics of humanity.⁵⁰ Only this type of ethics is capable of taking into account the "interpellation of the other" as formulated by the poor of the Third World. In our world situation, it would be either cynical or naive to reduce the problem of an ethically relevant justification of norms [*Normenbegründung*] to a technical-instrumental (means-ends rationality) problem of the investigation of adequate means and strategies for the attainment of "supreme objectives" [*Oberzwecke*], in which participants in negotiations do not have recourse to trans-subjective principles of justice; that is, in which, without consideration for the absent interests of third parties, adversaries or interested parties could reach an agreement thanks to a calculus of interest.⁵¹

Nevertheless, before I directly enter my coming-to-terms with [*Auseinandersetzung*] Dussel on the possibilities of discourse ethics, and with the goal of doing justice to his claims, I must first conclude my confrontation with marxism's inheritance. In other words, I must attempt to summarize my evaluation of the importance of marxism's inheritance in light of the foregoing reflections and in relation to the utopian element of the ethics of liberation.

It appears to me that the questioning, inspired by marxism, that the theory of dependence makes of the standard models of Western development, be they neoliberal or Keynesian, has at least established that a critique of the contradictions of the capitalist economic system, at a global level, is something that has neither been refuted nor whose critical potential has been exhausted. This opinion can be maintained even if one is convinced that the capitalist economic system is reformable and, from the ethical point of view, more acceptable than the variants of bureaucratic or state socialism that have been realized.⁵² I justify this conclusion above all on the circumstance that it is precisely the presuppositions of the Marxist system of thought, on which the so-called *sublation* [*Aufhebung*] of *utopia by science*, rests, that ought to be abandoned or completely transformed.

This thesis refers to three fundamental elements of Marxist thought:

1. The theory of "alienation" or "reification," inasmuch as it is essentially referred, in Marx, to the positive, basic concept of "living labor," and not primarily to the relation of reciprocity of interaction, which in the life world is complementary to work. This reference is also present to the extent that this theory does not distinguish between an *uncircumventable exteriorization* or an objectification of human subjectivity (or more explicitly, of immediate intersubjectivity), and the *self-alienation and reification* of subjectivity, or respectively, of the inter-subjective relation.

2. The marxist labor theory of value and surplus, inasmuch as it rests, in the last instance, on the theory of alienation as referred to work and the utopian ideal of the annulment of alienation.

3. The historical-determinist theory of the unconditioned prediction of the substitution of capitalism by Communist socialism that would actualize the "utopia of the realm of freedom."

Addendum 1

With respect to the theory of *alienation*, developed by the young Marx through his confrontation with Hegel and the young Hegelians, and which in a certain measure also constitutes the characteristic background of the theory of work in *Capital*, it appears to me indispensable to distinguish two things:

A) First, we must supersede, in a more fundamental sense than Marx and Hegel did,⁵³ the limitations of the point of departure in "living labor" as a *relation humanity-nature* (the self-creation of humans through the exteriorization and re-appropriation of "human essential powers"). This tradition dates back to the dominant modern tradition of *object-subject philosophy*. This sublation ought, furthermore, to take place in the sense of a distinction of and reflection on the complementarity between work and interaction, that is, linguistic communication. The problematization of exteriorization or alienation would have to be developed, then, by making reference to the *relation of complementarity* between labor and interaction, that is, communication, which in turn is already anchored in the life world. This would have to take place in such a way that institutionalized exteriorization and tendential alienation are not understood primarily as the exteriorization and alienation of an autarkically thought autonomous subject (nor of a "species subject"), but instead primarily as the exteriorization and alienation of the relationship of reciprocity of acting subjects and their linguistic communication. Only then it is possible to analyze the emergence of social *institutions*, and functional-structural *social systems*, in opposition to the exteriorization of labor in works or products, namely, as a supplement of labor as a phenomenon of tendential alienation.⁵⁴ To that degree there is, on the one hand, a certain harmony between my attempt at differentiation and certain tendencies, present in Marx and Hegel and, above all, in Dussel's basic concept of *proximity* (understood as the relation to the "other," the neighbor [*Nächsten*]⁵⁵), while, on the other hand, there is disagreement when my position suggests that, original to all human interactions there is also a *strategic* relationship, delegitimated from the outset by both Dussel and Marx. The consequence of this delegitimation resides in that for both Marx and Dussel, all anticipated and potential "objectifications" in the market system can no longer be understood by recourse to the relationship of the *exchange of commodities* susceptible to legitimation *within the sphere of consensual communication*, and the assumed *essential* consideration of the *use-value* of goods.

B) Seconds, the suggested differentiation, in the sense of a supplementation, finds itself linked to the greater complexity of the problem of alienation, which in turn leads to Marx's central idea of the utopia of the total, the "emancipatory" *sublation of the alienation of human praxis*, as present in the market economic system, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the overcoming of the system of state power. If we do not adopt the attitude of orienting ourselves exclusively (as the young Marx did) to the creative production process of the craftperson or artist (exteriorizes and at the same time reappropriates herself in her products), but instead orient ourselves to the *temporal mediation of interaction and communication through institutional or systemic means*, inherent in language but fully winning its quasi-autonomy only in the non-linguistic media of social systems (for example, *money and power*),⁵⁶ then, the following, at the minimum, would become clear. The notion of a complete sublation of the alienation and objectification of the unmediated relation of *proximity* between humans (in the sense of the structural-functional quasi-nature of social systems), which unquestionably has characterized the human condition, would imply by necessity something practically equivalent to a regression/dismantling [*Rückgängigmachung*] of *cultural* evolution. For all the differentiation of functional systems that began with rituals and archaic institutions, through which human praxis *unburdened itself from* initial execution, that is, creative action in favor of effective automatism (thereby deploying itself in time), would be converted into something superfluous in the Marxist "realm of freedom." Such an imaginable realization of the Marxist utopia would not be equivalent to state socialism, which does nothing but replace the self-regulative functional system of market economy by the regulative system of state power. Indeed, it would be equivalent to the regressive utopia of Pol Pot. What is now clear is that the "realm of freedom," which according to Marx would find its realization in communism, is differentiated from Hegel's "progress in the consciousness of freedom," precisely through the fact that here it is a matter of a *real sublation of alienated praxis by revolutionary praxis*, and not that philosophy sublimate (*aufhebt*) the exteriorization and alienation of the subjective spirit in the objective spirit by understanding both of these moves as *necessary conditions of self-consciousness*.

In view of this *trans-cultural utopian dimension* of Marxist "liberation philosophy," it would be suggestive to return to a position that, as it were, has its point of departure between Hegel and Marx. It is not a matter, in any way whatsoever, of annulling totally the Marxist concretization of the problematic of alienation and to return to Hegelian idealism. Nevertheless, it appears necessary to differentiate, partially reverting to Hegel, between the *exteriorization* (understood as something necessary) of human praxis (of work, as well as of interaction and communication) in social institutions and systems (as a cultural quasi-nature) *and* unconditionally avoiding the total *alienation* of praxis.

This raises the problematic of the adequate relation (scientifically informed

and ethically responsible) of humans with institutions or functional systems; something unquestionably important in our days. This means, on the one hand, that we ought to recognize the necessity to differentiate systems of action of quasi-automatic functioning, such as the economic social system and the state under the rule of law, and, to this extent, that we ought to take into account the ideas of systems theory inasmuch as this counts as social science.⁵⁷ For the effectiveness of social systems depends in great part on the adequate consideration of these ideas; in an analogous manner, technology's effectiveness in controlling nature depends on the causal-analytical perspective of the natural sciences. Nevertheless, we must resist system theory's suggestion of *functional reductivism*, just as much as physicalism was resisted as a previous form of reductivism.

To put the matter in a positive and programmatic sense: *linguistic communication*, which is equiprimordial with humanity's Dasein and is complementary to work (inasmuch as this is a re-elaboration of nature), and which attains its reflection in *argumentative discourse* in philosophy and science⁵⁸ this *meta-institution* of all institutions-must capitulate before neither social systems which have achieved their differentiation nor the so-called system constraints. It must not capitulate, that is, in the sense that its bearers [*Träger*] let themselves be persuaded that philosophical reflection (for example, the reflection on the intersubjective validity of truth claims and the normative correctness claims of morality) can be *reduced* to the "self-reference of an autopoietic social system" (something like the system of science), out of many other functional system of this type.⁵⁹ Rather, the human communication community, which through argumentative discourse arrives at a consciousness of its *meta-institutional* responsibility, must retain effective practical control and organizational initiative before any functional system. This means, for example, that this community must retain an effective capacity for the critique and reform of the *framework conditions of the market economy*, just as is the case with the democratic state in what refers to the system of regulation of power.

Naturally, the difficulty of this task lies not only in that it would have to be resolved (as happens in the democracies that we know) within the framework of a system of national-state self-affirmation, but also within the framework of a "civil and legal world order" [*weltbürgerlichen Rechtsordnung*] (Kant). The problem lies, in addition, in the circumstance that the meta-institutional discourse of any human communication community ought by necessity, at the same time, to *institutionalize* itself, as *real* discourse, and to this extent submit itself to the conditions of functional systems. However, to question the fact that, in the service of the postulated task, we have a responsibility to use technical communications media as well as the communicative disposition of the experts of science and technology, as well as that of those who are politically responsible, would be not only irresponsible defeatism but a complete distancing from reality.

It is precisely this that takes place today in thousands of congresses, commissions, etc, which concern themselves, at least according to their public pretensions, with the *regulation of human problems in the sense of an advocatory representation of the interests of all the affected*. In so far, then, with respect to the publicly effective, the regulative principle of a *discourse ethics* is already complied with here or more precisely, *Part A* of the grounding of this type of ethics is already claimed, although it should be made clear that the participating representatives of political and economic systems of self-affirmation in most cases continue, or see themselves obliged by responsibility, to follow in praxis Lübbe's model of *negotiations oriented at success*, or even see themselves obliged to follow it out of responsibility, in the sense of *Part B* of discourse ethics.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, and owing above all to the pretension that it is publicly effective, this type of ethics does not absolutely exclude an approximative accomplishment of the task of a meta-institutional or meta-systemic discursive responsibility as I have postulated it. I would like to underscore here that the only realistic and responsible possibility of having, through politically mediated *reforms*, some influence on the *framework conditions of the global economic system* and of transforming, perhaps in the long run, this system, in the sense of the realization at a global scale of social justice, is already given in the “function” of discourse that I have been suggesting.

Addendum 2

The critique or transformation, just sketched, of the Marxist theory of alienation and its complete sublation in reality, suggests, to a certain extent, a critique to Marx's labor theory of value. As is evident in the critique that follows, I will only indicate the most general aspects of its philosophical heuristic.

When one reads with impartiality the passages in *Capital* where Marx formulates his theory of value, one cannot help but be surprised at the way Marx distinguishes between use-value [*Gebrauchswert*] and exchange-value [*Tauschwert*]:

The usefulness of a thing —according to Marx— makes it a use-value. But this usefulness does not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter. It is therefore the physical body of the commodity itself, for instance iron, corn, a diamond, which is the use-value or useful thing... Use-values are only realized [*verwirklicht*] in use or in consumption. They constitute the material content of wealth, whatever its social form may be. In the form of society to be considered here they are also the material bearers of... exchange-value.⁶¹

Here one is surprised that for Marx use-value, that is, the *usefulness* of a thing (which, as he correctly observes, “does not dangle in mid-air”) finds itself *exclusively* conditioned by the “physical properties of the commodity.” Undoubtedly it is correct to say that “without this” (i.e., the commodity as a physical

body) usefulness could not exist, but we ought to also ask ourselves if such usefulness does not find itself conditioned as well by *people's needs*; more precisely, by the demands of potential users or consumers. Perhaps, however, Marx held this latter determination as self-evident. But if this were the case, the *demand in exchange* would also have to be, in the last instance, an expression of usefulness, that is, of the exchange-value of things inasmuch as they are goods. Use-value is constituted, so to speak, in the life world ("Use-values are only realized in use or consumption"), and in that sense they distinguish themselves, undoubtedly, from the *exchange-value that is referred to price*. But the use-value would have to be also *co-constitutive*, that is, it would also have to be a significant factor in the constitution of exchange-value in the economic system, for the simple reason that this is already a significant factor, co-constitutive, of the demand of the buyer. It is precisely this that Marx seems to call into question. Marx accomplished a radical *abstraction* when he introduced exchange-value as referred to a system.

As is evident from the Marx citation, use-values are *only* "the material bearers of exchange value." "Exchange-value appears first of all as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind. This relation changes constantly with time and place..." Nevertheless, "the valid exchange-values of the same commodity express something equal," and the "relation of exchange," between "let us now take two commodities, for example corn and iron. Whatever their exchange relation may be, it can always be represented by an equation.... What does this equation signify? It signifies that a common element of identical magnitude exists in two different things, in 1 quarter of corn and similarly in x cwt of iron."⁶² But, "this common element cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical or other natural property of commodities. Such properties come into consideration only to the extent that they make the commodities useful, i.e. turn them into use-values. But clearly, the exchange relation of commodities is characterized precisely by their abstraction from their use-values.... As use-values, commodities differ in quantity, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, *and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value.*"⁶³

With this *supra-abstraction* Marx has eliminated every co-constitution of exchange value through use-value; Marx is now ready to introduce what can be called his *absolute labor theory of value*:

If then we disregard the use-value of commodities, only one property remains, that of being *products of labour*.... With the disappearance of the useful character of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour embodied in them also disappears. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract.⁶⁴

Marx's supra-abstraction is confirmed with the following determination that he makes of abstract human labor:

A use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value [=exchange-value in the economic system] only because abstract human labour is objectified [*vergegenständlicht*] or materialized in it. How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? By means of the quantity of the “value-forming substance,” the labour, contained in the article. This quantity is measured by its duration, and the labour-time is itself measured on the particular scale of hour, days, etc.... The total labour-power of society, which is manifested in the values of the world of commodities, counts here as one homogeneous mass of human labour-power, although composed of innumerable individual units of labour-power [among themselves different]. [Because] each of these units is the same as any other, to the extent that it has the character of a socially average unit of labour-power and acts as such, i.e. only needs, in order to produce a commodity, the labour time which is necessary on an average, or in other words is socially necessary.⁶⁵

This average time “changes with every variation in the productivity [*Produktivkraft*] of labour.”⁶⁶

After Marx has reduced the value of commodities in the capitalist economic system to the labor power of work (or of workers) expended during a certain time, he can introduce his theory of “surplus,” which has fundamental importance for the critical reconstruction of capitalism and in particular for the theory of class struggle [*Theorie des Klassengegensatzes*]:

He shows, first of all, that the formation of *surplus*, without which neither the formation nor the utilization of capital is possible, cannot be obtained through an exchange of equivalents in the realm of the normal circulation of commodities. Nor can it emerge through the fact that buyers and sellers cheat each other, since this would represent nothing else than the redistribution of existing capital.⁶⁷ Marx then shows that under the historic-social conditions of capitalism, the solution resides in that “in order to extract value out of the consumption of a commodity, our friend the money-owner must be lucky enough to find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption is therefore itself an objectification of labour, hence a creation of value.”⁶⁸ This “specific commodity” represents “the capacity for labour, in other words the labour-power” of the wage-worker.⁶⁹ The value of this labor power that the capitalist buys is generally greater than the value of the wage that ought to be paid for the reproduction of the labor power of the workers (including the reproduction of their kind in their descendants), in this way the capitalist appropriates the *surplus* that allows him the utilization of capital.

Given this reconstruction of the grounding of the Marxist labor theory of value, we cannot be surprised that the *unilateral* (or *supra-abstraction*)

determination of exchange-value that we have been underscoring has been the object of strong critiques since the beginning. Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, for instance, the representative of the theory of "marginal utility" [*Grenznutzentheorie*], has criticized the neglect of the value of "natural resources" [*Naturgabe*] as well as of the function of "use-value" and, in general, of the "game of supply and demand" in the investigation of the influence that the quantity of employed labor has on the lasting form of the "price of goods."⁷⁰

The representative of revisionist marxism, Eduard Bernstein, who wanted to consolidate the Marxist theory of value with the limit of utility theory, criticized the onesidedness of the theory in the sense we have indicated.⁷¹

A particularly concise critique, from the view point of our heuristic of the complementarity of work and interaction, is that of George B. Shaw.⁷² According to him, the unilateral aspect of the Marxist theory resides precisely in the fact that Marx's analysis of the commodity, which "wants to investigate the points in relationship to which commodities are commensurable with one another, considers, nevertheless, exclusively only one of them, that is, their character as *product of abstract human labour*." In opposition to this there is the theory of "marginal utility," that "commodities are commensurable with each other in proportion to their *abstract utility*, and that the comparison that is made in praxis with a view to an exchange of commodities is not a comparison of their cost in abstract human labour, but instead is a comparison of their *abstract desirability*."⁷³ However, this depends directly on the degree of the satisfaction of needs through the commodities that are offered.⁷⁴

In my opinion, the unilateral character of the reduction of the "essence" of the "value" of goods (objectified already, as the "exchange-value" of "commodities") to inverted work, and, consequently, to the *labor-time* employed, can only be understood when one takes into account, as I have indicated, that Marx does not from the beginning relate the alienation of human praxis (which finds its objectified expression in the capitalist economic system) to the whole life complex of praxis—that is, to the relation of complementarity between work and interaction or communication. Instead, Marx refers such an alienation to work, that is, the production of goods, in accordance with modern subject-object philosophy and, in particular, with the tradition of the labor theory of value of the classics of economy.

If Marx had also referred from the beginning, and in a consequential manner, to the original reciprocity of human relations (which Dussel refers to as "proximity"), in the context of the problem of exteriorization, of alienation, and of the "cancellation" of objectified praxis in the capitalist system, he could not have overlooked that in the explication of economic relations of exchange, and, therefore, also the exchange-value of commodities, we cannot be completely abstract from the "use-value" of goods, thus entirely attributing it to (the "usefulness in relation to human needs") to the pre-economic status of

natural things. Marx would have had to note and consider in a consequent manner that not only is "abstract work" (the labor-power employed, that is, the cost of production of a commodity) constitutive of the value of goods, but the reciprocity of supply and demand as well. And that this depends on the *abstract utility for the buyer*, something that, in turn, depends not only on the *natural qualities* of goods but also on the *not-satisfied needs* of the buyer and, in this manner, on the *degree of the scarcity* of goods.

Summarizing, Marx would have had to locate differently the rupture between the praxis of the life world and its alienation in a quasi-objectified system, considering fully the complementary character of *work* and *interaction* in the life world and the economic system. Not only "living labor," as *production of goods*, ought to have its origin in the life world, such as this is imagined before the differentiation of an economic system; also the *exchange relation* between humans—not exclusively between producers of goods, but equally between those who dispose of the resources (think, for example, of the exchange of land and women)—ought to have the same origin. The institutionalization of morality and law, and with it the development of the indispensable framework of social order for all possible economic systems, ought to be developed out of the linguistically articulated and reflected *relation of reciprocity*, as is implicit in (economic) exchange (*Tausch*), and not exclusively on the basis of the potential value-creating capacity of the production of goods through work. In addition, the institutionalization of morality, as conventional morals [*Sittlichkeit*], as well as the institutionalization of law [*Recht*] in the *power system of the state*, represent necessary processes in the *externalization* and, consequently, in the tendential *alienation* of life praxis, which in turn constitutes a necessary presupposition of the effective functioning of the economic system.⁷⁵

From this system of correlations and connections we can extract the following conclusion. The attempt to overcome the alienation and objectification of worldly life praxis, which is inherent to the capitalist economic system, through the exclusive consideration of the "productive forces" and "production relations," that is, by appealing to the socialization of the property of the means of production, is equivalent to either a simple regressive utopian suppression of culture or, as Max Weber⁷⁶ anticipated with relation to marxism, to an unforeseen bureaucratization and paralysis of the economy due to the state system. In any event, the necessary efforts to mobilize the productive forces, that is, to ensure the efficient management of scarce resources in a system of production with a division of labor, cannot be guaranteed simply by the "free association" (proximity) of the producers, which constitutes in a certain sense, for Marx⁷⁷ and for Dussel, as far as I can see, the utopian dimension of the "realm of freedom."

Addendum 3

The third fundamental element of the Marxist thought system that must be abandoned is historical determinism, or "historicism" in Popper's sense,⁷⁸ taken together with Hegel's dialectical method and used by Marx at least at the macroscopic level of his thought, and applied by him in contrast to Hegel) in his "scientific" predictions of the future. This historical-dialectical formulation, in combination with the claims of a thematization of social being and of the consciousness that develops with it, that is, of the superstructure (and consequently, of scientific consciousness as well), has led to the adoption, not only by Marx, but above all by the "orthodox" Marxists, of a curious *meta-position* with regard to the normal world discourse of science. This has inevitably led to an almost total immunization of their position before any type of critique. On the basis of the dialectical-historical perspective, one could adopt a standpoint from which it seemed to be possible to localize any scientific-philosophical claim in a dialectical-historical fashion, and to explain it, consequently, objectively. This has led to the elimination in practice of the possibility of participating in (virtually unlimited) argumentative discourses, inasmuch as this last one is the *meta-institution* responsible for the *justification* or *critique* of all theories and any type of institutionalized science. Not discourse proper, but the dialectical-historical explanation of the objective necessity of factual discourses, as well as its results, appeared as something transcendently uncircumventable [nicht hintergehbär] for all argumentation. The questioning of this point by a non-Marxist theory was no reason for the Marxists to have recourse to an impartial decision, that is, to an argumentative discourse, in order to confront it, but instead to formulate the problem of "explaining" the theory in question in conjunction with its social context as the outcome of a determined phase in the development of bourgeois thought.

This tendency to "historicism," which has been fatal for the universalist undertaking of progressive science, culminated in "ethical historicism" or "futurism" (Popper). This has resulted in practice, With Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung, this created a situation in which Marxist intellectuals advanced from secretaries of parties to "philosopher kings" in the Platonic sense. These thinkers found themselves in a position that allowed them to impose politically (at least within the sphere of their influence) the meta-position of the instance of the uncircumventable decision before any other different validity claim. In this way, not only was *truth* what the politburo had to certify in accordance with the dialectical vision of the necessary path of history, but also what had to be considered as the *good* and the *just*, inasmuch as in *accordance with the path of history* these had to be the object of determination. The consequences of all of this are well known: the repeated determination of the party line, as well as the inevitable "purges" of the party and the state.

In view of the above, it appears understandable that all the anti-orthodox Marxists (among them also the author of Liberation philosophy) have distanced themselves from this historicism. For Dussel, Marx (even he of *Capital*) is primarily an ethical thinker,⁷⁹ in the sense, let us say, of the "categorical imperative" which the young Marx elaborated in his *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, where he writes; "The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that *for man the supreme being is man*, and thus with the *categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions* in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being."⁸⁰

The acknowledgment of the actual meaning and validity of this imperative, which is inevitable if we do not want to fall in to cynicism when considering the problem of the Third World, leads us also, in our day, to the imperative necessity of facing the problem of *historical progress with regard to the political-moral*. Hence, we are not allowed to bring too far our critique of the historicism of the 19th century *maitres penseurs* (Glucksmann), so as to negate even the moral duty—previously affirmed by Kant—of conceiving as possible moral progress in history, and to contribute to the effort of resisting its frustration, or to contribute in any way to its realization.⁸¹ It is not acceptable, then, to accept the postmodern affirmation of a definitive dissolution of the "unity of human history" and of the solidarity (anticipated counterfactually in argumentative discourse) of the *We*.⁸² Nor can it be satisfactory to comply with the quiescent slogan of German neo-pragmatism that would like to subvert Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach in the following manner:

Hitherto philosophers have only changed the world, where instead it is a question of letting it be in peace.⁸³

All of expressions can be considered as typically eurocentric from Dussel's perspective.

Now, how does it present itself to us: the actuality of the legitimate problem of an ethically grounded answer to the "interpellation of the other," to the interpellation of the permanently impoverished masses of the Third World, to the interpellation of those who do not effectively participate in the relevant discourses of the dependent metropoleis and their elites in peripheral capitalism? How does it present to us, this problematic under the conditions that today, as I have expounded, can be acceptable? These conditions require that *the path for replacing market economy imagined by Marx is unrealizable*. Or, said more philosophically: *the vision of a complete sublation of the tendential "exteriorization," objectification, and "alienation" of human praxis (that is, of its subject-object and of its subject-co-subject dimension) in a functional-structural social system, such as the global market-economy system constitutes, is in the worst of senses a utopia*. This Marxist idea contradicts, inasmuch as it is a postulate which refers to the institutional relations among free human beings and with nature, conceptions about the possibility of cultural evolution.

Obviously, we have affirmed that the human discursive or communication community, to which the interpellation of the other, of the poor, is directed, retains its place as *meta-institution of all institutions*, i.e., of all other *functional systems*, as long as we are capable of examining and discussing *interpellations*, such as the one Dussel presents in the name of the Third World. In accordance with this—and this is the provisional answer that I offer Enrique Dussel—what is important, and ought to be important to us, is politically and ethically to influence the *institutional-framework condition* of the economic system, something that requires considering the political-legal conditions of a system at the national and international level, with the goal of doing justice to the interpellation of the poor of the Third World.

What can *discourse ethics* contribute to this, as an ethics that as we have indicated, requires for its application conditions that do not yet exist in the contemporary world? I will attempt an answer to this question within the framework of a more detailed and text-based discussion in connection with Enrique Dussel's program.⁸⁴

Notes

1. See Fernet-Betancourt, ed. *Ethik und Befreiung* (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1980).
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-40.
3. Compare with the continuation of this "preliminary consideration" in its second part, "Diskursethik vor der Herausforderung der lateinamerikanischen Philosophie der Befreiung" in Raúl Fernet-Betancourt, ed. (forthcoming).
4. Fernet-Betancourt, ed. *Ethik und Befreiung* (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1990), pp. 69-96.
5. E. Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*. See also his "Philosophie der Befreiung" in R. Fernet-Betancourt, ed., *Positionen Lateinamerikas* (Frankfurt: Materialis-Verlag, 1988), pp. 43-59; and "Les quatre rédactions du Capital" in *Concordia*, 19, 1991, pp. 65-75, as well as the "The Reason of the Other. *Interpellation* as a Speech Act" (above), contribution to the congress "Transcendental Pragmatics and the North-South Ethical Problems," Mexico, March 1991.
6. Dussel has intensively occupied himself with the work of Marx, having published three volumes on the theoretical production of the Marx of the *Grundrisse* (*La Producción Teórica de Marx*), on the "Unknown Marx" of the 1861 to 1863 manuscripts (*Hacia un Marx Desconocido*), and on "Late Marx and Latin American Liberation" (*El Último Marx [1863-1882] y la Liberación Latinoamericana*). See the reviews by R. Fernet-Betancourt in *Concordia*, 11, 1987, pp. 101-03; 15, 1989, 99-100, and 19, 1991, 108.
7. Compare with V. Höfle, *Philosophie der ökologischen Krise* Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1992, as well as his *Praktische Philosophie in der modernen Welt* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992), pp. 131 ff. See also Karl-Otto Apel, "The Ecological Crisis as a Problem for Discourse Ethics" in A. Öfsti, ed. *Ecology and Ethics: A Report from Melbu Conference, July 1990* (Trondheim: Nordland Akademi for kunst og Vitenskap, 1992), pp. 219-60.

8. See Karl-Otto Apel. *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, and "Diskursethik als Verantwortungsethik—eine postmetaphysische Transformation der Ethik Kants." in Eornet-Betancourt. *Ethik und Befreiung*.
9. See E. Arens's report on the congress in Mexico. *Orientierung* (Zürich), 19, 55, Sept. 1991, pp. 193-95.
10. See K.-O. Apel. "Harmony through Strife as a Problem of Natural and Cultural Evolution" in Shu Hsien Liu/R. E. Allison. eds., *Harmony and Strife. Contemporary Perspectives East and West* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 3-19.
11. The isolated publication of these "preliminary considerations" in Fornet-Betancourt's *Diskursethik oder Befreiungsethik* (pp. 16-54) has clearly led to a misunderstanding. Thus, for instance, Franz Hinkelammert ("Die Marxsche Wertlehre und die Philosophie der Befreiung: einige Probleme der Diskursethik unter der Marxisumskritik Apels," manuscript), confused these "preliminary considerations" with an unpublished lecture which I gave in 1991 in Mexico. Dussel, similarly, misunderstood my position, as is evident from his "Erste Erwiderung an Karl-Otto Apel und Paul Ricoeur" (Porto Alegre lecture, September 1993), and "Re-Lecture Marx: Aus der Perspektive der lateinamerikanischen Philosophie der Befreiung" in *Bremer Philosophica*, 5, 1992, pp. 1-10). In this revised and expanded version of my "preliminary considerations" I will go into the positions of Dussel and Hinkelammert; see notes 74 and 75 of this essay.
12. See E. Dussel. "Re-Lecture Marx." p. 1.
13. See especially *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap. 1, Section 4: "The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secrets" (New York: Penguin Books. 1990 [1976]), pp. 170ff.
14. Compare my debate with J. M. Buchanan's and K. Homan's conception of a democratically legitimated market economy in Karl-Otto Apel. "Institutionenethik oder Diskursethik als Verantwortungsethik? Oberlegungen zur Begründung der Wirtschaftsethik" in J. P. Harpes. *25 Jahre Diskursethik. Anwendungsprobleme der Diskursethik in Politik und Wirtschaft* (forthcoming).
15. See especially K. Marx, "Zur Judenfrage" (1843). in S. Landshut. ed., *Karl Marx: Die Frühschriften* (Stuttgart: Körner. 1953). pp. 171-206.
16. See "Manifest of the Communist Party"; see note 15. pp. 525-60, and, especially, 527-31.
17. Enrique Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, paragraph 4.4.8.6. Translated from the Spanish.
18. Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, paragraph 2.1.6.3; p. 20.
19. *Ibid.*, paragraph 2.6.9.5.
20. See R. Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital* (Vienna: Europa Verlag. 1919); J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949); R. Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ein Beitrag zur ökonomische Erklärung des Kapitalismus* (Leipzig: Franke. 1921); V. Lenin. *Der Imperialismus als höchste Stadium des Kapitalismus* (Berlin: Verlag Neuer Weg 1946).
21. See especially Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (New York: Academic Press. 1974); *The Capitalist World-Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latinamerica*, rev. ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). In addition. see T.T. Evers. and P. v. Wogau. "Lateinamerikanische Beiträge zur Theorie der Unterenwicklung" in *Das Argument*, 79, 1973, pp. 303-404; I. Sotelo, *Soziologie Lateinamerikas* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973). D. Senghaas, ed., *Imperialismus und Strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), and by the

- same editor, *Abhängigkeit und die strukturelle Theorie der Unterentwicklung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974). F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, *Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung in Lateinamerika* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976; original Spanish, 1969). See with respect to this thematic the following essays by Dussel, which show how in its quintessence the theory of dependence is derived from Marx: "Marx's Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 and the 'Concept' of Dependency" in *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 65, Vol. 17, 1990, pp. 62-101, as well as "Die Essenz der Dependenz: Die Beherrschung unterentwickelter durch hochentwickelte Bourgeoisien und die Übertragung des Mehtwerts" in *Dialektik*, 2, 1993, pp. 99-105.
22. Compare J. Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976). This has been partly translated by Thomas McCarthy in *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).
 23. W. Schluchter, *Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus. Eine Analyse von Max Webers Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen: Mohr 1979). See also J. Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion*, and *Theory of Communicative Action* 2 volumes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983, 1987).
 24. Compare J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 1987).
 25. Compare I. Lakatos, "Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und ihre rationalen Nachkonstruktionen" in W. Diederich, ed., *Theorien der Wissenschaftsgeschichte* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 55-119.
 26. *Selbsteinholungsprinzip* also suggests the following ideas: a retracing, as well as a giving an account of one's own positions through historical reconstruction; literally, to catch up with oneself. Karl-Otto Apel's principle wants to elucidate and formalize the general intuition that historians since Hegel have, namely, that a historical discourse must be able to justify its own argumentative position, as well as that of its opponents, in terms of the internal logic of its very own theoretical constructs. [Translator's note]
 27. Compare K.-O. Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, Index; "Rationalitätskriterien und Rationalitätstheorien" in G. Meggle and A. Wüsthube, eds., *Pragmatische Rationalitätstheorien* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); "The Hermeneutic Dimension of Social Science and Its Normative Foundations" in *Man and World*, 25, 1993, pp. 247-70 (expanded version in K.-O. Apel and M. Kettner, eds., *Mythos Wertfreiheit?* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1994).
 28. Compare J. Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion*, and K.-O. Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung*.
 29. Compare K.-O. Apel, "Types of Rationality Today: The Continuum of Reason between Science and Ethics" in Th. Geraets, ed., *Rationality Today* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), pp. 307-40, and "Rationalitätskriterien und Rationalitätstypen," in G. Meggle and A. Wüsthube, eds. *Pragmatische Rationalitätstheorien*.
 30. Compare K.-O. Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung*, especially pp. 154ff and 370ff, and "The Challenge of a Totalizing Critique of Reason and the Program of a Philosophical Theory of Types of Rationality" in D. Freundlieb and W. Hudson, eds., *Reason and Its Other* (Oxford: Berg, 1992), pp. 23-48.
 31. Compare K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1955). Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Kulturen der Achsenzeit I. Ihre Ursprünge und ihre Vielfalt* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), and by the same, *Kulturen der Achsenzeit II. Ihre institutionelle und kulturelle Dynamik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992).
 32. See U. Menzel, *In der Nachfolge Europas. Autozentrierte Entwicklung in den*

- ostasiatischen Schwellenländern Südkorea und Taiwan* (Munich: Simon and Magiera, 1985), *Auswege aus der Abhängigkeit. Die entwicklungspolitische Aktualität Europas* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1988). D. Senghaas, *Von Europa lernen. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1982); U. Menzel and D. Senghaas, *Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt. Eine Bestandsaufnahme* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1986). T. Hurtienne, "Die Globale Abhängigkeitstheorie in der Sackgasse? Plädoyer für historisch-strukturelle Abhängigkeitsanalysen" in *Blätter des IZW*, 154, 1989, pp. 31-35. G. Hauck, "Modernisierung, Dependencia, Marxismus—was bleibt?" in *Peripherie*, 39/40, 1990, pp. 68- 81. See also the literature mentioned in note 34.
33. See, for example, U. Menzel, "Das Ende der 'Dritten Welt' und das Scheitern der grossen Theorie. Zur Soziologie einer Disziplin in auch selbstkritischer Absicht" in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 32, 1991, pp. 4-33, with references to the critique to the theory of dependence as presented by H. J. Puhle (ed.), *Lateinamerika. Historische Realität und Dependencia-Theorien* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1977); T. Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory" in *World Politics*, 31, 2, 1978 pp. 247-88; D. Seers, ed., *Dependency Theory. A Critical Reassessment* (London: Pinter, 1983).
34. See M. Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik*, I, ed. J. Winkelmann (Munich/Hamburg: Siebenstern, 1967), as well as volume II, *Critiques and Anti-Critiques*, by the same editor, 4th rev. ed. (Munich/Hamburg: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1982); C. Seyfart and W. Spronde, eds., *Religion und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung. Studien zur Protestantismus-Kapitalismus These Max Webers* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1973); W. Schluchter, ed., *Max Webers Studie über Konfuzianismus und Taoismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), *Max Webers Studie über Hinduismus und Buddhismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), and *Max Webers Sicht des Islam* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987).
35. P. Arlacchi, *Mafiosiethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt: Cooperative, 1989).
36. D. Ribeiro. *Amerika und die Zivilisation. Die Ursache der ungleichen Entwicklung der amerikanischen Völker* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985).
37. T. Hurtienne, "Peripherer Kapitalismus und autozentrierte Entwicklung-Zur Kritik des Erklärungsansatzes von Dieter Senghaas" in *Prokla*, 44, 1981, pp. 105-36. D. Senghaas later abandoned the theory of dependence, see the works cited under note 32.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
40. A. Hirschmann, *Entwicklung, Markt und Moral* (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1989).
41. See, for example, the study by G. Radnitzky. "Marktwirtschaft: frei oder social?" in G. Radnitzky/H. Bouillon. eds., *Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1991), pp. 47-75.
42. Hafez Sabet, *Die Schuld des Nordens* (Bad Koning: Horizonte, 1991).
43. E. U. von Weizsäcker, *Erdpolitik, Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt*, 2nd rev. ed. (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 1990).
44. *Ibid.*, p. 117. Galeano as cited in *State of the World 1990. WorldWatch Institute* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), p. 140.
45. E. U. von Weizäcker, *Erdpolitik, Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt*, p. 120.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
47. German edition by V. Hauf, *Unsere gemeinsame Zukunft* (Greven: Eggenkamp, 1987).

48. von Weizsäcker, *Erdpolitik, Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt*, p. 122.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
50. See K.-O. Apel, "A Planetary Macro-ethics for Humankind: The Need, the Apparent Difficulty and the Eventual Possibility" in E. Deutsch, ed., *Culture and Modernity: East- West Philosophical Perspectives* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 261-78. See also K.-O. Apel, *Ethics and the Theory of Rationality. Selected Essays Volume Two* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996).
51. See H. Lübbe, *Philosophie nach der Aufklärung* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1989), pp. 198ff, and "Sind Normen methodisch begründbar? Rekonstruktion der Antwort Max Webers" in W. Oelmüller, ed., *Transzendentalphilosophische Normen-begründungen* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1978); as well as my discussion of Lübbe in K.-O. Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), pp. 60ff; and the polemic with Lübbe on the theme "Ist eine philosophische Letztbegründung moralischer Normen nötig?" in K.-O. Apel/D. Boehler/G. Kadelbach, eds., *Funkkolleg Praktische Philosophie/Ethik: Dialoge* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1984), pp. 54-81.
52. See A. Przeworski, "Warum hungern Kinder, obwohl wir alle ernähren könnten? Irrationalität des Kapitalismus-Unmöglichkeit des Sozialismus" in *Prokla*, 78, 1990, pp. 138-71.
53. It is unquestionable that both Hegel and Marx dealt with the problematic of intersubjectivity, that is, of the alienation of human relationships. Nevertheless, this did not lead to a recognition of the paradigmatic and simultaneously complementary distinction between *object-subject* and *subject-co-subject* relations. See J. Habermas, "Arbeit und Interaktion. Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jeneser 'Philosophie des Geistes'" in his work *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968); and his *Theory of Communicative Action*.
54. J. Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*.
55. See E. Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, paragraph 2.1.
56. See A. Gehlen. *Urmensch und Spätkultur* (Bonn: Athenaum, 1956), First Part: Institutionen. See also my critical observations in "Arnold Gehlen 'Philosophie der Institutionen' und die Metainstitution der Sprache" in K.-O. Apel. *Transformation der Philosophie*. Vol. 1, pp. 197-222; and also my commentaries in K.-O. Apel/D. Böhler/K. Rabel, eds., *Funkkolleg Praktische Philosophie/Ethik, Studentexte* (Weilheim/Basel: Beltz. 1984), pp. 42-65.
57. See J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*.
58. Language [*Sprache*], that is, linguistic communication, is differentiated from any other form of human praxis in that, on the one hand, like other forms of praxis it is dependent on its being institutionalized as a "functional-structural system" which as a semantical system always unburdens the individual from the authentic intentionality of self-expression and world-interpretation through its providing all members of the linguistic community with a common interpretation, which in turn results in a "reduction of the complexity of meaning," but which, on the other hand, participates in the capacity of the human mind for self-reflection, in such a way that it is capable of articulating and making conscious, in an intersubjectively valid manner, its own exteriorization and objectification in a system, as well as in every other systemic exteriorization of human action. This peculiar function of language constitutes the ground on which also rests the possibility, in principle, of recognizing, in the argumentative discourse of the social sciences and philosophy, the institutional and systemic exteriorizations of human praxis as something inevitable but susceptible of control.

59. This is what is suggested, at least as far as I understand it, by systems theory, in the sense Niklas Luhmann has elaborated it as a substitute for the "old European philosophy," See N. Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, and *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft*.
60. See note 7.
61. Karl Marx, *Capital* Vol. 1, p. 126.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28. Emphasis added.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 128. Emphasis added.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 266ff.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
70. Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, "Zum Abschluss des Marxschen Systems" in O. Freiherr von Boenigk, ed., *Staatswissenschaftliche Arbeiten*, Festgaben für Karl Knies (Berlin, 1896).
71. E. Bernstein, "Allerhand Werttheoretisches," Vol. II: "Vom reinen Arbeitswert," in E. Bernstein, *Dokumente des Sozialismus* (Frankfurt: Saver & Auvermann, 1968), Vol. V, in particular p. 270; vol. III, "Vom Wesen und Wert des Wertbegriffes," pp. 369 and 464; Vol. IV, "Vom Wert des Wertbegriffes," pp. 557ff.
72. G. B. Shaw, "Wie man den Leuten die Werttheorie aufherrscht" in E. Bernstein, *Dokumente des Sozialismus*, Vol. II, pp. 84ff.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
74. F. Hinkelammert (see note 11) believes that my remarks reflect a "fundamental misunderstanding of the marxist theory of value" but he confirms simultaneously that they express the opinions of the "marginal use" theoreticians and also Bohm-Bawerk (p. 4). My misunderstanding of the Marxist theory of value is said to lie in that I reproach Marx "with abstracting from use-value in his explanation of market-prices," whereas in fact not Marx but the market itself abstracts from the use-value and hence is the "subject of abstraction" (p. 2) The reference to "marginal-use" theory, on the other hand, is said to have lost its relevance today because its opinions have been proven false. It was proven by, for instance, Edgeworth and Pareto, that the "measurability of use-extent" (in contrast to the measurability of labor time) is impossible, which within neoclassical economic thought led to the conclusion of having to abandon value-theory entirely because, in light of this, it was denounced as "metaphysical."

To both of these points I would like to address myself in the following remarks:

Addendum 1. I believe, in fact, like the "marginal-use" theoreticians, that Marx has incorrectly assumed that an explanation of how market prices are determined ought to abstract from "(abstract) utility"—and from the "use-value" of goods—because the market mechanism (as Marx correctly assumed) of price determination abstracts from the "concrete use-values" of goods. This abstraction is indeed also confirmed by bourgeois theoreticians like Paul Samuelson and M. Weber (see Hinkelammert, p. 14ff). The point of this critique of marxism lies in that it can possibly open a perspective to the indispensable achievements and benefits of the market mechanism (especially price signals) that were not considered by Marx (such as, for example, the discovery and mediation of needs and resources): benefits, which, under the presuppositions of an appropriate "framework" (i.e., a "social market economy" on a world scale), could build a

deciding counterweight to the admittedly often disastrous “external effects” of the capitalist market system. Were this to be the case, then there would be an alternative to the Marxist presupposition that the market economy must destroy “humanity and nature.” On this point, Hinkelammert is still in basic agreement with Marx, but he simultaneously declares “that we today must take as obsolete and utopian the marxist solution of the overcoming the capitalist system” (p. 8). I do not know, then, how he can arrive at an ethically engaged philosophy of economy.

Addendum 2. I do not believe that the now clarified critique of the Marxist labor theory of value must be burdened with all the special assumptions which Hinkelammert supposes I should be committed to; assumptions such as, for instance, the “measurability of use-extent” or the adoption (corresponding contrapuntally to the Marxist utopia) of a bourgeois utopia of an “ideal price system,” or, similarly, a deterministic system of equilibrium of “perfect competition” (pp. 81f). I hold, as Hinkelammert does, that the attempt of the 19th century to understand economy as an exact, value-free, nomological science, in analogy to classical physics, was essentially a project that failed; just as Karl Marx’s attempt to understand the “laws” of the economy, in the sense of a macroscopic-dialectical insight into the “necessary path of history”—which in turn implied the possibility of “an unconditional prognosis” (Popper)—also failed. Hinkelammert is right when claims that the “overcoming of capitalism [would have to be] necessary and inevitable,” if one had to suppose, with Marx, that “the capitalist production of commodities created wealth in which the sources of wealth, humanity and nature, are themselves destroyed” (p. 26). However, this presupposition by Marx represents an “unconditional prognosis” of the future of history, something that in my view is methodologically no longer admissible. Furthermore, the implied theory of the “impoverishment” of the proletariat has been contradicted in the leading industrial countries of the North, and this is essentially due to the fact that Marx’s presupposition of a free market with respect to the specific commodity, labor power, has been canceled through the intervention of labor unions. There is thus in principle the possibility that the capitalist system of the market economy could be reformed socio-politically, that is, with respect to the “frame-work” conditions, in historically unpredictable ways. (Here lies, in my opinion, the possible starting point for an ethics of the economy.) Admittedly it is this possibility that has—on a world-scale—not been redeemed. Why is this the case?

With this type of questioning, I have introduced the *theory of dependence* as an innovative and earnestly received theory, while also attempting to develop for myself, through a *pro* and *contra* discussion of the literature, a picture of its relevance. For the unbiased reader, one could hardly talk of a “throw-away critique” (Hinkelammert), although one could just as little talk of a definitive assessment. This far I am not yet.

75. I hope in the context of these “preliminary considerations,” to have made clear that, in contrast to Dussel’s assumption (in his “Response to Apel and Ricoeur,” below), for me it is not a question of disputing something like the relationship of the Marxist conception of “living labor” to a “community,” but that, instead, it is a matter of suggesting that the life-worldly basis of intersubjectivity that is supposed by Marx—the basis of a community of producers—is insufficient for an understanding of the constitution of any market-economic relationships of commodity

exchange. The “essential” presupposition of this last should be, in my view, more complex than it is presupposed by either Marx or Dussel. In the philosophical undercutting of this complexity there lies, however, the dangerous, illusionary and very utopian anticipation of a possible dissolution of the market economy of commodity exchange through a direct (self-transparent) distribution of goods by the community of producers. It is solely in light of this conception, which Dussel clearly shares with Marx (despite the reservations expressed by Hinkelammert), that I have assessed Dussel's “marxism” (and not, as Dussel supposes, by imputing to him some sort of dogmatic marxism-leninism).

However, this discussion shows that, with regard to the concepts of utopia, regulative ideas, ideal models, and “transcendental” (philosophy), or a “transcendental economy,” as Dussel once postulated, clarification is still required: one which, in the context of these preliminary considerations, cannot be undertaken.

76. M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen; Mohr, 1924), pp. 508/f. See also W. Schluchter, *Aspekte bürokratischer Herrschaft. Studien zur Interpretation der fortschreitenden Industriegesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985).
77. I am here basing myself especially on the following section from Vol. 1 of *Capital* (“Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret”), which is very telling with regard to what Marx had in mind as an economic system which would come after the overcoming of the capitalist market economy of commodity exchange:

Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force.... The total product of our imagined association is a social product. One part of this product serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But another part is consumed by the members of the association as means of subsistence. This part must therefore be divided among them. The way this division is made will vary with the particular kind of social organization of production and the corresponding level of social development attained by the producers. We shall assume, but only for the sake of a parallel with the production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence is determined by his labour-time. Labour-time would in that case play a double part. Its apportionment in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the correct proportion between the different functions of labour and the various needs of the associations. On the other hand, labour-time also serves as a measure of the part taken by each individual in the common labour, and of his share in the part of the total product destined for individual consumption. The social relations of the individual producers, both towards their labour and the products of their labour, are here transparent in their simplicity, in production as well as in distribution. (*Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 171-72)

78. Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957); and *The Open Society and Its Enemies: The High Tide of Prophecy*, Vol. 2. (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1991).
79. See E. Dussel, “Les quatre rédactions du *Capital*” (see note 5, as well as the works cited in note 6).
80. Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 251.
81. I. Kant, “Über den Gemeinspruch; Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis,” *Akademie-Textausg.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 308ff.
82. See Jean-François Lyotard in *Critique*, 456, May 1985, pp. 559ff.

83. O. Marquard, *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 13.
84. Karl-Otto Apel, "Discourse Ethics before the challenge of Liberation Philosophy: Second Part", trans. Eduardo Mendieta Forthcoming in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 22, no.2, pp. 1-25.