

## FOREWORD

This book gathers some of the essays which are fruits of recent debates and dialogues that have only just begun. The Philosophy of Liberation that I practice, not only in Latin America, but also regarding all types of oppression on the planet (of women, the discriminated races, the exploited classes, the marginalized poor, the impoverished countries, the old and homeless exiled and buried in shelters and asylums, the local religions, the homeless and orphaned children (a lost generation) of inhospitable cities, the systems destroyed by capital and the market... in short, the *immense majority of humanity*), begins a dialogue with the hegemonic European-North American philosophical community. The works here presented all gravitate around one central theme: eurocentrism and the invisibility of "economics" that in turn prevent the development out of poverty of the *greater part of humanity* as a fundamental philosophical and ethical theme.

In the first part of this book, in fact, the essay "Liberation Philosophy from the Praxis of the Oppressed" was presented at the First International Congress of Latin American Philosophy that took place in the city of Juárez (Mexico), May 1990, and in which I situated some issues in debate from the perspective of my re-interpretation of Marx's work, and from my critique of machismo, a problem that I began to reformulate in this work and which will be the object of future explicit studies in *Ethics of Liberation*, under redaction.

On 25 November 1989, two weeks before the so-called fall of the Berlin Wall-news of which I received on 9 December from Agnes Heller before I was to give a lecture on "The Four Redactions of Capital" at the New School for Social Research in New York-I delivered a work in German on the "Introduction to Apel's *Transformation of Philosophy* and Liberation Philosophy",<sup>1</sup> which had been requested by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt of Aachen, in order to initiate a dialogue with Apel's discourse ethics from the perspective of liberation philosophy. This was only a beginning.

In another work, therefore, which is here the second essay, "The Reason of the Other: 'Interpellation' as Speech Act", I presented the clarification and development of my position in Freiburg. This work was presented originally in March of 1991 at a seminar organized in Mexico. The last part of this essay, and the latter sections of the work dedicated to a dialogue with Ricoeur, share some similarities given that my intention was to note the urgency of a return, "against fashion," to the philosophical and critical discourse of Marx (which I

articulated without contradiction in my interpretation of several volumes with respect to Levinas and as a function of a philosophical discourse on the liberation of the poor of the earth).

The third work, "Toward a North-South Dialogue", was presented in German on 14 March 1992, in Bad-Homburg (next to Frankfurt), on the occasion of Karl-Otto Apel's seventieth birthday, and was later published by Suhrkamp in a *Festschrift* for Apel.

The fourth work, "From the Skeptic to the Cynic", was presented in German at a conference which took place in Mainz, 11 April 1992, as the third stage in the dialogue that had begun in Freiburg in 1989.

The fifth work, in French, "Hermeneutics and Liberation", requested by Domenico Jervolino, professor at the University of Naples, was a lecture that served as the basis for a dialogue with Paul Ricoeur, which took place in the university on 16 April 1991. I had already spoken with Ricoeur on the theme in January of 1990 in Rome, on the occasion of a seminar on ethics which had taken place at the Lateranense University, and during a trip I made to Chicago to meet and talk at length during a most amicable evening with my old professor from the Sorbonne.

The sixth work, "A 'Conversation' with Richard Rorty", I prepared in order to be able to exchange some ideas with Rorty on the occasion of his visit to us in Mexico, 2-5 July 1991. We were only able to converse a little with Rorty. However, given that I had read his work expressly for this encounter, this was enough in order to understand better his thought "in action," personally. To the question whether «the exploitation of Latin America, or of poor North-Americans, is a fact *caused* by capitalism?," Rorty answered: "I do not know!" He exclaimed doubtfully, "Is there in any event a system without exploitation?" -which contained, without him noticing it, an affirmative answer to my question<sup>2</sup>.

The seventh work, «Modernity, Eurocentrism" and Trans-Modernity," I wrote when Charles Taylor had been invited to hold a seminar in Mexico, in 1992 (but which was later postponed). The philosopher of the "ethical life" and "authenticity," who has so many merits for cultures which would like to affirm their identity, I had to submit to some critiques which nevertheless do not diminish his historical work.

In the second part, the eighth work is the first written entry of Apel in the debate-since in 1991, in Mexico, Apel had made only an extemporaneous presentation, situating himself still at the level of a clarification of context and methodology, and manifesting in his critique, in any event, an extremely open position toward the problem of the South. This work has been included here in order to give greater clarity to the breadth and depth of the debate. Ricoeur's answer, the ninth work, "Philosophy and Liberation", delivered at the meeting that took place in Naples, consists in admitting, in certain way,

the lack of an economics in his own discourse, but concerns itself primarily with demonstrating the danger of an economics without politics.

It is for this reason that in the tenth contribution, "On World System, Politics, and the Economics of Liberation Philosophy", I began an answer, initially to Ricoeur—the logic of the argumentation required it so—in order to later focus almost exclusively on Apel.

I hope that this debate will help the reader to understand better the meaning of a Philosophy of Liberation, such as I personally practice.<sup>3</sup> I think this is a new stage for the Philosophy of Liberation. It would seem as though its stage of hidden and criticized gestation has ended and the public debate has begun, beyond the boundaries of the Latin American horizon. This was necessary in order to better discover and elaborate its own architecture. However, this was equally necessary in order to make it known within the context of the contemporary discussion; because, in my opinion, it has very good reasons to contribute in favor of the oppressed, exploited, and dominated, especially in favor of the impoverished peoples of the peripheral nations of capitalism, who live under a neo-liberal hegemony of economies of free competition (as Friedrich Hayek would say), where, soon and not too far from the "Fall of the Berlin wall" (1989), the true meaning of the New World order, inaugurated with the "cruelty" (to talk as Rorty) of thousands of tons of bombs thrown on an innocent people—since the madness of Saddam Hussein and the people of Iraq have to be distinguished—will be seen. It is necessary to ethically demonstrate, in a time of confusion, how the same principles should reign concerning the rights of the people of Kuwait, as well as the rights of Panama or Grenada, and not simply to allow the invasion of the Persian Gulf by the great American power, and to legitimate its violent and destructive action against Iraq simply because it is a lesser power and because it threatened the center of petroleum supply for the capitalist world (a "great word" for Rorty, but a necessary one for the clarification of the oppression of poor peoples).

The Philosophy of Liberation, thus, opens itself up to new themes from the same *punto de partida* (point of departure): the "interpellation" of the oppressed (be they poor, women, children, elderly people, the discriminated—against race, the peripheral nation) that pragmatically interrupts (in the sense of Austin) within the horizon of the Totality (in the sense of Levinas) dominated by the hegemonic reason, or what we have begun to call recently *cynical reason* (which Rorty does not criticize because he refuses to enter into discussion). The Philosophy of Liberation affirms decisively and unequivocally the communicative, strategic, and liberating importance of "reason" (with Habermas and Apel). It denounces eurocentrism and the pretension to universality of modern reason (with the postmoderns, but for other "reasons"), and commits itself to the reconstruction of a critical philosophical discourse that departs from the

“Exteriority” (with Marx and Levinas, for example) and assumes a practico-political “responsibility” in the “clarification” of the liberating praxis of the oppressed. Neither abstract universalistic rationalism nor irrationalist pragmatism: transcendence and synthesis of a liberating *historical reason*, critique of the pretension to universality of particular reason, and affirmation of the rational novelty of future totalities constructed by the erotic, pedagogic, political, and even religious praxis of the *oppressed* (women, children, popular cultures, classes, national exploited groups, and the alienation of many in the fundamentalism that is in fashion). In this sense, yes, the Philosophy of Liberation is a particular language and a meta-language (a “language game”) of the “languages of liberations”. The philosophy of feminist liberation, the philosophy of political-economic liberation of the poor (as persons, groups, classes, popular masses, and peripheral nations), the philosophy of cultural liberation of youth and peoples (from the educational systems and hegemonic media), and even the philosophy of religious and anti-fetishist, or anti-racist, liberation are all concrete levels of the Philosophy of Liberation. Rorty would be scandalized by this great “meta-narrative” of “great words”; but at least I believe he accepts the importance of poetry and propheticism. The Philosophy of Liberation pretends, and I have been saying it for more than twenty years, being a “proteptics” (“exhortation” to the transformation of critical thinking) that should create ethical conscience, promote solidarity, clarify and ground the responsible demand to engage and commit oneself organically (as Gramsci would say) in the movement of the praxis of liberation of the oppressed-whatever the level of oppression. It is a great moment in the history of Reason as communication (Habermas), as community (Apel), as solidarity (Rorty), as positive hermeneutics of the symbolics of the oppressed (to which Ricoeur contributes elements but does not develop the theme)...not forgetting, which appears to be always forgotten, that it is the oppressed herself or himself-themselves (child, women, “pueblo”)-who are the *historical subjects of their own liberation*: a subject that philosophy cannot pretend to replace but instead, with clear conscience, in which philosophy plays a function of solidarity of “second act”-a reflection (the *a posteriori*) about praxis (the *a priori*).

A last comment about the language used in this work is in order. All of these texts must be placed within their respective debates and their diverse languages. It is for this reason that far too frequently there appear within parentheses, or the text itself, words in their original languages, or, in the notes, suggestions for translations or for oral conversation. Forgiveness is requested from the reader. We have left the texts just as they were prepared in order to retain their provisional character, as materials for future development, and in order to remember the expressions and style of the authors with whom these dialogues were held. There are, as well, many repetitions because each text had to explain everything to the new interlocutor. Finally,

I would like to thank Eduardo Mendieta for the great labor he has undertaken in gathering and translating these texts, certainly an authentic promise for the irruption of Hispanic philosophy in the United States.

Enrique Dussel

## Notes

1. This has been published in Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, ed., *Ethik und Befreiung* (Aachen: Augustinus Buchhandlung, 1990); pp. 69-97; in Spanish, it has appeared in Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, Enrique Dussel, and Karl-Otto Apel, eds., *Fundamentación ética y filosofía de la liberación* (México: Siglo XXI, 1992), but has not been included in here.
2. If "one does not know" whether capitalism is the cause of exploitation, but one affirms (given that the question is a rhetorical device in this question) that there is no system without exploitation (that is, in all systems there is exploitation), the next question then would be: "How is it that you have not asked yourself, or have not interested yourself, in knowing what is the cause of exploitation in *this system*, the capitalist system?" given that there must be one since it is a system and it cannot lack some type of exploitation. There is no room here for the evasive: "I do not know," Instead, one has to be in solidarity and attempt to "clarify" *the cause* of their suffering. This it is my opinion, is the objective of a pragmatic philosophy, at least in the sense of Dewey's or Cornel West's vision.
3. See my old work *Philosophy of Liberation* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985).

## *Acknowledgments*

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Stephen Eric Bronner, who has been an inspiration and a mentor. Enrique Dussel was kind to read over my translation and make comments. Prof. Karl-Otto Apel was also very generous with his time. He checked and made suggestions on my translation of his work. I have been fortunate to have received institutional support, without which this project would not have been possible: the New School for Social Research, and in particular Elizabeth Btewer; the DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst); and the University of San Francisco, where I held the Irvine Fellowship in philosophy, which allowed me the time to complete the research for the introduction and to revise the final manuscript. At the University of San Francisco, I am very thankful for all the support and encouragement I received from Gerardo Marín and the Dean of Arts and Sciences, Stanley Nel. I also want to thank Prof. Jürgen Habermas and my colleagues in the Habermas colloquium at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, where most of the work for this book was carried out, especially Pere Fabra, Luis Sánchez, Amós Nascimento, Juan Carlos Velasco, Max Pensky, Christina Lafont, Anna Riek, Peter Niesen—a global philosophical community. Finally, I am very thankful to Keith Ashfield of Humanities Press for his confidence, patience, and encouragement, and Cindy Kaufman-Nixon, who took special care of this manuscript. I would also like to thank William Zeisel for his work on this manuscript and my research assistants, José Espinoza and Maria José Perry.

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### *Editor's Introduction*

In Marxist, theological, or Latin American studies circles Enrique Dussel would not need any introduction. Unfortunately, this is not the case in philosophical circles, although Dussel himself was trained primarily as a philosopher. There are several reasons for this distorted reception of what is undoubtedly one of the most impressive—in its breadth, depth, and sheer quantity—creative and synthesizing philosophical, historical, cultural, and theological minds to come out of Latin America in the last thirty years. First, and above all, Dussel is a Latin American philosopher writing in what is today a “barbaric” language, Spanish. This, however, translates into two strikes against him; that is, he is neither from one of the cultural “centers” authorized to produce and disseminate the latest philosophical fashions, nor are his works known or translated (except for a few exceptions). The marketplace of ideas remains bewitched by the linguistic prolixity and seductiveness of playful and sensual French or the Teutonic seriousness and finality of German. Second, for political, cultural, and historical reasons, Dussel, as one of the main representatives and articulators of Liberation Theology, has been unequivocally ghettoized and relegated to the “safe” area of theological studies. Politically, liberation theology has always been suspect to both Washington and Rome. Perhaps we need to remind ourselves of President Reagan’s official condemnation of Liberation Theology. Culturally and historically, North American philosophers have for the most part lacked sensitivity toward the interpenetration of religion, society, politics, and philosophy,<sup>1</sup> *pace* Robert Bellah, Harold Bloom, and Cornel West, and *pace* the unquestionably important, almost fundamental role religion played in the thinking of the founders of a distinctly North American philosophical tradition (think for instance of Royce, Peirce, Dewey). As an illustrative analogy, the curious reception Cornel West’s work has had in the recent past in the United States, which for a long time remained in the shadow of religious and theological faculties, is indicative of the same schizophrenic attitude. Third, as a “third world” Marxist—Dussel Marxism not only advocates a unique but has, over the last fifteen years, established himself as one of the foremost exegetes, critics, and analysts of Marx’s *oeuvre*—and philosopher who takes seriously the “dependency” theories of social scientists, he has been taken, when heard, to be talking at the beat of an “unfashionable,” anachronistic, and superseded “language game”. Fourth, and perhaps this goes without saying, the philosophical disciplines remain, for the most part and with some rare exceptions, imprisoned

by their deeply entrenched eurocentrism. In the following introduction, therefore, I hope to address this unfortunate state of affairs by providing some very general and schematic markers in Dussel's life, his intellectual development (I), and the development of Liberation Philosophy (II). I will conclude with some remarks on the essays here collected concerning their place within a Liberation Philosophy discourse and their possible impact within the philosophical discourse of the global community of philosophers and social scientists (III).

## I. Biographical Sketch

In accordance with one of the main tenets of Dussel's philosophical system, a philosopher's life, as well as that of any other human being, cannot be cogently understood if it is not related to the concrete historical period(s) through which that life extends. Moreover, the historical context of a person's life, as Dussel never tires of emphasizing, is always entwined with its location in the social space (or geopolitical space) that constitutes the spatial referent of all historical events. The historical time of someone in Paris or New York is very different from that of someone in New Delhi or Bogotá by virtue of their place in a geopolitical space. Dussel's life, therefore, is punctuated as much by what has happened in historical time as by where he was when something happened. I will divide Dussel's life into four periods, following Dussel's own chronology as well as that of other Dussel scholars. I will, however, follow this division not merely because it fixes certain dates and places, but also because it refers to particular stages in the evolution of the conceptual architectonic of Dussel's system which bear the imprint of their spatial and temporal referents. These periods will refer specifically to areas of research and particular philosophical approaches that reflect shifts in space as well as shifts in historical time.<sup>2</sup>

*The Formative years (1934-57).* Enrique Dussel was born in 1934, in La Paz, a small village about 150 km from Mendoza, a major city in Argentina. His great grandfather was of German provenance and his father was the village doctor. He grew up without hardship but exposed to the general penury and hunger of his people. During his youth, Dussel was involved in the Catholic Action movement. He also was extensively involved in university student politics. He became president of the student federation of the University of Mendoza. His formation, reflecting the rather classical character of university education at the time, was primarily in Thomism. It was during this period of his education that Dussel was exposed to the category of analogy and its central role in medieval philosophy. He obtained his philosophy licentiate with a thesis on "the concept of the common good from the pre-



Socratics to Aristotle” (1957). These are the years of a young, village intellectual, moving back and forth between the country and the city.

*The Years of the Discovery of Latin America (1957-67)*. In 1957, after completing his licentiate, Dussel traveled to Spain to continue his philosophical studies. In Spain he received a doctorate in philosophy with a 1,200-page dissertation on "The Concept of the Common Good in Charles de Konick and Maritain". During this time he came under the influence of Xavier Zubiri, a member of the "Madrid School" that gathered around Ortega y Gasset. It is from the distant perspective of Europe, as a foreigner in the colonizing land, that Dussel discovered "Latin America". This discovery, as he understood it at the time, called for an archeological recovery of the "ethical-mythical sources" of Latin America, as well as the development of a universal historical perspective within which to place the life world of Latin America. From 1959 to 1961, after finishing his doctorate in philosophy, and having come under the influence of Paul Gauthier, Dussel moved to Israel to live in a kibbutz. During this period Dussel immersed himself in the Semitic roots of Christianity, learned Hebrew, and explored the spiritual dimensions of poverty. From the colony, to the center, and then to another historical and spatial periphery, Dussel moved through the layers of a space filled with historical consequences and memories. It is during this period that he began a trilogy on the three different ethical-mythical cores from which our modern Latin American cultures descend, that is, the Semitic, the Greco-Roman, and the Christian "mythical-ethical cores". In 1961, he wrote his *Semitic Humanism*, followed in 1963 by *Hellenic Humanism*. This trilogy was concluded in 1968 with *Dualism in the Anthropology of Christendom*. The trilogy was methodologically motivated by Paul Ricoeur's symbolics and hermeneutics, especially as these were articulated in his *Symbolism of Evil*. The theme was the phenomenological elucidation of the world-views disclosed in the particular symbols that different cultures use to give meaning and guide their life worlds. After Israel, Dussel returned to Europe, this time to France and Germany, to continue his studies. In 1964, in Mainz, he wrote *Hypotheses for a History of the Church in Latin America*. This work later became influential in the development of Liberation Theology, and in particular the critiques of European ecclesiology (Boff, for instance). During this period he received his second doctorate, in history, from the Sorbonne with a dissertation on the defense of the Indians in the Christian Church in the New World, published as *Les Eveques Hispano-Américains. Défenseurs et évangilisateur de l'Indien 1505-1620* (1970). In Dussel's intellectual biography, this period is particularly important because he discovered Latin America as a horizon of meaning and understanding that must be understood from within and from without, according to its own symbolics, and according to its place in world history.

*The Beginning of Liberation Philosophy (1967-75)*. After ten years of absence, Dussel returned to Argentina in 1967. He became a professor of philosophical anthropology and later of philosophical ethics at the National University of Cuyo. From 1967 to 1969, Dussel travelled throughout Latin America lecturing on the history of Latin America, its place in world history, and its intellectual, philosophical, and spiritual sources. Dussel himself points to 1969 as a determining moment in the emergence of a new phase of his thinking, for it was during this year that he attended a conference of sociologists in Argentina and was introduced to “dependency theory”. However, as he himself has pointed out in many other places, his openness to “new approaches” could not have been possible without the continuous dialogue, debate, and exchange that took place during the two years he had been back in Latin America. Another very important discovery of this period was that of Emmanuel Levinas's work, which “woke him up from his ontological sleep (as much Heideggerian as Hegelian)”. Indeed, if the prior period was one of “reconstruction” and “discovery,” this period was one of “destruction” and “building anew”. From 1969 onwards, Dussel set out to develop the categories of a uniquely Latin American philosophical perspective, which required the “dismantling” and “recuperation” of the categories that made possible the elaboration of a Latin American emancipatory discourse. This project, it should be kept in mind, only makes sense against the background of the influential debate between Leopoldo Zea and Salazar Augusto Bondy.<sup>3</sup> By early 1970, after in-depth studies of Hegel, Heidegger, and Levinas, and with all of his historical works on Latin America in his bag, Dussel discovered and elaborated the main tenets of a liberation ethics: ethics is *prima philosophia* (in Levinas's and Apel's sense<sup>4</sup>) and its method is not the dialectic (whether in its cosmological, ontological, or egological versions) but the analectic of Otherness (the rupture into and transformation of totalized life worlds by the creative and appellative epiphany of the Other, not as mere *difference* but as the truly *distinct*, as wholly Other).<sup>5</sup> In the spring and summer of 1970, he lectured on ethics and began work on what became a five-volume ethics. During this time he also lectured throughout Latin America on “Ethics, History and the Theology of Liberation”.<sup>6</sup> These early years of the ferment of Liberation Philosophy were also some of his most prolific.

This period of gestation and elaboration, however, cannot be understood without the political background against which Dussel and his Argentinian colleagues worked. The late sixties and early seventies were the period of Latin American “populisms”, partly inspired by the Cuban revolution, partly inspired by the bourgeois anti-imperialistic movements, of which Peronism was one instance (see chapter 10, below). Right-wing and left-wing Peronism waged war on the Argentinian national landscape, and liberation philosophers were caught in the middle. In 1973, Dussel was the target of a bomb attack in his house. By 1975, after years of persecution and threats, and finally being

expelled from the National University of Cuyo, he took his family out of the country. In 1975, Dussel began his exile in Mexico, and a new stage in the development of liberation philosophies was initiated.

*Toward a "Transcendental Economics" and Mexican Exile 1975-Present.*

In Mexico, Dussel wrote what is perhaps the most systematic, broad, and rigorous presentation of the basic propositions of Liberation Philosophy. Unfortunately, many people come to this book without realizing that it is in fact the summary of his five volumes on ethics, his works on Hegel and Levinas, and his numerous historical writings. *Philosophy of Liberation* is a work which also tries to give an overview of a fairly sophisticated and developed philosophical discourse. What is distinctive about this stage is not only that Dussel was in exile in Mexico, but that, partly inspired by the failures of populism (see chapter 10 below), the criticism and debates about the categories of class and people as foundations for any philosophy, and the need to translate dependency theory into a philosophical formulation, Dussel began an in-depth study of Marx. As a by-product of his *Widerholung* of the tradition, Dussel discovered a "warm current", to use Ernst Bloch's term<sup>7</sup>, that is linked to left Hegelianism, but which in Dussel's terms has to do more with the Semitic aspects of the thought current; in which we can find medieval mystics, Feuerbach, Schelling, Marx, Rosenzweig, Buber, and Levinas. In contrast to the dialectic of a cosmos, being, or consciousness that ascends to unity, autonomy, divine passivity, or self-determination so as to return to itself-where the other of itself is left out as a residue of the true process (the dialectic) as the non-being, the particular, the unknown and worthless-the "warm current" of dialogic, apophantic, creative, analogical thinking moves from the otherness of the other, which always remains beyond the totalized totality. The moment of transformation, of creative irruption into the frozen and stabilized totality, arrives from beyond the horizon of this totality. This is the metaphysical "exteriority" of the Other. Dussel discovered how Marx, not just the young Marx but also, and especially, the older Marx, belongs to this tradition. And while Dussel's works, up through his 1975 *Philosophy of Liberation*, elaborate ethics as first philosophy, it is only after 1975 that this ethics obtained a substantive, practical dimension through the incorporation of Marx into the understanding of a human being's being-in-the-world. Levinas's categories of the Other, the face-to-face, the offering, and so on, will obtain "materiality," "carnality," through their Marxist transformation. The Other will become the dispossessed, the paupers, the ones without anything but their own flesh. The face-to-face will become the fundamental practical-ethical encounter. A Marx seen not just as a Hegelian, but primarily as a Schellingian, in the tradition of Buber, Rosenzweig, Levinas, became the point of departure for the formulation of a

"transcendental economics".<sup>8</sup> Transcendental refers in Dussel's philosophy to, on the one hand, the transcendence of the Other, the exteriority of the dispossessed, and, on the other hand, to the "conditions of possibility" which have been hermeneutically, linguistically, and pragmatically transformed by Karl-Otto Apel.<sup>9</sup> As a reference to the exteriority of the Other, Dussel's transcendental economics points to the poverty of the worker, or pauper, who is the sole creative source of value. As a reference to the conditions of possibility, Dussel's transcendental economics refers to the conditions of the preservation of life as such, the one true condition of possibility for everything else. "Transcendental economics" can be seen as product of the marriage between Levinas's critique of ontology and Marx's critique of capitalism. It is an approximation to writing the *Critique of Practical Reason*, for which Marxism and apophantic metaphysics are already close to being a *Critique of Pure Reason*, to paraphrase Ernst Bloch.<sup>10</sup>

This is not only a new stage in Liberation Philosophy, but also one in the development of world philosophy. This may be the case not only because Liberation Philosophy takes itself to be a particular philosophical discourse that unmasks the false universality of eurocentric philosophical discourses (of modernity as well as postmodernity), but also, and as its corollary, because Liberation Philosophy at the same times claims to have elucidated the parameters of all contemporary philosophical thinking, namely, their forming part and taking place within a "world system". In fact, just as Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Taylor, Rorty et al. claim that philosophy has made a "linguistic", "pragmatic", "hermenutical", "post-metaphysical" turn, where the locus of universal philosophical claims is language and not being or consciousness, Dussel assents but adds the severe proviso that philosophy has made this turn but not sufficiently, or not in earnest and in accordance with the deepest insights of the triple paradigm shift. It is the role of a "transcendental economics" to not only make good on the promises of the three different moments of the linguistic turn, but also to make good on Marx and the promise that he still holds out for the Third World.

## II. Historical Sketch of Liberation Philosophy

Just as the history of contemporary neo-pragmatism, which is espoused in one way or another by Rorty, Bernstein, Fraser, and West, has a pre-history that dates back to the early 19th century, but which has a more immediate history in the late sixties<sup>11</sup>. Liberation Philosophy has a pre-history which at least dates back to the 16th century (de las Casas, Montesinos, and others) and the 18th and 19th century (Bolívar, Santander, and others) with the development of emancipatory discourses that legitimated the movements of independence and liberation from Spain, England, Portugal, etc., but which has its most immedi-

ate historical antecedents in the late sixties and early seventies (see chapter 1).

Following Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, but adding some other elements, I will suggest that there are at least eight factors that must be considered when trying to understand the emergence of liberation philosophy:<sup>12</sup>

1. The Cuban Revolution (1959) and its significance for Latin America<sup>13</sup>.
2. The second general assembly of CELAM in Medellín (Colombia) in August 1968<sup>14</sup>.
3. The development of Latin American Liberation Theology (1968-72); the appearance of its "manifesto", Gustavo Gutiérrez's *A Theology of Liberation*<sup>15</sup>.
4. The polemic between Augusto Salazar Bondy and Leopoldo Zea (1969-70) concerning the possibility of an authentic Latin American philosophy.<sup>16</sup>
5. The renaissance of Latin American "populisms," and Argentina's case in particular (1970-75).
6. The development of dependence theory.<sup>17</sup>
7. The global events that go by the name 1968.<sup>18</sup>
8. Globalization of finance capital, a new phase in "Late Capitalism".<sup>19</sup>

The Cuban Revolution was, and continues to be, a source of inspiration for Latin Americans. The possibilities and limits of any possible revolutionary movement in Latin America were exemplified by the triumph and ultimate constraint of this great challenge to the imperialist hegemony the United States exercised over the whole continent. The Cuban Revolution meant the possibility of a unique Latin American path toward political emancipation that navigated between the populisms of some of the most reactionary dictatorships the history of Latin America has seen and the violence of the "national security" states that became the rule after the fifties, partly as a reaction to the threat of communism, but based mostly in an ideology of top-down political modernization (yet another aspect of *desarrollismo*). As Martin Luther King, Jr., galvanized African-Americans in the late fifties and early sixties in the United States, and today has become an icon of hope and transformation, Che Guevara was the prototype of the new Latin American man. Even today there is no Latin American city without a mural of Che Guevara.

As important as Vatican II was for the general transformation of Catholicism in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, it was not until Medellín that Latin American bishops appropriated Vatican II for their churches. The documents that came out of this conference have been appropriately called the Vatican II of Latin America.<sup>20</sup> In general terms the conclusions reached at this conference opened the way and laid the foundations for the "church of the people" and its concomitant, a theology of liberation.

Gustavo Gutiérrez gave the clearest formulation of the consequences of both

Vatican II and the second general assembly of Latin American bishops. In *A Theology of Liberation*, Gutiérrez began the paradigm shift that would take Latin American theology away from abstract philosophy to the social sciences, away from the fallacy of *desarrollismo* to a historical theology of "liberation", away from the conceptual naivete and self-deceiving autonomy of European theological discourse to self-conscious, self-critical, engaged theological reflection. It is not without justification that Liberation Theology has been called a second Reformation.

While Latin American theologians were developing a unique theological discourse that would be true to the social reality from which it arises and of which it is a critical commentary, philosophers were trying to come to terms with the inauthentic state of Latin American philosophy. Augusto Salazar Bondy asked whether *there exists a Latin American Philosophy*, to which he answered negatively. Bondy saw the Latin American state of oppression, under-development, and dependency as the conditions for the impossibility of a truly authentic Latin American philosophy. Thus, for Bondy, an authentic Latin American philosophy could only appear in the form of a liberation philosophy, a philosophy which begins with the Latin American reality of oppression and dependence. Zea, in contrast, argued that Latin American philosophy was, by virtue of its having arisen from Latin American reality, already truly Latin American and thus could not be any less authentic than it was. Latin American philosophy, whether in the form of exegesis, critique, or creative intervention vis-à-vis European philosophy, was philosophy as such (*sin más*). For Zea, Bondy's denial of the Latin American past was a tremendous failure which vitiated his own project of a liberation philosophy. In contrast, Zea called for the development of a Latin American philosophy of history, one which would place Latin America within universal history.

After the Cuban Revolution, and in conjunction with the ascendancy of home-grown bourgeoisies, populism made a reappearance in Latin America, especially in Chile and Argentina. It is against the background of these populist political movements that we must understand both the revival of the Catholic Church through its *comunidades de base* and the philosophical debates about an authentic Latin American philosophy. It is with reference to the same context that the important debates between liberation philosophers about whether "class" or "people" were better analytical categories must be seen to reflect the ambiguities and dangers of applying European categories to a different social reality. Still, what is central about these populisms is that they gave occasion for much hope as well as reason for much disappointment about what the "people" could do and, in effect, would do.

From the standpoint of the so-called autonomy of philosophical thinking, however, it was the development of dependence theory which catalyzed the development of Liberation Philosophy. While philosophers had already begun

to orient themselves to the social sciences, just as the theologians were doing, partly as a consequence of the influences of hermeneutics and Frankfurt-school critical theory, it was dependence theory that caused the major caesura in philosophy. Dependence theory provided the fundamental conceptual framework within which Latin American under-development and dependency could be understood. Liberation Philosophy translated it into philosophical categories. Dussel's early works reflect this clearly. Through Zea, Bondy, Scannone, Dussel, et al., dependence theory became a philosophy of history, a metaphysics of exteriority, an ethics of liberation, and so on. Just as the convergence between Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Peirce, Seattle, and Austin created the rupture in the self-understanding of (Euro-North Atlantic) philosophy that goes by the name of "linguistic turn", the convergence of the works of Wallerstein, Frank, Cardoso, Faletto, and Amin<sup>21</sup> created an "epistemological break" in the reflection of Latin American philosophers. Everything from now on was seen differently.

Mexico City, New York, Berlin, Paris, all across the world students were "liberating" universities, intellectuals were on the side of the people, cities were in flames, and the streets were barricaded. The year 1968 saw a global phenomenon that pointed to a transformation not just in the nature of capital, now in the process of complete globalization, but also in the consciousness of First World and Third World peoples. The year 1968 was as much about the critique of imperialism, racism, and sexism within industrialized nations as it was about the affirmation of Third World peoples' autonomy, identity, will to freedom, and liberation. A global, non-Euro-North American history of philosophy would have to look at the resurgence of pragmatism and the development of an autochthonous black liberation theology, for instance, after the late sixties, as a parallel process to the emergence of Liberation Theology and Liberation Philosophy in the southern cone of the continent.

### III. The Impact of These Essays

This book reflects both Dussel's coherent and systematic philosophical positions and how his ideas have developed in a constant dialogue. The book is thus divided into two sections. The first gathers Dussel's original contributions to what were sometimes first encounters, but were more frequently already ongoing debates. The second section gathers responses by Karl-Otto Apel and Paul Ricoeur, as well as Dussel's own rebuttals. The first four chapters reflect clearly Dussel's and Apel's philosophical *Auseinandersetzung*. The rest stand as confrontations with the philosophical propositions of individual thinkers from the standpoint of an overall argumentative strategy. It is precisely this argumentative strategy and philosophical position that gives coherence to this book.

In the first essay, Dussel discusses the present status of Liberation Philosophy from the standpoint of a global history of Liberation Philosophy and the tasks that lie ahead for it. Dussel suggests here a periodization that recuperates the earliest, and sometimes unfairly forgotten, manifestations of liberation thinking within Latin America and Europe as nascent center. Liberation Philosophy has as its earliest antecedents the philosophy of the critique of the conquest of Amerindia (1510-53) and the philosophy of colonial liberation (1750-1830). To the period of the critique of the conquest of Amerindia belong Montesinos, Mendieta, Vittoria, and de las Casas. With them, in fact, begins the true counter-discourse of modernity. The historical and philosophical antecedent of the struggles for justice and political autonomy that will give rise to the differentiation among the state, civil society, the Church, and the emergence of something like a *Rechtstatt* are for the most part dated in the 17th and 18th centuries by thinkers like Weber, Parsons, Habermas, Rorty, Taylor, even Ricoeur. This, however, reflects not only a false chronology but also an inappropriate focus on central Europe (France, Germany, etc.) as the center or loci of true political development.<sup>22</sup> In recuperating these "forgotten" discourses for liberation philosophy, Dussel also redeems them for the counter-discourses of modernity, the counter-discourses that give any emancipatory and normative content to modernity as a project. In general, however, this first essay is a very clear, succinct introduction to the main philosophical and historical sources of liberation philosophy, as well as to its most pressing problems and tasks.

The second, third, and fourth chapters are direct confrontations with Karl-Otto Apel's transcendental pragmatics and discourse ethics. The first part of chapter 2 presents a brief but very accurate sketch of Apel's *Denkweg*.<sup>23</sup> Dussel also clarifies the status of Liberation Philosophy vis-à-vis postmodernism, a clarification which was needed due to Apel's initial perception of liberation philosophy as a type of postmodern discourse. Interestingly, while Dussel himself already in the early seventies talked of liberation philosophy as a type of postmodern philosophy, inasmuch as it saw itself overcoming the philosophy of consciousness or its egological dialectic, more recently, since the vogue of postmodernity brought on by the Lyotard et al., Dussel has opted for a different descriptive term: trans-modernity. The term trans-modernity underscores that Liberation Philosophy is not about either negating modernity or blithely accepting it, but about transcending it anadialectically; that is, to think the couplet modernity and postmodernity not just from within, but also, and especially, from the perspective of its *reverso*, its underside, its occluded other.

This chapter will also be particularly important in what it contributes to the further clarification of the foundations of a post-linguistic paradigm of philosophy. One of the central problems in the speech-act theory has been the status of statements which do not fit easily into either the perlocutory or



illocutory categories, such as is the the case with interpellation. In this second chapter, Dussel proceeds to elaborate "interpellation", which in his case assumes the primordial character of a moral appellation, as a *sui generis* speech act. Interpellation as such, instead of pointing to the positive description of its background assumptions (i.e., either the ideal communication community or the ideal speech situation of Apel and Habermas, respectively), points to the negative (*via negativa*) delimitation of the conditions which are required but never given that would make the speech act both understandable and acceptable. At stake, however, in Dussel's problematization of interpellation is the same problem that has been raised by Charles Taylor, Martin Seel, and Karl-Otto Apel with respect to the constitution of meaning and the justification of validity. In other words, the problem of *Welterschließung* (world-disclosure). The question raised by this term is: How does the "new" disclose itself or is allowed to be disclosed within an already given horizon of meaning?<sup>24</sup> Dussel's question, then, is: How are new moral-ethical claims allowed to shatter and re-constitute perspectives that do not allow for them (examples: responsibility for the past, for future generations, for nature, for the genetic integrity of species, etc)?

Chapter 3, written on the occasion of Apel's seventieth birthday, sets out to clarify some of the conditions of possibility for a mutually fruitful dialogue between First World and Third World philosophers. Central to this encounter is the critique of a eurocentric conceptualization of modernity, the assumption of a new category of social analysis (the "world-system"), and the translation of the linguistic turn into a "transcendental economics". In the next chapter, Dussel, again trying to assimilate Apel's conceptual gains and advances, profiles a division of labor between discourse ethics and liberation ethics. Whereas the former deals with the skeptic, the latter deals with the cynic. Each one represents a respective rhetorical figure. Each one represents a set of very different, but complementary, challenges. While the skeptic accepts the other as a dialogue partner, the cynic negates such encounter. Discourse ethics and liberation ethics meet at the point where the skeptic and the cynic turn into each other, namely, at the boundary, at the shady area of the exceptional, the extraordinary, the extreme situation of moral denial and ethical irresponsibility. Another way of looking at this problem will be presented in the seventh chapter, on Taylor.

The fifth chapter is significant for an understanding of both the hermeneutical origins of Liberation Philosophy and its revisioning of hermeneutics. After a careful reconstruction of Ricoeur's intellectual biography and comparison with the evolution of Liberation Philosophy, Dussel proceeds to argue for the need to develop an "economics of symbolics" or an "economic semiology", that is, a hermeneutics or semiology that takes into account seriously the economic dimensions of the symbolic constitution and appropriation (and

disappropriation for others) of the world. In the next chapter, Dussel enters into a similar dialogue with Rorty. In contrast to the general and frequently vicious and contentious character with which Rorty's work is dealt, Dussel proceeds to demonstrate and appreciate its importance. Rorty's skepticism vis-à-vis analytic philosophy is extremely healthy for Latin American philosophy departments, where analytic philosophy still reigns supreme. Furthermore, just as Rorty's work has led to a broader perspective within North American philosophy circles that sees both ordinary language philosophy and continental hermeneutical philosophy as aspects of the same project (a project which was in fact began by Apel in the early sixties<sup>25</sup>), his work may lead to the thawing of relations between the analytic and the continental-oriented institutes, faculties, and schools, within Latin American philosophical circles. All of that granted, Dussel points out a very serious aporia in Rorty's discourse. On the one hand, he is open, and is properly praised by Dussel for being so, to the "prophetic" voices of feminists and even African Americans<sup>26</sup>, but, on the other, he seems to be closed to the possibility that Third World countries may raise similar prophetic voices. In Dussel's view, Rorty seems to be too preoccupied with a discussion about "language" and not enough about what language should be talking, namely, the realities of suffering and oppression that only seem to be voiced in terms of the "great narratives" of liberation that Marxist discourses still make possible.

Chapter 7 is a significant intervention in the debate between universalists and communitarians, or between neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians.<sup>27</sup> Beyond, however, being an innovative intervention in this debate, it is also a contribution to moral theory in general. After a careful analysis of Taylor's project of a reconstruction of the sources of the modern self, Dussel points out a series of extremely deleterious biases and occlusions that threaten the reach and validity of such a project. Against Taylor's focus on the Greeks as the great grandfathers of our concepts of autonomy, authenticity and self-actualization, Dussel points out that the notions of individuality and self-responsibility ought to be dated, more appropriately, as far back as Egyptian burial practices and even the more ancient Mesopotamian practices of responsibility for one's fellow human being (*Code of Hammurabi*). Similarly, just as Apel and Habermas are faulted for identifying modernity with the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Revolution—thus following Hegel—without noting that in many cases these are but consequences of more fundamental and determining events, such as the "discovery" of the New World and the installation of Europe as center of a "world system", Taylor is also found to be affected by this type of eurocentrism. However, in terms of moral theory, Dussel suggests that liberation ethics articulates itself as a *tertium quid* between neo-Kantian proceduralism and neo-Hegelian substantive ethical life. As a third path, or approach, liberation ethics elucidates, on the one hand, that within all types

of Kantian proceduralism there is always someone affected who has not formed part of the discussion of validation and universalization of norms, which Dussel calls the *principium exclusionis*, and, on the other, that within all ethical projects that depart from some substantive principles of a given life world or form of life there is always someone who is oppressed, which Dussel calls the *principium oppressionis*. Dussel, again, underscores how liberation ethics and discourse ethics, whose relationship is now mediated vis-à-vis Taylor's ethics of authenticity, meet and part ways at the intersection of exceptional moral situations, which are the exception for "developed" societies but are the rule for "under-developed" societies.<sup>28</sup>

The second part of the book gathers the most immediate answers and rebuttals by Apel, Ricoeur, and Dussel.<sup>29</sup> In his answer to Dussel, Apel takes the opportunity not only to address certain confusions and uncertainties about the reception of discourse ethics, but also, and especially, takes this as an opportunity for an extremely fruitful exchange. Apel takes Dussel's challenges and translates them into direct modifications of the architectonic of discourse ethics. Apel, for instance, considers Dussel's challenge to be not just morally justifiable and appropriate but also extremely important and revealing from a methodological perspective. Indeed, Apel appropriates Dussel's imputations of eurocentrism for a clarification of his own *Selbsteinholungsprinzip*,<sup>30</sup> which demands an internal account of the logic and validity of one's normative stand. Apel, thanks to Dussel, realizes that most discourses of the human sciences, in particular the economic sciences, have failed to take into account the world-system perspective and the development of under-development (in Andre Gunder Frank's phrase). In this sense, Apel concludes that even if dependency theory, as well as Dussel's appeal to Marx, are found wanting in terms of a series of empirical qualifications, they nevertheless present a series of extremely important methodological and normative challenges.<sup>31</sup>

Ricoeur's answer, based on the transcript of his oral answer to Dussel, is a wonderfully succinct description of the "normative goals and contents" of the project of modernity. First, Ricoeur acknowledges the variety of contexts from which most discourses of liberation emerge. More precisely, for Ricoeur, while Europe's background is the struggle against totalitarianism in its two variants, fascist and communist, Latin America's context is one of direct confrontation with the United States. These different "points of departure" may make them incommensurable or incommunicable. Second, Ricoeur wants to acknowledge the rich and valuable inheritance bequeathed to us by the historical experience of the West. In Hegelian fashion, Ricoeur sees this tradition as being about political and ethical freedom. This tradition has agglutinated and appeared under three different aspects: the critique of the sovereign and sovereignty; the crisis of the concrete universal-which Ricoeur very suggestively correlates to the emergence of hermeneutics and the transition to a philosophy of language-and

the development of a system of law with its corresponding infrastructure. In his rebuttal to Apel and Ricoeur, Dussel returns to some of the central themes that run through all the essays gathered here. First, against Ricoeur's claim that the European experiences of totalitarianism may be incommunicable to a substantially different situation, Dussel articulates from a "world perspective" the interconnection between Latin American or peripheral populism (or bourgeois nationalisms) and the European or central nationalistic movements (fascism and nazism). From a world-system perspective, both movements are trying to gain control of national capital in a situation of the growing globalization of capital. In response to Apel, Dussel underscores again the importance of Marx for Latin American social-scientific and philosophical discourses. It is through a rediscovered, or for the first time truly discovered, Marx (given the incredible amount of material that has been published over the last twenty-five years) that a philosophy in a planetary and non-eurocentric key can evade either extreme politicism, or insufficient globalization and concretization. Here again are profiled two of the central theses of this book, and of Dussel's most recent work, namely, that eurocentrism must be taken seriously as a *philosophical* problem, and that philosophy must abandon no longer appropriate or useful notions or categories of universal history; instead it must appropriate for its methodology the more concrete methodological approach of the world-system.<sup>32</sup> Insofar as Dussel's articulation of Liberation Philosophy raises these questions, Liberation Philosophy de-centers itself in order to make a global or planetary (not universal) claim. It ascends from its particularity to globality. This is a new phase of Liberation Philosophy, and, it is to be hoped, the beginning of a global philosophy as well.

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## Notes

1. For a discussion of the nexus between these different spheres, see Enrique Dussel, *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation (1492-1979)*, trans. Alan Neely (Grand Rapids, Michigan; William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981).
2. I developed the biographical sketch from the following sources; Roberto S. Goizueta, *Liberation, Method and Dialogue: Enrique Dussel and North American Theological Discourse* (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1987), especially the introduction, pp. xviii; Hans Schelkshorn, *Ethik der Befreiung: Einführung in die Philosophie Enrique Dussels* (Freiburg; Herder & Co., 1990), especially sec. 1.2, pp. 16ff; the biographical essay by Germán Marquínez A., "Enrique Dussel; filósofo de la liberación

- latinoamericana" in Enrique Dussel, *Introducción a la filosofía de la liberación*, 3d ed. (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva América, 1988), pp. 5-51; Enrique Dussel, "Liberación Latinoamericana y Filosofía" in *Praxis Latinoamericana y Filosofía de la Liberación* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva América, 1983), pp. 9-19; Luis Sánchez, "Dussel, Enrique" in F. Maffé, ed., *Dictionnaire des Oeuvres Philosophiques*, Vol. 2 (Paris: PUF, 1992), col. 3196. See also in this book chapters 1, 5, and 10. In chapter 10, Dussel speaks of six moments. These moments or phases, however, occur within the four periods that he originally set up; these are the ones I have decided to appropriate for my own sketch. See also my reviews of Schelkshorn's work on Dussel and Dussel's collection of essays on the history of philosophy in general and liberation philosophy in particular in *Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology*, Vol. 3, 1 (August 1995), pp. 62-63, 71-75.
3. See Leopoldo Zea, *La filosofía americana como filosofía sin más* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1969); Leopoldo Zea, *El Pensamiento Latinoamericano*, 3d. ed. (Mexico: Ariel, 1976), especially Chapter V of the third part. Raúl Fonet-Betancourt, *Philosophie und Theologie der Befreiung* (Frankfurt: Materialis Verlag, 1987), especially Chapter 2, section II. Ofelia Schutte, *Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought* (Albany: SUNY, 1993), pp. 73ff.
  4. See Levinas, *Totality and Infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) pp. 72ff, pp. 302ff. Karl-Otto Apel, *Towards a Transcendental Semiotics* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1994) pp. 112ff., and *Diskurs und Verantwortung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988). See also Adriann T. Peperzak, ed., *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy. Literature and Religion* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
  5. A frequent criticism against Dussel is that he is not really developing a Latin American liberation philosophy because he remains as fixated on European philosophical discourses as the most naive eurocentrist. This criticism is not only unfounded, but also blind to the dialectic of ideas. It is unfounded because Dussel has pursued one of the most extensive analyses of Latin American autochthonous critical and emancipatory thinking-Leopoldo Zea and Francisco Miró Quesada being some of the other most important historians of ideas in Latin America. His histories of the church, theology, and philosophy in Latin America are compendiums and encyclopedias of occluded and forgotten popular knowledge. His histories are always histories from the "underside", from the side of the oppressed. This criticism, furthermore, is blind to the dialectic of ideas by pretending that there has not been a co-determination of both center and periphery. Latin America is as much what it is and what is not in the eyes of European philosophers (think of Hegel and Marx), as Europe is what it is and is not in the eyes of Caliban the savage, the primitive.
  6. These lectures have appeared as *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, trans. Bernard F. McWilliams (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1978).
  7. On Ernest Bloch notions of "warm" and "cold" currents, see "Avicenna un die Aristotelische Linke", in *Das Materialismusproblem-seine Geschichte und Substanz-Gesamtausgabe. Volume 7* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977). pp. 479-546.
  8. See chapter 10 especially for a clarification of this term. See also Enrique Dussel. *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx* (see my review of this book in *The Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology*, 2, 3, February 1995, pp. 67-71), as well as the five volumes of commentary, reconstruction, and critiques of Marx that Dussel published over the last decade (see Bibliography). See also Enrique Dussel, *Historia de la Filosofía y Filosofía de la Liberación*, especially part two, which gathers a series

- of preliminary studies on Marx. With respect to the relationship between Marx and what I have here called the warm current, see chapter 10, below.
9. See Karl-Otto Apel, *Towards a Transcendental Semiotics*.
  10. The citation reads: "Man kann darum sagen, daß gerade die scharfe Betonung aller (ökonomisch) determinierenden und die vorhandene, aber noch im Geheimnis bleibende Latenz aller transzendierenden Momente den *Marxismus in die Nähe einer Kritik der reinen Vernunft rückt, zu der noch keine Kritik der praktischen Vernunft geschrieben worden ist*. Die Wirtschaft ist hier aufgehoben, aber die Seele, der Glaube fehlen, dem Platz gemacht werden sollte...." Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie*, 1924, 2nd rev. ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964), p. 290.
  11. See Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). See also Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1982).
  12. Fernet-Betancourt, *Philosophie und Theologie der Befreiung*. See also Jorge J. E. Gracia, guest editor, *The Philosophical Forum: A Quarterly*, XX, 1-2, Fall-Winter 1988-89, special double issue: "Latin American Philosophy Today". This volume has essays by Leopoldo Zea, Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg, Ofelia Schutte, David Sobrevilla, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Jorge J. E. Gracia, and Iván Jaksic. Gracia's and Cerutti-Guldberg's essays are particularly important for an understanding of the history of Latin American liberation philosophy.
  13. See Jorge G. Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), for a recent critical but fairly accurate assessment of Cuba's role in the history of Latin America.
  14. See Christian Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 111ff. This is one of the best socio-political analyses of the emergence of Liberation Theology in Latin America. See also Daniel H. Levine, *Popular Voices in Catholicism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
  15. Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation*, trans. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1988), originally published in Spanish in 1971 and translated into English in 1973. For a survey of the significance and impact of Gutiérrez, see Marc H. Ellis and Otto Maduro, eds., *The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of Gustavo Gutiérrez* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1989).
  16. Augusto Salazar Bondy, *¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América?* 11 th ed. (México: Siglo XXI editores, 1988); originally published in 1968. For Zea's response see his *La filosofía americana como filosofía sin más*; see other works cited in note 3.
  17. It is not to be noted that the development of dependence theory coincided with the ultimate failure of the "Alliance for Progress", which was founded in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy. See Christian Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory*, pp. 111ff. For an analysis of the centrality of dependency theory in the development of Liberation Philosophy's critical theory, see Stephen T. Leonard, *Critical Theory in Political Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 96ff. His analysis of Liberation Theology as critical theory is also extremely insightful. In general, my approach to Liberation Philosophy is very similar to Leonard's, i.e., I would like to see it not "just" as a Third World theory of emancipation but also, and above all, as part of a global (planetary in Dussers and Apers sense) critical theory. In other words,

- Liberation Philosophy is the critical theory of the Third World, just as critical theory is the Liberation Philosophy of the First World. Evidently, their different “points of departure” and “problematics” require that they use different analytical tools. Yet, they share the same “practical intent”: liberation, emancipation, redemption, justice, solidarity.
18. The literature on 1968 is immense, but with respect to the development of Third World philosophies, changes in the global system, and the “explosion of the Third World” by means of which the “natives” become “human”, see Fredric Jameson, “Periodizing the 60s (1984)” in Fredric Jameson, *The Ideologies of Theory. Essays 1971-1986: Volume 2. Syntax of History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 178-208. It is interesting to note that Dussel at times refers to Liberation Philosophy as a philosophy of/from/about barbarity. Zea also speaks of the discourse from/of barbarity and margination; see his *Discurso desde la Marginación y la Barbarie* (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos, 1988).
  19. See Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). On transformation of the capitalist economic world -system and its ideological effects see James O'Connor, *Accumulation Crisis* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
  20. Enrique Dussel, *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation (1492-1979)*, p. 147.
  21. See Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey* (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), part III, for a survey of some of these authors. See Apers superb discussion of the importance of dependence theory in his answer to Dussel, chapter 8. See also Fernet-Betancourt's *Philosophie und Theologie der Befreiung*, pp. 66, and Schelkshorn's *Ethik der Befreiung*, pp. 20ff. See also Andre Gunder Frank, «Latin American Development Theories Revisited: A Participants Review» in *Latin American Perspectives*, 19, Issue 73, No.2, Spring 1992, pp. 125-39.
  22. See the extremely important works by Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), *All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolomé de las Casa and Jaun Ginés Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974). See also the classic Silvio Zavala, *La filosofía política en la Conquista de América* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947). Gustavo Gutiérrez, *Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ*, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1993).
  23. This is a summary of a larger essay which has appeared in Spanish as “La Introducción de la 'Transformación de la Filosofía' de K.-O. Apel y la Filosofía de la Liberación (Reflexiones desde una Perspectiva Latinoamericana)” in K.-O. Apel, E. Dussel, Fernet-Betancourt, eds. *Fundamentación de la ética y Filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 45-104. Given the dearth of secondary, and even primary, materials on Apel, both of these are extremely welcome scholarly contributions.
  24. I would like to underscore that this is central problem as much in Apel's transcendental semiotics as it is in Habermas's theory of communicative action. Note, for instance, on page 339 of *The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity*, Habermas talks about *two axes* around which the value spheres have differentiated: the axis of *Welterschließung*, or world-disclosure, which has to do, as Habermas points out, with the disclosure of the new, the transformative that takes place in language through art, literature, and art criticism; and the axis of intra-mundane learning

processes, where we deal with culture, society, and our own selves from the standpoint of the development of subsystems of management or personal, cognitive, and moral competencies. The former has to do with creativity and the co-constitution of the world in and through language. The latter has to do with language as a "problem-solving tool". It has to be noted that Habermas is developing this new line of argumentation as a way to counteract the challenges of postmodern criticism that accuse him of totally leveling off or excising the dimension of creative aesthetic experience. Habermas, however, wants to do this without losing the problem-solving capacity of language. Note Thomas McCarthy's comments in the introduction, p. xiii, as well as Habermas's further comments in pages 114-16. See "Question and Counterquestions" in Richard Bernstein, ed., *Habermas and Modernity* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), pp. 202-03. See also "A Reply" in Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds. *Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. Jones (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990), pp. 221-22. It would be interesting to explore whether these parallelisms map over to the distinction between life-world and system. Compare with the tables in "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 58, and Table 16 in Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 329.

Axis	Value Spheres	Linguistic Function	Momentor Interests	Validity Claim
Welterschließung: world-disclosure	<i>Questjions of taste:</i> art, literature, criticism	Subjective expression	Expressive	Truthfulness
Intra-mundane learning processes	<i>Problem-solving discourses:</i> 1. Truth 2. Justice 3. Mortality	1. Representation	1. Cognitive-Instrumental	Truth
		2. and 3. Interpersonal relationships	2. and 3. Moral-practical	Appropriateness or Rightness

For Karl-Otto Apel's position on this problem, see "Sinnkonstitution und Geltungsrechtfertigung. Heidegger und das Problem der Transzendentalphilosophie" in Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg, eds. *Martin Heidegger: Innen- und Außensichten* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 131-75. See Maria Lafont, *Sprache und Welterschließung: Zur linguistischen Wende der Hermeneutik Heideggers* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), *La razón como lenguaje. Una revisión del giro lingüístico en la filosofía del lenguaje alemana* (Madrid: Visor, 1993), as well as her essay "Welterschließung und Referenz" in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 41/3, 1993



- 491- 507. Martin Seel, *Die Kunst der Entzweiung. Zum Begriff der ästhetischen Rationalität* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985). See also Albrecht Wellmer's important discussion on truth and fallibility with respect to the Habermasian speech-act theory: "What Is a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning? Variations on the Proposition 'We understand a Speech Act When We Know What Makes It Acceptable'" in Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, eds. *Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 171-219.
25. See Karl-Otto Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2 vols (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973).
  26. See Richard Rorty, "The Professor and the Prophet" in *Transition*, 52, 1991, pp. 70-78, for a very appreciative review of Cornel West's work.
  27. See Seylar Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, eds., *The Communicative Ethics Controversy* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990); Michael Kelly, ed., *Hermeneutics and Critical Theory in Ethics and Politics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990); David Rasmussen, ed. *Universalism vs. Communitarism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990).
  28. I treated this theme in my essay "Discourse Ethics and Liberation Ethics: At the Boundaries of Moral Theory", *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 21:4, July 1995, pp. 111-26.
  29. The essay here included is an extensively revised and expanded version of Apel's German version of the first part of his answer to Dussel. Apel has written a second part which I have already translated and is forthcoming in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 22, no.2, pp. 1-25. Dussel also has a second rebuttal: "La Ética de la Liberación ante La Ética del Discurso", which is forthcoming in a *Festschrift* for Helmut Peukert edited by Edmund Arens. The most competent and thorough study of the debate between Apel and Dussel is a recent doctoral dissertation by Hans Schelkshorn, *Diskurs und Befreiung: Studien zur philosophischen Ethik von Karl-Otto Apel und Enrique Dussel* (University of Vienna, March 1994), 448 pages.
  30. For elaboration on this see Karl-Otto Apel *Ethics and the Theory of Rationality. Selected Essays. Volume Two* (See Bibliography), and "The Rationality of Human Communication: On the Relationship between Consensual, Strategic, and Systems Rationality" in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 18, 1, 1994, pp. 1-25.
  31. Apel's more recent works reflect the insights he has gained from his encounter with Dussel; see "Institutionsethik oder Diskursethik als Verantwortungsethik? Überlegungen zur Wirtschaftsethik" in J. P. Harpes, ed., *25 Jahre Diskursethik. Anwendungsprobleme der Diskursethik* (forthcoming).
  32. For Dussel's most recent discussions of the relationship between world-system and philosophy, see: "The 'World-System': Europe as 'Center' and Its 'Periphery.' Beyond Eurocentrism". Lecture presented at the Seminar on Globalization, Duke University, November 1994, Eduardo Mendieta and Pedro Lange-Churión, eds., *Latin America and Postmodernity: A Reader* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, forthcoming). See also the recent work by Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literary, Territoriality and Colonization* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).