

Appendix

LIBERATION ETHICS: FUNDAMENTAL HYPOTHESES

If Paul Tillich found it difficult to explain to North Americans how the church functioned in Europe, how much more difficult it will be for a theologian of Latin America or the peripheral world to explain the critical function of ethics in situations calling for profound social changes.¹

MORALITY WITHIN SYSTEMS

The years since the 1930s, in the United States and Europe, have witnessed a transition from a criticism of the prevailing system *as a totality* to a mere reformist critique of the social order. By way of a meaningful date we might recall April 13, 1933, when the name of Paul Tillich² appeared on the list, drawn up by Hitler's national-capitalist government, of "intellectuals" to be eliminated as "critical" of the system.³ Tillich himself would later write:

So many creative events of the 1920s were destroyed by persecution or exile. But there is one thing that they have not managed to undo in the church and culture. I mean the horizon of Germany and Europe.⁴

In 1932 Reinhold Niebuhr published *Moral and Immoral Society*,⁵ and Emil Brunner *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen*.⁶

The crisis of 1929—a capitalistic crisis resulting in increased repression of the working class of the countries of the "center"—the triumph of the Russian revolution, and the rise of Stalin produced an

upheaval in theology. The "early Tillich" and the "early Niebuhr" (and somewhat earlier, the "early Barth") wielded a Christian critique that began to move back from a criticism of the system as such to propound a reformist, prudent morality. "Illusion is dangerous. It fosters terrible fanaticisms," wrote Niebuhr in the conclusion of his *Moral and Immoral Society*.⁷ With Tillich, who had written *Die sozialistische Entscheidung*,⁸ "Christian realism" moved on to develop a theology of culture.

In those same years another movement of great importance finally expired: the "social gospel."⁹ It is a wondrous experience today to read the work of a Richard Ely, *French and German Socialism* (New York, 1883), or, in Washington Gladden's *Tools and the Man: Property and Industry under the Christian Law*, chapter 10, "Christian Socialism":¹⁰

In the most recent works on socialism we always find a chapter entitled, "Christian Socialism." Does the expression have any meaning? Is Christianity socialistic in some sense? Or might socialism be Christian?¹¹

Explanations are no longer important. Neither is Gladden's criticism of Marx (which is remarkable, for Gladden knew him).¹² The important thing today is that, once upon a time, there was a Christian criticism of the capitalist system as a totality. W. Rauschenbusch excoriated "our semi-Christian social order" and said that it was governed by the "law of profit."¹³ Those Christians of yesterday, so intimately involved with social struggles from the turn of the century to 1929, were soon to be buried by the violence of European/North American capitalism, and by the hegemony of that capitalism, and during the two world wars, from which the United States emerged triumphant (and the Commonwealth defeated, no less than Germany and Japan).

Postwar moral theologies failed to shake off the reformist mold. The system was to be accepted as is and reformed *in part*. This is the only conclusion we can draw from an honest examination of the major moral treatises.¹⁴

Emil Brunner's early *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* is especially interesting. Beginning with chapter 34, "Essence and Function of the Economy"¹⁵-far superior in its treatment of the Catholic moral

theologies of the time-Brunner launches out on a forthright criticism of capitalism itself ("Capitalism is an economic anarchy, hence the Christian is obligated to struggle against it in favor of a true social order").¹⁶ But then he criticizes *de facto* socialism.¹⁷ In the same fashion Helmut Theilicke, in his *Theologische Ethik*,¹⁸ clearly betrays his reformism ("Revolution as *Ultima Ratio*").¹⁹ Of course neither here nor in any of the other works cited in my consideration of this series of writers do we find the oppression of peripheral countries referred to. And yet Bartolomé de Las Casas had posed the question, theologically and forthrightly, four hundred years before.

We may observe that this shift from a criticism of capitalism to its critical acceptance has now culminated, in the current crisis, in its downright moral justification. The entire North American neoconservative (and European conservative) movement²⁰ would be quite comfortable with Robert Benne's conclusions in his *The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment*,²¹ in chapter 7, "The Virtues of Democratic Capitalism." Benne showed us these "virtues," and concluded:

Democratic capitalism has been a misjudged social system, especially by the liberal intellectual community, religious as well as secular. For our part, we return to democratic capitalism, and give it full credit for its historical potential, viewing it from the standpoint of its practical and moral values.²²

For these intrasystemic moralities, utopia, or any radical critique of the system is anarchy and fantacism. It is the irrational side of "historicism," seemingly refuted by Karl Popper and translated into economic terms by Milton Friedman in the neo-capitalism of the "self-regulated competition of the free market." And behold, conservative moral theologies are expected to treat of the question of the "norm" (or law), the question of values, virtues, good and evil, the problem of language, of technology, and even of peace, without ever questioning the "system" as such. Analytic conservative thinking is radically opposed to dialectical proposition.

LIBERATION ETHICS

By contrast, the capitalism of the *peripheral* capitalist countries, and

the oppressed classes of these countries, owing to the capitalistic hegemony that had emerged between the two wars, entered into an irreversible state of crisis after the Second World War. A decade after the war's end the expansion of North American capitalism wiped out the projects of peripheral national capitalism. (In 1954 Vargas committed suicide in Brazil. In 1955 Perón fell in Argentina. In 1957 Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Nasser in Egypt, Sukarno in Indonesia, others in Africa and Asia.) The "populisms" in the periphery had represented the last attempt of an autonomous, non-dependent, *national capitalism*, under the hegemony of a *national bourgeoisie*, as with the Congress Party in India, to resist the North American onslaught. The crisis of the "dependent capitalism" model (1955-65) in Latin America (from Kubitschek to Goulard in Brazil, or in Argentina from Frondizi to Illía to the Onganía coup of 1966) showed the non-viability of peripheral capitalism. The so-called assistance of "capital and technology" (which worked *against* the capital and the technology of the poor and backward national capitalism of the periphery) did not produce "development," but only implanted the "transnational corporations," thus accelerating the extraction of wealth (in economic terms, "profit"; in theological terms, "life" and "blood"-the life and blood of the poor peoples, the life and blood of the workers) from the periphery.²³

The ethics of liberation began historically as a theoretical attempt (in the form of theology and philosophy) to explain a praxis occasioned by the failure of "developmentalism."²⁴ Hence, if Karl Barth said of theology in general that "the relation of *this* God with *this* human being and of *this* human being with *this* God are for me the theme of the Bible and of theology"²⁵-his way of indicating the concrete, existential element in the relationship-then for liberation ethics (and thus for fundamental theology, as we shall see) we should have to say that the relationship of the *living* God with this *poor* human being, and of this *poor* human being with the *living* God, is the theme of the Bible and theology. Thus we make contact with, and develop from new foundations (no longer European/North American, but *world*)-the great themes of the "early" Barth, Tillich, Niebuhr, and so many others. But this *theoretical* interface is possible only because of a historical connection-a connection in praxis. Those Christian pioneers opposed a capitalism in crisis (and were buried by Fascist capitalism in Europe and the United States); we

too oppose capitalism, but a capitalism in *structural*, and far more profound, *crisis*; an autonomous, national capitalism is now *impossible* in the periphery.

It is impossible for capitalism to produce wealth in peripheral and underdeveloped countries, or to ensure its distribution to the immense impoverished majorities. To be sure, this is denied by theologians who have identified Christianity's lot with that of capitalism.²⁶ In recent times, in a philosophical approach, John Rawls²⁷ has once more proposed individualistic liberal positions, and Ronald Dworkin is right:

Rawls does argue that this fundamental right to equality requires a liberal constitution, and supports an idealized form of present economic and social structures.²⁸

Nevertheless, Dworkin himself is a prisoner of liberalism. Nor does Alisdair McIntyre's *After Virtue* overcome the impossibility of propounding a social ethics, this work remaining stuck on an abstract level.²⁹ Hence neither does the theological attempt of a Stanley Hauerwas³⁰ manage to so much as surmise the remote legitimacy of criticizing the capitalistic system, being enveloped by it and presupposing it as a totality. If a Stephen Charles Mott reaches a better solution than do others in the question of violence in situations of social change,³¹ nevertheless neither does he suspect the emergence of a prophetic criticism, in biblical categories, of the system as a totality. All these authors remain caught in an ineluctable reformism.

Liberation ethics arises as a theory preceded by and demanded by a praxis opposed to the system *as a totality*. Reformist "developmentalism" in Latin America proposes-fruitlessly-substitute models ("developmentalisms" under the aegis of CEPAL [Ecumenical Council for Latin America], "national security", "neo-populism," "Christian Democracies," and the like), but accepts the system as a whole. It is just an other morality. For a liberation ethics, by contrast, the first task is to penetrate and overthrow the *basis* of the system and replace it with *another* basis, one beyond, transcending, the present system. Analytic thinking leaves room for dialectic, and negative dialectic permits an "analectic" (or the affirmation as origin of negation, as we shall see).

THE "FLESH" (IN ITS TOTALITY)

The reformist moralities ask how to be good in Egypt. They debate about norms, virtues, and so on-but accept Egypt as the prevailing system. But Moses asks how to escape *from* Egypt. In order to be able to "emerge" or "escape,"³² however, I must be aware of a whole that *envelops* me, and an *outside* through which I can pass. Indeed, liberation *ethics* (as contradistinguished from "intrasystemic" *moralities*)³³ begins with a description of the system *always already* "enveloping" the subject: the practical subject (as oppressor/oppressed), and the theoretical subject (the theologian). In the Bible the system as a whole is thought of as "*this world*,"³⁴ or the "flesh" (*basar* in Hebrew, *sarx* in Greek-not to be confused with *soma* in Greek, "body," although the two are indeed sometimes confused in the Septuagint and Paul). The "sin of the flesh" or the "sin of Adam" is precisely idolatry, fetishism: the affirmation of the prevailing totality as the absolute, ultimate totality, and the denial, in that assertion, of the existence of the other (Abel) and hence of God (the absolute Other). The absolutization of the prevailing totality is the sin of the flesh, inasmuch as the other has *already* been negated *practically*; "Cain fell upon his brother Abel and killed him" (Gen. 4:8).

In Latin America today, the "system" is Anglo-Saxon capitalism on the social plane, machismo on the erotic, ideological domination on the pedagogical-and idolatry on *all* levels. The theme has the unfathomable depth of reality, and manifests the human being's infinite capacity to create systems-systems that can be literally "idolized," set up over and against God.

THE "OTHER" (ANALECTIC EXTERIORITY)

Before entering upon an ontic treatment of a multitude of moral problems, ethics must explain the fact and reality that *beyond* the whole there is still the other. Levinas's *Totalité et Infini* has shown this is a phenomenological approach,³⁵ but not from the standpoint of political economics.³⁶ Despite its critics, liberation ethics is no "Marxism for the people" (to recall Nietzsche). It has a deep implantation in metaphysics (Xavier Zubiri correctly asserts in his *On Essence* that reality transcends being), in an ethics as first

philosophy (as Levinas repeats so frequently-hence, as we shall see, a theological ethics, in its most essential aspect, is fundamental theology).

"Beyond," transcending (ontologically transcendent to), the horizon of the system (beyond the horizon of the flesh, beyond totality), "the other" is presented or appears (is an "epiphany" and not a mere "phenomenon") as one who "provokes" (Lat., *pro-*, "from ahead," and *vocare*, "to call") and demands justice. "Others" (the "widow, orphan, and alien" of the prophets' mighty cries, under their universal name of "poor") vis-à-vis the system are the metaphysical *reality* beyond the *being* of the system. They are the outside, then.³⁷ They are those most foreign to the totalized system. Franz Hinkelammert dubs them "inner transcendence."³⁸ They are the locus or "place" of the epiphany of God: *the poor*. In the system, the only possible *place* for the epiphany of God is constituted by those who *are not* the system-those distinct from the system: the poor. Jesus' identification with the poor in Matthew 25 is not a metaphor; *it is a logic*. God, the Absolute Other, is revealed *in the flesh* (the system) by the other: the poor. The metaphysical (and eschatological) exteriority of the poor (simultaneously theological and economic, if we understand what is meant by a theological or divine economy),³⁹ situates them as (historical) reality and posits their concept as the key (epistemological) category of all liberation ethics (that is, of fundamental theology as such).

ALIENATION, SIN, OPPRESSION

In the system (first methodic aspect and first concept), the other (second aspect, but the "key" aspect, and a more radical one than the first) is *alienated* (third aspect and category). The "alterification" (rendering them "other," different from what they are) of the "others" is, metaphysically, to make them "the same": a mere functional, internal part of the system. The human being, the living and free subject (agent) of creative work, sells his or her work and becomes a "wage-earner"-in an intrinsic, ontic, aspect founded in the *being* of capital, founded in capitalism. The (free) "other" now becomes "other" in the sense of being divorced from himself; a thing. Just as Christ "emptied himself and took the form of a slave,"⁴⁰ so

the "other" is converted into an oppressed individual, the "poor" one as complex category (as exteriority, and as interiority dominated in the *flesh*). The "poor," those who do not enjoy the fruit of their labor, *in the system* are the manifestation of sin. Sin, which is only domination of the other, is revealed when someone is poor. The poor are the *others*, despoiled of their exteriority, their dignity, their rights, their freedom, and transformed into an *instrument* for the ends of the dominator, the lord-the "good" of the idol, the fetish.

All of this is readily applicable, of course, to the social reality of the exploited classes, the dominated countries, the violated sex, and so on. But this "application" destroys in its very cementing the organic interface of the prevailing European-North American theologies and poses problems that cannot "conveniently" be relegated to an appendix of a theology of social ethics, but which (as the matter at hand is that of the very constitution, the very *a priori*, of theologizing *subjectivity*-as theory-and of Christian subjectivity-practically) are the *first* questions of any theology (as fundamental theology). The question, "Is it possible to believe?" is preceded by the question, "What are the conditions of historical praxis for this very question?" To pose this latter, antecedent question from the locus of the "pharaonic class" in Egypt is not the same thing as to pose it from the locus of the "slaves." *Whence* do I pose my very first question in fundamental theology? That *whence*, that "*from where*" of my historical social situation, is itself the first chapter of *all theology*, and not an adventitious question under "almsgiving": "aid to underdeveloped countries." We know that our colleagues of the "center" are not in agreement in this matter. The next decades will tell who is right.

LIBERATION, SALVATION, EMERGENCE ("GOING OUT")

Only in this "fourth" (methodic and real) sense can the question of redemption (christology) be understood as (eschatological) salvation and liberation. Each of these concepts denotes *the same thing*, but in relation to distinct terms. "Liberation" connotes a relationship to an antecedent term (*ex quo*), to a "whence": one emerges *from* a prison. "Prison" is at one and the same time (because it is *the same thing*) the system of oppression and sin. The concept (and reality) of liberation includes two terms and one reality (inasmuch as it is a concept of

motion): *whence* the motion begins, *whither* it is heading, and the *motion* itself. Theologically, metaphorically, and historically: *from* Egypt, *to* the promised land, *through* the wilderness.

The concept of "freedom"-as in Häring's moral theology-lacks the dialectical density, the historical complexity, and the practical clarity of the category (and praxis) of liberation. The fact that Abraham, Moses, and so many others "leave" the "land" of Chaldea or Egypt for another "land" that "I shall show you"⁴¹ posits a dialectic between *two* terms. Prevailing theological moralities (those cited above), in failing to call radically into question the former "land" (the "old man"-in Latin America, the *current* system of oppression, dependent capitalism), in failing to posit as the *necessary* horizon of *all* of its discourse the utopia of the future "land" (the "new man"), can propound only a reformist morality: a reform of the system under which one lives *in* the land of Chaldea, in Egypt. Never will they "go out" or "emerge" to the wilderness, nor therefore will they ever receive, in the wilderness, the "new" law (the "new" ethical normativity).

The question of norms, laws, virtues, values, and even ends must *be posed within* the problematic of *both* lands (totality versus exteriority, prevailing system versus utopia, dependent capitalism versus alternatives, and so on). Hence the question of an ethics *of liberation* (the propositional phrase is "objective," corresponding to the Latin or Greek "objective genitive") is that of how to be "good" (Gust, saved) not in Egypt, nor in the monarchy under David, but in the sojourn in the wilderness-in the passage or transition from an "old" order to the "new," not *yet* prevailing, order. The heroes and saints refused to allow their behavior to be governed by prevailing norms. Otherwise Washington would have remained a loyal subject of the British monarchs, Father Hidalgo would have obeyed the laws of the Spanish Indies, the heroes of the *Résistance française* would have complied submissively with Hitler's orders in France, and Fidel Castro would have permitted Cuba to go on being a United States weekend colony. What is the foundation of the ethic of the praxis of the heroes when they rise up against laws, norms, so-called virtues or values, and even the ends of an *unjust* system? This question may constitute an appendix to the moral theology of Europeans and North Americans. But for Christians of the periphery, it is chapter 1 of all fundamental theology-inasmuch as it constitutes the answer

to the question, "What is theology, as a whole, for?" Barth, Tillich, Niebuhr, before the crisis of 1929, had glimpsed these questions. But they were very far from being able to approach them from the complex world situation that faces us today, or even to handle them on a world level.

Liberation ethics is a rethinking of the totality of moral problems from the perspective and exigencies of "responsibility"⁴² for the poor, responsibility for a historical alternative that would *permit* a *struggle* in Egypt, a journey in the wilderness in a *time of transition*, and the *construction* of a promised land-the historical land of promise that is always to be judged in the light of that eschatological land "beyond all hope of historical material production," the reign of heaven, which will never be *completely* built in history (but which is ever a-building in the construction of the transitory, perishable "lands" of history).

SOMETHING ABOUT METHOD

To argue that any alternative to the prevailing system must be "utopian," by which is meant a reference to the origin of all evils-as Popper does in his *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (which argues for an anti-utopian Christianity)-means to limit methodology in moral theology to either analytical (in the tradition of Ayer, Wittgenstein, et al.),⁴³ or more or less eclectic (taking something from sociology, something from medicine, something from politics, and so on, according to the branch of morality that happens to be under consideration). Such methods are valid, but only so long as they are understood as constituting means to a merely partial theological moral discourse. When they pretend to be the only valid methods, and when they criticize holistic methods as "imprecise" and "unscientific," then they are transforming themselves into ideological methods-methods for covering up reality.

After all, to call the system *as a whole* into question is the task of the dialectical method, from Plato to Aristotle⁴⁴ to Thomas Aquinas to Kant, Hegel, or Sartre. In reality-as Heidegger, whose concept of "world" is strictly dialectical, would say-the dialectical method is an ontological situating of every object or thing that appears to me ontically. *To know how to refer* the means, the instrument "at hand," *the object, to its foundation (being)* is the property of the dialectical

method. Here Marx merely asks questions about merchandise, money, production, and so on, in the light and on the foundation of the *being of capital* (the essence of capitalism).

The ontological method (in this case an economic ontology)⁴⁵ has nevertheless emphasized the "negation of the negation" or the "negative dialectic" (Adorno, for example, or the Frankfurt School, including even Ernst Bloch). The revolutionary process, or the process of negating the prevailing totality (Lukács), is a praxis arising out of the negation of a negation. It springs from the negation of the oppression produced in the oppressed by the system. One might even say that the negation of the negation has the system as its horizon, and that the system is transcended only from a point of departure in a utopia that, as artistic fantasy (Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*) or as projected alternative, is really possible only from within "the very" system. The origin of the negation is the system itself. In other words, the negation is an empty horizon (pure possibility, or transcendent horizon: the reign of freedom as an age of absolute "free time").

Liberation ethics, on the other hand, takes its point of departure in an affirmation of the real, existent, historical *other*. I have designated this "transontological" (metaphysical) *positive moment* of departure, this active point of the initiation of the negation of the negation, the "*analectical*." ⁴⁶ By the prefix, the Greek *ana-*, I wish to denote a point "beyond" the ontological horizon (of the system, of the "flesh"), a point "beyond" or transcending being. It is this *logos* (*ana-logos*), this discourse originating in transcendence of the system, that reflects the originality of the Hebreo-Christian experience. If "in the beginning God created" (Gen 1:1), this can be only because the *other* is antecedent to the very principle of the cosmos, of the system, of the "flesh." The metaphysical "anteriority" of the *other* (who creates, who gives self-revelation) has its historical, political, and erotic aspects as well.

The poor, the oppressed class, the peripheral nation, the female sex object, all have their *reality* "beyond" the horizon of the system that alienates them, represses them, dehumanizes them. The *reality* residing in the Nicaraguan people, the "beyond" within them, the transcendence within them of the horizon of Somozism, of dependent capitalism, has provided them with a fulcrum for their negation of their oppression and a motivation for their liberation praxis. The

oppressed contain (in the structure of their subjectivity, their culture, their underground economy, and so forth), the trans-systemic (eschatological) wellspring permitting them to discover themselves as oppressed *in the system*. They discover themselves oppressed when they experience themselves eschatologically as distinct from the system in their exteriority to it. The analectic affirmation of their "dignity," of their freedom (negated in the system), of their culture, of their work ("unproductive work" for capital, but *real for them*) *outside* the system (and "outside" the system not because the poor have overcome that system, but often enough because the system considers them "nothing," non-being, and it is from that *nothing*-which is real-that *new* systems are built) is what originates the very mobility of the positive dialectic.

This method and historical reality do not commence with the negation of oppression. Rather, the negation of oppression commences with the *analectic affirmation* of the (eschatological and historical) exteriority of the other, from out of whose project of liberation the *negation of the negation* is effectuated and new systems are constructed. These systems are not mere *univocal* realizations or actualizations of something already existing *in potentia* in the old, unjust system. The new system is an *analogous* realization, so that it includes something of the old system (*similitudo*), but something absolutely new (*distinctio*) as well. The new system was impossible for the old. Thus the former has been *creation*, through the irruption of the analectic otherness of the poor in their self-liberation.⁴⁷

The method of liberation ethics-as an aspect of the creative act of God's unconditioned freedom and of the redemptive act of Christ's subsumption (*subsumptio*) of flesh (the system) by the analectic irruption of the Word (brought about in the negation of sin and the construction of the reign of God)-is analectical. It is more than a negative dialectic: it is a positive dialectic, in which the exteriority of the other (of the Creator, of Christ, of the poor) is the positive practic condition of the methodic movement itself. The poor, and their actual, concrete liberating praxis, in the analectical anteriority of this reality, constitute the fundamental and first stage of the dialectic. Ethics is *subsequent* to this moment -but ethics itself begins by asserting the absolute priority *of the poor*: this poor person in whom "Christ *poor*, " God, is revealed as absolute challenge and responsibility.

In Latin America, liberation ethics is the justification of the goodness, heroism, and holiness of an oppressed people's liberation praxis in El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, or Brazil (in "Egypt")-the goodness, heroism, and holiness of a people already sojourning in the desert (as the Nicaraguan people), where the "priest Aaron"-longing to return to Egypt-offers worship to the golden calf (the idol), while the prophet Moses (liberation ethics?) must not only destroy the fetish, but offer the people being freed a "new" law. The "new" law, however, emerges in dialectical antithesis to the law of Egypt. One cannot begin as the moralities begin-by positing the morality of the act in its non-transcendent relationship to the norm or law. On the contrary, the absolute ethicity of the act connotes a transcendent relationship to the building of the reign of God in the historical processes of liberation that constitute the praxis of the real, material poor, the "hungry." Only from this horizon, and *only subsequently*, can all of the problems of abstract moral subjectivity (with which all moral theologies begin) be posed.

The encyclical *Laborem Exercens* furnishes us with a fine starting point for founding an ethics of liberation in the exploited fleshliness of the poor in their work. Such a eucharistic or economic radicality merits further reflection.⁴⁸

NOTES TO APPENDIX

1. See Paul Tillich, *Die Bedeutung der Kirche für die Gesellschaftsordnung in Europa und Amerika* [The meaning of the church for the social order in Europe and America], in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 107ff. Tillich writes: "The social function of the Church cannot really be understood without a clarification of its social and economic structure, and without relating it to the social order" (p. 119).

2. How could I fail to recall another date-March 30, 1975? My name then appeared on similar lists in Mendoza, Argentina, and I was expelled from Cuyo National University, for similar reasons-a phenomenon that was occurring in so many other parts of Latin America as well.

3. Hitler's Nazism was a government of laws and statutes that provided for the "viability" of German *national* capitalism (Krupp, Thiessen, Siemens, and so forth), with an eye to a world hegemony over the capitalist market. The Latin American military governments (since 1964) provide for

the "viability" of a capitalism *dependent* on the United States, which is far worse.

4. Paul Tillich, *Christentum und Sozialgestaltung* (1919-33), vol. 2 of *Gesammelte Werke*, p. 11.

5. New York: Scribner's, 1932.

6. Tübingen: Mohr, 1932.

7. Niebuhr, *Moral and Immoral Society*, p. 277. Niebuhr refers to his book as "a social analysis written at least partially from the perspective of a disillusioned generation" (p. xxv). "In Germany E. Bernstein ...transformed expectations of catastrophe into hope for evolutionary progress toward equal justice" (p. 181),

8. Vol. 2 of *Gesammelte Werke*.

9. See Charles Howard Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism* (1865-1915), Yale Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); Robert Handy, *The Social Gospel in America, 1870-1920* (Oxford University Press, 1966); Aaron Abell, *American Catholicism and Social Action, 1865-1950* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960).

10. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1893, pp. 275ff.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

12. On pages 257ff. there is a discussion on the meaning of value in Marx (fifty years before the publication of the *Manuscripts of 1844* and hence with naive distortions). At one moment the author wonders, "We go part way with Marx and Robertus; then we part company with them. How far can we wisely go with them? How many of their projects may we safely adopt?" (p. 280). But then, suddenly: "Socialism, as we have seen, is simply a proposition to extend the functions of the state so that it shall include and control nearly all the interests *of life*. Now, I take it, we are agreed that, as Christians, we have a right to make use of the power of the state, both in protecting life and property, and in promoting, to the same extent, the general welfare" (p. 281)-written in the United States in 1893! What happened? What happened was that the labor movement was brutally repressed. (see James Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925* [Boston: MR Press, 1967].)

13. W. Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order*(New York, 1919), pp. 222ff.

14. See, for example, Bernard Häring, *Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity*, 3 vols. (Slough, Berks., 1978-81). Although far superior to other Catholic moral theologies, this work relegates questions like economic and political ethics to an appendix (vol. 3, chap. 7), or else relates "life" only with medical questions or abortion (3:21-130). It fails to relate life to work or social life (repression of the poor, and so on).

Similarly in *Handbuch der christlichen Ethik*, edited by A. Hertz, W. Korff, T. Rendtorff, and H. Ringeling (Freiburg: Herder, 1978-82), the great problems are "modernity" (the first moral topic ["The Norm," 1:108ff.]); "life," related only with medicine; politics, examined in virtue of a *Verfassungsprinzip* or "principle of composition" (2:215ff.). There is something on economics, but under the title (for peripheral countries), "Developmental Assistance" (2:417ff.). The "new international order" is given neither a biblical nor an ontological nor an anthropological basis, but is studied from an exclusively sociological viewpoint (3:337ff.). And so on, with the articles of this collection generally.

15. Emil Brunner, *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen*, pp. 380ff.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 412ff. The Christian position is a kind of social-democratic "third way" for the author (pp. 417ff.).

18. Tübingen, Mohr. See esp. vol. 2/2 (1958), pp. 224ff. Thielicke relegates the problem of property to a special appendix (vol. 3 [1964], pp. 224ff.), where he manifests what might be called a certain "economic blindness." His analyses are almost exclusively juridical or socio-political.

19. *Ibid.*, 2:423ff.

20. See Jürgen Habermas, "Die Kulturkritik der Neokonservativen in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik," *Praxis* (Haverford), vol. 2/4 (1983), pp. 339ff. See Habermas, *Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt, 1981).

21. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981. The odyssey of a Michael Novak is a case in point. Having launched his career as a liberal Catholic theologian, with works like *The Open Church* (1964) and *The Men Who Make the Council* (1964), a scant two decades later Novak is writing *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism* (1982) and *Toward a Theology of the [transnational] Corporation* (1981), published by the American Enterprise Institute. These neoconservative theologies are *not* "economically blind": "The official documents of the popes and the Protestant ecumenical bodies are notably strong on moral vision, much less so in describing economic principles and realities. The coming generation will inherit as a task the need to create and to set forth systematically a theology of economics" (*Theology of the Corporation*, p. 21).

22. Robert Benne, *The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment*, p. 174.

23. See my "The Bread of the Eucharistic Celebration as a Sign of Justice in the Community," *Concilium*, no. 152 (1982), where I show the relationship obtaining among life, blood, work, and product. A "theology of money" and economics must begin with these metaphysical and biblical

premises. (See Rudolf Bultmann's article on *zao* [the verb, "to live"], in Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch des Neuen Testaments*, vol. 2 [1935], pp. 833-77.)

24. The pejorative suffix ("developmental-ism") is used to suggest the ideological, false character of the European and North American doctrine of "development" (and "developmental assistance") prevailing in some Christian circles (and in CEPAL). Developmentalism seeks to remedy *effects* without attacking the (principal) *causes* of the crisis, which are structural and pervasive. Thereby it aggravates the evil.

25. Karl Barth, *Der Römerbrief* (Zurich, 1954), p. xiii.

26. See Michael Novak, *Will it Liberate? Questions about Liberation Theology* (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987).

27. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge University Press [Mass.], 1971). See O. Oeff, *Über Rawls Theorie der Gerechtigkeit* (Frankfurt, 1977).

28. Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 182.

29. A. McIntyre, *After Virtue* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). McIntyre's keen critique of earlier moralists is tarnished by his return to Aristotle, and his taking a position between Aristotle and Nietzsche. Neither Of the two, obviously, can be ethicists of liberation.

30. Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); idem, *The Peaceable Kingdom* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

31. Stephen Charles Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 188-9. One's attention is arrested by the remark of John Coleman: "As a social scientist I have often been puzzled, if not irritated, by the almost religious importance many Latin American theologians of liberation give to the writings and analysis of Karl Marx" (John Coleman, *An American Strategic Theology* [Paulist Press, 1982], p. 125).

32. The concept of emerging, of being "led to the outside"-"Leave your land" (Gen. 12:1); "Lead him *out of Egypt*" (Exod. 13:16); etc.-is a fundamental theological metaphor .

33. See my explanation of the difference between "morality" and "ethics" at the end of the present article as it appears in *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973), vol. 2, section 21, and in "One Ethic and Many Moralities," *Concilium*, 150 (1980).

34. See my *Para una ética de la liberación*, vol. 2, section 21. For the category of "flesh" or "totality," see *ibid.*, 1:33ff. See also my *Philosophy of Liberation* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1985), pp. 21-9.

35. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l' extériorité* (The Hague, 1961).

36. See my view of Emmanuel Levinas in *Emmanuel Levinas y la liberación*

latinoamericana (Buenos Aires, 1975).

37. See my *Philosophy of Liberation*, pp. 39-49.

38. *The Ideological Weapons of Death: A Theological Critique of Capitalism* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1986), p. 61.

39. See "The Bread" (n. 23, above).

40. As we know, Luther translated the *ekenosen* of Phil. 2:7 *entäusserte sich* ("emptied himself, poured himself out")-the essential note of a "kenotic" theology-whence it passed to Hegel by way of his professors of christology in Tübingen. It is a basic Christian concept.

41. The category "land" (*'eres*) has a strict eschatological meaning in the Bible. See the article *Ge* ("land") in Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, 1:676. This meaning appears in Ps. 37:11, Matt. 5:3, Heb. 11:9. What I am emphasizing here is the dialectic of the *two* lands: "From the land (*me'areska*) ...to the land (*'el-ha 'ares*)that I will showyou" (Gen. 12:1); "From this *land* to the beautiful, rich *land* flowing with milk and honey" (Exod. 3:8). We are "leaving Egypt (*mi-misraym*)" (Exod. 3:10).

42. "Irresponsibility" *for others*, for the oppressed, *in the face of* the concrete economic system of oppression. Hans Jonas, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung* (Frankfurt, 1982) fails to establish the concrete meaning of "responsibility." Jonas keeps to an abstract level. He deals with "technology," but never as an aspect "of capital" (*als Kapital*). He fails to understand this "subsumption" (*Subsumption*).

43. See F. Bockle, "Der sprachanalytische Ansatz" in Hertz et al., eds., *Handbuch der christliche Ethik*, 1:68ff.

44. See my *Método para una filosofía de la liberación* (Salamanca, 1974).

45. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1857-1858) (Berlin, 1974), and more recently, the *Manuscripts of 1861-3* (*Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* [*Manuskript 1861-1863J*, MEGA, 3.2, vols. 1-6 [1977-82]), authorize my reinterpretation of Marx from a point of departure in an ontology in the strict sense. (*So wird das Kapital ein sehr mysteriöses Wesen*-*"Thus capital becomes a very mysterious being,"* *ibid.*, p. 2163, line 11).

46. See my "*Pensée analectique en philosophie de la libération*" in *Analogie et Dialectique* (Geneva, 1982), pp. 93-120; my *Philosophy of Liberation*, pp. 158-60. See also Roberto Goizueta, "Domination and Liberation: An Analysis of the Analectical Method of E. Dussel," dissertation, Graduate School, Marquette University (Milwaukee), May 1984, 298 pp.; Anton Peter, "Der Befreiungstheologische und der Transzendentaltheologische Denkansatz. Ein Beitrag zum Gespräch zwischen E. Dussel und K. Rahner," dissertation, Theologische Fakultät Luzern (Switzerland), Feb. 1987, 625 pp.

47. *Para una ética de la liberación*, section 25 (2:58ff.); section 47 (3: 1 09ff.); section 66 (4:109ff.); section 73 (5:91ff.).

48. The Polish thinker Josef Tischner (*La svolta storica*, Italian trans. [Bologna, 1981]; *Etica del lavoro* [Bologna, 1982], especially "Il lavoro privo di senso," pp. 76ff.) has rightly taken "work" as a proper center of theological reflection. For Poland the problem is the worker's *control* of the product. For Latin America the problem is *consumption* of the product of work (for there is hunger, the result of oppression and structural theft). In Poland workers (the *nation*) seek to know *what* they produce bread *for*, and try to control its production. In Latin America workers (the people) seek to *possess* the fruit of their work, the eucharistic bread. See John Desrochers, *The Social Teaching of the Church* (private publication, Bangalore, 1982, esp. pp. 637ff.). Clearly, *Laborem Exercens* permits liberation ethics a material radicalization of its discourse.