

PREFACE

What follows is addressed to neophytes in philosophy of liberation. It does not claim to be an exhaustive exposition. It is a discourse that proceeds by elaborating one thesis after another, using its own categories and its own method. It is a provisional theoretical philosophical framework.

Except in the Appendix, this work has few footnotes and no bibliography. Writing in the sorrow of exile (in Mexico), I did not have access to my personal library (in Argentina). My memory had to take its place.

Written from the periphery, for persons and peoples of the periphery, this book nonetheless also addresses readers in the center of the present world system. It is like the alienated child who protests against the overbearing father; the child is becoming an adult. Philosophy, the exclusive patrimony of, first, the Mediterranean world and then of Europe, now finds an origination that allows it to be authentically worldwide for the first time in the course of human history.

It is my hope that the theoretical philosophical framework that I am proposing—an ensemble of theses calculated to foster a certain type of thinking—will spark a worldwide philosophical dialogue. It sets out, of course, from the periphery but, for the most part, it uses the language of the center. It could not do otherwise. The slave, in revolt, uses the master's language; the woman, when she frees herself from the dominative male, uses macho language.

Philosophy of liberation is postmodern, popular (of the people, with the people), profeminine philosophy. It is philosophy expressed by ("pressed out from") the youth of the world, the oppressed of the earth, the condemned of world history.

HISTORY

The following introductory chapter serves simply as an example of how one essential phase of a philosophy of liberation can be developed. A philosophy of liberation must always begin by presenting the historico-ideological genesis of what it attempts to think through, giving priority to its spatial, worldly setting.

1.1 GEOPOLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY

1.1.1 *Status Questions*

1.1.1.1 From Heraclitus to Karl von Clausewitz and Henry Kissinger, "war is the origin of everything," if by "everything" one understands the order or system that world dominators control by their power and armies. We are at war—a cold war for those who wage it, a hot war for those who suffer it, a peaceful coexistence for those who manufacture arms, a bloody existence for those obliged to buy and use them.


Space as a battlefield, as a geography studied to destroy an enemy, as a territory with fixed frontiers, is very different from the abstract idealization of empty space of Newton's physics or the existential space of phenomenology. Abstract spaces are naive, nonconflictual unrealities. The space of a world within the ontological horizon is the space of a world center, of the organic, self-conscious state that brooks no contradictions—because it is an imperialist state. I am not speaking of the space of the claus-

trophobic or the agoraphobic. I am speaking of political space, which includes all existentially real spaces within the parameters of an economic system in which power is exercised in tandem with military control.

Unnoticed, philosophy was born in this political space. In more creative periods, it was born in peripheral spaces. But little by little it gravitated toward the center in its classic periods, in the great ontologies, until it degenerated into the "bad conscience" of moral—or rather, moralistic—times.

1.1.1.2 I am trying, then, to take space, geopolitical space, seriously. To be born at the North Pole or in Chiapas is not the same thing as to be born in New York City.

DIAGRAM 1



1.1.2 *Oppression of the Colonial and Neocolonial Periphery*

1.1.2.1 The claim that philosophy of liberation is post-modern is grounded in the following thesis: modern European

philosophy, even before the *ego cogito* but certainly from then on, situated all men and all cultures—and with them their women and children—within its own boundaries as manipulable tools, instruments. Ontology understood them as interpretable beings, as known ideas, as mediations or internal possibilities within the horizon of the comprehension of Being.

Spatially central, the *ego cogito* constituted the periphery and asked itself, along with Fernández de Oviedo, "Are the Amerindians human beings?" that is, Are they Europeans, and therefore rational animals? The theoretical response was of little importance. We are still suffering from the practical response. The Amerindians were suited to forced labor; if not irrational, then at least they were brutish, wild, underdeveloped, uncultured—because they did not have the culture of the center.

1.1.2.2 That ontology did not come from nowhere. It arose from a previous experience of domination over other persons, of cultural oppression over other worlds. Before the *ego cogito* there is an *ego conquiro*; "I conquer" is the practical foundation of "I think." The center has imposed itself on the periphery for more than five centuries. But for how much longer? Will the geopolitical preponderance of the center come to an end? Can we glimpse a process of liberation growing from the peoples of the periphery?

1.1.3 *Geopolitical Space and the History of Philosophy*

1.1.3.1 Philosophy, when it is really philosophy and not sophistry or ideology, does not ponder philosophy. It does not ponder philosophical texts, except as a pedagogical propaedeutic to provide itself with interpretive categories. Philosophy ponders the nonphilosophical; the reality. But because it involves reflection on its own reality, it sets out from what already is, from its own world, its own system, its own space. The philosophy that has emerged from a periphery has always done so in response to a need to situate itself with regard to a center—in total exteriority.

1.1.3.2 Pre-Socratic thought appeared not in Greece but in Turkey and southern Italy, from a political periphery (they were dominated), from an economic periphery (they were colonies), and from a geopolitical periphery (they were threatened by the armies of the center). Medieval thought emerged from the fron-

tiers of the empire; the Greek fathers were peripheral, as were the Latin fathers. Even in the Carolingian renaissance, renewal came from the peripheral Ireland. From peripheral France arose a Descartes, and Kant burst in from distant Königsberg.

Distant thinkers, those who had a perspective of the center from the periphery, those who had to define themselves in the presence of an already established image of the human person and in the presence of uncivilized fellow humans, the newcomers, the ones who hope because they are always outside, these are the ones who have a clear mind for pondering reality. They have nothing to hide. How could they hide domination if they undergo it? How would their philosophy be an ideological ontology if their praxis is one of liberation from the center they are opposing? Philosophical intelligence is never so truthful, clean, and precise as when it starts from oppression and does not have to defend any privileges, because it has none.

1.1.4 *The Center, Classic Ontology, and the System*

1.1.4.1 Critical thought that arises from the periphery—including the social periphery, the oppressed classes, the *lumpen*—always ends by directing itself toward the center. It is its death as critical philosophy; it is its birth as an ontology and ideology. Thought that takes refuge in the center ends by thinking it to be the only reality. Outside its frontiers is nonbeing, nothing, barbarity, non-sense. Being* is the very foundation of the system, the totality of the sense of a culture, the macho world of the man of the center.

1.1.4.2 For Aristotle, the great philosopher of the classical period, reared to accept slavery and pursue self-centeredness, the Greek was human. The European barbarians were not human, because they were unskilled; nor were Asians human, because they lacked strength and character; slaves were not human either; women were halfway human and children were only potentially human. The human being par excellence is the free man of the *polis* of Hellas. For Thomas Aquinas the feudal lord exercised his

* I differentiate between Being (Latin, *esse*; German, *Sein*) and being(s) (Latin, *ens, entia*; German, *das Seiende*).

jus dominativum over the servant of his fiefdom, and the man did the same over the woman (Eve, even though she had sinned, could not transmit original sin, because the mother only supplies the matter, but the man gives Being to the child). For Hegel the state that bears the Spirit is the "dominator of the world," before which all other states are "devoid of rights (*rechtlos*)." For this reason Europe appointed itself "the missionary of civilization" to the world.

1.1.4.3 Ontology, the thinking that expresses Being—the Being of the reigning and central system—is the ideology of ideologies, the foundation of the ideologies of the empires, of the center. Classic philosophy of all ages is the theoretical consummation of the practical oppression of peripheries.

1.1.4.4 Thus philosophy of domination, at the center of the ideological hegemony of the dominant classes, plays an essential role in European history. Nonetheless, one could trace throughout all that history a critical thinking that is in some way a philosophy of liberation insofar as it articulates the ideological formation of dominated classes.

1.1.5 *Greek Philosophy*

1.1.5.1 Parmenides, from the periphery of Magna Graecia, proclaimed the radical beginning of philosophy as ontology: "Being is; non-Being is not." What is Being if not the foundation of the world, the horizon that encompasses the totality within which we live, the frontier that our armies control? Being coincides with the world; it is like the light (*phos*) that illumines an area but is not itself seen. Being is not seen; what it illuminates is seen—things (*onta*), tools, instruments (*pragmata*).

Being is that which is Greek, the light of Greek culture. Being extends as far as the frontiers of Hellenism. Over the horizon is non-Being, uncivilization, Europe and Asia. This sense of ontology is found in the political thought of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics.

1.1.5.2 From the poor colonist who like Heraclitus experienced Being as the logos that walls the city (defending it from barbarians), to the Alexandrine or Roman cosmopolitan who confused the city with the cosmos, the Greco-Roman city was

divinized and identified with nature itself. Thus did ontology end up affirming that Being, the divine, the political, and the eternal are "one and the same thing." Power, domination, and the center are identical, above the colonies with other cultures, above slaves of other skin colors. The center is; the periphery is not. Where Being reigns, there reign and control the armies of Caesar, the emperor. Being is; beings are what are seen and controlled.

1.1.5.3 Classic Greco-Roman philosophies, with some exceptions, in fact articulated the interests of the dominant pro-slavery classes and justified their domination from the horizon of Being itself. It is easy to understand Aristotle's "The slave is a slave by nature" or the inclination of Stoics and Epicureans to extend deliverance to all the citizens of the empire, so as to ensure a "good conscience" in all its members, on the one hand, and to sanctify the empire, finite manifestation of the gods of cosmopolitanism, on the other.

1.1.6 *Mediterranean Thought between Ancient and Modern Times*

1.1.6.1 The peripheral humans of this transition were the poor Bedouin of the Arabian desert, not the Indo-Europeans who, crossing the Eurasian steppes with their horses, one day invaded Greece, Rome, and India. The Bedouin and shepherds of the desert did not experience Being as light but as proximity, face-to-face encounter with a brother or sister of the same ethnos or a stranger to whom hospitality was offered. One day the Bedouin comprised the kingdoms of Akkad, Assyria, and Babylonia; they will depart in exile to Egypt. They will be liberated with Moses. They will be the origin of the vision of the world that Maimonides will be able to define centuries later as "the philosophy of creation," a theoretical metaphysics that justifies the politico-political revolution of slaves and the oppressed (3.4.4).

1.1.6.2 From the periphery, the Being that strikes the ear of the attentive listener as freedom will also triumph in its classic epochs: in Constantinople after the fourth century, in Rome after the sixth century, in Baghdad after the ninth century, in Córdoba after the tenth century, in Paris after the thirteenth century. The Semitic world (Christian, Muslim, and Jewish) will also have its

ontology, its expressed fundamental ideology. After having begun by stating "Blessed are the poor," and after having understood that Abel never built his city as Augustine prescribed in the *City of God*, they ended by again identifying Being with the ruling system, the earthly city (of the medievals or of the caliphs) with the city of God. Creation—which permitted the understanding of things, profits, systems, and kingdoms as contingent and possible (not necessary) and therefore changeable (3.4.5.2)—came to justify the medieval Mediterranean system: God wanted things *this way*. The ideologizing of the subversive and political metaphysics of creation was the beginning of its end, of its fossilization, of the modern centro-European revolution.

1.1.6.3 In the same way methodical Semitic-Christian thought, first articulated by the nomadic and austere tribes of the desert, ended by justifying the dominating class, the world of medieval feudalism. Critics of the mode of feudal production and the structure of prescribed tribute were not lacking, but they frequently ended up in the hands of the Holy Office, the Inquisition.

1.1.7 *Modern European Philosophy*

1.1.7.1 The modern age began when the Mediterranean millennium crumbled. For Cretans and Phoenicians as well as Arabs and Venetians, the Mediterranean was the central sea (*medi-terra*), the center of world history. Nevertheless, Germano-Latin Europe enclosed by the Turko-Arabic world (which extended, after the fall of Constantinople, from Andalusia in southern Spain to the gates of Vienna) could not expand into the wider world. The medieval Crusades were the first European expansionist attempts, but the Arabs were sufficiently powerful to return the frontiers to their former positions. Beginning with the fourteenth century, the Portuguese and then the Spanish began to control the North Atlantic (which from the end of the fifteenth century until today will be the center of history). Spain and Portugal opened Europe to the west; Russia will do it to the east. In the sixteenth century Spain discovered the Pacific to the west and Russia did the same to the east. Now the Arab world is enclosed and loses the centrality it had exercised for almost a thousand

years. Later Spain and Portugal will give way to the British empire. Now Europe is the center. From the experience of this centrality gained by the sword and by power, Europe begins to consider itself the archetypal foundational "I."

1.1.7.2 From the "I conquer" applied to the Aztec and Inca world and all America, from the "I enslave" applied to Africans sold for the gold and silver acquired at the cost of the death of Amerindians working in the depths of the earth, from the "I vanquish" of the wars of India and China to the shameful "opium war"—from this "I" appears the Cartesian *ego cogito*. This *ego* will be the unique substance, divine in Spinoza. In Hegel the *ich denke* of Kant will recover perfect divinity in the absolutes Wissen, absolute knowledge, which is the very act of totality as such: God on earth. If faith, the perfect cult of absolute religion in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, is the certitude that the representation of the understanding is the absolute Idea, such certitude is that which world dominators have: they are the manifestation on earth of the divinity. The empires of the center—England and France as colonial powers, Nazi Germany, and later the United States with its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—thus once more possess an ontology that justifies them, a subtle ideology that gives them a "good conscience."

What is Nietzsche if not an apology for the human conqueror and warrior? What are phenomenology and existentialism if not the description of an "I" or a *Dasein* from which opens a world, always one's own? What are all the critical schools, or even those that launch themselves in search of a utopia, but the affirmation of the center as the future possibility of "the same"? What is structuralism but the affirmation of totality—though not leading to a politico-economic resolution in real liberation?

1.1.7.3 "God is dead"—that is to say, Europe is dead because it deified itself. At least the fetish has died for us and with it the United States as its quantitative extension. The death of the fetish is important, for just as "all criticism begins with the critique of (fetishist) religion," so liberation is possible only when one has the courage to be atheistic vis-à-vis an empire of the center, thus incurring the risk of suffering from its power, its economic boycotts, its armies, and its agents who are experts at corruption, violence, and assassination.

1.1.7.4 *Homo homini lupus* is the real—that is, political—definition of the *ego cogito* and of modern and contemporary European philosophy. It is the ontological expression of the ideology of the bourgeois class, triumphant in the British revolution, which will dominate the capitalist world. Philosophy again becomes the center of the ideological hegemony of the dominating class.

1.2 PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION OF THE PERIPHERY

1.2.1 *Critique of the Conquest*

1.2.1.1 Philosophy of liberation is recent. Nevertheless, its antecedents are older than modern European philosophy. Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566) wrote that "they have used two ways to extirpate these pitiable nations from the face of the earth," referring to the two ways Europeans used to dominate the periphery. "One is by unjust, cruel, bloody, and tyrannical wars"—that is, the Europeans assassinated the inhabitants of the periphery. "The other way is that after they have assassinated all those, such as adult males, who can yearn for freedom—usually they do not leave any survivors of war except children and women—they then oppress survivors with the most violent, horrible, and hateful slavery." They assassinated the Amerindians; if they left any alive, they debased them, oppressing them with servitude. They spared women, to live in concubinage (sexual domination) and children, to be educated in European culture (pedagogical domination). And thus in the name of the "new god" (gold, silver, money, pounds sterling, or the dollar) there have been immolated to the god of nascent mercantilism, the god of economic imperialism, and the contemporary imperialism of the multinational corporations, millions more human beings of the periphery than those the Aztecs immolated to their god Huitzilopochtli—to the horror of civilized, religious-minded Europeans!

1.2.1.2 The philosophy that knows how to ponder this reality, the de facto world reality, not from the perspective of the center of political, economic, or military power but from beyond

the frontiers of that world, from the periphery—this philosophy will not be ideological. Its reality is the whole earth; for it the "wretched of the earth" (who are not nonbeing) are also real.

1.2.2 *Colonial Mercantile Philosophy*

1.2.2.1 I call colonial philosophy that which was exported to Latin America, Africa, and Asia beginning with the sixteenth century (the universities of Mexico and Lima were founded in 1552 with the same academic ranking as those of Alcalá and Salamanca), and especially the spirit of pure imitation or repetition in the periphery of the philosophy prevailing in the imperialist center.

1.2.2.2 Latin American colonial philosophy was cultivated in the Hispanic periphery. Spain, like no other metropolitan power (through the influence of the Renaissance and the Iberian "Golden Age"), founded in its American colonies more than thirty centers of higher studies that granted licentiates and doctorates in philosophy (the majority with a view to ecclesiastical studies). The most famous faculties of philosophy were those of Mexico and Lima. Their professors published their works in Louvain, Leipzig, Venice, and other prestigious publishing centers of Europe, as in the case of the *Logica mexicana* by Antonio Rubio (1548-1615), which was used as a textbook in the University of Alcalá (one of its ten editions was the 1605 edition of Cologne). The Peruvian Juan Espinoza Medrano (1632-1688) published in Cuzco his famous *Cursus philosophicus* in 1688. The faculties in Bogotá, Guatemala City, Quito, Santiago de Chile, Córdoba del Tucumán, and others, can also be named. Nevertheless, all this was, although partly creative, a reflection of the neoscholasticism of Spain.

In the eighteenth century, the Baroque Jesuit educational program, with its *reducciones*—settlements of Amerindians converted to Christianity (the most famous were in Paraguay)—made important advances in philosophy, physics, mathematics, and politics. However, it never went beyond imitation, and it was doubly ideological: repeating in the periphery (and concealing the domination suffered there) an ideological process initiated in Europe.

1.2.2.3 The colonial mercantile stage in the Portuguese and first English colonies did not envision the foundation of philosophical centers in the periphery. Colonial elites were formed in Coimbra and London. This was the beginning of a cultural domination that would be perfected later on.

1.2.3 *Colonial Mercantile Emancipation*

1.2.3.1 Two centuries ago, in 1776 to be exact, the process of emancipation from colonial mercantilism began. In New England a group of valiant colonists arose against the British homeland and began a war of national emancipation. This process will continue in Luso-Hispanic America from 1810 to 1898—from the emancipation of Argentina and Peru to that of Mexico, and thence to the Caribbean. Puerto Rico, from being a Spanish colony, becomes an *estado libre asociado* (a "free associated state," a contradiction in terms) of the United States, which a half-century before had annexed Texas, New Mexico, and California, lopping them off from Mexico.

From Washington to Hidalgo, Bolívar and San Martín ignited the thought of emancipation, which did not become an explicit philosophy. Bentham sights it at the end of the eighteenth century, and Hegel describes it in his *Philosophy of Right* in 1821: "England understood that emancipating the colonies was more useful than keeping them dependent." The English empire had learned that it cost less to withdraw its bureaucracy and armies from its colonies. The emancipator heroes did not fathom the full impact of their deeds. The liberation of which the philosophy of liberation speaks was still an unsuspected future horizon. From them, nevertheless, present-day philosophers can imbibe a deep yearning for freedom.

1.2.4 *Imperialist Recolonization*

1.2.4.1 As soon as the first crisis of the industrial revolution could be overcome in England and France, principally around 1850—that is, when sufficient accumulation of capital was in place—the imperialist center began a second colonial age

(in the second half of the nineteenth century). Now the Arab world, black Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and China are to undergo the impetuous onslaught of what will quickly become monopolistic economic imperialism.

1.2.4.2 Colonial elites were now systematically trained in the imperialist center. Oxford, Cambridge, and Paris were transformed into theaters of "reeducation," of brainwashing, until well into the twentieth century. The colonial oligarchies were brown, black, or yellow, and they aped the philosophy they had learned abroad. True puppets, they repeated in the periphery what their eminent professors of the great metropolitan universities had propounded. In Cairo, Dakar, Saigon, and Peking—as in Buenos Aires and Lima—they taught their pupils the *ego cogito* in which they themselves remained constituted as an idea or thought, entities at the disposal of the "will to power," impotent, dominated wills, castrated teachers who castrated their pupils.

1.2.4.3 These colonized philosophers had forgotten their past. The Arab world did not return to its own splendid philosophy dating back to the ninth century. India was ashamed of its sages and so was China, though both nations had produced treasures of thought for more than three millennia. The past did not withstand the attack of modern imperialist metropolitan thinking, at least in its most progressive, modernizing, and developmentalist forms.

1.2.4.4 Modern European philosophers ponder the reality that confronts them; they interpret the periphery from the center. But the colonial philosophers of the periphery gaze at a vision foreign to them, one that is not their own. From the center they see themselves as nonbeing, nothingness; and they teach their pupils, who are something (although illiterate in the alphabets imposed on them), that really they are nothing, that they are like nothings walking through history. When they have finished their studies they, like their colonial teachers, disappear from the map—geopolitically and philosophically, they do not exist. This pathetic ideology given the name of philosophy is the one still taught in the majority of philosophy schools of the periphery by the majority of its professors.

1.2.5 *Neocolonial Imperialist Emancipation*

1.2.5.1 With the coming of World War II a new world power emerged. The United States took the lead in reapportioning the world at Yalta (1945). The colonies of the British empire and what remained of French and other European colonies were redistributed. The heroes of neocolonial emancipation worked in an ambiguous political sphere. Mahatma Gandhi in India, Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and Patrice Lumumba in the Congo dream of emancipation but are not aware that their nations will pass from the hands of England, France, or Belgium into the hands of the United States.

As in the first stage of colonization (1.2.2.), philosophy has rich material to apply itself to. Freedom is a distant utopia, not a foreseeable prospect. Nevertheless, a substantive, explicit philosophy of national anticolonial emancipation has never been elaborated. There have been only manifestos, pamphlets, and political works (which implicitly include a philosophy but are not philosophy in the strict sense). The thinking reflected in them was the most polished of peripheral thinking in the modern world. Its thinkers situated themselves in an appropriate hermeneutical space, in the correct perspective. But it was not yet philosophy, even though the work of Frantz Fanon was already a beginning.

1.2.5.2 The new imperialism is the fruit of the third industrial revolution. (If the first was mechanistic and the second monopolistic, the third is the international effort of the transnationals, which structure their neocolonies from within.)

The transnationals do not occupy territories with armies or create bureaucracies. They are owners, directly or indirectly, of the key enterprises—production of raw materials, process industries, and services—of the periphery. Furthermore, the new imperialism exercises political control over its neocolonies and their armies. One utterly new feature is that the empire pursues a policy of cultivating desires, needs (4.3.3). This empowers it, through mass media advertising, to dominate peripheral peoples and their own national oligarchies. An ideological imperialism (4.2.7 and 5.7) is also at work here.

1.2.5.3 Progressivist philosophy of the center, when sim-

ply repeated in the periphery, becomes an obscurantist ideology. I am not thinking only of phenomenology or existentialism, or of functionalism or critical theory, of science that becomes scientism, but also of a Marxism that does not redefine its principles from the viewpoint of dependency (5.9.1.2-5). Ontology and nonradical criticism (such as that which thinks science cannot be ideology, because of its presuppositions or its real but unacknowledged goal) are thus the last ideological underpinnings of imperialist ideology (3.3.6).

1.2.6 *Philosophy of Liberation*

1.2.6.1 What is at stake is neocolonial liberation from the last and most advanced degree of imperialism, North American imperialism, the imperialism that weighs down part of Asia and almost all of Africa and Latin America. Only China and Vietnam in Asia, Cuba and Nicaragua in Latin America, and Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia in Africa have a certain modicum of freedom, certainly much more than other peripheral nations. Clearly they must know how to use the geopolitical division established in Yalta, must know how to rely on the politico-military power that controls the sphere outside the "partitioned" world, within whose frontiers they have achieved relative freedom. Thus China relies on the United States to safeguard its freedom from the nearby U.S.S.R., and Cuba relies on Russia to safeguard its freedom from the nearby United States. Far be it from me to trivialize the content of their politico-economic models. I want only to point out a geopolitical factor that peripheral nations can never forget or they will be lost. The cat can make a mistake; it is only toying with its prey. But the mouse cannot make a mistake; it will be its death. If the mouse lives, it is because it is smarter than the cat.

1.2.6.2 Against the classic ontology of the center, from Hegel to Marcuse—to name the most brilliant from Europe and North America—a philosophy of liberation is rising from the periphery, from the oppressed, from the shadow that the light of Being has not been able to illumine. Our thought sets out from non-Being, nothingness, otherness, exteriority, the mystery of no-sense. It is, then, a "barbarian" philosophy.

1.2.6.3 Philosophy of liberation tries to formulate a metaphysics (2.4.9.2)—not an ontology (2.4.9.1)—demanded by revolutionary praxis (3.1.7-8) and technologico-design poiesis (4.3) against the background of peripheral social formations. To do this it is necessary to deprive Being of its alleged eternal and divine foundation; to negate fetishist religion in order to expose ontology as the ideology of ideologies; to unmask functionalisms—whether structuralist, logico-scientific, or mathematical (claiming that reason cannot criticize the whole dialectically, they affirm it the more they analytically criticize or operationalize its parts); and to delineate the sense of liberation praxis. Post-Hegelian critics of the European left have explained it to some extent. Only the praxis of oppressed peoples of the periphery, of the woman violated by masculine ideology, of the subjugated child, can fully reveal it to us (5.9).