

OVERCOMING LEVINAS:
 ANALECTICAL METHOD AND
 ETHICAL HERMENEUTICS

ANALECTICAL METHOD BEYOND LEVINAS:
 LATIN AMERICAN MEDIATIONS AND THE ANALOGICAL
 WORD OF THE OTHER

IN *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación, Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, and *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, after extensive discussions of the critics who moved beyond Hegel (Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Schelling), Dussel explains at length how his philosophy surpasses Levinas's. His introductory remarks indicate how his critique/ development will proceed.¹

The real surpassing of this whole tradition, beyond Marcel and Buber, has been the philosophy of Levinas, still European and excessively equivocal. Our surpassing will consist in rethinking the discourse from Latin America and from ana-logy; this surpassing I formulated after a personal dialogue held with the philosopher in Paris and Louvain in January of 1972. ...

Nevertheless, Levinas always says that the Other is "absolutely other." Thus he tends toward equivocality [*equivocidad*]. For the other part, he has never thought that the Other could be an Indian, an African, an Asian.²

Dussel's criticism of Levinas's Eurocentrism—that he never thought that the Other could be an Indian, African, or Asian—seems to fault Levinas for working at the abstract level of the essence of the ethical intersubjective relationship without discussing concrete instantiations. This criticism seems unfair, particularly given Dussel's careful and laudatory recognition of the abstract level at which Marx pitches his analysis of economic systems, seeking out, for instance, the essential determinations of

"production," whether in an Aztec, Incan, Egyptian, European, or Latin American context. But Levinas's abstract level could certainly accommodate Dussel's Latin American situation; for, as Dussel's own account of their conversation shows, Levinas, instead of resisting Dussel, "could only accept" (*no pudo menos que aceptar*) that he had never thought that the Other could be Indian, African, or Asian since he had been preoccupied with the sufferings inflicted by Stalin and Hitler. Dussel's self-described task of the "implementation of the mediations" of Levinas's description of the originary experience of the face-to-face in its erotic, pedagogic, and political dimension—for all its creativity—involves a surpassing that preserves Levinas (*Aufhebung*, in Hegel's sense) and still depends upon him. Dussel himself admits that his conversation with Levinas turned up both a "similitude" between their thought and a "radical rupture."³

One can better appreciate this criticism of Levinas's Eurocentrism and Dussel's relationship to Levinas after considering the second mode of surpassing: namely, "from analogy," as developed in the three texts mentioned above. Before taking up a series of questions on analogy, Dussel sketches some principal features of his "ana-lectical" method: its opposition to a dialectical method proceeding from out of itself instead of from the Other beyond the Totality, its replacement of a Heideggerian ontological fundament by a prior ethical moment, and its inclusion of a constitutive practical, historical option to listen to, interpret, and serve the Other. This analectical method, beginning with the Other, discovers the analogical character of the word of the Other.⁴

Dussel begins his discussion of analogy by defining terms. *Logos*, at the root of analogy, signifies to "collect, reunite, express, define" whereas its Hebrew correspondent, *dabar*; means "speak, talk, dialogue, and reveal." *Logos* tends toward a univocity that subsumes and suppresses differences, whereas its Hebrew correspondent, *dabar*; entails analogy discoverable to one who assumes an attitude of trust and the obedience of a disciple (*obediencia discipular*) toward the Other who is different. Dussel speaks here of *analogia verbi* or *analogia fidei*, different from (and yet related to) Thomistic discussions of analogy that focus on the analogy of expressive words (*analogia nominis*).⁵

There are even different, analogous kinds of analogy, or in Dussel's words, "the notion of analogy is itself analogical." Dussel explains one such type of analogy by citing Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to the effect that "Being is predicated in many ways, but always with respect to some origin." Following Aristotle, the philosophical tradition, including thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, or Heidegger, realized that Being is not predicated as a genus of its species. Rather, Being, which transcends every genus and is not even conceivable as the genus of genera, can better be understood as the horizon of the world or light of all that exists or the totality of meaning. Nevertheless, ultimately the content of the word "Being" is identical with itself, one and the same, and the many forms in which it expresses itself fail to escape the identical and univocal ontological totality. Face to face with the Other, however, one discovers that Being as the fundament of the totality is not the only manner of predicating Being. This Other above and beyond the totality, possesses Being in an analogical, distinct, and separated way from the way it is possessed within the Totality. Though there would seem to be a shared concept (Being) within this analogy as within the first kind, here one may apply any predicate to the Other at most tentatively, dependent upon the revelation of an Other "whose presence makes evident the absence that attracts and provokes" and who is still incomprehensible and transontological. Here metaphysical distinction replaces the ontological difference of the first type of analogy.⁶

According to Dussel, the revelatory word of the Other, although similar to the word employed by other users of the same language and therefore comprehensible in a derived and inadequate way, still does not lend itself so easily to interpretation because of the depth and incomprehensibility of its distinct origin: namely, the Other who speaks it. When a young man tells a young woman "I love you," the words carry with them pretensions to a truth as yet unverified (that the man really loves her) and an obligation and demand that the listener place faith in the speaker. The said ("I love you") refers radically to the saying (especially the presence of the revealer) beyond the said and beyond the listener's own ontological comprehension as a totality.⁷

Dussel amplifies on this reference of the revealed word to the revealer, since it touches on the essence of the human person, of

historicity, and rationality. The word of the Other comes from beyond the mundane listener's existential comprehension of the world, and in order to understand that word, the listener must at first accept it only because the Other speaks it.

It is the love-of-justice, transontological, that permits one to accept as true her [the Other's] unverified word. This act of historical rationality is the supremely rational act and manifests it [historical rationality] from the fullness of the human spirit: to be capable of working on the basis of a *believed* word is, precisely, a creative act that proceeds beyond the horizon of the whole and that advances *on the basis of the word* of the Other into the new.⁸

Inversely, to reduce the word of the Other to what has been already said, to make the Other's analogical word identical to (and therefore univocal with) one's own, is to deny the distinctiveness of the Other's word; it is to kill and assassinate the Other. To avoid such a univocal obliteration of the Other, one must commit oneself in humility and meekness to a pedagogic apprenticeship with the Other as master and to a following of the way that the Other's word traces, day in and day out. Philosophy, beginning from this analectic starting point, proceeds dialectically, borne forward by the word of the Other. When one actually hears this novel word of the Other, the result is that the prevailing Totality is placed in movement toward a correct interpretation of the word of the Other, finally achievable when the new Totality, the new fatherland, the new future legal order, is established.⁹

Dussel's insight here that the word of the Other means the same to all language users and yet carries with it a depth and incomprehensibility because of its distinctive origin, the Other, resembles Alfred Schutz's important differentiation between the objective and the subjective meanings of signs. In Schutz's view, signs have an objective meaning within a sign system when they can be intelligibly coordinated to what they designate within that system independently of whoever uses the sign or interprets it. At the same time, however, an aura surrounds the nucleus of objective meaning in that everyone using or interpreting a sign associates it with meanings that have their origin in the unique experiences in which that person learned to use the sign. This aura constitutes the subjective meaning. Schutz concludes: "Ex-

actly what Goethe means by 'demonic' can only be deduced from a study of his works as a whole. Only a careful study of the history of French culture aided by linguistic tools can permit us to understanding the subjective meaning of the word 'civilization' in the mouth of a Frenchman."¹⁰ Furthermore, since each person's stream of consciousness never completely overlaps another's, the meanings one gives to another's experience can never be precisely the same as the meanings that the Other gives to them, since one would have to be the other person in order to interpret them in exactly the same way. Dussel readily admits these difficulties of translation, for he recognizes that the passage from one world to another in an adequate, complete, perfect manner is impossible, insofar as one word carries in its train the totality of a world that is untranslatable and that needs to be uncovered if that word is to be understood. Within this understanding of language, every word usage becomes essentially analogical, meaning the same and yet not quite the same to conversants. By what Schutz calls the general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives, commonsense individuals overleap these discrepancies in meaning by assuming that they would see things as the Other does if they were in the Other's place. Although this thesis might lead to an uncritical assimilation of the Other's meanings to one's own, it also underlies the confidence that the Other is rational and that one would act and think as the Other does if one were in the Other's position. Of course, such trust in the rationality of the Other becomes more difficult and more daring, the farther the Other's exteriority lies from one's Totality, and the more divergent the Other's history and social background from one's own, and the more the Other's belief and action system (and not just individual words) seem at odds with one's own.¹¹

Dussel's emphasis on trust in the analogical word of the Other need not contradict Jürgen Habermas's conviction that one can understand another only if one is involved as a participant in assessing the validity claims of the Other through "rational interpretation." Such assessing involves no expectation that the Other will prove to be irrational; in fact, our assessments for the most part find the Other conforming to rational standards we would hold regarding consistency and basic empirical beliefs. Donald Davidson's principle of interpretive charity would have it that in

order "to understand others, we must count them right in most matters." But there will come moments in which another's statements seem to contradict commonsense beliefs or logical principles, such as those of identity or noncontradiction. To use an example drawn from anthropology: the Nuer spoke of a sacrificial cucumber as an ox, or a human twin as a bird. Even here, though, anthropologists, almost as if driven by a conviction of the rationality of the Other, have attempted to provide contextual interpretations that might explain away seeming contradictions as part of ritual behavior or as metaphor. Because of this trust in the analogical world of the Other that, according to Dussel, constitutes the first moment in the encounter with the Other, interpreters can also decide that at the moment they are not in a position to judge the soundness of the reasons of the Other—and Habermas admits that such postponement of judgment would be a legitimate evaluative alternative for a rational interpreter. Still, if, after exhausting efforts to understand and after trustingly postponing final judgment, one finds oneself compelled to disagree with the Other's beliefs or practices, one could do so for the sake of the Other in complete consistency with the invitation to responsibility for the Other flowing from the initial moment of the face-to-face. Such judgment reveals the presence of the second moment in Levinas's account of intersubjectivity, the intervention of the Third who introduces comparison, measuring, and equality (as if "before a court of justice"). This second moment always occurs with reference to the originary moment, since, as Levinas puts it, "proximity is not from the first a judgment of a tribunal of justice, but first a responsibility for the other which turns into judgment only with the entry of the third party." Since these moments are not chronological moments, the standards of judgment (introduced by the Third) can penetrate to the assessing activity that takes place as one stands face to face with the Other, under obligation to be responsible for the Other. Even to recognize that the Other is different and that one ought to refuse any judgment of the Other because one does not as yet understand the Other would presuppose the presence of just such standards; to set in abeyance temporarily one's standards of judgment for the sake of the Other presupposes that they are there.¹²

The task of listening to the analogical word of the Other trans-

forms philosophy itself. Philosophy becomes a pedagogics, the method of knowing how to believe the word of the Other and interpret it. Committed to the Other, the philosopher gains access to a new world and sets about destroying the obstacles that impede the revelation of the Other. In Latin America, philosophy becomes a cry, a clamor, an exhortation of those who have taught the philosopher: the people dominated by the ruling system centered in the North Atlantic community. Latin American philosophy itself appears as a new and analogical moment in the history of philosophy. On one hand, it is tied to and expounds the history of philosophy to which it belongs and to which it is therefore similar, but not with a similarity that might be confused with the identity and univocity of Hegelian history, in which each philosopher or people is valued as part of one, identical, unfolding historical process that began with Europe and is Europe's own process. On the other, if Latin American philosophy is completely distinct, the history of philosophy breaks down into a series of equivocal "philosophical biographies," in Jaspers's terms. For Dussel, though, we are left with neither Hegelian identity nor Jaspersian equivocality, but with the analogy of a continuous history of philosophy, whose discontinuity is evidenced by the liberty of each philosopher and the distinctiveness of each people.¹³

It is fitting that Dussel should conclude his discussion of his overcoming of Levinas by reflecting on the analogical character of philosophy. For the critic who would describe Dussel's implementation of the mediations of Levinas's description of the original face-to-face as only a continuation of Levinas, or as only an application of Levinas, reads philosophy as a univocal unfolding and overlooks the novelty of Dussel's thought. Is there perhaps in this refusal to recognize the analogical character of philosophy, in this tendency to reduce all philosophy to its historical predecessors and its European roots, a philosophical affront to the metaphysically distinct Other, the Other as Latin American philosopher? If the voice of the poor of Latin America speaks through Dussel and others as a philosophical mouthpiece, isn't something distinctive going on there, however much Dussel may utilize Levinasian categories?

Perhaps Dussel's most original surpassing of Levinas lies precisely in this notion of analogy, which does not tolerate the equi-

vocity of Levinas's totally Other and questions the univocity of the critic who shields himself from the challenge of the novel by striving to show that there is nothing new under the sun.

ANALECTICAL METHOD AND THE UNMASKING OF FALSE UNIVERSALISM

In Dussel's hands, the analectical method, which discloses the analogical word of the Other, develops further into a critique of false universals that expands into a critique of philosophical-theological pretentiousness, science, and even the project of modernity—all this beyond Levinas's ethics, but also in its spirit. Such a development is all the more remarkable when one samples Dussel's earlier works from 1965 to 1970 and finds an emphasis on universalism almost at the expense of particularism. In the appendix to *El humanismo semita*, he claims that the religious community needs to free itself from any nationalistic particularism and that only a *death to particularism* will permit Salvation to reach to the ends of the earth. The poems of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh express a universalism without frontiers, a centrifugal extranational universalism achieved by the *evacuation* of every particularism. In *El catolicismo popular en la Argentina*, Dussel discusses the missionary universalism of the religion founded by Jesus that ought to take the word of God (presumably given first as universal) and clothe it with cultural mediations. In theological articles, Dussel urges that Christians abandon the methods and structures of Christendom "in order to integrate themselves into the Universal Civilization of which Latin American is only a part and in which it must participate each day more and more actively." In *Hipótesis para una historia de la Iglesia en América Latina*, Dussel defends the *tabula rasa* methods of the Spanish missionaries who did not build on religious practices of the Indians. Dussel argues both that these missionaries sought to avoid syncretism and that these indigenous cultures had not arrived at the evolutionary level of the Roman, Hindu, or Chinese empires. Once Dussel underwent his conversion to Levinas's thought, such "Catholocentric" and "ethnocentric" judgments cease to appear, and he focuses his

efforts instead on an unmasking of false universalistic claims, such as these of his earliest period.¹⁴

Dussel's works after 1970 abound in criticism of such false universalizations. The pretended universality of North Atlantic culture camouflages an historical will-to-power evident from the first meeting of the Spanish *conquistadores* with the indigenous American cultures until the present. Dussel depicts starkly the original negation of the Amerindian culture in the name of this "universal" culture:

Amerindia or Hispanoamerica is not so much a brute, mute being as a being *silenced* and *brutalized* in the presence of an ear habituated to hearing other music, other languages, other harmonies. The Indian is not a being in the rough, but rather one brutalized in the presence of a the unilateral consciousness of the conqueror, blind to Indian values. The Indian is the barbarian only for those who elevate their world into the only world possible.¹⁵

The Spanish king in the first law of *Bullarum* legitimates this oppression of America Indians in the name of the universal God: "God has entrusted to us in His infinite mercy and goodness the rule over such a great part of the world. ...happily it has been given to us to lead the innumerable peoples and nations that inhabit America ('the West Indies') into the Catholic Church and to subject them to our rule."¹⁶

Just as the Spanish occupied the Indian kingdoms for the sublime motive of evangelization, the North Americans seized Texas, New Mexico, and California for another "rational" motive: manifest destiny. Sarmiento followed this pattern in the nineteenth century by elevating Latin American urban centers to a universal value over against the countryside: "The nineteenth century and the twelfth century live together: one in the cities, the other in the fields. ...[We are speaking] of the struggle between European civilization and indigenous barbarism, between intelligence and matter, an unavoidable struggle in America."¹⁷

In the twentieth century, a pretended universal culture—of Coca-Cola and cowboy pants—destroys the cultural objects, customs, symbols, and meaning of life of peripheral peoples. Moreover, the doctrine of development (*doctrina del desarrollo*) universalizes the model of developed countries by insisting that

underdeveloped countries lack elements of this model and need to imitate it, even though such a doctrine leads to the peripheral countries' losing control of their internal economies, transferring decisions to the center, and weakening their already unproductive commercial oligarchies—all because of basic inequalities in the terms of exchange. As Dussel remarks, every oppression has its ideology, and each commences when it situates the Other in non-being, reducing it to servitude as it pretends to pass on civilization.¹⁸

Throughout history, cultural systems of knowledge have involved the imposing of Eurocentric patterns of understanding on the rest of the world. For example, according to Aristotle the prevailing Greek social structures of slavery and the oppression of women take on an the physiomy of eternity and divine permanence. By imputing such economic and erotic depravity to nature itself, the ontology of the Totality, although presenting itself as light, fundament, and eternity, is nothing other than economically and erotically repressive. It is no wonder that Dussel describes philosophical ethics as concealing ideologies that naturalize or sacralize domination by dehistoricizing the established order. Another instance of this cultural imperialism, Rousseau's pedagogy, rejecting feudal, noble, monarchic, or ecclesiastic modes of education, permits the bourgeois state to take over the education of the son since the family and popular culture have nothing to say or teach. For Rousseau, human nature is truly grasped only by the rising bourgeoisie, whose disdain of popular culture will lead to imperial and neocolonial extremes later. By stressing the unconditional character of the aseptic preceptor, the neocolonial state of the Center, by means of the enlightened and imperial culture, identifies itself as the universal culture, as human nature, without critical conscience. Freud, too, while adequately detecting the pedagogic domination of father over son, flowering under the sway of modern subjectivity, imputes this structure to a worldwide human nature, thereby invalidly universalizing a peculiar European experience. Historical accounts also substitute particularist perspectives for universal ones. Thus Alfred Weber's *History of Culture* pretends to present an account of universal culture, but it mentions Latin America in

only four lines (regarding Spain's discovery of it), and Lortz's *History of the Church* never even mentions Latin America.¹⁹

Part of Dussel's struggle to unmask deceptive universals involves his criticism of Roman Catholic practices and teachings. The Church's liturgical year, for example, evidences the northern hemisphere's universalizing of its practices without regard for differences, thus ordering celebrations of the humble beginnings of the Son of God (Christmas) at a time when the earthly sun in Latin America is at its peak, and of the resurrection of Christ when all creation finds itself in an autumnal process of death. The fixing of the universal liturgy at the Council of Trent also undermined any efforts to include indigenous rituals at precisely the time when evangelization in Latin America might have been enhanced by such possibilities. Furthermore, the social doctrine of the Church, thought out in European context or in that of developed nations, does not correspond to the concrete situations of Latin Americans, since, for instance, it recommends that one overcome class war, but says little about overcoming the domination of one class by another. More recently, Dussel has criticized the Third World Synod of Roman Catholic bishops for failing to condemn injustice, and in his view the Latin American Episcopal Conference at Medellín found itself impelled to supplement the supposed universalism of this synod with mandates appropriate to Latin America. Christian doctrines afford a continual source for legitimating corruption, as in the case of the Pinochet-led military junta of Chile whose Declaration of Principles in 1973 styled the junta itself as the defender of the universally revered Christian concept of life against its Marxist opponents. According to Dussel, there is a constant danger of confusing Judeo-Christianity with a particular civilization, race, or a determinate nation or people. Hence, Dussel almost completely reverses his earlier Catholicism when he finally concludes that the role of Christianity is to demythologize the absolutized relative.²⁰

Theological reflection, no less than Church practice, tends to cloak its particularity in universal garb. In his essay "Théologie de la 'Périphérie' et du 'Centre,'" Dussel chides the dogmatic slumber of a pretended theological universality which the particularity of the center has assumed. The center, the North Atlantic community, has been and still is able to impose itself on other coun-

tries because of the power of its economy, its technology, and even its libraries, publications, and theological administrative structures. It is still necessary, he believes, to envision "an international division of theological labor" in which theologians would humbly take up their partial, situated tasks, specific to a continent, and in which they could become cognizant of the determinations exercised on them instead of assimilating uncritically theologies inappropriate to their context. Dussel here merely follows the advice of Peruvian philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy, who urges Latin Americans in his *Existe una filosofía de nuestra América ?* to be vigilant and mistrustful in the extreme so as not to fall into alienating modes of reflection offered from outside Latin America. But such caution, far from undermining theology, will lead to a new vision of theology itself. Theology requires that one take the large way, that of "distinction," that of constructing a new "analogical" theology.

Within the dialogues of the periphery have arisen differences among Africa, Asia, Latin America, and between the center and the periphery. Some bridges offering possible solutions have also arisen, first of all, for understanding the position of the Other, and then, for arriving at some method and some categories (a paradigm) which might be capable of opening to a future *mundial* theology. This new analogical totality will be built up in the twenty-first century beginning from affirmed and developed particularisms (among these, *as particulars*, Europe and the United States).²¹

Dussel's skepticism about universals is not, however, total, but, rather, heuristic and ethically oriented. In *Fundamentación de la ética y filosofía de la liberación*, Dussel observes that the philosophy of liberation inevitably maintains a continual suspicion of the nonfundamental character of every "real accord," and considers as possible domination every pretense to universalization following from such "consensus." For Dussel, though, this preference for suspicion is part of an inevitable and inescapable ethical exigency. Dussel finds Apel actually concurring with this suspicion, in that Apel defends the idea of a regulative principle of an ideal community of communication placing in question every real one—a questioning essential for the progress of interpretation.²²

Because of this mistrust of the possibility of disguised oppres-

sion, Dussel at times makes disparaging remarks about the possibility of science. In *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, he states that the human sciences, and sciences in general, have questioned their own suppositions and have understood that there is no universality in science. To pretend to such universality is to calculate and conclude in favor of the dominator, the North Atlantic culture and civilization. Furthermore, even the axioms of science, including mathematical axioms, are neither universal nor eternal, but cultural. An axiom is accepted because it is worthy of being accepted as "cultural" evidence. Citing Cornelius de Pauw on how heat has damaged the brains of Africans and other false "scientific" demonstrations of the inferiority of blacks, Dussel concludes, against Althusser, that there is a grade of ideological contamination from which science can never free itself. In *Filosofía de la producción*, Dussel observes how scientists and technologists, as if intent on hiding their particularity beneath a universalistic veil, prefer not to talk about a Latin American science, but rather about science and technology in general.²³

In several of these contexts, though, Dussel indicates that his interpretation of science is not as arbitrary or relativistic as it might seem. For instance, the Latin American social scientists, questioning universality, really wonder whether the mere functionality of an economic system can satisfy the ethical criteria by which that system ought to be judged. In this view, although scientific conclusions might be autonomously valid, their application in a wider context depends on extra-scientific, ethico-political considerations. In addition to these considerations of the mission of science for society, Dussel also notes how prescientific ethico-political commitments condition one's scientific "vocation" and the problems one chooses to address. In addition, such commitments determine what articles journals accept and what academic projects receive financing. Although it is regrettably true that politics often plays a repressive role in academic settings, these practices do not undermine the validity of scientific claims to truth, but in fact could presuppose it as something they battle to suppress.²⁴

In his essay "Historia y praxis (Ortopraxis y objetividad)," Dussel works out his most careful resolution of the tension between the cultural determinants of science and its objectivity. Following the later Husserl, he argues that everyday-life praxis and

its interests provide for the constitution of objects, such that, for instance, it would have been impossible for the Pharaoh to recognize the legitimacy and consistency of the hope of exploited slaves: it was beyond the possible horizon of his capacity for object-constitution. The physical structure of the matter at hand and the practical, historical collectivity cannot be divorced from each other in the mutual roles they play in the building up an object. Of course, a methodic, disciplined scientific/transcendental subjectivity can supplant the empirical (pathological) subject producing the opinions of everyday life, and, as the later Husserl taught, one must never forget this subject-correlative character of scientific findings if one wishes to avoid forms of scientism and objectivism. According to Dussel's conception, recent philosophy of science has settled for a type of "abstract objectivity" that is achieved within the conditions of the elaboration of a discourse and in conformity with spelled out epistemologically required exigencies. Following Marx's *Capital* instead, Dussel opts for a "concrete objectivity" that, while it elaborates a rich totality of multiple determinations and relations, seeks correspondence with the real, validity, and the achievement of truth (as opposed to mere objectivity without truth). Not only does Dussel show himself highly unrelativistic at this point of the argument, but he insists that when a liberating praxis involves itself with what is exterior to the prevailing totality, it uncovers a rich mine of data, hypotheses, and reality neglected by those intellectuals of ruling hegemony whose prescientific constitutive processes have not even allowed such data to appear. Such praxis, elucidating a new horizon of knowability of daily and scientific objects, is intrinsic to theory itself and by no means extratheoretical. Dedication to the oppressed makes possible a greater degree of objectivity than is possible for the "new mandarins" of the system, as Chomsky describes them. Although scientific knowledge continues to be relative to disciplined subjective processes—and so is neither absolute (presuppositionless) Hegelian knowledge nor blind commonsense prejudice—there are degrees of objectivity possible that are enhanced, particularly when the scientist is exposed to the data of exteriority against which the prevailing system refuses to test itself.²⁵

Here again, Dussel's analectical method leads him to question

the universalizations in a domain where Levinas rarely ventured—science. Like Levinas, however, Dussel shows himself skeptical of any pretentious rationality that would legislate uncritically for all others. At the same time, Dussel's critique of science shows that the very Other who makes one doubtful about rationality holds the key for helping rationality to be more rational. In this, Dussel shows himself even more analogous to Levinas, who saw in the face of the Other, not the enemy of reason, but the positive invitation to discourse and the ultimate horizon (beyond even Husserl's life-world) that must be taken into account if rationality is to be truly rational.

Even the dialectical process itself can function as a type of oppressive universalization. Beyond the well-known and already discussed fact that for Hegel there is no exteriority, Dussel realizes that even a negative dialectics such as that of the Frankfurt School, Ernst Bloch, or Sartre ends up affirming the system it rebels against. If the Sandinistas risked their lives in Nicaragua simply because they wished to deny "Somocism," then Somocism would have become their central obsession, the focus of their energy, and thus embraced them within its tentacles even as they rebelled against it. But, in Dussel's view, the Sandinistas revolted before all and principally to affirm the Nicaraguan people, with their practices, values, memories, their "spaces" of liberty and dignity, their history, their accounts of liberation, their music, language, economy of self-subsistence and life outside the *Somocista* order, in the light of all of which they recognized Somocism as oppression. The Sandinistas negated the negation inflicted on the Nicaraguan people *from* (*desde*) the affirmation of the Nicaraguan people. As opposed to negative dialectics, authentic liberation springs neither from hatred nor from a desire for struggle in itself, but is moved by love and by appreciation for the value of the exterior culture.²⁶

Bartholomé de las Casas exemplifies the authentic prophet, since he underwent tutelage at the hands of the oppressed and learned to admire the beauty, culture, and goodness of the indigenous, the new, the Other. Las Casas indeed appreciates the *pulchritudo prima* that Dussel claims is to be found in the face, carnality, and dark-skinned loveliness (*belleza criolla*) of the poor, the oppressed, the Other, giving the lie to aristocratic aesthetics that

attributes only ugliness to the Other in order to make it easier to subjugate that Other. Unlike Gines de Sepúlveda or Fernandez de Oviedo, who saw the indigenous person as totalized within their system, Las Casas discovers the exteriority of indigenous persons in their positivity and out of his love begins a critique of their unjust totalization.²⁷

Without falling into the later myth of the *bon sauvage*, he writes of them:

God has raised all these universal and infinite peoples in their whole type as the most innocent people, without evils or duplicities, most obedient and faithful to their natural rulers and to the Christians whom they serve; and more than any other people on the face of the earth they are more humble, more patient, more pacific and tranquil, without bickering or harshness. They are, thus, the most delicate of people, thin, and tender in comportment, and less able to suffer labors, and they die more easily from any kind of sickness.²⁸

Because Las Casas had transcended the ontological horizon of the system and come into contact with the Other as Other, it was love that fueled his protest:

Then it was that they [the indigenous peoples] knew them [the Europeans] as wolves and tigers and the cruelest of lions who had been hungry for many days. And they have done nothing else these forty years to this part of the world until today, and even this very day, than [inflict] havoc, slaughters, distresses, afflictions, tortures and destructions by strange, new, and varied forms of cruelty that have never been seen, or read about, or heard of before.²⁹

Although affirmation of the exteriority alone affords escape from the all-absorbing vortex of dialectics and negative dialectics, Dussel's analectic method, starting from the Other, never permits him to relax his restless doubting of universalizations and Eurocentric systems of knowledge, religious practices, theology, and science. Such disbelief places the rational project of modernity in jeopardy for Dussel, who gladly exults in the epithet "postmodernist."

Latin American philosophy is, then, a new moment in the history of human philosophy, an analogical moment that is born after Eu-

ropean, Russian, and North American modernity, but antedating the African and Asian postmodern philosophy which they will constitute with us in the next "mundial" [*mundial*] future: the philosophy of the poor, the philosophy of human-mundial liberation (not in univocal Hegelian sense, however, but in sense of an analogical humanity, where each person, each people or nation, each culture, can express its own [contribution] to the analogical universality which is neither abstract universality [totalitarianism of a particularism abusively universalized] nor the concrete universality [univocal consummation of domination]).³⁰

Ironically, Dussel's own mistrust of oppressive universalization does not prevent him from engaging in similar behavior, as is evident in his repeated discussions of homosexuality. Dussel roots his opposition to homosexuality in the history of philosophy. In Plato's *Symposium* the celestial Aphrodite brings it about that males love males—the best type of eros—while the earthly Aphrodite inspires the heirs of the androgynous one, men and women, to love each other with a heterosexual love that is to be despised because it is not a sexuality of those who are the same (*los mismos*). Homosexuality for Plato is the love of the same for the same, with all the exclusionary connotations that the word "same" carries for Dussel and Levinas. Dussel equates sex shops, drug orgies, and pornography with homosexuality as so many misguided efforts to overcome narcissistic, totalized eros, which can be overcome only through the marriage of the couple that procreates a son. When the Other is constituted as a mere sexual object, the act is one of homosexuality and alienation of the Other as a mere mediation of autoeroticism. The tension of erotic-dominating praxis is essentially homosexual and Oedipal, and negates the sex of the distinct Other, reduces the Other to the same, and portends the death of the family! Lesbianism becomes the sum of all perversions and the radical loss of a sense of reality, the final solipsism of the Cartesian or European ego. In speaking of the subjugation of exteriority to money, Dussel comments that "the fetish advances thus as the perfect phallus of perverse, homosexual, masturbative desire." It never seems to enter Dussel's imagination that committed, generous, generative, nonnarcissistic sexual relations are possible between homosexuals, so oblivious is he to his complicity with the heterosexual totality that inflicts enormous

psychological and even physical violence throughout the world on those who are its Other. Other-oppressive aspects of Dussel's erotics, rightly criticized by Ofelia Schutte, may be traced to residual influences of his earlier natural law position (relinquished in his turn to Levinas) or even to his uncritical assimilation of *Totality and Infinity's* patriarchal erotics, which Levinas abandoned by the time he wrote *Otherwise Than Being*. But pointing out how Dussel himself proffers false universalizations does not undermine his analectical method; it suggests, rather, how much more carefully and rigorously he needs to apply it.³¹

ANALECTICAL METHOD, ETHICAL HERMENEUTICS, AND THE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF REASON

Whereas the previous section highlights Dussel's critical, at times negative, stance toward universalization, science, and rationality in general and concluded with his saluting the banner of post-modernism, there is another side to his analectical method. Beginning with the Other, Dussel, in fact, develops what I would describe as an ethical hermeneutics that actually enhances and renews rationality. Viewed through this optic, Dussel will very much resemble Levinas the phenomenologist, who, as I argued in the first chapter, can only be characterized as antirational if he is misunderstood. This interpretation of Dussel can be corroborated, in that the later Dussel dubs himself, not postmodern, but "transmodern."

Following Heidegger's rooting of the theoretical attitude in a prior practical one (*Zuhandenheit* precedes *Vorhandenheit* which abstracts from it), Dussel recognizes that the act of knowledge is always inscribed, really and practically, in the total process of praxis, as an "internal" moment at praxis's service. The fundamental practical project of a society, group, or individual opens the horizon of possible constitution of the objects of knowledge, which need not preclude the attainment of scientific objectivity by means of a methodical, disciplined, or transcendental attitude, supervening upon that of the empirical, pathological, or daily subject. However, one first opens to the world, not through a theoretical attitude, but rather through a practical one that gives a

subsequent impulsion to theory. Thus, in Dussel's view, philosophy is a second act, to follow on the praxis of liberation; and theology as a thematizing thought (*pensar temático*) succeeds prophetic commitment (*praxis existencial*). One ought not to define the morality of an action by its transcendental relation to a norm or law; rather, one ought to begin with the historical process of the liberation of actual material peoples "who are hungry." Within such a framework, one can situate all the problems of abstract moral subjectivity with which moral theologies often mistakenly begin. Dussel ties this practical option for the Other and the poor in with his analectical method:

What is proper to the analectical method is that it is intrinsically ethical and not merely theoretical, as the ontic discourse of the sciences or the ontology of the dialectic is. That is to say, the acceptance of the Other as Other signifies already an ethical option, a choice, and a moral commitment: it is necessary to deny the totality, to affirm oneself as finite, to be an atheist of the fundament as identity. "Every morning my ear is awakened so that I can hear as a disciple" (Isaiah 50:4). In this case, the philosopher, before being an intelligent person, is an ethically just person, someone who is good, who is a disciple. ...The analectic method includes then a previous practical historical option.³²

Immediately after Dussel points to this option for the poor in his *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, he begins to describe what he calls the "ethos of liberation," a particular attitude assumed by one who opts for the poor. One must silence the dominating word, open oneself interrogatively to the provocation of the poor one, and know how to remain in the "desert" with an attentive ear. In the second volume of *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Dussel expounds more fully on this ethos. It involves a sacred fear, respect before the Other as other. It is neither sympathy, which remains bound to the eros of the Same, nor the love of friendship, which demands mutuality, but rather the habit of creatively putting oneself forward without seeking reciprocity, gratitude, or gratification. It consists in confidence in the Other, faith in the Other's future and liberty, accrediting the truth of the Other's word, denying any possibility that one can have total comprehension of the Other. In this attitude, one affirms the exis-

tence of another culture in the supposedly "uncultured" or "illiterate."³³

The polar opposite of this ethos of liberation is to be found in the Heideggerian/Nietzschean ethos of the hero, the exact inverse of the Jewish thinking of alterity. In the ethos of the hero, the perfection of humanity is achieved in arriving at what one is able to be, in realizing one's own most authentic possibilities. Such an ethos affirms the Totality as the uniquely valuable and, with a depreciation of the Other based on self-love, despises the Other. The heroic ethos mistrusts the Other as acting exclusively from cynicism, hypocrisy, convenience, and astuteness, and whatever sign of infidelity the Other gives only confirms this suspicion. Such lack of confidence in the Other eventually leads to a despairing solipsism, self-fixated upon an abstract, convenient, and dead past. Disordered pleasure is condemned, but the order of comfort is esteemed. This hero eliminates anyone who threatens his gluttony, luxury, inebriety, and regulated incontinence and adopts a stony insensibility in the face of the Other's misery. The hero undertakes arduous and fearful projects and exercises power over the weakest with pride and ambitious ostentation. Preeminent examples of this heroic ethos are Caesar in Gaul and Cortés and Pizarro in Amerindia. Their activities involved denying the Other as a Germanic barbarian or Indian and reifying them as an oppressed "thing" at the service of the dominant group.³⁴

One who lives out of the ethos of liberation locates herself in the "hermeneutic position" of the oppressed and takes on their interests, thereby discovering previously unnoticed values and emphases and opening the horizon of the possible constitution of objects of knowledge often invisible to those ensconced within the Totality. Beginning with the poor (*desde el pobre*), the hero of liberation thereby discovers a whole new critical perspective, a new criterion of philosophical and historical interpretation, a new fundamental hermeneutics, typical of the Gramsci-type "organic intellectual." Dussel comments on this perspectival approach to hermeneutics in one of his theological writings:

A beggar, for example, sees the color on the outside of the rich man's house from the outside, something the rich man on the inside doesn't see. We have a better view of the house of the center

because we live on the outside. We are not stronger, but weaker. But in this case weakness is an asset. Our theology engages in criticism of the theology of the center precisely because ours is a theology of the periphery. Therefore, it is a theology that will clearly propose critical points or support for Latin America but also for the Arab world, for Africa, India, China, and for the blacks and Chicanos of the United States—by far the greater part of humanity.³⁵

In a Latin American context, these different perspectives of interpretation shape the meaning one gives to legality and justice, as when, for instance, the powerful accuse the heroes of liberation of being subversives and communists intent on destruction and deserving prison and torture, even as these heroes know that their praxis highlights the perversity and evil of prisons and torturers, the tribunals of justice and governors. Historical examples also illustrate Dussel's hermeneutical perspectivism: of Miguel Hidalgo, for instance, whose action was legal according to the "law of the poor," even though he was denounced by theological faculties and excommunicated by the Mexican bishops. Transvaluating Nietzsche's transvaluation of values, Dussel illustrates how the perspective of the ethos of liberation inverts the reigning "virtues" of the *conquistador* by giving priority to service of the poor and mercy toward the oppressed; the very meaning of "virtue" is understood differently, depending on one's perspective.³⁶

Dussel, in fact, defines the philosophy of liberation as being, not a theoretical option, but rather a practical-political option for the poor, a moral commitment to the Other, open to a plurality of theoretical categorizations (for example, Frankfurt School, philosophy of language, Levinasian metaphysics, or Marxism) and even political options. Dussel insists, though, that this practical option for the Other is not to be considered extra-theoretical, since, by displaying new horizons of knowability, it determines knowledge and plays a role in constituting theory. For instance, great politicians like Bolívar or Sandino achieved a greater degree of rightness (*rectitud*) and everyday-life (*cotidiana*) objectivity than those lacking any political knowledge or those protected from reality by their position in the dominant classes.³⁷

While one commits oneself to the poor ethically merely in response to the face of the Other, not for the knowledge to be

gained from the Other or for any ulteriorly sought advantages for oneself—otherwise one would be subjecting the Other to one's own Totality and not really committing oneself to the Other—in Dussel's view improved prospects of knowledge result as an unintended by-product from such a commitment. He speaks, for instance, of an increased understanding of Others resulting from commitment to them. Dussel even suggests that this process of understanding the Other through "deculturation" of oneself is achieved through a kind of secondary socialization at the hands of the Other—a socialization that could be accelerated if there were a "novitiate" set up to enable people to understand divergent cultures. In contrast, Cardinal Daniélou's 1972 universal condemnation of violence and his censuring of the priests of the Movement for the Third World for their involvement in politics involved a violation of the first rule of hermeneutics: "It is necessary to situate oneself correctly in the world in which an event occurs."³⁸

The commitment to the Other heightens self-criticism, particularly for philosophical discourse bound to academic university settings and prone to ideologize, cover, and justify existing domination because of its isolation from real, concrete, historical contexts. To be critical and aware of one's own limitations, one must establish relationships with the historical, real practices of oppressed peoples. Dussel cites Noam Chomsky to the effect that "in the measure that power is made more accessible [to the intellectual], the inequalities of society recede from his/her vision." While Dussel recalls Marcuse's observation that intellectuals transform crimes against humanity into a rational enterprise, it is clear that the ethical commitment to the Other that enhances self-critique does not lead to despair over reason, but hope for its liberating power. Dussel repeats Marcuse's claim that "if nature is in itself a legitimate, rational object of science, it is not only the legitimate object of Reason as power, but also of Reason as liberty, not only as domination, but also *as liberation*." Self-critique takes its start when one understands that it is only in relation to the Other that one can even become aware that one is located within a Totality.³⁹

In the Other, theory itself finds a source for its own renewal. Just as Thomas Kuhn has noted that scientific revolutions begin

when "an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately,"
so

The objects situated in the sphere of exteriority ...are no longer able to be treated by the paradigms that have risen to explain fact within the horizon of *I* [the interest-orientation of the Totality] . The intrasystemic explanation....is no longer considered as "objective" by the dominated subject. ...The *loss of objectivity* of the historical explanation is confused, in the system that the praxis of liberation *leaves behind*, as if it were something "subjective," badly intended, reduced, not real, ideological at least for its real function of hiding *E* [the sphere of exteriority]; the sphere of exteriority discovered from liberating praxis is the origin of the crisis of the explanatory paradigm.⁴⁰

The power of the Other to renew theory is further illustrated in the cases of Ernst Bloch and the early Frankfurt School who remain caught in the "evil infinite" of negative dialectics because they lack a positive, affirmative starting point in the Other. This point of aid would have given their theory, as it gives all theory, the capacity for novelty beginning from the perspective of what it totally Other, that is, from a perspective of real, total oppression.⁴¹

Although Dussel conceives empathic identification with the Other as expanding the limitations of reason confined within a self-enclosed totality because the condition of the possibility of the constitution of the objectivity of the object depends on the project and interests of knowers, his recognition of the sociohistorical conditioning of hermeneutic perspectives does not lead to epistemological relativism. He admits the existence of a physical structure of matter that is interrelated with historical collective practices—both of which constitute supports (*soportes*) of objectivity. Even dialectical explanation (including Marxist brands), in Dussel's opinion, must include correspondence with the real. He further distinguishes the empirical or pathological subjectivity, which holds those merely probable opinions accepted by most people, from a scientific or transcendental subjectivity, more methodic and disciplined, whose conclusions must comply with the exigencies of epistemological apparatuses. In each case "knowledge" is always correlative to a type of subjectivity, but a greater objectivity is to be found in the conclusions of science which must

be proven valid according to reflectively established criteria and standards. There is, then, an autonomy of science, but it is relative to a transcendental or scientific subjectivity that has elaborated through history its exigencies and criteria. Finally, if one admits that interests can occlude from sight the issues and persons on the exteriority of the Totality, then one must also conclude that certain valid claims can be justified about that exteriority and its legitimate ethical claims and that the totality would either have to concur with the validity of those claims or persist in its ideological, irrational blindness to their truth.⁴²

It should be pointed out that the servicial initiation of the relation with the Other does not preclude secondary rational, critical exchanges with the Other at the level of what Levinas might call the Third (although Dussel does not use this language) and on the Other's behalf. Every culture, in Dussel's view, grasps itself as the center of the world, and every stage in development tends to absolutize itself. For instance, the Neolithic urban revolution brought about the complication of political structures and new Amerindian modes of production, with the result that increasing injustice climaxed in the domination of brother by brother in the Incan and Aztec empires. Contrary to those critics who claim that he is naïvely populist, Dussel recognizes that "the people" are not free from inauthenticity, voices misgivings about popular religiosity, observes that the oppressed have often introjected the oppression they have received, and refrains from any uncritical endorsement of populist spontaneity. The prophet or the philosopher can aid the people, the collective Other outside the center of power, to become more productive, just as enlightened pedagogues strive to promote critical attitudes among those for whom they are responsible. Philosophers and prophets can discover and highlight the self-critical elements already to be found within cultures and popular art, such as the tango *Margot* written by Celedonio Flores in 1918 in Argentina about a young woman who forsakes her poor barrio to become a prostitute of a wealthy man of Buenos Aires. This critical approach to the Other can be reconciled with the primacy of place given to the Other in the first moment of encounter only through a communicative dialogue between philosopher and the Other and between prophet and people, but there is in Dussel no irrational worship of the Other.⁴³

These indications of a proral strain in Dussel's hermeneutics on behalf of the Other, or "ethical hermeneutics," as I have dubbed it, come to clearer expression in a series of more recent lectures Dussel delivered in Frankfurt on the five hundredth anniversary of Columbus's landing in America, entitled *1492: El encubrimiento del Otro—Hacia el origen del "Mito de la modernidad."* In these lectures, Dussel sets his position off from postmodernism. Whereas postmodernism criticizes modern reason as reason, Dussel criticizes modern reason for concealing an irrational myth. In Dussel's view, Europe, prior to the conquest of the Americas, was isolated, after having failed in the Crusades to recover control over the Eastern Mediterranean. Islam extended across northern Africa through Iran to northern India. Only in 1492, and with the conquest of Mexico in particular, did Europe first experience "strongly" the European ego controlling another empire, subduing the Other, as servicial, colonized, dominated, exploited, and humiliated. Only then did Europe succeed in constituting other civilizations as its periphery. This "going out" of Western Europe from the narrow limits within which the Islamic world had confined it constitutes, in Dussel's opinion, the birth of modernity as a worldwide event, a "mundial" happening. Dussel believes that Germanic-centered scholarship, with little concern for Spain's significance in history, mistakenly designates the Renaissance or Reformation as the origin of modernity, even though those events were basically only intra-European occurrences.⁴⁴

Europe, of course, interpreted the landing of Columbus in its own terms, calling the continent the "New World" and "America" in honor of Amerigo Vespucci. Dussel traces what he sees to be the European interpretation of the colonization of America. Europe considered its culture more developed than and superior to the cultures found there. If these other cultures could be made to "leave" their barbarity and underdevelopment through a civilizing process, this would constitute development (the fallacy of development, in Dussel's view). Europe's domination of other cultures was envisioned as a pedagogic action, a necessary violence, a just war, a civilizing and modernizing task, and the sufferings of these cultures were justified as the necessary costs of the civilizing process and the payment for a "culpable

immaturity." The European conquest was thus perceived as not only innocent, but even meritorious. The conquered victims were "culpable" for their own conquest, for the violence exercised upon them, since they should have abandoned their barbarity voluntarily instead of obliging their conquerors to use force. Gines de Sepúlveda typifies this Eurocentric self-justification by applying Christ's parable urging his disciples to go out into the byways and force those who were not originally invited to attend the banquet to the indigenous peoples of America: "As regard these barbarians, let us say, violators [that is to say, culpable], blasphemers, and idolators, I maintain that we not only can invite them, but ought to compel them so that receiving the empire of the Christians they might hear the apostles who announce the Gospel."⁴⁵ Dussel sees Sepúlveda's recommendation as justifying the use of violence to include the Other in the "community of communication" and employing irrationality (war) to initiate argumentation, as opposed to Bartolomé de las Casas who demanded that Europe comport itself rationally from the beginning of the dialogue with the Other.⁴⁶

Though Dussel admits that European modernity conceives itself as rational emancipator, it is also accompanied by an irrational "myth" by which it justifies its own violence against the rest of the world, its sacrifice of others on the altar of "development" and "civilization."

Modernity, in its rational nucleus, is emancipation of humanity from the state of cultural, civilizational immaturity. But as myth, in the mundial horizon, it immolates men and women of the peripheral colonial world (and the Amerindians were the first to suffer) as exploited victims, whose victimization is covered with an argument for sacrifice as the cost of modernization. This irrational myth is the horizon that the act of liberation must transcend (and so this act is rational, as deconstructing the myth and practico-political, as an action that surpasses capitalism and modernity in a trans-modern type of ecological civilization, popular democracy, and economic justice).⁴⁷

This myth was clearly evident at the beginning of modernity, when Europe "discovered" America, not as something that resisted Europe as distinct, as the Other, but as the material on which the same projected itself, eclipsing the Other.⁴⁸

What is evident here is that Dussel envisions the philosophy of liberation as dissolving the myth accompanying the emancipative dimensions of rational modernity, as unmasking the false universals and misuses of reason that would justify North Atlantic violence against the rest of the world and clothe naked power motives in the garb of moral-pedagogic rhetoric. This Nietzschean-like project of Dussel's, born in an un-Nietzschean way from an ethical hermeneutics, which interprets the events of history and the structures of society from the perspective of the poor and outcast Other, is directed, not at discrediting rationality, but at making rational modernity more rational. Since Dussel's ethical hermeneutics enriches processes of rationalization, he exchanges his early self-characterization as postmodernist to "transmodernist," not as disdainful of reason as postmodernity and yet too suspicious to endorse wholeheartedly critical theory's project of rehabilitating modernity.

We have attempted to outline the manner of analyzing the question in order to introduce the historical conditions of a theory of dialogue that does not fall (1) into the facile optimism of an abstract rationalist universalism (which can confuse universality with Eurocentrism and modernizing developmentalism) from which the actual "Frankfurt School" could derive, or (2) into the irrationality, incommunicability, or incommensurability of the discourse of the postmodernists. The Philosophy of Liberation affirms reason as a faculty capable of establishing a dialogue, an intersubjective discourse with the reason of the Other as an alterative reason. In our time, it is this reason that denies the irrational moment of the "sacrificial Myth of Modernity," in order to affirm (take up into a liberating project) the rational, emancipatory moment of the Enlightenment and of Modernity, but now a Trans-Modernity.⁴⁹

Here Dussel's analectical method, which began with the analogical word of the Other, like our own word and yet bearing its own distinctive meaning, and ended with an analogical philosophy of liberation, indebted to Europe and yet distinct from it, comes to its full flowering. Dussel's transmodern philosophy of liberation owes itself to rational modernity and yet cannot be subsumed under it. Dussel also shows himself, like Levinas understood as a phenomenologist (more than a postmodernist), finding in the Other an Archimedian point from which to place

reason in question and yet thereby make it all the more rational. But in an interesting way, for all his allegiance to Levinas, Dussel has not forsaken his earlier devotion to Heidegger. For his philosophy is an ethical hermeneutics that, beginning from a rootedness and embodiedness in the perspective of the Other, patiently acquired through a tutelage at the hands of the Other, undertakes an interpretation of history, the economy—in particular Marx's reading of the economy—religion, and theology. It is to the implementation of this hermeneutics of these diverse realms from an ethical perspective that we must now turn. It will be apparent that only in adopting the posture of an ethical hermeneutics, a synthesis of Levinas and Heidegger, can one truly understand history, religion, and the economy. Only from an ethical hermeneutics can one be fully rational.

NOTES

1. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 113-25; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:161-74; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, 3rd ed., pp. 185-98.
2. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 112-13; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:160-61; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, p. 185.
3. Enrique Dussel, *La producción teórica de Marx: Un comentario a Los Grundrisse* (Iztapalapa, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985), pp. 30-63, 362-64; Enrique Dussel and Daniel E. Guillot, *Liberación latinoamericana y Emmanuel Levinas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Bonum, 1975), pp. 8-9.
4. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 113-16; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:161-64; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 186-88.
5. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 116, 127 n32; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2: 164, 238n486; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 188-89, 201 n32.
6. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 116-18; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:164-67; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 189-91.
7. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 118-19; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:167-68; *Método para una filosofía de la*

liberación, pp. 191-92. Dussel here clearly evidences influences from Levinas's *Otherwise Than Being*.

8. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, p. 120; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:168; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, p.193.

9. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 119-22; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:168-71, *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 192-95.

10. Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 124-25; Dussel, "Sobre el sentido de la traducción," pp. 135-36.

11. "Sobre el sentido de la traducción," *Actos del Primer Congreso de Estudios Clásicos* (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1972), 99, 123-25; Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers. I. The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 11-13.

12. Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, pp. 102-20; Steven Lukes, "Relativism in Its Place," in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982), pp. 262-71; Ernest Gellner, "Concepts and Society," in *Rationality*, ed. Bryan R. Wilson (London: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 33-49; Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being*, pp. 157-62, 190-96.

13. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 122-25; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:171-74; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 195-98.

14. *El humanismo semita*, pp. 168-70; Dussel and Esandi, *El catolicismo popular en la Argentina*, p. 30; "Hacia una historia de la Iglesia latinoamericana," 503; *Hipótesis para una historia de la Iglesia en América Latina*, p. 171.

15. *Cultura latinoamericana e historia de la Iglesia*, p. 93.

16. Enrique Dussel, *Los últimos 50 años, 1930-1985, en la historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (Bogotá: Indo-American Press Service, 1986), p. 310.

17. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, III. *Filosofía ética latinoamericana: De la erótica a la pedagógica de la liberación*. Mexico City: Editorial Edicol, 1977), p. 199.

18. *Ibid.*, 1:154; 3:199, 205, 209; 4:61; Enrique Dussel, *Ética comunitaria* (Madrid: Ediciones Paulinas, 1986), p. 216.

19. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:73, 3:67, 91, 139, 149; *Cultura latinoamericana e historia de la Iglesia*, pp. 90-92.

20. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*. V. *Filosofía ética latinoamericana: Arqueológica latinoamericana—Una filosofía de la religión antifetiva*

chista (Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás, Centro de Enseñanza Desescolarizada, 1980), p. 109; *ibid.*, 3: 219; *El catolicismo popular en la Argentina*, p. 60; *Ética comunitaria*, pp. 228-230; Enrique Dussel, *De Medellín a Puebla: Una década de sangre y esperanza* (1968-1979) (Mexico City: Editorial Edicol, 1979), p. 64; *Hipótesis para una historia de la Iglesia*, p. 30; *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, p. 146.

21. Enrique Dussel, "Théologie de la 'Peripherie' et du 'Centre': Rencontre ou confrontation?" *Concilium*, 191 (1984), 158; see also 152, 157; *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, p. 159; Augusto Salazar Bondy, *Existe una filosofía de nuestra América?* (Iztapalapa, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1975), p.132.

22. Enrique Dussel, "La introducción de la 'Transformación de la filosofía' de K.-O. Apel y la filosofía de la liberación: Reflexiones desde una perspectiva latinoamericana," in Karl-Otto Apel, Enrique Dussel, and Raul Betancourt-Fornet, *Fundamentación de la ética y filosofía de la liberación* (Iztapalapa, Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1992), pp. 75-76.

23. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:187, 3:165, 216; Enrique Dussel, "Racismo, América Latina negra, y teología de la liberación," *Servir* [Mexico], 86 (1980), 187-88; Enrique Dussel, *Filosofía de la producción* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva America, 1984), p. 98.

24. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:187, 3:164-65, 216-18.

25. Enrique Dussel, "Historia y praxis (Ortopraxis y objetividad)," *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva América, 1983), pp. 307-29.

26. *La dialéctica hegeliana*, pp. 82, 96, 107; Enrique Dussel, "Respondiendo algunas preguntas y objeciones sobre filosofía de la liberación," *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación* (Bogotá: Nueva América, 1983), pp. 95-96; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana. IV. Filosofía ética latinoamericana: La política latinoamericana*. Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás, Centro de Enseñanza Desescolarizada, 1979), pp. 101-102. For Dussel, popular culture, exterior to the system of capital, can achieve liberation as a creative, analectic subject according to *Cultura latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 29-30.

27. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 3:75-76, 178.

28. *Ibid.*, 4:41.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, 2:173; see also 2:167-68, 3:173; *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, pp. 124-25; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, p. 197; "Théologie de la 'Périphérie' et du 'Centre,'" 157-58; *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, p. 88.

31. Enrique Dussel, "Fundamentación analéctica de la liberación," *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, 2nd ed. (Salamanca: Ediciones Sigueme, 1974), p. 263; *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, p. 102; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 3:69,72,83,101-102, 113,117; 5:84; Ofelia Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought: A Critique of Dussel's Ethics," *The Philosophical Forum*, 22 (1991) , 277, 284, 293; for a critique of heterosexual totalization within the *feminist* tradition, see Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). Fortunately, in his recent *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, ed. and trans. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1996), pp. 9-10, Dussel has retracted this earlier position on homosexuality and several of the ethical positions for which Ofelia Schutte criticized him. *The Underside of Modernity* appeared after *Ethical Hermeneutics* had already been sent to press, so I was unable to take account of its many important discussions, including Dussel's engagement with Ricoeur, Rorty, and Taylor. By far, Dussel's most extensive philosophical encounter has been with Apel, and I have taken into account the essays in *Underside of Modernity* dealing with this encounter, because I had access to them before that book was published.
32. *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 187-88; Enrique Dussel, "Una década argentina (1966-1976) y el origen de la 'Filosofía de la liberación,'" *Reflexão*, 38 (1987),31. Enrique Dussel, "Retos actuales a la filosofía de la liberación en América Latina," *Libertação/Liberación*, 1 (1989),13; "Historia y praxis (Ortopraxis y objetividad)," pp. 312-17, 322-26. *Filosofía de la producción*, pp. 26, 62; " An Ethics of Liberation: Fundamental Hypothesis," 60; Enrique Dussel, "Sentido teológico de lo acontecido desde 1962 en América Latina," *Organización Internacional de Universitarios Catolicos, Pax Romana*, Ref. doc. mind. No.239, September 30,1971, p. 7.
33. *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, p. 188; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2: 114-17.
34. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:35, 72, 86.
35. *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, p. 166.
36. *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 71, 301; Enrique Dussel, "Ética de la liberación," *Iglesia Viva*, 102 (1982),596; *De Medellín a Puebla*, p. 44; *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, p. 138.
37. *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 71-72, 324-25; "Una década argentina," 31; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 4:95; *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, p. 187.
38. Enrique Dussel, *Teología de la liberación y ética: Caminos de liberación*

- latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Latinoamerica Libros, 1975), p. 167; Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Carden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), pp. 138-47; on "secondary socialization," see pp. 171-72. *De Medellín a Puebla*, p. 120.
39. *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 301, 311; *Para una ética de la liberación*, 2:175.
40. *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, p. 323.
41. *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:102.
42. *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, pp. 313, 315-16, 322, 324-26.
43. Enrique Dussel, *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation* (1492-1979), trans. and rev. Alan Neely (Crand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1981), p. 214. *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación*, p. 273. *América Latina: Dependencia y liberación*, p. 215; Enrique Dussel, "Cultura latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación: Cultura popular revolucionaria mas allá del populismo y del dogmatismo," *Cristianismo y Sociedad* [Mexico], 80 (1984), 43-44; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:106, 109, 178; 3:126, 155, 188, 215, 221; 4:36, 38, 120-121; 5:108. *Teología de la liberación y ética*, pp. 149-58; *Hipótesis para una historia de la Iglesia*, p. 54.
44. Enrique Dussel, *1492: El encubrimiento del Otro—Hacia el origen del "Mito de la modernidad" : Conferencias de Frankfurt, Octubre de 1992* (Madrid: Editorial Nueva Utopía, 1992), pp. 9-13, 41-47, 125-29. After this book had been submitted for publication, a translation of Dussel's book on 1492 appeared: *The Invention of the Americas, Eclipse of the "Other" and the Myth of Modernity*, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995). In the footnotes that follow, references will be made to this Spanish edition.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-92.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-80.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30, 41-47, 169-80.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 203.