

ENRIQUE DUSSEL'S PHILOSOPHY of liberation has come under fire recently from different quarters. Horacio Cerutti Guldberg's *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana* (1983) and a related article by Ofelia Schutte in *The Philosophical Forum* (1991) have strongly attacked Dussel. Karl-Otto Apel, with whom Dussel has been in dialogue over the past several years, also raises pertinent objections. In this chapter, I will focus on the criticisms of Cerutti and Schutte, demonstrate how they converge on the problem of rationality in his thought, and discuss their validity.<sup>1</sup>

#### CERUTTI AND SCHUTTE ON DUSSEL

Horacio Cerutti Guldberg, whom Dussel himself originally classified among the first generation of the philosophy of liberation in Argentina, disputed first of all this very classification.<sup>2</sup> In Cerutti's view, only Dussel's own ideological leanings would have led him to include people of such different ages and ideological positions under a single generation. Ironically, however, in his *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, Cerutti later willingly identified himself with the philosophy of liberation as a part of its problematizing subsector, despite his earlier disclaimers.<sup>3</sup>

In Cerutti's view, the protagonists of the philosophy of liberation project an ethicist's self-image of moral superiority. Schutte would explain such an attitude by Dussel's tendency to set himself as the errorless, guiltless, blameless Other over against an evil, oppressive system. Any philosopher identifying with the Others of that system becomes uncritically deified as "ethically correct," capable of exercising a new authoritarianism legitimated in the name of "God," "liberation," and "exteriority."<sup>4</sup>

These self-righteous personality traits, which Schutte and Cerutti ascribe to Dussel, reflect, in their view, a deeper, erroneous philosophical approach. Dussel characterizes his philosophy as a first philosophy, a privileged first *logos*, a self-sufficient and fundamental knowledge like Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the ultimate criterion of reference and criticism, superior to the sciences and immune to their critique. Paradoxically, Schutte notes that Dussel offers no rational demonstration for this foundation for all other rationality.

It is true that he [Dussel] has also claimed that there is no reason for him to give arguments for the foundations of his theory, since the foundation is beyond proof, anyway. I would point out, however, that whether one believes one's ideas are the manifestation of the divine on earth on account of so-called rationally demonstrated "proofs" (which may yield "certitude") or whether one holds the same belief because of some emotional or mystical conviction (as Dussel's theory seems to exemplify), the results are quite similar in terms of the pretense or claim to represent the voice of the divine in human affairs.<sup>5</sup>

Unsurprisingly, Cerutti's final verdict is that the philosophy of liberation opts for irrationality; it is a truly barbarian philosophy, but not in Dussel's sense, which is aligned with those excluded by power centers, as in the days of the Greeks.<sup>6</sup>

To deal adequately with questions about the rationality of Dussel's work, it would be necessary to take deeper account of his philosophical origins. The idea of a "foundation" not justified by "rational demonstration," or of an ethical "first philosophy" suggests Dussel's use of such sources as the phenomenologies of Husserl and Levinas, even though, as we have seen, Dussel developed them. It is important to note that neither Schutte nor Cerutti ever discusses these origins at length. Their lack of familiarity with this line of thought is suggested by several of Schutte's references to Dussel's mysticism, and by Cerutti's comment that in Marcuse's *Un ensayo sobre la liberación* (1969) the language of the Other acquired its first formulation, even though Levinas's *Totality and Infinity* had been published eight years earlier. Only a careful consideration of Dussel's sources and his use of them will enable us to assess the rationality of his own thought.<sup>7</sup>

Both Cerutti and Schutte relate this philosophical irrationalism to Dussel's and others' underlying religious commitments. Cerutti accuses Dussel of fideistically requiring religious faith as a prerequisite for philosophizing. Just as the Argentinian "Priests for the Third World" opposed Marxism as not yet purified of enlightenment rationalism and thus inexorably inclined to intellectualism and scientism, so Dussel's "populist sector" of the philosophy of liberation emphasized—in contrast to Marxist proclivities toward the urban proletariat—the role of *campesinos* in the process of revolution and supported Peronist populism because of its support for popular religiosity. Juan Carlos Scannone, an ally of Dussel's, uncritically utilized concepts of Ignatius Loyola's spiritual discernment to choose between Marxist and pastoral strategies. In addition, the philosophers of liberation resisted ideological or political confrontation by offering explanations of Christian morality or personal allusions. Similarly, Schutte finds Dussel longing for pre-Cartesian understandings of philosophy and duplicating Church teaching almost to the letter, theoretically condemning even divorce. In Schutte's opinion, the Other is used symbolically throughout Dussel's work as a "God-substitute."<sup>8</sup>

According to Cerutti, it is precisely these religious leanings that prompted Dussel and other liberationists to present the philosophy of liberation as an alternative to atheistic Marxism, to prefer analyses based on the category of the *pueblo* to class analysis, to substitute exaggerated populist rhetoric for careful philosophical analysis, and, finally, to support the return of Juan Perón, even though Peronism would eventually unleash fascist forces and result in so many tortures, disappearances, and deaths.<sup>9</sup>

In Cerutti's view, Dussel's foundationalist approach leads him to adopt an attitude of superiority over science and to close himself to science's findings. Dussel seems to assume that he knows in the abstract what the sciences will say in the concrete. Unlike liberation theologians such as Gutiérrez and Assman, Dussel tends to ontologize the findings of the social sciences on dependence theory because he is unaware of the limits of social scientific findings, neglects the multicausal character of dependence, and overlooks in a folkloric manner existing interdependencies. Schutte believes that since Dussel derives fundamental principles

from faith rather than scientific knowledge, his thought will always be incompatible with Marxism. Dussel also shows himself opposed to Freudian and feminist thought. Cerutti finds Dussel's boast that Latin American philosophy begins with the philosophy of liberation negating all preceding Latin American thought. Philosophers of liberation denounce all European rationality, too, as imperial, academic justification of oppression.<sup>10</sup>

The original sacrifice of rationality appears in subservience to the Other, which can lead one to adhere "always to the other's authority on pain of being considered morally inept."<sup>11</sup> Paradoxically, the Others to whom one is to be subservient are portrayed as weak and needing help and hence incapable of thinking on their own. The result is that the expert, who began in subservience to the Other, assumes the role of representing and speaking for the Other, who ends up subordinate to that expert. The philosopher's near heteronomy before the Other leads to an eventual megalomaniac self-aggrandizement.<sup>12</sup>

Cerutti's and Schutte's criticisms, although predominantly negative in tone, flow from an underlying affirmation of the rational character of philosophy that, in their view, Dussel's philosophy threatens. For Cerutti, philosophy ought to avoid dogmatism and give an account of its own praxis. Taking part in philosophy demands that one not be partisan, but open oneself to the maximal possible criticism. Schutte, too, envisions philosophy as critical thinking, intent on testing the validity of its claims. To argue that claims possess clarity, truth, or correctness simply because they *originat * from an epiphany of the Other's face is to commit the genetic fallacy that the origin of a claim proves its validity.<sup>13</sup>

## ASSESSING THE CRITICISMS

While Dussel's at times ostentatious self-expression may account for some of Schutte's and Cerutti's reaction to him, there is a constant danger of becoming self-righteous at precisely the point where, after listening to the Other, one is commanded to command others, as Levinas puts it. But for Levinas this commanding of others arises out of a context in which one first of all places oneself vulnerably before the exploited Other and then under-

takes prophetic discourse to Others, including the exploitative Other, for whom and to whom one is also responsible. Levinas recognizes that the pervasive presence of the Other purifies even prophets of their arrogance, since he no sooner grants the need for commanding in *Totality and Infinity* than he immediately, in the next section, reasserts the asymmetry of the interpersonal. On the basis of these Levinasian underpinnings, two conclusions seem warranted regarding Dussel's imputed self-righteousness. On one hand, to the extent that Dussel transforms vulnerability before the Other into an instrument of dogmatic self-assertion, he betrays his own starting point and contradicts his Levinasian origins. On the other, one must be wary of the charge of self-righteousness and focus more on the contents of a prophetic discourse since throughout history people have attempted to silence authentic prophets by charging them with arrogance and self-righteousness.<sup>14</sup>

Whatever Dussel's personality traits may be, Schutte's and Cerutti's deeper critique is that such traits flow from an erroneous underlying philosophical approach: namely, that Dussel claims to produce a first philosophy, a fundament that the sciences and other forms of knowledge cannot shake. Here again, a more careful understanding of Dussel's Levinasian roots can meet the criticism. There is no doubt that Levinas conceives ethics as first philosophy—he has even entitled an essay to that effect—even though the explicit characterization of his philosophy as first philosophy diminishes in the later works. Ethics must be first philosophy for Levinas, because every cognitional domain pursued, every theme discussed, and every truth sought is situated in relationship with the Other as interlocutor, who arises behind even the theme in which he or she is presented and who continually issues inescapable ethical demands. The reference to an interlocutor breaks through the text that discourse claims to weave in thematizing and enveloping all things in such a way that even the discourse intent on totalizing being belies the very claim to totalize. Yet this "foundation" does not warrant self-righteousness or the sense that one is privileged over others, ultimate, self-sufficient, or exempt from critical scrutiny. For Levinas, on the contrary, theory of any sort requires an "unnatural" movement, a restraint of one's drives and impulsive movements—in brief, the attitude of a

being that has learned to distrust itself by submitting to questioning from another. The ethical relation, as both origin and ally of the quest for truth, accomplishes the very intention that animates the movement unto truth. It is a strange foundation that Levinas provides since it affords no consolation or security and, unlike traditional foundationalist epistemologies which lull people into uncritically forgetting the arbitrariness of freedom and to which Schutte's and Cerutti's criticisms more aptly pertain, continually undermines any pretense to surety. For Levinas, on the contrary, "the essence of reason consists not in securing for man a foundation and powers, but in calling him in question and in inviting him to justice."<sup>14</sup>

Schutte's lack of familiarity with the Levinasian bases of Dussel's thought—fostered at times by Dussel's own effort to distance himself from Levinas—could also explain Schutte's complaint that Dussel seems to offer no rational demonstration or arguments for his viewpoint. But even if Dussel fully articulated all his Levinasian presuppositions, Levinas presents phenomenological descriptions for the judgment of autonomous knowers who ought to assent to such descriptions only if they, as Husserl expressed it, "see that it is so." Though such descriptions do not consist in rational demonstrations or arguments in the usual sense, they appeal to what Herbert Spiegelberg called "critical self-evidence," arrived at after careful and unbiased inspection and scrutiny and providing unobstructed cognitive accessibility in which the self-evident object or state of affairs "shines forth." Descriptions can be revised or even abandoned in the light of further evidence disclosed during the course of one's experience or through discourse with others. In such phenomenology, there is no appeal to self-evidence, in the naive sense of a feeling of comfortable self-assurance, as it is understood especially by Anglo-American critics of self-evidence. Such phenomenological descriptions involve neither emotional nor mystical conviction and claim no divine guarantees. Furthermore, phenomenological insight is not offset by the fact that a statistical study might indicate that a majority of the population does not recognize it.<sup>16</sup>

It is not only the phenomenological nature of the Other's givenness that might make Dussel's foundations seem unprovable; it is also the foundational locus of the Other with reference to every

type of demonstration. Levinas contends, for example, that every process of rational demonstration and discursive argumentation presupposes the Other whom Levinas describes and to whom justifications are presented. Even to try to prove to an Other the validity of Levinas's descriptions of the Other would presuppose what one is trying to prove. "The interlocutor cannot be deduced, for the relationship between him and me is presupposed by every proof."<sup>17</sup>

In addition, Dussel's Levinasian basis does not license attitudes of superiority toward the claims of any scientists, who constitute the Other of philosophy and deserve a fair hearing. It is difficult to see how any scientific findings could invalidate that demand for respect and responsibility from the Other that any presentation of scientific findings always presupposes. If Dussel neglects the multicausal character of dependence or of the existing interdependencies out of haughtiness toward social scientists—and I will discuss this issue in greater depth in the next chapter—then the fault lies, not in his philosophical presuppositions, but in his infidelity to them. Finally, Dussel's frequent and sometimes exaggerated claims of having overcome all preceding Latin American thought and all European rationality reflect more Levinas's assertion that his discovery of the ethical dimension subtending all discourse goes beyond earlier ontological and epistemological positions that have neglected what they presuppose and thereby tended to reduce the Other to the same. As I have argued above, Levinas's ethics is not to be construed as antirational; rather, in Levinas, European rationality achieves a summit of self-critique, becoming aware of the taken-for-granted horizons that invite rational discourse into being in the first place and renew rationality continually.<sup>18</sup>

In Dussel and Levinas, service of the Other does not demand that one sacrifice rationality and adhere "always to the other's authority on pain of being considered morally inept," as Schutte suggests. Dussel engages in no irrational worship of the Other, as mentioned above. Abundant textual evidence exists that Dussel believes that every culture, including the former Inca and Aztec empires, is prone to a mistaken self-absolutization. Moreover, he repeatedly admits that "the people" are not free from inauthenticity, voices frequent misgivings about popular religiosity, ob-

serves that the oppressed have often introjected the oppression they have received, and refrains from any uncritical endorsement of populist spontaneity. Prophets and pedagogues are obliged to foster those self-critical elements, often already to be found within their cultures and popular modes of expression, such as the narrative underlying the Argentinian tango.<sup>19</sup>

It is important to emphasize that Levinas's texts do not enjoin any blind servility or a forfeiture of personal autonomy that would be highly offensive not only to Schutte and Cerutti, but also to the entire modern mentality, including outlooks profoundly influenced by Kant, such as Karl-Otto Apel's. As the first chapter makes clear, Levinas acknowledges his debt to phenomenology, which depends entirely on the capacity of the free, critical agent to place in question all that the naïve natural attitude bequeaths. For this reason, Levinas insists on beginning, not with logical relations in which the I and the Other are reversible and undifferentiated, but with an I facing the Other. Hence, the I must be conceived first and foremost as separate, as atheist, that is, as independent of God, of any pantheism or emanationism, of any "participation" in being, free with regard to every system that might swallow him or her up. Just as sensation challenged the Parmenidean monism derived from logic, so, for Levinas, one's identity is established through sensible enjoyment—the joy of breathing, looking, eating, working, egoism—a happiness in which the I identifies itself in ignorance of the Other or the Totality and not in a dialectical opposition in which the I would be only one moment of the Hegelian-type whole it resists. If, as Levinas argues, one can surpass oneself and become preoccupied with the Other only at the apogee of enjoyment, and if one can be hospitable only if one already dwells in one's own home, then this trajectory in Levinas's works points toward the fact that only a full self can undertake service of the Other. On the basis of enjoyment, the I discovers its own interiority, its capacity to decide the meaning of its own life, in the face of death or the imperialism of the later historiographer's false interpretations. Interiority is "the refusal to be transformed into a pure loss figuring in an alien accounting system." Because of this interiority, one finds scandalous the control that violence can exercise over even the will that heroically resists it. It is to this separate, independent I, accomplished in its

own autonomy, that the Other appears, as inescapably present to the I as its own body or its own history, in relation to which it must also take up its free choices.<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, Levinas's descriptions of ethical relationships presuppose this development of autonomy. If he is describing prescriptive rather than denotative statements, as Lyotard explains, then it can certainly be the case that some prescriptives emerging from the Other are not justifiable. At such a later justificatory moment—assumed in relation to the prior experience of the Other's prescriptions—one can and ought to turn to principles of consistency, equality, and impartiality introduced at the level of the Third, provided such norms are tested against the face-to-face so that they do not disguise oppression. Because of the autonomy and self-critical character of *both* parties, discourse occurs between two points that do not constitute a system, a cosmos, or totality—which would be the case if the Other suppressed the I. Discourse involves risk, as Levinas observes: "This discourse is therefore not the unfolding of a prefabricated internal logic, but the constitution of truth in a struggle between thinkers, with all the risks of freedom. The relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me."<sup>21</sup>

Finally, the Other's call to infinite responsibility confirms the subjectivity in its apologetic position, but "apology" is precisely the word Levinas uses to describe those defending themselves before mistaken historical verdicts. It implies a defense of one's own position, which, although undertaken because of a sense of responsibility to the Other, could well be legitimate over against the Other. Apology is the opposite of blind concurrence with the Other.<sup>22</sup>

In fact, the intervention of the Other upon one's self augments one's autonomy by summoning one beyond the straight line of justice and the universal objective law which applies to all indifferently.

Judgment no longer alienates the subjectivity, for it does not make it enter into and dissolve in the order of an objective morality, but leaves it a dimension whereby it deepens in itself. To utter "I," to affirm the irreducible singularity in which the apology is pursued,

means to possess a privileged place with regard to responsibilities for which no one can replace me and from which no one can release me. To be unable to shirk: this is the I. The personal character of apology is maintained in this election by which the I is accomplished qua I. The accomplishing of the I qua I and morality constitute one sole and same process in being: morality comes to birth not in equality, but in the fact that infinite exigencies, that of serving the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan converge at one point of the universe. Thus through morality alone are I and the others produced in the universe. The alienable subjectivity of need and will, which claims to be already and henceforth in possession of itself, but which death makes a mockery of, is transfigured by the election which invests it, turning it toward the resources of its own interiority. These resources are infinite—in the incessant overflowing of duty accomplished, by ever broader responsibilities.<sup>23</sup>

Levinas's thought here gives the lie to the commonsense view articulated by someone like Ayn Rand that altruism reduces one to subservient feebleness. In addition, examples like that of Bishop Oscar Romero, the timid cleric turned by the sufferings of the poor into undaunted critic of the Salvadoran military who later assassinated him, support Levinas over Rand. In fact, those who consistently espouse positions like Rand's and who, because of what Levinas calls their allergy to the Other, consistently fear that the Other will exploit an "I" committed to Levinas's ethics must examine whether they may have unwittingly absorbed as their philosophical starting point the spontaneity of freedom whose value, Levinas says, is often exempted from further discussion. Though such a beginning is the target of Levinas's critique, his attempt to place the self and its critical powers at the service of the Other do not eviscerate that self or its powers. For to be a mindless puppet of the Other is in the end completely detrimental to the Other's own good.<sup>24</sup>

Contrary to Cerutti, Dussel does not require religious faith as a prerequisite for philosophizing, although Dussel's failure to discuss his Levinasian bases and the difference between an appeal to phenomenological intuition and a demonstration or organization might make it appear that religion or mysticism is substituting for philosophy. Furthermore, Dussel opposes vulgar Marxism

not only because it denies the religious beliefs of those it seeks to liberate, but also because it overlooks their cultural and national characteristics. Ultimately, to subjugate the Other to a theoretical system centered in the category of class is but another form of totalization, contrary to Marx's own intentions as Dussel displays them in his trilogy on Marx.

However, I do agree with Schutte that Dussel's ethics in particular tends to reduplicate Church teaching and does not adequately take account of the implications of a theory of exteriority for women and homosexuals. Such errors do not undermine an ethics at the service of alterity, but require that that ethics be more rigorously applied. Furthermore, in regard to the charge that Dussel seeks a pre-Cartesian position, I have argued that he began with a natural law theory, attempted to integrate it with Heideggerian ontology, and abandoned the entire ontological project to embrace Levinas's ethics. Though many of his comments, particularly in the ethics, still reflect those natural law tendencies, the turn to Levinas involves an entrance into the modern (and even postmodern) philosophical arena.<sup>25</sup>

In his essay "Una década Argentina (1966-1976) y el origen de la 'Filosofía de la Liberación,'" Dussel himself has responded extensively to the objection that he supported Peronism in spite of its eventual fascist consequences. In that essay Dussel describes how, given the complex and ambiguous situation of Argentina in the early 1970s, he opted, in conjunction with the university youth with whom he worked, to situate himself within the populist anti-military movement in favor of Perón's return, and yet with criticism and creativity. Dussel claims that he considered the "true word" to proceed from the poor and the pueblo, not from a leader mandating that his word was the only word, as Perón did. In effect, Dussel also accuses Schutte and Cerutti of committing the genetic fallacy, since one ought not to confuse the concrete, historical conditions of the origin of the philosophy of liberation with the constitution of its categories or the growing structure of its discourse which applies to other sectors of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Dussel's ultimate proof that he was a dangerous critic from within the people, that he was never allied with the populist party, is that his house was bombed and one of his students killed

because he was perceived as "poisoning the minds of the young with his Marxist doctrine."<sup>26</sup>

It is evident that Dussel's philosophy, properly understood in its relationship to Levinas and, as we shall see later, Levinas's philosophy properly understood as phenomenology at a pretranscendental level, upholds the same standards of rationality as Cerutti and Schutte fear Dussel is abolishing. Dussel's philosophy, properly understood, can give an adequate account of itself and need not take refuge in uncritical dogmatism. In exposure to the Other and the Other's question, one opens oneself to the greatest possible criticism—in fulfillment of what Cerutti considers to be the task of philosophy. Surely, too, Dussel could agree with Schutte that philosophy involves critical thinking, testing the validity of claims, presenting phenomenological descriptions for scrutiny, and not holding that claims are justified merely because they emerge from the Other. It is the Other who invites self-criticism and the Other who asks that one justify one's positions and prove validity. One's responsibility for the Other, which precedes whatever stance one adopts, in no way precludes differing with the Other or criticizing the Other for the Other's sake. The nature of apology and the daring, risky character of discourse, which does not unfold like a prefabricated internal logic, do not demand a mindless conformity with the Other, and it is always possible that radical disagreement with the Other springs from the deepest love for that Other.

## NOTES

1. Counterpositions to Dussel's such as those of Ricoeur, Rorty, and Taylor are not considered in this chapter and the next because the volume in which these counter positions are considered, *The Underside of Modernity*, appeared after this book had gone to press.
2. Enrique Dussel, "La filosofía de la liberación en Argentina: Irrupción de una nueva generación filosófica," *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva America, 1983), pp. 54-56. Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, pp. 31-37.
3. Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, p. 223.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 56, 282; Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought," 281-82.

5. Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought," 289, 293. In Schutte's view, Dussel never criticizes the phenomenological method which he utilizes either; see 290.
6. Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, pp. 40, 46, 50, 235-39, 271.
7. Ibid., p.160.
8. Ibid., pp. 66-67, 153, 192, 201, 213, 278-79; Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought," 275, 277.
9. Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, pp. 12, 17, 21, 25, 55, 136-37, 157, 187-90, 194, 205, 213, 252; for Dussel's own comments on populism, see his "Una década argentina (1966-1976) y el Origen de la 'Filosofía de la Liberación.'"
10. Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, pp. 79-80, 86, 117, 119, 131, 202, 208-10, 216, 235, 236, 238, 239, 244, 271, 283, 288; Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies," 271, 278-79, 284; Leopoldo Zea, "Dependencia y liberación en la filosofía latinoamericana," *Dianoia*, 20 (1974), 180.
11. Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought," 280.
12. Ibid., 280, 283, 288; Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, pp. 257-58.
13. Cerutti, *Filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, pp. 292, 308; Schutte, "Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought," 291.
14. *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 213-15.
15. Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in *The Levinas Reader*; ed. Sean Hand (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1992), pp. 75-87; cf. also, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," in *ibid.*, pp. 61, 66-69; "God and Philosophy," in *ibid.*, p. 169; *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 28, 42-48, 65-66, 69, 72-73, 82-101, 201-12, 218-19, 302-303; *Otherwise Than Being*, pp. 16, 20, 160, 170.
16. Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 74-76; Herbert Spiegelberg, *Doing Phenomenology: Essays on and in Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 80-129, 154-55.
17. *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 43-48, 92.
18. Ibid., pp. 42-48.
19. *History of the Church in Latin America*, p. 214; "Hipótesis para elaborar un marco teórico de la historia del pensamiento latinoamericano," in *Praxis latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación* (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva América, 1983), p. 273; *América Latina: Dependencia y*

*liberación*, p. 215; "Cultura latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación," 43-44; *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, 2:106, 109, 178; 3:126, 155, 188, 215, 221; 4:36, 38, 120-21; 5:108; *Teología de la liberación y ética*, pp. 149-58; *Hipótesis para una historia de la Iglesia*, p.154.

20. *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 28-29, 36, 54-63, 76, 110, 172-74, 229-38; "Time and the Other," in *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1992), p. 53; *Otherwise Than Being*, p.111. Chronologically, enjoyment or the establishment of one's identity could never occur before the presence of the Other, which is as present to the I as its own body, as *Otherwise than Being* continually points out. The chronology of the philosophical account, which cannot take up everything at once, can, like Descartes's *Meditations*, discuss the *cogito* before the appearance of the idea of the Infinite. These two temporal orders do not undermine the existence of the autonomous I before the Other whose demand reaches the I before the I chooses it. See *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 54-55.

21. *Totality and Infinity*, p. 73.

22. Lyotard, "Levinas's Logic," pp. 125-26, 130, 144, 145, 152; *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 53-61, 73, 96, 212-14; *Otherwise Than Being*, pp. 120, 159, 190, 193, 196,-97.

23. *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 245-46.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-90; *Otherwise Than Being*, pp. 116-17; Ayn Rand, *For the New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 33, 38, 40, 63.

25. See above, chap. 2, pp. 28-45; chap. 3, pp. 66-67. As has been mentioned, Dussel retracts his earlier position on women and homosexuals in *Underside of Modernity*, pp. 9-10.

26. "Una década argentina (1966-1976) y el origen de la 'Filosofía de la liberación,'" 29-33, 35.