

Party Switching and Democratization in Brazil

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1. Introduction

Parties play an essential role in the consolidation of democracies. Strong parties organize and aggregate social interests, regularize democratic practices, and serve as mechanisms for compromise and representation.. They decrease voters' information costs (especially in an environment with many candidates) and can increase governments' accountability to voters.

According to most measures of development, Brazil's parties rank among the most backward in Latin America. Brazilian political institutions discourage party development, giving party leaders little control over their organization's behavior and encouraging within-party competition and deputy individualism. Most parties have comparatively short life spans, and many are based on a prominent individual or leader, rather than an aggregation of social interests¹.

One oft-cited indicator of party weakness is the high rate of party switching. During each of the last two legislatures (1986-1990, 1990-1994), more than 30% of deputies changed their party affiliation, some more than once. And this is nothing new. While party-switching was quelled during Brazil's authoritarian period (1964-1985), students of pre-1964 Brazilian politics also noted the high rates of party changing². But to date there has been no serious examination of deputies that change parties.

This project explores party switching in Brazil, specifically, the role of elections, ideology, and constituents in party switching for career-oriented deputies. The paper proceeds in three steps. First, I review research on the Brazilian party system and on party switching generally. Second, I use data from the 49th Chamber of Deputies to examine all incidents of switching from 1991 to 1995. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the role of political parties in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies and the broader political arena.

The analysis indicates that switching is strongly associated with careerism and that there is a strong, stable component to Brazilian party politics that has been traditionally overlooked. Deputies change party to maximize electoral security, but limit their movements to ideologically neighboring parties. Party leadership and experienced deputies are much less likely to change partisanship. And where constituents pay attention and disapprove of switches, changing rates are significantly lower than elsewhere.

2. The Brazilian Political System and Party Switching

The following paragraphs provide an overview of Brazilian party politics and the literature on party switching. First, I review the literature on Brazilian party politics. Second, I consider the research on party switching in the United States political arena. Paradigms from both are used as a guide for the data analysis in Section 3.

In informal political conversation, Brazilians will observe that "parties don't matter". While social scientists won't go quite that far, they do agree that Brazilian political parties are the most underdeveloped in the Americas. Mainwaring (1991) finds that the electoral and party system encourages extreme individualism and antiparty behavior by deputies: individualistic campaigns with intraparty competition, independent legislative action, and party switching. Brazilian majority parties have difficulty assembling a voting majority and maintaining a cohesive legislative presence (Kinzo, 1995). Dix (1992) calls Brazil, "...the best-known example of a poorly institutionalized party system." He analyzes several characteristics of party development, and finds Brazil well below the Latin American average. And Sartori writes of Brazil,

¹Dix, 1992.

²Schneider, 1971.

In the world today, it is difficult to find a country that is as anti-party as Brazil, both in theory and in practice. Politicians refer to the parties as *party for rent*. They change party freely and frequently, vote against their membership, and refuse to accept any form of party discipline, under the allegation that one cannot interfere in their freedom to represent their constituents. (Sartori, 1993, p11).

These observations continue a trend noted by social scientists for years: Schneider (1971) notes the weakness of Brazilian parties and frequent party switching.

As for sources of Brazil's party "underdevelopment", research points to two related causes. First, formal institutions and party norms prevent party leaders from effectively disciplining their members, while encouraging intra-party competition and individualistic behavior. Second, an uninformed electorate is not equipped to sanction deputies' behavior. The following paragraphs discuss each in turn.

Brazilian party leaders are very poorly equipped for the task of party discipline. The primary mechanism for party discipline in PR systems is control of ballot access. In "closed-list" systems, party leaders select candidates and order those candidates on the ballot. Deputies depend on party leadership for both the opportunity to run for office via ballot access, and the likely outcome of their campaign via the ballot ordering. Deputies that abandon the party's position, or consistently break rank on legislative votes are easily dealt with. They are simply removed from the ballot, or moved to the bottom of the ballot for the next election. Deputies know their careers depend on the approval of party leaders, and are very hesitant to defect against the party in any context³.

Brazil uses the open-list PR system for legislative elections. States serve as districts, with seats allocated according to a skewed population formula. Voters may cast a single vote either for a party's list or for an individual candidate, but nearly always vote for an individual. Seats are allocated among parties based on the total number of votes each party and all its candidates receive. Parties allocate their seats among candidates based solely on the number of individual votes each candidate receives, i.e., there is no party "ordering" of the candidate lists. Finally, many winning candidates resign their mandates for higher appointed or elected offices. They are replaced by substitutes from their party list, known as "suplentes".

The peculiarities of the Brazilian system mean that leaders have little control over access to the list. First, becoming a candidate is not difficult. Nominations are made by state party conventions, but observers assured me that there is little difficulty getting on the ballot. Part of the explanation might be the large number of candidates. Each party may run up to 1.5 times the number of seats available. In a state like São Paulo, a party can run as many as 90 candidates. Most of these are guaranteed to lose the election, but their votes are important to the party's total number of seats. As a result, parties are advantaged by filling their electoral lists, and are hesitant to exclude would-be candidates.

Further, a second particularity of the Brazilian system, the *candidato nato* guarantees ballot access for incumbents. All office-holders are guaranteed a place on their current party's ballot in the next election. This guarantee holds regardless of how many times they switch party. Again, this particularity makes Brazilian party leaders weak vis-à-vis their members.

Finally, the open-list PR system encourages intra-party competition. Electoral success is determined by one's votes relative other candidates from the same party. So candidates are only competing within their own party. As a result, the most fierce electoral battles are often fought between candidates from the same party. In fact, candidates often make informal agreements with candidates

³ In Venezuela, party discipline is so strong that there were arguments against a computerized roll-call recording device. There was no need for such a device, opponents argued, because everyone always voted the party line.

from other parties to coordinate their efforts; sharing media time and putting both their names on campaign literature, for example (Mainwaring, 1991).

If institutions do not encourage party discipline, attentive voters that value partisan commitments may. But common to much Brazilian voter research is the finding that the general electorate knows little about representatives' behavior, is incapable of making judgments about deputies, and hence has little or no influence over these politicians. Rabinovich (1990) comments, "The voter has no knowledge of the candidate he votes for: usually, he doesn't know anything about the candidate's proposals, ideas, or behavior."⁴ Ames (1995) writes that, "Brazilian citizens ... have little control over their representatives. This should come as no surprise, because no one observing a Brazilian election would feel confident that many voters know anything at all about the positions of their deputies"⁵. Although voting is only mandatory for literates, even this subgroup is extremely uninformed: survey data show that six months after an election, most subjects can't remember who they voted for⁶. McDonough finds that during campaigns, candidates run on local issues and symbolic appeals. Von Mettenheim argues that the Brazilian electorate tends to think about politics in one of two references: personal ties, or immediate benefits, but not in terms of national issues.

The literature on Brazilian parties suggests that party affiliation and party organizations mean little, and play little role in Brazilian politics. But, as Joe Doherty observed, if party has no meaning, why would deputies bother to change their membership? There is a new growth of research showing that Brazil's parties are not as amorphous as the previous work suggests. Nicolau (1996a, 1996b) shows that party switches are ideological and that "left" parties have lower switching rates. Limongi and Figueiredo (1995) make a similar argument about party switching, but focus on cohesion and discipline within parties. They find high rates of party cohesion, higher than the literature would lead one to believe.

Further, while the literature may stereotype voters as ignorant and inattentive, there is actually substantial variation in the electorate across region and across urban/rural divides. Southern Brazil is relatively middle-class and well-educated, and party switching is considered a "sin" there. Northeastern Brazil, especially the rural areas, maintains many of the same patronage networks that elect whomever the local bosses approve. The same differences correspond with urban and rural divisions. Rural poverty and distance from voting booths make it easy for rural party organizations to trade patronage for votes. Urban mass media markets and easy transportation to the ballot make simple patronage relationships much more difficult to develop.

Neither Brazilian institutions nor voters encourage strong party discipline. Together, these explain the opportunity to switch parties: there is a very low (if any) cost to changing partisanship. But unaddressed is the issue of motivation. What might deputies gain from changing their partisan affiliation? Research from the United States offers a number of suggestions. First, party affiliations change simply because some parties die and new ones are born. This happened in US House elections before the Civil War: often candidates affiliations changed, because their old parties disbanded between elections. This might be the case for Brazil's post-1981 period. Until 1981, the military government imposed a two party system and did not allow party switching. After 1981, the two parties were disbanded and many new parties sprung up to fill the vacuum. In that period, one might find that most party switching was due to party survival. But more recently, while there have been a few party mergers, the majority of switches are from one existing party to another.

⁴ Rabinovich, 1990, p57. Translation mine.

⁵ Ames, 1995, p341.

⁶ Personal communication with David Fleischer, 1995.

Second, realignment of social cleavages may prompt politicians to change party. In an analysis of US party changing, Canon and Sousa (1992) noted that the inexperienced lead the way in realignment changes, as they have less to lose by going to a new party. But again, these changes imply permanent, or semi permanent voter realignments, and the growth and decline of parties. There is no evidence that such a realignment is taking place in Brazil.

Third, switching is also conceived in strategic terms. Bianco and Aldrich (1992) model legislators' choices of party affiliation as a function of electoral and ideological considerations. Each candidate weighs the electoral prospects of each party, the choices of her opposition, and the ideological distance from her own ideal points.

3. Data from Brazil's 49th Chamber of Deputies

During Brazil's 49th Chamber of Deputies (1991-1995), there were 255 incidents of party switching, representing moves by 182 deputies. Most switchers changed just once, but some deputies moved as many as 7 times⁷. The following paragraphs investigate these switches, exploring a number of dimensions to deputies' behavior: elections, experience, partisanship, ideology, and constituencies.

a. Electoral motivation

One motivation to change party is electoral. Deputies might change party to improve their chances of re-election. Such a move could improve electoral prospects in several ways. First, recall that election depends on two variables: the number of seats that your party's total votes earn, and the candidate's votes relative others in her party. As a result, 20,000 votes might be enough for an electoral victory in one party - but not in another. The first party might have a few very popular candidates that earn several extra seats for the party, or might have many mid-range losing candidates to the same effect. If electoral concerns drive party switching, then the switchers should be those who are "electorally at risk". Deputies with strong voter bases, who already are members of strong performing parties, have no need to seek membership in a "better" party. Only those who were elected from the bottom of their lists should have an incentive for change.

To investigate this explanation, I created a "Rank" variable. "Rank" is the deputy's position on his party list, determined by the number of votes received. Suplente's are all numbered as zeros, the successful candidate with the smallest vote share is numbered '1', and the rest of the winning candidates are ranked according to their vote share.

Table 1 shows the rate of party switching corresponding to different positions on the party lists for all deputies in the 1990 election. There is a clear relationship between switching and electoral rank. Deputies at the bottom of the list were much more likely to change party than those at the top. 50% of substitutes changed party, as did 43% of those elected from the bottom of the list⁸. Switching rates fall for higher list positions.

b. Experience and Party Ties

Another consideration for switchers ought to be tenure. Deputies with long careers may have much invested in their current party affiliation. They might have more access to distributive resources, Chamber leadership positions, and more influence in policy-making decisions. They may well also have

⁷ I exclude incidents where deputies left a party without joining another.

⁸ There is a disproportionately large number of deputies with rank "1". This is because many state parties just elect one or two deputies.

ties to federal and state bureaucrats of the same political party. Finally, there may be benefits to developing an enduring public image associated with one party or another. Conversely, inexperienced deputies have little invested in their current party system, and hence little reason to maintain their membership.

Table 2 displays party-switching rates by number of federal deputy terms. Switching rates correlate clearly with both. Switching rates are highest for first term deputies: 37% changed party affiliation. Second-term deputies had the next highest switching rate, at 31%. These two groups comprise most deputies in the Chamber: 429. The other, more experienced deputies had switching rates of about 20%.

Table 3 shows switching rates by total experience in elected office, including municipal, state, and federal offices. The trend here is even more pronounced: first-time politicians changed party at a rate of 40%. Those in their second to fourth position changed party 30-some % of the time. And those in their fifth or later elected position changed party less than 30% of the time. The fact that experience outside the federal chamber also correlates negatively with switching indicates that the benefits of party membership accrue outside the chamber as well, and raise the cost of switching.

Table 4 looks at party switching rates based on number of party leadership positions, at both the municipal, state, and federal level. Non-party leaders have switching rates of almost 38%, compared to 15% for those with one leadership experience, 13% with two, and about 22% for those with three or more.

Together, tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate that Brazilian legislative politics is much more structured and stable than previously thought. While more than 30% of deputies are changing party, these deputies disproportionately represent the inexperienced newcomers to Brasília. The 70% that is not changing party represents the core leaders: those with more experience in politics, in the Chamber, and in their parties. These non-changers are the deputies with real access to decision-making and agenda-setting power. So while 30% of deputies *are* changing party, they are the “least important” deputies for successful work on a legislative agenda.

c. Ideology

The previous suggests that Brazilian deputies are very strategic in their party affiliation. But are they purely opportunists? How much do real ideological concerns play a role in their decisions? One way to ask the question is to consider the ideological distances spanned by the deputies’ party switching. Do deputies change to parties of diverse ideological leanings, or do they tend to stick to one or another side of the political spectrum?

Figure 1 shows the ideological range of party switching in Brazil’s 49th Chamber of Deputies, sorted from liberal to conservative. Ideological scores for each party were calculated using roll-call votes cast by non-switchers. Only votes with at least 300 deputies present and at least minimal opposition were included in the analysis. The method used is HOMALS (see Gifi, 1990), or homogeneity analysis using an alternating least squares algorithm for calculations. This technique is useful for multidimensional scaling using categorical data - like votes and parties.

Figure 1 shows the spread of party-switching, and suggests that deputies limit their changing to ideologically “close” parties: deputies do not change from one extreme of the spectrum to another. Further, the right is much less constrained than the left in terms of their party changing. Conservatives move between a wide range of ideologies, from extreme right to centrist parties. Center, and center-left deputies limit themselves to close ideological neighbors.

Is switching ideologically motivated? Do deputies move to parties that are closer their ideal points? Figure 2 is a histogram of deputies’ proximity to new and old parties. The values represent the

difference between the closeness to the new party and the distance to the old party, using the same HOMALS data. To simplify the problem, when deputies switched more than once, I only looked at their first and last party. The histogram shows that while switching may have ideological *limits*, it isn't ideologically motivated. The mean of deputies' distances to parties is almost exactly zero - meaning that on average, deputies tend to be equidistant from their old and new parties.

Lastly, are deputies' legislative votes for rent - or are party affiliations for rent? When deputies change party, do they begin to vote with the leadership of their new party, or do they continue to vote as they did when in their old party, without regard for their new party? Figure 3 shows the movement of deputies' voting when they switch party. These figures record the difference between deputies' proximity to their new party before and after they changed membership. Positive values show that voting behavior moved toward the new party; negative values represent movement away from the party.

Almost half don't change their voting at all when changing party - this is the spike in the histogram at 0. A small number of deputies move away from their new party (negative values). And a remaining third or half of the deputies move toward their new party. Clearly, on average there is no obvious trend of movement toward new parties. But the skew to the right might indicate that some deputies do change their behavior. So for most party switchers, parties are just "for rent", and don't cause any changes in voting behavior. But for some deputies, perhaps a third, joining a party moves them closer to the new party center, perhaps indicating that these legislators are for rent, rather than the party.

d. Constituencies

Finally, perhaps constituents play a role in legislators' decisions to change party affiliation. As discussed above, while voters in general have little knowledge of deputies, specific information levels vary across several groups: elite vs. general constituents, concentrated vs. dispersed constituents, and regional constituents.

Local elites and party leaders who fund and support campaign efforts are much more informed than general electorate. Desposato (1995) has shown that deputies' *are* accountable to such local elites and are very responsive to such groups during important roll-call votes. Detailed data are not available on the role of local leadership in party switches, but this hypothesis does correlate with left-right differences in Figures 1. Conservative legislators tend to follow paternalistic patterns of elite constituent accountability⁹. Their elite constituencies should be less concerned with party id and more concern with deputies' delivery of goods and services to the home bailiwick. Hence the wide, less constrained party switching on the right. Left parties are ideological and much less personalistic. Their elite constituencies are labor leaders and intellectuals, for whom party id is more important than pork provision. Thus the variation in party-switching ranges corresponds with the ideological/pragmatism balance among elite constituencies.

Deputies' propensity to change party should also vary with the urban/rural nature of their constituents. Urban voters have more political information, and are much more able to hold deputies' accountable for switching party. As a result, urban deputies should be much less likely to switch party than their rural colleagues.

Since deputies' elections are held statewide, they could technically receive votes from any municipality, rural or urban. Practically, however, their votes tend to be concentrated in specific areas. We can distinguish between the urban/rural nature of deputies' vote bases using two variables:

⁹ Soares, 1995.

clustering and dominance (Ames 1995). Clustering refers to the spread of a deputies' votes, and is measured using the sum of squared vote shares. Specifically, for each deputy, the percent that each municipality contributes to her total votes is squared and summed over all municipalities. Deputies from urban areas will have high clustering scores, because they will likely get most of their votes from one or two large municipalities. Rural deputies will have low clustering scores, because they will have to earn votes across numerous smaller communities. Dominance captures the extent to which deputies are the main vote-getters in municipalities. In large urban areas, deputies should have very low dominance scores, because their vote share is a small percent of the total. In rural municipalities, deputies may dominate the election and have high dominance scores¹⁰.

Table 5 compares clustering and dominance scores from the 1990 election for switching and non-switching deputies. The table presents average cluster scores and average dominance scores. In both cases, the patterns are as expected. Non-switchers have higher clustering scores than switchers, indicating that urban constituents are more attentive than those in rural areas. Further, switchers, as expected, have higher dominance scores, indicating again the rural deputies are more likely to switch party than their urban counterparts. The differences are not huge, but they are significant.

Finally, constituents in different regions will be more or less attentive for the above reasons, plus specific regional differences in education, culture, and attitudes about politics. The South, for example should have low party switching because voters are the best educated, most attentive, and consider party switching a "sin". Southeastern and southwestern deputies should have the next lowest rates, due to the large urban centers. Finally, north and northeastern regions should have the highest rates of switching, as the extreme poverty and backward rural areas make deputy accountability minimal. Table 6 shows party switching by region. Only one-fourth of Southern deputies change party, while between 35% and 38% do so in the North and Northeast. The Southeast, as expected, is in-between at 29%.

Table 7 shows the results of fitting several logistic regression models to the dataset. In each case, the dependent variable is "Switched", coded 1 for deputies that did change party and 0 for those that did not. The rest of the variables we have seen before: Elected Offices record the total number of elected offices the individual has held. Party Leadership counts the number of local, state, and national party leadership position the deputy has held. Clustering and Dominance capture the deputies' distribution of votes. Clustering refers to the extent that deputies' receive all their votes from a small number of municipalities, dominance captures the extent to which deputies dominated the election in municipalities where they received votes. Electoral rank records the deputy's position on her party list in the 1991 election. Region is a categorical variable that is coded separately for each of Brazil's file areas: North, Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, and South.

The first model shows a logistic regression on all but region, and concurs with the tabular analysis presented above. All but the Cluster variable and the intercept estimate are significant. Elected offices, party leadership, electoral strength, and dominance all are significant at the .05 level, and all have estimates with the appropriate signs. A negative slope on Elected offices means that the probability of switching falls with experience. Similarly, negative coefficients on party leadership and rank mean that more involvement in a political party, and stronger electoral performances also independently reduce the benefits of party switching. The large positive coefficient on dominance captures the rural/urban divide, and shows that rural deputies are more free to switch, because their performance is measured in pork, not ideology. Clustering's p-value is .12, well outside the rejection range, but small enough to warrant some respect.

¹⁰ These measure were first proposed by Ames, 1995.

The same trends are reflected when dummy variables for region are added. In this case, South is excluded, so regional coefficients reflect the differences between the South and every other region. Again, elected offices, party leadership, electoral strength, and dominance have significant coefficient estimates with the expected signs. Cluster's p-value is further from the rejection range at .27. Finally, the estimates for regional differences are not significant and do not reflect the patterns observed earlier. In this model, Southern deputies don't necessarily have the lowest changing rates, coming third behind Northern and Southeastern deputies. And none of the regional coefficients are significant, and a Wald test of the overall region variable shows no significance.

Table 8 shows two identical ordered logit models for comparison. For these models, the dependent variable is "Number of Switches", which counts the number of times a deputy changed party. The same variables that make switching once likely can make repeated incidents likely as well. The data concur; coefficient patterns from the ordered logits are identical to those in the logit regression, and the same variables are significant. Excluding region, all variables but "cluster" are significant. With region in the equation, the other variables are still significant, but regional differences do not seem to have an independent impact on rates of switching.

Both of the models strongly concur with the tabular analysis. The explanations explored for party switching are confirmed by the logistic and ordered logit estimations. These estimates and their significance were generally stable across different combinations of variables, and across larger and smaller models. Stability suggests that not only are the variables significant, they are also very independently significant, not merely the product of multicollinearity.

4. Conclusion

This preliminary analysis sought to explore the phenomenon of party switching in Brazil. This is not a new phenomenon in Brazil. The literature from the 1960's mentions the bizarre behavior of deputies, specifically their habit of switching party often. The military successfully imposed a tight and disciplined two-party system from 1964 until the early 1980's but when the controls were relaxed, deputies reverted to politics as usual, and immediately began changing their affiliations.

This unique feature of Brazilian politics has become anecdotal evidence for the complete lack of any structure to that country's party system. "Unideological" "fluid" and "anti-party" are the terms usually used to describe that country's politics.

This paper contributes a number of significant findings that shed light on the nature of Brazilian politics. First, deputies' behavior was analyzed from a strategic perspective, and data from the 49th Chamber strongly supports those hypothesis. Specifically, deputies have electoral concerns in mind when they change party. Deputies close to the bottom of the list are much more likely to change party than their more secure colleagues. And most switch immediately after the election, when memories of a close call are strongest.

Second, there is a strong and stable component to Brazilian party politics that is often overlooked by the typically anecdotal research conducted to date. While 30% of deputies switched party, 70% did not. Further, these 70% are likely to yield most of the decision-making power in the Chamber. They are the most experienced deputies and politicians, while switchers are likely to be first-time politicians. The non-switchers are also often party leaders, who have invested in their parties' development at local, state, and federal level. Switchers, on the other hand, tend to be those without any party leadership experience. The evidence shows that the largest segment of the Chamber is actually very stable, and that the deputies with real authority in parties and on the floor are likely to be stable in their partisan affiliation.

Third, while deputies are strategic, both they and their parties are also ideological. While we saw that deputies' party changing is not motivated by ideology, it is limited to ideologically "close" parties. Further, many deputies do *not* change their voting behavior to suit their new party's leaders. Finally, political parties can be easily ordered in a left-right spectrum, and a multidimensional scaling roughly reproduces that same figure. The bottom line: not only is it simply untrue that Brazilian parties are unideological, ideology structures and limits the extent of party switching.

A fourth finding was that constituents do matter in deputies' calculations, with two caveats. First, some constituents matter more than others. The pattern of switching suggests that those I call "elite constituents" can effectively constrain switching, as happens in the "leftist" political parties. Second, the general electorate can limit switching. In the South and Southeast, where voters are more attentive and media more developed, switching is lower than in the rural northeast and north. Finally, deputies from urban areas tend to have lower switching rates than their rural counterparts.

This paper has not nearly exhausted the possibilities for exploring party switching. There remain unanswered questions on the historical patterns of changing, on the impact of changing on future electoral performance, and on the role of party factions in switching. But this paper has shown that the literature on Brazilian politics requires some serious rethinking. The phenomenon of switching has long been accepted at face value as an indicator of the absence of party development. But switching is itself very structured and strategic, and there is a large stable leadership that does not change party. An oft-cited remark on Brazilian parties is that they are "parties for rent". We have seen that while parties do have space for rent, many of their vacancies are already filled by committed, long-term tenants.

Tables and Figures

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Notes about the data

Data for this project come from nearly 1,000 separate computer files, and numerous printed sources. The Secretária Geral da Mesa of the Câmara dos Deputados provided all the roll-call votes from the 49th Chamber in 700 separate files. They also provided information on all the party switching that took place. The Tribunal Superior Eleitoral provided all electoral data from 1990 and 1994. I obtained experience and party leadership information from the chamber's published biographies of deputies.

Because each data source had different levels of detail, the numbers of observations will vary depending on which variables are used. For example, the detailed municipal-level electoral data needed to calculate "clustering" and "dominance" were missing two important groups. First, the dataset did not include suplente's, those who did not have enough votes to be elected but were able to stand in as substitutes when deputies took a leave of absence. Second, for some inexplicable reason, three states were excluded from the 1990 electoral data. For the RANK variable, I was able to substitute printed information, but all deputies from these three states have missing values for the clustering and dominance measures.

The use of HOMALS also requires a qualification. Deputies regularly leave Congress for other opportunities, permanently or temporarily. Suplentes replace those taking a leave of absence. I do not yet have detailed data on these changes of office, so the HOMALS analysis includes an unrealistically large number of missing values where deputies left office.

I am seeking to resolve these problems to the extent possible through written data requests to Brazilian agencies, but suspect that the dataset will not be complete without archival work in Brasília.

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Table 1

- - Description of Subpopulations - -
 Summaries of SWITCHER
 By levels of RANK90B

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			.3248	.4687	548
RANK90B	1.00		.3827	.4876	162
RANK90B	2.00		.3529	.4802	102
RANK90B	3.00		.3714	.4867	70
RANK90B	4.00		.3077	.4660	52
RANK90B	5.00		.2051	.4091	39
RANK90B	6.00		.3333	.4804	27
RANK90B	7.00		.2632	.4524	19
RANK90B	8.00		.2500	.4472	16
RANK90B	9.00		.2143	.4258	14
RANK90B	10.00		.1000	.3162	10
RANK90B	11.00		.2162	.4173	37
Total Cases = 548					

Table 2

- - Description of Subpopulations - -

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			.3280	.4700	503
NTERMS__	.00		.3688	.4833	282
NTERMS__	1.00		.3116	.4648	138
NTERMS__	2.00		.1905	.3974	42
NTERMS__	3.00		.2353	.4372	17
NTERMS__	4.00		.2308	.4385	13
NTERMS__	5.00		.1667	.4082	6
NTERMS__	6.00		.3333	.5774	3
NTERMS__	7.00		1.0000	.	1
NTERMS__	10.00		.0000	.	1

Total Cases = 548
 Missing Cases = 45 or 8.2 Pct

Table 3

- - Description of Subpopulations - -

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			.3280	.4700	503
TTLELECT	.00		.4052	.4931	116
TTLELECT	1.00		.3288	.4714	146
TTLELECT	2.00		.3514	.4807	74
TTLELECT	3.00		.3231	.4713	65
TTLELECT	4.00		.2791	.4539	43
TTLELECT	5.00		.1429	.3563	28
TTLELECT	6.00		.2000	.4140	15
TTLELECT	7.00 and up		.2500	.4472	16

Total Cases = 548
 Missing Cases = 45 or 8.2 Pct

Table 4
Switching rates by Number of Party Leadership Positions

- - Description of Subpopulations - -

Summaries of SWITCHER
 By levels of PRTYLEAD

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			.3280	.4700	500
PRTYLEAD	.00		.3753	.4848	389
PRTYLEAD	1.00		.1525	.3626	59
PRTYLEAD	2.00		.1333	.3457	30
PRTYLEAD	3.00		.2308	.4385	13
PRTYLEAD	4.00		.2308	.4385	9
Total Cases = 548					
Missing Cases = 48 or 8.8 Pct					

Table 5

Mean of Vote Clustering, by Switching Status

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
Switched	.2421	.2349	262
Didn't Switch	.2146	.2081	127

Mean of Vote Dominance, by Switching Status

	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
Switched	.1634	.1362	262
Didn't Switch	.1907	.1501	127

Table 6

Summaries of SWITCHER
 By levels of REGION

Variable	Value	Label	Mean	Std Dev	Cases
For Entire Population			.3242	.4685	546
REGION	NE		.3797	.4869	158
REGION	NO		.3478	.4798	69
REGION	SE		.2857	.4530	189
REGION	SO		.2674	.4452	86
REGION	SW		.3636	.4866	44
Total Cases = 548					

TABLE 7

Logit Estimates

Number of obs = 368

chi2(5) = 32.89

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Pseudo R2 = 0.0701

Log Likelihood = -218.02346

switcher	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ttelelect	-.1409774	.068298	-2.064	0.039	-.274839	-.0071158
rank90b	-.1591086	.045059	-3.531	0.000	-.2474226	-.0707945
prtylead	-.4050279	.1720918	-2.354	0.019	-.7423216	-.0677342
clustr90	-.815973	.5262964	-1.550	0.121	-1.847495	.2155491
domnce90	2.133656	.8571032	2.489	0.013	.4537643	3.813547
_cons	.1145599	.2965409	0.386	0.699	-.4666496	.6957695

Logit Estimates

Number of obs = 368

chi2(9) = 34.79

Prob > chi2 = 0.0001

Pseudo R2 = 0.0742

Log Likelihood = -217.07083

switcher	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ttelelect	-.1409883	.0690004	-2.043	0.041	-.2762265	-.0057501
rank90b	-.1507068	.0477051	-3.159	0.002	-.2442071	-.0572065
prtylead	-.4256801	.1761071	-2.417	0.016	-.7708437	-.0805164
clustr90	-.6301202	.5659616	-1.113	0.266	-1.739385	.4791441
domnce90	2.10693	.8604345	2.449	0.014	.4205094	3.793351
Iregio_2	-.0080956	.4473788	-0.018	0.986	-.8849419	.8687506
Iregio_3	-.3694639	.475504	-0.777	0.437	-1.301435	.5625069
Iregio_4	-.2783282	.4409919	-0.631	0.528	-1.142656	.5860001
Iregio_5	-.3974172	.4744662	-0.838	0.402	-1.327354	.5325194
_cons	.2587215	.4912413	0.527	0.598	-.7040939	1.221537

TABLE 8

Ordered Logit Estimates

Number of obs = 368
 chi2(5) = 29.18
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0431

Log Likelihood = -324.08073

numswtch	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ttelelect	-.126813	.0660882	-1.919	0.055	-.2563434	.0027175
rank90b	-.1394894	.0431111	-3.236	0.001	-.2239855	-.0549933
prtylead	-.4089151	.170562	-2.397	0.017	-.7432104	-.0746197
clustr90	-.613737	.5136121	-1.195	0.232	-1.620398	.3929243
domnce90	1.826536	.8192988	2.229	0.026	.22074	3.432332
(Ancillary parameters)						
_cut1	-.0134919	.289081				
_cut2	1.476759	.3104703				
_cut3	3.328594	.4627231				
_cut4	4.189053	.6360991				
_cut5	4.597709	.7558476				
_cut6	5.293069	1.035058				

Ordered Logit Estimates

Number of obs = 368
 chi2(9) = 30.91
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0003
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0456

Log Likelihood = -323.21597

numswtch	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ttelelect	-.1284688	.0664287	-1.934	0.053	-.2586667	.0017291
rank90b	-.1333646	.0460613	-2.895	0.004	-.2236431	-.043086
prtylead	-.4151694	.1736393	-2.391	0.017	-.7554961	-.0748427
clustr90	-.4137095	.5521488	-0.749	0.454	-1.495901	.6684822
domnce90	1.820687	.821411	2.217	0.027	.2107507	3.430623
Iregio_2	.1770304	.4173042	0.424	0.671	-.6408708	.9949316
Iregio_3	-.1372236	.4555393	-0.301	0.763	-1.030064	.755617
Iregio_4	-.0340762	.4189111	-0.081	0.935	-.8551269	.7869744
Iregio_5	-.2602734	.4503946	-0.578	0.563	-1.143031	.6224839
(Ancillary parameters)						
_cut1	.0258205	.4638953				
_cut2	1.522004	.4776849				
_cut3	3.376907	.5900959				
_cut4	4.237678	.7342416				
_cut5	4.646518	.8401985				
_cut6	5.341671	1.098185				

Figure 1
Are switches ideologically constrained?




Figure 2
Are switches ideologically motivated?




Figure 3
Does switching change roll-call voting behavior?

