

The Impact Of An Educational Institution On
Host Nation Militaries

THE U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS
AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF POLICY
OR MERELY A SCAPEGOAT

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THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHORS AND DO NOT
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INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the problems posed by the creation of a military educational institution designed to transfer the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures of the armed forces of a hegemonic power, the United States, to the armed forces of weaker and smaller states throughout Latin America. This paper asks whether the purpose of the institution is purely the professional one stated or if there are other agendas present. In the case of the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) other agendas clearly existed from its inception until the present. However, none of these agendas were ever hidden ones. Indeed, they have been completely overt and remain as a matter of public record. Simply put, the agendas of SOA always were and continue to be those of the foreign policy of the United States government.

In light of SOA's critics, this paper seeks to fill a research void, and there is great need for this void to be filled. Little objective analysis has been done on the US Army School of the Americas' purpose, techniques and objectives. Instead, the most sensationalistic critics of the school claim it to be a "School of the Assassins" (Raush, 1997) or a "School for Scandal" (Kitfield, 1996) in which dictators and death squads are trained to murder and torture civilians throughout Latin America, including El Salvador, Peru and Guatemala. These immoral, illegal and heinous acts, according to many of the critics, are carried out as explicitly instructed by SOA courses, and often seek to further an immoral, illegal and imperialistic US foreign policy. These critics are correct on one count: The School of the Americas **is** an instrument of US foreign policy. Unfortunately, the critic's understanding of the purpose of SOA, the nature of US foreign policy pursuits and objectives, and the nature of insurgent warfare, terrorism and how to combat them ends here. SOA is neither a school for assassins nor a trainer of torturers and murderers. By promoting these things, SOA would consequently run contrary to US foreign policy goals and interests in the Latin American region. In addition, by utilizing such tactics, SOA would have had severe, adverse ramifications on the major US foreign policy goals in Latin America throughout the 1980s: that of stopping the spread of Communism throughout the region and protecting newly

established, fragile democracies such as El Salvador from falling under Communist rule through insurgent warfare. This in turn, would have threatened US national security.

SOA's professional purpose is to "provide doctrinally sound, relevant military education and training to the nations of Latin America; promote democratic values and respect for human rights, and foster cooperation among multinational military forces" (SOA Pamphlet, 1996). SOA is an implement of United States foreign policy and seeks to foster "a commonality of purpose and procedures among U.S. and Latin American countries" (SOA Pamphlet, 1996). SOA was created to not only train Latin American armies in Spanish in the way the US Army operates, but also to further US foreign policy goals. This has been SOA's agenda whether US foreign policy addressed anti-communism, human rights, or the proper conduct of military operations in a democracy. US foreign policy has always been concerned with these three issues, as they are intertwined. However, the primary focus of US foreign policy depends on the strategic threat or context at a given point in time and shifts as the international arena undergoes change. Thus, given SOA's mission and agenda, it is impossible to analyze the institution without simultaneously examining the broader context of US foreign policy.

This study begins by providing a contextual background of SOA by placing its history and function within the overall framework of US foreign policy. In an attempt to separate fact from sensationalism, the paper provides an indepth analysis of both SOA's critics and the criticisms and accusations leveled against the school. The paper further addresses the critique of SOA in terms of the impact of SOA courses (or lack thereof) on alleged human rights violators. In doing so, SOA graduates are also examined, especially those that the U.S. State Department and SOA deemed worthy of inclusion in the SOA Hall of Fame in terms of how those individuals reflect sometimes conflicting foreign policy objectives. The paper then looks at how SOA has responded to criticism in terms of its institutionalization of its support of U.S. government human rights and democratization objectives through curriculum and oversight. Finally the paper draws conclusions as to whether SOA has been and/or can be an effective instrument of U. S. government policy in these critical areas.

BACKGROUND

From the end of World War Two to the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union, United States military involvement in Third World conflict revolved around national security concerns within a Cold War context. The bipolar sphere of East-West conflict set the stage for proxy wars to be fought as the primary means of military engagement of the two superpowers. United States security interests focused on the Soviet threat, and U.S. military intervention in the Third World was first and foremost a means by which Soviet advancement could be curtailed or rolled back. It was in this global setting that the US Army School of the Americas was conceived.

The institution which would evolve into the US Army School of the Americas, the Latin American Center - Ground Division, was founded in 1946 at Fort Amador in the Panama Canal Zone. This creation was in response to a request by Latin American leaders that US military training, which began during World War II, expand into technical and professional areas (White Paper, 1995). These areas included technical skills, the preparation and maintenance of food, and support functions. Most importantly, a link was further established between the U.S. and Latin American armed forces (White Paper, 1995).

In 1949, the School was reorganized and moved to Fort Gulick near Colon. On February 1, 1949 all training activities within the Panama Canal Zone were consolidated under the US Army Caribbean School (USARCARIB). The School was founded as a Latin American Training Center whose purpose was the training of Latin American Students (Benitez Letter 1966, p.49). Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the School's role included the training of US soldiers, instruction of Latin American students in US armed forces organization, equipment and doctrine, and support of US military missions in Latin America. (Williams 1985, p.6). USARCARIB was required to "instill in the Latin American representatives a further appreciation of the ideals of democracy and the American way of life" as well as "augment the efforts of US agencies to foster friendly relations with Latin American countries" (White Paper 1995, p.3).

This cultivation of American ideals of democracy throughout Latin America occurred at a time when the United States believed its way of life to be particularly threatened. The East-West

conflict was in full force throughout Europe, China, Korea and the Middle East and resulted in such foreign policies as The Truman Doctrine. Truman's Point Four Program (1949) called on the United States "to assist the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to raise their standards of living" through technical support, scientific and managerial knowledge, planning for long term economic development, production machinery and equipment, and financial assistance. The United States embarked on a policy of containment to meet the Soviet threat, and with the fall of Chiang Kai Shek and America's "failed" policy in China, concern heightened that the spread of Communism in the Third World would be a "Falling Domino" effect (MacDonald, 1992). In 1948, a Communist led provincial revolt occurred in India. Communist insurgencies were underway in 1949 in Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and the Philippines. Consequently, Latin America remained on the back burner.

The Eisenhower Administration continued the policy of Containment as set forth by the Truman Administration but also formulated a policy of Massive Retaliation to deter Soviet expansionism. Due to the frustration of the Korean War, the Eisenhower Administration scaled down the concept of direct intervention until the 1958 landing of United States forces in Lebanon (Klare, 1989). The Eisenhower Doctrine called for the prevention of the spread of Communism throughout the Middle East through the promotion of economic strength and development, development of programs of military assistance and cooperation, and "the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism..." (Eisenhower, 1957).

Critics of Eisenhower's Massive Retaliation policy to prevent Soviet adventurism in the Third World argued that a policy of Massive Retaliation was ill suited for the peculiar conflicts associated with Third World instability. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor argued that, "While our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the Great War, it has not maintained the Little Peace: that is, peace from disturbances which are little only in comparison with the disaster of general war" (Klare, 1989). According to Taylor (1960), "The national Military Program of Flexible Response

should contain at the outset an unqualified renunciation of reliance on the strategy of Massive Retaliation" and the United States must prepare itself to "Respond, anywhere, any time, with weapons appropriate to the situation."

The Kennedy Administration incorporated these ideas into its policies, and the United States underwent a buildup of both nuclear and conventional forces. However, rather than a doctrine of Massive Retaliation, strategies of the Kennedy Administration revolved around the idea of "Flexible response" and counterinsurgency - a new doctrine which would be tested during the Vietnam crisis. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's strategy (Kaufmann, 1973) was to create a system of defense through military assistance programs for "Gray areas", like Latin America, the Far East, and East Asia, that would be responsive to threats against those regions but not rely upon nuclear weapons to combat the threat.

During the Kennedy Administration, the United States became heavily involved in covert operations throughout Laos, the Congo, and Thailand. Whereas Eisenhower emphasized offensive, unconventional covert war against "undesirable governments", Kennedy emphasized "overt, and covert warfare against internal enemies of friendly governments" (McClintock, 1992). Kennedy maintained that past U.S. attempts at guerrilla and anti guerrilla capabilities had been aimed at general war, and that it was necessary to formulate counterinsurgency operations to deal with any size force.

The United States was to embark upon an "Alliance for Progress" and a policy of "hemispheric security" to prevent the spread of Communism near its borders. President Kennedy proclaimed in his inaugural address the US intent to oppose aggression or subversion throughout Latin America. As a result of the Kennedy Administration's new security policies, the role of USARCARIB was expanded to meet the Communist threat. In 1961, the Army added a course in counter insurgency operations to help Latin American countries counter externally supported insurgent movements (White Paper, 1995). On July 1, 1963 the school renamed itself the U.S. Army School of the Americas. The renaming of the school emphasized the school as a key

element of US - Latin American relations, as an element of the Inter-American Military System and of part of the Organization of American States (Williams, 1985 p.7).

SOA's emphasis on counterinsurgency corresponded to the overall US foreign policy goals of containing communism. This emphasis lasted throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s. Following the US failures in Vietnam during the Johnson Administration, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger's post-Vietnam strategy eschewed the direct use of U.S. forces in the Third World. According to the Nixon Doctrine (1970) the "United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world." Key elements of the Nixon Doctrine included the United States maintaining its treaty obligations and providing a shield against nuclear threats to allies vital to U.S. security. The tenet of the Nixon Doctrine which most affected U.S. intervention in Third World conflict called for furnishing "military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense" (Laird, 1973). The emphasis on covert operations and indirect manipulation was sparked by isolationist sentiment which swept the United States as a result of the Vietnam syndrome. Gerald Ford's short tenure as President witnessed a continuation of the Nixon policies toward Third World conflict.

When Jimmy Carter was elected President, the nation continued to suffer from the Vietnam syndrome (and the Watergate crisis). Congress attempted to reassert itself into the foreign policy making process of the United States. Carter called for an emphasis on human rights in United States foreign policy, as it was purported that recent U.S. policy had sacrificed human rights in favor of right-wing, friendly dictatorships. Carter criticized recent U.S. foreign policy, notably the "Kissinger legacy," for being insensitive to legitimate demands for change from Third World regions such as Latin America and African nations (Melanson, 1991). Furthermore, Carter and his advisors believed that the use of military power to maintain influence throughout the Third World had lost its utility.

As a result, the curriculum of SOA no longer placed its main thrust upon counterinsurgency. Congressional restrictions resulted in the exclusion of states in SOA due to alleged human rights violations, a reduced level of funding for SOA and subsequently reduced enrollment levels. Table one gives a list of excluded countries, the majority of which revolve around human rights issues. By the late 1970s, SOA had focused on light infantry tactics, maintenance of equipment, supply and related subjects. In addition to these restrictions, there was initial concern over the school's future with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty. This Treaty, however, which returned the Canal to Panamanian control allowed the US to retain operation of the school in Panama.

Despite the push for a greater Congressional role in foreign policy and a emphasis on human rights, a notable shift occurred in the Carter Administration's policy outlook toward the Third World when four critical events occurred: the fall of the Shah of Iran; a surge of guerrilla upheavals in Central America, especially in Nicaragua; the Iranian hostage crisis; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Melanson, 1991; Klare, 1989). In June 1979 Carter made several Presidential decisions that directly affected U.S. policy toward the Third World. First, the

TABLE ONE: COUNTRIES EXCLUDED FROM SOA

COUNTRY	YEAR	REASON
Argentina	1978	Human Rights Issues
Brazil	1978	Human Rights and Nuclear Issues
Chile	1975	Human Rights Issues
Costa Rica	1966	Congressional Exclusion (no army)
Cuba	1960	Diplomatic Relations Severed
El Salvador	1978	Human Rights Issues
Guatemala	1978	Human Rights Issues
Haiti	1978	Limited to Air/Sea Rescue Courses
Nicaragua	1979	Human Rights Issues
Paraguay	1979	Human Rights Issues
Uruguay	1976	Human Rights Issues
Venezuela	1978	Limited To Professional Development Courses

SOURCE: U.S. Army School of the Americas, 1979

United States would use military power to protect economic resources in the Third World. Second, a Rapid Deployment Force comprising personnel from all four services would be activated for potential threats in the Third World nations of Southwest Asia. Third, the United States would acquire new basing rights in Oman, Kenya and Somalia. Finally, a permanent battle group would be deployed to the Indian ocean (Klare, 1989). The Carter Doctrine reaffirmed U.S. intent to use military force to protect U.S. vital interests.

In Latin America, the policies that reflected the Carter Doctrine were seen in the support the US began to provide to the reformist junta in El Salvador while the older policy of opposition to dictatorships with nasty human rights records was seen in the efforts by the administration to work out an accommodation with the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua. This dichotomy

of policy was displayed to the world at the Latin American Studies Association meetings at Indiana University in the fall of 1980 as US Ambassador James Cheek made the Carter Administration's case in a plenary session.

President Reagan came to office amid renewed threats to United States security interests. Reagan continued and enhanced the military buildup begun under President Carter, and the use of military force became a partner to diplomatic maneuvers and other non military strategies such as economic sanctions or assistance programs toward the Third World. During Reagan's first term in office, the President relied upon a policy of containment to counter Soviet expansionism, and American foreign policy became synonymous with "peace through strength."

By Reagan's second term in office, the Reagan Doctrine, emphasizing low intensity, non-conventional approaches, came to encompass five major components (Halliday, 1989:70-92). First, low intensity conflict doctrine was a mixture of U.S. counter-insurgency operations of the 1960s and the British concept of low-intensity conflict. It stressed the combination of military and nonmilitary forms of combat as well as preparation for protracted commitments, minimization of U.S. combat involvement and mobilization of public support through "public diplomacy". Second, the concept of pro-insurgency was introduced in the form of support for anti-communist guerrillas or "freedom fighters". During the 1980s, the U.S. provided support for such movements in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. Third, preventing future revolutions from occurring was a main tenet of the Reagan Doctrine. The Administration relied upon security assistance, strengthened support of military counter-insurgency campaigns, and political intervention to prevent further revolutions. In Sudan, El Salvador, Haiti, the Philippines and South Korea, the U.S. contributed to the departure of dictatorial leaders through diplomatic maneuvers. Fourth, anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism were issues of special concern for the Reagan Administration. National Security Decision Directive No. 138 called for military strikes against terrorists organizations and their supporters for attacks against U.S. facilities and personnel (Klare, 1989). The April 14, 1986 bombing of Tripoli, Libya is a case in point. Fifth, the Reagan doctrine called for a reassertion of American power throughout the world.

With the renewed emphasis on counterinsurgency and containment of Communism during the Reagan Administration, the School of the Americas again reflected US foreign policy. Due to conflicts with the Panamanian president over operation of the school, SOA was closed on October 1, 1984, and relocated to Fort Benning Georgia where it reopened in 1984 and remains to present day. During the 1980s, SOA's areas of emphasis included instruction on joint and combined operations, counterinsurgency, counter terrorism and other forms of low intensity conflict, leadership development and resource management (White Paper, 1995). SOA's agenda reflected the Reagan Administration's policy of prevention of the spread of Communism throughout the hemisphere. This prevention included aiding friendly democratizing states in their fight against Communist backed insurgent guerrilla movements, strengthening relations among the United States and Latin American countries, and furthering democracy throughout the region. Because the key to combating insurgent warfare and resisting the spread of Communism rested upon the concept of the legitimacy (Manwaring, 1991) of the government in power based on the perception of the population, the training of dictators and death squads to purposefully violate human rights, torture and kill innocent civilians was never a part of SOA doctrine or the policy of the United States Government. Put simply, morality issues aside, it was never in the US government's interest and therefore the School's interest to do so! The Reagan Doctrine revolved around a Cold War world in which American interests were threatened by the spread of Communism. Similarly, the School of the Americas reflected this policy. However, after the end of the Reagan Administration a remarkable change in international relations had swept the world. The Cold War was over.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe did not signal an end to United States interests in Latin America. US interests in this region remain a primary focus of US foreign policy in the post Cold War era. US interests include foreign direct investment in Latin America, exports (40% of US exports go to the Western Hemisphere), economic growth, oil, continued democratization, transnational threats such as narcotrafficking, international terrorism and migrant flows, and regional instability including

insurgencies and border disputes (USCINCSO, SOA briefing slides, 12/12/96). The School of the Americas corresponds to these interests. During the Cold War, it helped to win the fight against Communist expansion in the hemisphere. In the post Cold War era, it furthers the inculcation of democratic ideals and values, including a respect for human rights, by aiding in the development of military leaders supportive of democracy such as General Enrique Lopez Albuja of Peru, General Rafael Samudio Molina of Colombia and General Jorge H. Felix Mena of Ecuador. Similarly, the School of the Americas provides a vital means of combating threats to US national interests and to interests of Latin American countries by providing exposure to current ideas on peace keeping operations, command, control, communication, computers and intelligence, counternarcotic operations, counterinsurgency operations, resource management and civil military operations (USCINCSO, SOA briefing slides, 12/12/96).

Today, SOA provides a resource for Latin American countries mutually beneficial to both Latin America and US national interests. Through SOA, the US has the necessary access to influence future leaders of Latin America. It is in this way that the US is able to promote democratic values and respect for human rights throughout the hemisphere and in turn further US national interests and goals. However, SOA remains a lightning rod for critics opposed to US foreign policy. It is to an examination of these critics and their allegations that we now must turn.

ANALYSIS OF SOA'S OPPONENTS

SOA'S opponents fall into three basic categories. These are the serious critics of SOA as an institution, the critics of US foreign policy, and the political opportunists. Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive.

Father Roy Bourgeois and the other religious critics of SOA fall primarily into the first category with significant overlap into the second. Note what Bourgeois says in this excerpt from his letter to the New York Times of October 8, 1996.

When the poor, who live in degradation and under oppression, can no longer endure their suffering and cry out for justice, the School of the Americas-trained

soldiers are there to silence them -- along with those who dare defend them. Graduates of the School of the Americas were responsible in El Salvador for the massacre of six Jesuit priests, the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the rape and murder of four United States churchwomen, the massacre of hundreds of men, women and children at El Mozote and many other atrocities.

Clearly Bourgeois and his associates believe that the School carries out the foreign policy of the US, a foreign policy which they find reprehensible. Moreover, they lay particular blame on the military of the various Latin American countries for all that is wrong in those nations and attribute many of the attitudes reflected in the actions of those militaries to SOA acting both independently as well as an instrument of US policy.

Nevertheless, one should note the nature of the accusations. For example, Bourgeois attributes the assassination of the six Jesuits to graduates of SOA and Mary McGrory cites the UN Truth Commission report to back up this claim. Yet, as one of the authors of this paper has demonstrated elsewhere, there is a significant problem in the way the Truth Commission assigned blame for that heinous crime (Fishel, 1994). Many of those blamed by the commission clearly were not involved in the act (although they did engage in the initial cover up). Moreover, there is no link of any kind made between the courses these officers attended at SOA and their subsequent actions. Those junior officers tried and found guilty of the act had attended the SOA cadet course whose program of instruction shows no indication that these tactics of atrocity were ever taught or condoned. (SOA, POI, El Salvador Cadet Course, 1984 and 1985) Such tactics are contrary to US Army doctrine and simply are not part of any program of instruction. The question of what was in the "so-called torture manuals" will be addressed below.

Regardless of the validity, or lack thereof, of the claims of such opponents of SOA as Roy Bourgeois, there can be no doubt that he sincerely believes that the School is guilty of both independent illegal activity as well as support for an illegal and immoral policy. The fact that he is mistaken on the first count and wrong about the legality of the foreign policy in question should give rise to questions about the wisdom of his proposed solution to the alleged problem, to wit, closing SOA.

The second group of critics quite obviously overlaps with the first. Where the serious critics of SOA place the emphasis on the School itself, this second group sees it as (1) a symbol of the despised foreign policy and (2) an instrument whose elimination will make it more difficult to sustain that policy. Colman McCarthy (1996) states these positions in his Washington Post column, "The true affront to conscience is that peacemakers are in prison while peacebreakers continue to be trained. If Pentagon leaders had only a remote sense of moral response to the record of squalor at Fort Benning, they would apologize to the imprisoned protesters and seek reparations for the thousands of surviving families in Latin America whose loved ones were killed or tortured by U.S.-trained monsters." And as the New York Times (1996) stated in an article on the manuals, "...they recall the roiling political divisions of the cold war, when the United States willingly overlooked some abuses in Latin America."

The third category, the political opportunists, epitomized by Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy II (D-MA), also overlaps with the other two but is characterized by a political agenda that merely makes use of the alleged sins of SOA and American foreign policy to enhance the status of the politician. In Rep. Kennedy's case, the most recent charges he made against the School on March 17, 1997 muddy the water by attempting to link SOA and its manuals to other, unrelated manuals and documents that were produced by the CIA in the 1980s. (Office of Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy II, 1997) The link among the manuals is neither obvious nor demonstrated. Moreover, as one senior US Army observer put it, Kennedy's attack on President Reagan seemed overtly political; he also admitted that the matter was entirely historical, i.e. SOA has no "torture manuals" and does not "teach torture" now; and was far too harsh in his (and the report's) allegations of cover up in the DOD Inspector General's report. (Personal communication from a senior US Army staff officer in the Pentagon, 1997)

ANALYSIS OF THE CHARGES AGAINST SOA

What of the substance of the various allegations about SOA? Are any of them true? If so, what is the context of the truth (for context is absolutely essential in determining the importance)?

The charges against SOA generally are: (1) it is a school for Latin American dictators; (2) it is a school of assassins; (3) it teaches torture. We will address each in turn.

With respect to the first allegation, criticism usually is focused on the members of the SOA Hall of Fame with the addition of selected graduates of any of the 45 or so (1994 total) courses offered which vary in length from a few days to the 47 week Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). Thus discussion of this critique must address the members of the Hall of Fame and then move on to some of the other selected graduates. Before considering the members it is well to touch on the selection process.

Members of the Hall of Fame are graduates or former Guest Instructors nominated by the US mission to the host country and vetted by the US Department of State. The members so selected are listed in Table Two which includes the year in which they were inducted, the SOA courses attended, and the US administration during which they attended SOA. Twenty-five officers have been inducted into the SOA Hall of Fame. Of these, only one has ever been the head of government in his country, General Hugo Banzer of Bolivia, and he is the only one to have taken power in an unconstitutional manner. We will return to Banzer's alleged sins later. Of the 25, only four were students in the School's longest course, CGSOC. This course directly parallels the same course at Fort Leavenworth and has always been attended by US as well as Latin American officers. In recent years, its student body has included US Air Force, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve officers as well. In short, unless the critics are prepared to accuse the US Army of teaching its own to violate democratic and constitutional norms (in which case all US military schools should be closed) then here is not where dictators, assassins and torturers are made.

Three of the 25 were guest instructors, one of whom was the Latin American Assistant Commandant (as well as the acting Commandant in the absence of a US officer). Interestingly, all Source: US Army School of the Americas briefing book, 1994.

three were Colombians--two Ministers of Defense and one Commanding General of the Army. Colombia, for all its history of violence and drug problems in recent years has, perhaps, the most

democratic record of any nation in Latin America since independence. Since there is no overlap among the guest instructors and the CGSOC graduates, the seven officers can be addressed as a group since only this group was at SOA long enough (one year or more) to have been in a position to have absorbed any significant informal cultural influence. The other Hall of Fame inductees attended courses ranging from two weeks to 17 weeks in length. Based on current course lengths we can estimate that the modal course for these officers was five weeks long. One month is hardly enough time to have any significant impact on the values of adult or near adult men.

Of the courses attended by the inductees, only the Counter Resistance, Counter Insurrection, Military Intelligence, Counter Intelligence Orientation, and Military Police courses are candidates for the introduction of improper materials. (The Psychological Operations course might also be a candidate but none of the members of the Hall of Fame attended it.) Inductees who attended one of these courses number six (6). Two were Colombians with one each from the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In no case have any of these officers been accused of being dictators, assassins, or torturers. The remaining inductees attended the following courses: Motor Officer (1), Jungle Operations (1), Maintenance Orientation (1), Combat Staff (1), Officer Logistics (1), Infantry Weapons/Tactics (3), Communications Officer (1), Engineer Officer (1), Civic Actions (1), and CC7 (1). (US Army School of the Americas Briefing Book for Academic Consultants, 1994). By nation the inductees represent: Bolivia (2), Colombia (6), Dominican Republic (3), Ecuador (2), Guatemala (1), Honduras (2), Paraguay (1), Peru (3), Uruguay (1), Venezuela (4). (Briefing Book, 1994) Ten of the inductees represent two countries with the strongest democratic records in Latin America in this century, Colombia and Venezuela. Thus, based on this quantitative look at the Hall of Fame, it is clear that its members generally have been chosen to represent professional military achievement and democratic success.

The one apparent exception is General Hugo Banzer Suarez, a dictator to be sure. However, in the words of former United States Ambassador to Bolivia (and Peru and El Salvador), Edwin Corr (1997):

General Hugo Banzer, one of the dictators often reviled by critics of SOA, was a vital player in the return to democracy of Bolivia. Contrary to some SOA detractors...he was not the principal leader of the 1971 military coup against General Juan Jose Torres, another military dictator about whom few Bolivians have much good to say. Banzer did emerge as the dictator after the coup...

Many Bolivians refer to Banzer's rule as a *dictablanda* (a "soft" dictatorship) rather than a *dictadura* ("hard" rule). This is not to say that there were not human rights abuses...during the coup, its immediate aftermath, and during the Banzer dictatorship(1971-1978)....

General Banzer began the return to constitutional democracy in 1978 by resigning and holding presidential elections. Four years of political chaos followed in which there were seven heads of state. In 1982, Banzer's political party, the National Democratic Action (ADN), accepted as the elected president Hernan Siles Suazo, whose government contained long-time radical, leftist opponents to Banzer and the ADN.

In 1985, Hugo Banzer won a plurality of the national vote for president. The Bolivian Congress, in accord with constitutional procedures, ignored the electoral victory and selected Dr. Victor Paz Estensorro as president. Not only did Banzer accept what to him and his party was an unfair act by Congress, Banzer aborted a well organized and already underway effort by Banzer party supporters and key military commanders to carry out a coup...that would have prevented Paz from taking office and installed Banzer as president.

In 1989, Banzer again was a candidate for president and accepted electoral defeat. His party entered into a coalition government with the Congress' choice, Jaime Paz Zamora. Banzer and his party remain major actors in the democratic system that has flourished in Bolivia since 1982. (*Italics and emphasis in original.*)

As to Hugo Banzer's attendance at the School of the Americas: in June 1956 he was a student in a two week Motor Officer course! This experience, of course, predisposed him to accept the presidency after the coup of 1971 and establish his dictatorship. If this is correct, then we suppose that the same two week Motor Officer course in 1956 also predisposed him toward his subsequent staunchly democratic behavior! Like many Latin American military officers, Hugo Banzer is a complex individual with democratic and authoritarian values mixed in a wide variety of ways--ways which are hardly dissimilar to those found in many Latin American civilians. To blame SOA--or even credit it--for the behavior of any of its graduates is like blaming Harvard for the behavior of its graduates (such as the alleged Unibomber).

Sadly, in the years since the critics of SOA have intensified their attacks, the School has lost the biographies it once had of the inductees into the Hall of Fame, the last one having been

inducted in 1993. As best we can determine, the biographical data was purged in a cleansing of the files in the best bureaucratic fashion. There is no evidence that it was destroyed in any attempt to cover up any wrongdoing by the inductees. Such evidence of wrongdoing is both unlikely to appear in these types of biographies and they are far too easy for a competent researcher to reconstruct given time. In our research for this study, we were able to get or reconstruct some eight biographies: those of Banzer, Rafael Samudio Molina, Manuel Jaime Guerrero Paz, Hector Garcia Tejada, Jorge Enrique Asanza Acaituri, Jorge Humberto Felix Mena, Humberto Regalado Hernandez, and Enrique Lopez Albuja Trint. In these cases no evidence of the alleged sins appear except in the case of Banzer already discussed. Indeed, when retired Peruvian General Enrique Lopez Albuja was appointed by President Alan Garcia as the first Minister of Defense of Peru, there was great satisfaction in the United States Southern Command that such a consummate and untainted (by either corruption or partisan political activity) individual had been given the position (Caffrey,1987).

Going beyond the Hall of Fame, one might turn to the Guest Instructors at SOA. Three who are personal friends of one of the authors provide interesting profiles of the type of officer assigned to this position and, perhaps, a sense of the impact it had upon them. The officers in question here are two Salvadorans, General Mauricio Vargas and General Jiame Guzman Morales, and one Peruvian, Colonel Percy Delgado de la Flor.

Mauricio Vargas was a Guest Instructor in the mid 1980s. Upon his return to El Salvador in 1985 he took command of the Atonal Immediate Reaction Battalion. In 1987 and 1988 as a Colonel, Vargas was the Operations Officer of the Joint Staff. During this period he was the day to day director with his US counterpart of a combined assessment of the Salvadoran armed forces. From that position he moved on to command Military Detachment IV in Northern Morazan from which he was promoted to General and became the Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. In this position he negotiated the just end of the civil war with the FMLN. In the Salvadoran military Vargas was always known to be close to the Christian Democratic Party--the party of the late president of El Salvador, Jose Napoleon Duarte.

In 1987-88 Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Guzman Morales was an operations officer under Vargas and supervised much of the combined assessment working with his US counterparts. Following this tour Guzman went to SOA as a guest instructor. During his tenure at SOA one of the authors had occasion to discuss with him the implementation of the recommendations of the assessment on which they both had worked. Guzman noted that they were to be implemented over a five year period thereby assuaging some of this author's fears that they were being ignored. Indeed, those reforms that were not overtaken by events have been largely implemented by Guzman in his subsequent positions which culminated in his current role as Minister of Defense. Indeed, it has fallen on Guzman to carry out not only the military reform program but also the peace that General Vargas helped to negotiate.

Colonel Percy Delgado de la Flor was a contemporary as Guest Instructor at SOA with Mauricio Vargas. Delgado was an infantry officer who specialized in intelligence and was extremely well thought of in the Peruvian Army as well as being sufficiently successful as a SOA Guest Instructor to be awarded the US Army Commendation Medal which he wears with great pride. Upon his return to Peru, Delgado worked in intelligence where he focused on what was then the elusive target of *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), the Maoist guerrillas who nearly destroyed Peru's fledgling democracy. Earlier, Delgado had commanded the first infantry battalion sent into the Upper Huallaga Valley to respond to the threat posed by *Sendero*. This was in 1984. Thus, he was intimately familiar with the alleged relationship between *Sendero* and the narcotraffickers. Like many of his military contemporaries, Delgado discounted the strength of that relationship and believed that the real threat to Peruvian security came from *Sendero*. In acting on this belief, Delgado, like General Alberto Arciniega, commander of forces in the valley, ran afoul of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) who accused him of being on the take from the traffickers (Delgado, 1993; Gonzales: 1992, pp. 105-126). This accusation, of course, ruined Delgado's career which might not have been so tragic had it been true; at least he would have been rich and not wearing a threadbare uniform from having to survive on his military salary!

Clearly, these Guest Instructors epitomize the traditions that one hopes would come from any US military school: selfless service to the nation with the highest regard for truth, democratic behavior, and honesty. While two of them gained the highest honors their nation could bestow one suffered for his honor in the best tradition of military service anywhere.

School of Assassins?

The second accusation, that SOA teaches assassination seems to come from two sources: (1) that the alleged mastermind of the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, retired Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, was a graduate as was the alleged commander of the Guatemalan forces allegedly responsible for the murder of US citizen Michael Devine and the disappearance of the common law husband of Jennifer Harbury, Colonel Roberto Alpirez; and (2) that sniper skills are taught in some combat courses. Indeed, in one document identified by DOD as containing improper material which violates American policies or principles the following statement is made, "The C. I. agent must offer presents and compensation for information leading to the arrest, capture or death of guerrillas." (New York Times, Oct 6, 1996) Thus it would appear that this document, titled "Handling of Sources", may support the school of assassins theory. Yet, when is it wrong to kill guerrillas? It is clearly not wrong to kill them in combat; nor is it wrong to lay an ambush for them and kill them. Moreover, it would not be wrong to collect intelligence on the location of guerrilla fighters so that they could be attacked and killed. And, since when is combat assassination? Thus, SOA can hardly be guilty of teaching assassination unless this one sentence is so misinterpreted to mean that the guerrillas should be captured and then killed in violation of all the laws of land warfare!

Torture

The third allegation is that SOA, as a matter of policy and as a matter of fact, taught the practice of torture. The following, from a Memorandum for Record written in 1971 by then Commandant of the School, Colonel William W. Nairn (1971), state the official position on the use of torture as an interrogation technique:

a. U. S. army doctrine state that physical harm must not be employed as a means of interrogation. The underlying rationale is that an individual being tortured will tell his tormentors only what he believes they want to hear, without regard to the truth of the information elicited.

b. Accordingly, USARSA teaches that all forms of torture must be scrupulously avoided.

This was the policy prior to 1971 and remains the policy today. Nevertheless, both the New York Times and Representative Joseph P. Kennedy's report (1997, p. 2.) allege that, "The contents of the training manuals, which taught murder, torture, and extortion, were discovered by the Pentagon in 1991." However, in none of the excerpts released by the Pentagon or by Congressman Kennedy is the issue of torture even raised. Indeed, the only excerpts which have questionable material in them are those released by the Pentagon (which are not to be confused with the two unrelated CIA manuals Kennedy discusses in the same report). What is even more interesting is that the only questionable material is found in the document entitled, "Handling of Sources."

This, in itself, is a remarkable observation. One would expect that if torture were indeed being taught as a technique, its instruction would be found in documents relating to interrogation or counterintelligence. One would certainly not expect it to be discussed as a technique for dealing with paid informants! After all, as everyone who has ever seen a movie in the undercover cop or espionage genres knows, threatening one's sources with harm is the surest way to make them turn on one!

Continuing with this theme, the "Handling of Sources" manual, in a DOD acknowledged questionable statement asserts, "The CI agent could cause the arrest of the employee's parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of a placement plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization" (Kennedy 1997, p. 79). Taken out of context this surely looks terrible and, if treated as actions to intimidate one's source, would be clearly in violation of law, policy, and principle. Yet, again, how many times have we seen in such movies as *Serpico* the undercover agent being imprisoned or beaten (torture?) with his consent so as to gain the credibility necessary to infiltrate the enemy or criminal organization? Equally, how incomprehensible would it be to

take these actions to coerce an unwilling agent? Surely, one cannot expect that the US Army, or even the CIA, would be so stupid as to take such a counterproductive action! In short, the context in which these questionable statements is found clearly changes both their meaning and impact. Finally, continuing to repeat the words assassin and torture over and over does not constitute either a smoking gun or evidence that either violation of morally right action, principle, doctrine, policy, or law ever took place.

RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE

In 1993, one of the periodic bursts of public criticism of SOA led by Father Bourgeois and recounted in Newsweek under the title "School for Dictators," caught the attention of the Commander of the US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Lieutenant General John Miller. General Miller also wore two additional hats as Deputy Commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). With all three hats he was in the chain of command of the Commandant of SOA and in the first and third was his immediate superior. Miller asked his Director of Graduate Degree Programs, Dr. Philip J. Brookes, if SOA needed an academic advisory committee like CGSC. Brookes, knowing little of SOA (but quite a lot about the formation and sustainment of advisory committees) turned to one of the authors of this piece for advice on both SOA and individuals who might be qualified to serve in an advisory capacity.

Both academics quickly agreed that an advisory committee created only to respond to the charges against SOA would be counterproductive but such a committee that was designed to provide external professional academic advice over the long term would be just as necessary and useful for SOA as it was for CGSC. It was on this premise that they proceeded. From his position, Brookes knew that the regulations on federal advisory committees precluded the rapid establishment of any new ones; at the same time it would be possible to gather a group of individual consultants at SOA at the same time to provide the needed advice.

Interestingly, initial resistance to the idea came from SOA itself which saw the notion as one more attack rather than as an effort to help the school develop over the long term. This resistance was overcome in the time honored military manner by the CAC Commander making his desires very clear to the SOA Commandant. Meanwhile, at CGSC Brookes began his search for individuals who would be willing to serve and would have the required expertise and appropriate perspective. The criteria for selection were: Latin American area expertise and the ability to speak Spanish, affiliation with (either present or former) an institution of higher education, an open mind with respect to SOA, some degree of familiarity with the US military, and identification with no strong ideological current. From a group of nominees, who were also asked for their own recommendations, the following individuals were appointed by the TRADOC Commander: Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, Henry Bellmon Professor of International Relations at the University of Oklahoma, John T. Fishel, Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Louis W. Goodman, Dean of the School of International Service at American University, Lawrence Graham, Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at Austin, Max G. Manwaring, Independent Consultant and former Professor of Political Science at Memphis State University, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, Director of Democracy Projects at American University, and General Fred F. Woerner, Professor of International Relations at Boston University (and former CINC of the US Southern Command).

The consultants met at SOA on 28 June 1994 for three days of discussions over various issues facing the school. Out of those discussions, their rapporteur (Fishel) produced a report the gist of which was that "Each of the consultants believes that ... [SOA] is a valuable tool for assuring access to the military in Latin America which remains an important political force in the region. Such access is essential to achieve US goals in Latin America of institutionalizing democracy and respect for human rights." (Rapporteur 1994) On the issue of human rights instruction SOA had instituted direct instruction in each course as well as specific courses on the subject. "It soon became clear that while these informational activities are necessary to meet bureaucratic requirements, they are merely first steps and will not dissuade the critics." (Rapporteur 1994)

Moreover SOA's assertion that it could measure the behavioral changes in its students on human rights convinced the consultants that SOA was engaging in wishful thinking. This criticism echoed loudly in the discussions and the report of the Rapporteur.

Among the specific recommendations made by the consultants was the following (Rapporteur1994):

Finally, the role of the academic consultants needs to be institutionalized as a formal committee.... Said committee should be built around the existing consultants and expanded by four academics including one Latin American. Normal terms should be for three years with a stagger so that the entire committee does not change at once. What we have done so far should be the beginning of a process.

Indeed, it was the beginning of a process but one that took longer than anyone anticipated. The action to create a Board of Visitors for SOA involved TRADOC and the Undersecretary of the Army, Joe Reeder, and it was not until the spring of 1996 that the Board of Visitors (BOV) was constituted. From the original group of academic consultants Corr, Fishel, Graham, Mendelson-Forman, and Woerner were retained. Generals Paul F. Gorman, former CINC USSOUTHCOM, and William R. Richardson, former TRADOC Commander, were added along with Ambassador Ambler Moss, Director of the North-South Center of the University of Miami, and Mr. Steven Schneebaum, an Washington lawyer who was a member of the Board of Directors of the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG). The BOV, while not unlike the consultants group, was slightly weaker in its academic representation, stronger in its military orientation, slightly stronger in its diplomatic appeal, and significantly more overt in its representation of the human rights community.

The BOV met in June 1996 and was welcomed by the new Commandant, Colonel Roy Trumble, a Special Forces officer with long experience in Latin America and a real interest in the success of SOA. Also taking time to personally charge the BOV was the TRADOC Commander, General William Hartzog. Hartzog's presence signified the personal interest he was taking in the success of SOA. The BOV selected Ambassador Corr as its Chair with General Richardson as the Vice-Chair. One of the requests made by the consultants was that they observe field training

and the members of the BOV visited a field site where a counterdrug raid was being planned. Clearly, no preparation had been made for the BOV visit (as is the norm in all military classes-- they just go on as if visitors were not there). In addition, the BOV visited with CGSC students and observed other classes in session. While members had criticism of the style of some instruction there was no deviation from US Army doctrine and human rights issues were embedded into the instruction itself. For example, in planning the drug raid, human rights cautions were emphasized in the rules of engagement (ROE).

The second meeting of the BOV was held at SOA from December 10 through 12 1996. The focus of this meeting was on several issues carried over from the first meeting and the consultants' visit. Among these were human rights issues which had been raised again by the release of the so called torture manuals discussed in the previous section, however, present for the meeting were investigators from the DOD Inspector General's Office carrying out the second phase of their investigation. In addition, issues raised by funding and the general nature of academic activity were also discussed. In short, the BOV was already beginning to take on the advisory role that Dr. Brookes had intended from the time he responded to General Miller's inquiry.

As part of the BOV activities, Mr. Schneebaum was asked to undertake a preliminary review of the incorporation of human rights into the SOA curriculum. Among his conclusions were that "human rights issues, problems, simulations, examples, and concerns are explored in all areas of the School's instruction." (Schneebaum 1996) He also noted that specific concerns such as the role of the military in civil democracies were addressed and that, "there is a deliberate effort to discuss failures of the United States to live up to the standards today expected of all members of the international community, such as Andersonville (to which a field trip is organized) and My Lai. The School does not teach, in other words, that the United States has an unblemished record, or that ...[its] citizens are by dint of their nationality endowed with the right to preach virtue" (Schneebaum 1996):

There is no evidence that, since 1991, any teaching manual or other material coming into the hands of students has contained any message inconsistent with a respect for internationally recognized human rights. The inference that this has not

in fact happened, of course, is empirically verifiable, since the manuals and plans exist and are available for inspection. Apparently, a comprehensive review is being undertaken under the auspices of the [SOA] Human Rights Committee....

In his professional capacity as a human rights lawyer, Schneebaum volunteered to work with SOA to expand and improve on its capacity to provide effective education and training in human rights matters. In an ironic twist of fate, several members of the Board of the IHRLG called on Mr. Schneebaum to resign his membership on the BOV. "Their perception was that Steve's SOA affiliation, because of allegations against SOA and some of its graduates, compromised the IHRLG." (Reeder 1997) Schneebaum responded in a manner consistent with his report to the BOV and stated that his participation on the BOV helped contribute to the protection of human rights. "He told his fellow IHRLG board members that logic and moral principle required him to retain his membership on both Boards.... Unfortunately, the majority of the IHRLG Board members somehow saw things differently, and Steve's membership in the IHRLG has been suspended." (Reeder 1997)

CONCLUSION

The experience of Mr. Schneebaum, just recounted, leads us to our major conclusion: that the US Army School of the Americas is a scapegoat for whatever is perceived to be wrong with US foreign policy toward Latin America. It matters little, or not at all, that individual academic consultants, the SOA Board of Visitors, a private consulting firm, the DOD Inspector General, the General Accounting Office, an eminent human rights attorney, and even Representative Kennedy all agree that, whatever may have been the case in the past, the school does not now teach dictatorship, torture, or assassination. (See among others GAO 1996) Nevertheless, this agreement does not deter Kennedy and others from arguing that, "Fifty years ago, the U.S. Army School of the Americas opened its doors in Panama to a class of Latin American and Caribbean military officers to receive training in the art of war. Half a century later, it is time to shut the School down." (Kennedy 1997)

Of what, however, has SOA been guilty in its fifty years of existence? It has been guilty of carrying out the foreign and defense policy of the United States government to the best of its ability. It has instructed Latin American officers and enlisted personnel in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the conduct of military operations. It has addressed communist insurgencies, the causes of revolt, and the best ways to counter those insurgencies with an emphasis at all times on the need to establish and maintain the legitimacy of the government and its armed forces. Since 1976, in one way or another, SOA has taken cognizance of human rights as an issue and sought to incorporate a proper respect for it in its instruction.

SOA has been guilty of, in a wide variety of courses, trying to inculcate the proper role of the armed forces in a democracy. Courses on military civic action harkened back to the early days of the United States when the Army played a major role in the development of the west from exploration to road and canal construction. The current course called "democratic sustainment" attempts a more sophisticated look at the role of the military in a democracy but carries the same theme forward. The CGSOC course, the center piece of officer instruction, differs from its parent at Fort Leavenworth only in its awareness of the historical baggage that Latin American militaries carry and the fact that it addresses the issue of military authoritarianism directly.

Finally, SOA is guilty of trying to bring Latin American defense civilians to its courses under the expanded International Military Education and Training Program (Expanded IMET) as well as developing courses of particular relevance to the post Cold War era such as countermining operations, counterdrug operations, and peacekeeping. It is also guilty of adapting its courses to the new era in international affairs.

Interestingly, the product of SOA is not so much the technically proficient officer or enlisted graduate of a particular course but rather a body of graduates who share a common understanding of US doctrine and the shared experience of having been at a school with other Latin American soldiers from other nations. This shared experience, while it does not directly limit conflict, has been useful in the aftermath of two of the most recent border conflicts in the hemisphere: the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras and the 1995 conflict between Ecuador and Peru.

In the former, at least two SOA classmates faced each other on opposite sides of the conflict and found their shared experience essential in keeping the cease fire in place (Lopez 1980). In the latter, the shared experience facilitated the successful incorporation of officers from both countries into the MOMEF observer mission to maintain the cease fire and develop confidence building measures.

In the end, what SOA accomplishes is to build a network of access among the militaries of the Americas that is developed and expanded in the InterAmerican Defense College and InterAmerican Defense Board, and the Conference of American Armies. This network has finally expanded into the Defense Ministerial meeting at Williamsburg, VA that grew out of the Summit of the Americas in Miami. Future Defense Ministerials will be the fruition of what began as a technical school for Latin American soldiers at the end of the second World War.

Name and Position	Year Inducted	SOA Courses	US Administration
Gen. Hugo Banzer Suarez Former Pres. of Bolivia	October 1988	Motor Officer Course June 1956	Eisenhower (R)
Gen. Guido Emilio Sandoval Zambrana Commanding General, Bolivian Army	November 1991	Jungle Operations Course Nov 1967	Johnson (D)
Gen. Rafael Samudio Molina Colombian Minister of Defense	October 1988	Guest Instructor Jan-Dec 1970	Nixon (R)
Gen. Nelson Mejio Henao Commander, Colombian Army	June 1989	Counter Resistance Course Oct 1961	Kennedy (D)
Gen. Manuel J. Guerrero Paz Colombian Minister of National	December 1989	AsstCommandant/Comman dant	Reagan (R)

Defense		Dan-Dec 77.Jun-Sep 77	
Gen. Manuel A. Murilla Gonzalez Commander, Colombian Army	November 1991	Military Police Officer Course Nov 1962	Kennedy (D)
Gen. Luis E. Roca Maichel Cmdg Gen. of Colombian Armed Forces	November 1991	Guest Instructor Dec 1973-Dec 1974	Ford (R)
MG Hernan Jose Guzman Rodriguez Commander, Colombian Army	May 1993	Maintenance Orientation Course Dec 1969	Nixon (R)
MG Hector Garcia Tejada Director, National Investigations Dominican Republic	May 1993	Counter Insurrection Course Nov 1970 Command/General Staff Course Dec 1974	Nixon (R) Johnson (D)
MG Jose Emilio Guzman Fernandez Chief of Staff of the Army Dominican Republic	May 1993	Combat Officer Staff Course May 1973	Ford (R)
MG Tommy Rafael Fernandez Alarcon Former Asst. Sec. State for Armed Forces	May 1993	Officer Logistics Course Dec 1969	Nixon (R)
Gen. Jorge H. Feliz Mena Ecuador Minister of Defense	August 1989	Military Intelligence Course Dec 1964	Johnson (D)
Gen Jorge E. Asanza Acaiturri	December	Guest Instructor	Carter (D)

Chief of Joint Armed Forces Command Command General Ecuadoran Army	1989	Jan 79-Jan 81	
BG Manuel Antonio Callejas y Callejas National Defense Chief of Staff Guatemalan Army	October 1988	Command/General Staff course Dec 1970	Nixon (R)
BG Humberto Regalado Hernandez Cdr in Chief, Honduran Armed Forces	October 1988	Infantry Weapons/Tactics Sesp 1961	Kennedy (D)
MG Policarpo Paz Garcia Provisional President of Honduras Cdr in Chief, Honduran Armed Forces	October 1988	Communications Officer Course Dec 1956	Eisenhower (R)
MG Eumelio Bernal Chief of Staff, Paraguayan Armed Forces	December 1990	Infantry Weapons/Tactics April 1956	Eisenhower (R)
Gen Enrique Lopez Albuja Trint Minister of Defense, Peru	October 1988	Infantry Weapons/Tactics Oct 1955	Eisenhower (R)
Gen Jorge Zegarra Delgado General, Peruvian Army	September 1990	Counter Intelligence Orientation Sep 1962	Eisenhower (R)

Name And Position	Year Inducted	SOA Courses	US Administration
Gen Pedro E. Villanueva Valdivia Commanding General, Peruvian Army	November 1991	Engineer Officer Course Hune 1959	Eisenhower (D)
LTG Carlos P. Pache Gelabert Cdr in Chief, Uruguayan Air Force	December 1990	Civic Actions Course June 1968	Johnson (D)
Gen Eliodoro Antonio Guerrero Gomez Minister of Defense, Venezuela	October 1988	Command/General Staff Course Dec 1972	Nixon (R)
MB (NG) Jose Angel Marchena Acosta Commanding General Armed Forces of Cooperation, Venezuela	October 1988	Military Police Officer Course Dec 1960	Eisenhower (R)
MG (NG) Alfred Antonio Sandoval Hernandez Commanding General Armed Forces of Venezuela	October 1988	Command/General Staff Course Dec 1971	Nixon (R)
MG Jose M. Troconis Peraza Commander of the Venezuelan Army	December 1990	CC7 Course May 1970	Nixon (R)

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