

**SHE'S NOT A LIBERTINE, HE DOESN'T DRINK:
POPULAR MORALITY AND THE STATE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHILE**

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In 1990, after seventeen years of dictatorial rule in Chile, General Augusto Pinochet ceded power to a democratically elected government. The transition to democracy that ensued has presented Chileans with formidable challenges: checking the power of the military, dealing with the legacy of human rights abuses, democratizing the authoritarian state structures created by Pinochet and confronting the heightened class inequality generated by the military's neo-liberal economic policies. In the years following 1990, however, public debate has frequently centered on a distinct, although not unrelated, set of issues: crime, teenage pregnancy, drug use, divorce and abortion.¹

This is not the first time that Chileans have discussed morality with such fervor. In fact, similar moral concerns emerged in a prior period of democratization and economic change, one that began when the populist Arturo Alessandri took power in 1920 and accelerated between 1939 and 1949, when representatives of reformist, center-left "popular-front" coalitions controlled the executive branch of the state.² During that earlier era, efforts to end the repressive policies of the "oligarchic state" generated anxiety over alcoholism, single motherhood, illegitimate births and the general mal-constitution of families.³

In both historical conjunctures, private and public concerns became intertwined as rapid political and economic change made citizens fear that there would be a chaotic erosion of moral norms. The ascendance, in 1939 as in 1990, of governing coalitions that included leftist political parties--the popular fronts grouped together the Socialist, Communists, and Radical parties while diverse progressive parties and Christian Democrats make up the Concertación--provoked uneasiness, especially among economic elites and the political right. These anxieties were heightened by the fact that both coalitions came to power in part through intense popular mobilization and that both sought to deepen citizen participation. To quell apprehensions, the Concertación, like the popular fronts before it, has insisted that changes will not undermine the broader social fabric. Like the popular fronts, the Concertación has tried to consolidate its political control by invoking the importance of family and sexuality to the nation-state, delineating appropriate masculine and feminine behavior, and stressing the moral rectitude of the coalition itself.

However, the Concertación has apparently been less successful than the popular fronts in allaying citizen fears of moral decay. This perceived failure is not surprising. Today, after seventeen years of military rule, the Chilean state is weaker and smaller than it was in the 1930s and 1940s. Hence, one might argue, it is less able to carry out a capillary social integration. The give and take of public opinion, such as it is today, has replaced the more face-to-face negotiations that characterized relations between grassroots organizations, party leaders and state officials prior to 1973. The left-wing of the Concertación is more detached from popular organizations than were leftists in either 1939 or the 1980s, and it is therefore less able to mediate between popular groups

and state officials. The right has grown stronger and the alleged free play of the market, grounded in negotiations between state officials and entrepreneurs, now supplants the more extensive tri-partite processes of economic planning that existed before 1973. Political rhetoric now emphasizes individual needs over social needs. The Chilean polity is in short more fragmented and less participatory, and today's leaders appear less able to contain "deviant" behavior.

This paper examines the gendered morality of Chilean politics in the years before 1973 and elucidates how that morality has shaped Chileans' expectations in the 1990s. The paper explores, in other words, the forms of political negotiation that characterized Chilean politics before 1973 and the repercussions of those forms of negotiation. My main focus is on the popular-front period (roughly 1936-1949), a formative time in which the forms of political bargaining that characterized the pre-1973 Chilean "compromise state" first took shape. It was during the popular -front years that working-class Chileans and political and economic elites first agreed to respect democratic institutions and to use those institutions to negotiate an unevenly accepted balance between economic growth and redistribution. Throughout the popular-front period (and until 1973), the adherence of economic elites to this political bargain wavered as subalterns pressured for democratization--not only for increasing economic benefits but also for political rights and influence. Yet the widely-held belief that national economic and political prosperity depended on a controlled incorporation of popular sectors strengthened agreement. Meanwhile, the acceptance of the left into mainstream politics helped ensure more restrained forms of popular participation.⁴

In this paper, I try to discern the gender coordinates of working-class influence on the popular-front state, focusing specifically on socialist politics, which were an important component of popular-front efforts to secure popular adherence and foment popular participation. Sexual mores, I suggest, were integral to an evolving socialist morality that helped consolidate the left, conditioning the relation of the left to the working-class and ultimately of popular classes to the state. I thus demonstrate how a gendered socialist morality shaped national-popular forms of governance. Finally, I argue that we can better comprehend the unequal negotiations of compromise politics, as well as their lasting effects on Chileans, by looking at gender and sexuality.

Chile: Then and Now

The gendered nature of the Concertación project and how it both shaped and was shaped by Chileans' experiences of the popular fronts first became evident to me during 1991-1993, as I conducted interviews for a project on gender in popular-front Chile. In those interviews, I frequently found that as I sought to guide conversation toward the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the men and women with whom I spoke preferred to talk about more recent events. Hence our conversations often ended up jumping from one period to another, in a contrapunctual dialogue.⁵

My interview with Margarita Montalva was in many ways typical: our conversation shifted frequently between past and present and often centered on questions of morality, gender and

sexuality. Montalva, who began her political involvement in a neighborhood consumer group in the early 1940s, became an active participant in the Chilean women's movement soon thereafter. Later, in the 1960s, after years of prodding by her Communist husband, she joined the Communist Party and held leadership positions within women's organizations associated with that party. For most of Pinochet's seventeen years in power, from 1973-1990, Montalva participated in groups that opposed military rule.⁶

Issues of gender and morality emerged frequently in my interview with Montalva. When I asked her how she got other women involved in politics during the 1940s, for example, she answered that getting women to "become conscious" and politically active was a gradual process and she talked about the problems she faced and how she overcame them. Montalva saw gendered moral concerns as crucial to socialist efforts to create class consciousness and build popular organizations.

We came up against their husbands' objections too. So we had to go and talk to him and show him. And say to him, "Well go to my house, see what I'm like. Because your wife's not going to be harmed by being around me. I'm not a libertine. I don't live on the streets. I don't drink. I live with my husband." . . . That's how we carried out the struggle. And the best thing the social struggle has done is to lift men up out of vice.⁷

Pursuing a similar theme, Montalva told me about a woman she had seen on television the week before our interview. According to Montalva, this woman, whose son was a drug addict, had said of her son:

"I want them to find him, and arrest him, and take him to a rehabilitation program. I want them to get him off drugs because we haven't been able to. I don't want them to hit him or mistreat him, but to get him to change his life. He has his whole life in front of him. He can get married. Meet a woman, get married and become a family man, get a job."

At another point in the interview Montalva charted a course for the present and future by exhorting the Chilean left of the 1990s to organize drug addicts. Thus while seemingly seconding the drug addict's mother's call for state intervention to rout drug addiction, she drew on her past experiences within a socialist milieu that lifted "men up out of vice" to posit the need for socialist organizing around the issue.⁸

In addition, Montalva proposed that women had to place limits--and especially sexual limits--on men in order to assure that men respected them. This was a tenet, she explained to me, that she herself had put into practice when dating her husband. Montalva knew, however, that this practice had fallen into disuse. In fact, Montalva chastised her nieces, who were of a different generation, for failing to demand that men respect them in this way. She recalled telling her nieces:

"Before one didn't go out," I say, "like these couples today." "That scandalizes me a bit," I say to them. They go out all night or at any hour. No, one used to have certain limits, which one set oneself. I say to the girls, I say to them that it's the woman who has to make herself respected. I say, "How is it possible for your boyfriend to say to you 'Let's go to the hill' and you just go with him. 'Let's go at ten o'clock,' and you go at ten." So I say to them that they're looking for trouble. "I can't just follow a man, no matter how much I care about him." Here, the girls just laugh.

Linking this moral precept to Communist organizing, Montalva told her nieces--and me--about Elías Lafferte, a founder of the Chilean Communist Party who became a member of the Chilean Senate. Lafferte, Montalva remembered, used to give nostalgic speeches about the sexual restraint of Communist men during the early days of the Communist movement. Lafferte, Montalva implied, would roll over in his grave if he saw how young women and men behaved today.⁹

Finally, addressing herself both to me and to an unspecified interlocutor--the *chiquillas*, or "girls" (who were perhaps her nieces, perhaps her women friends)--Montalva recounted a conversation in which she expressed her views on popular organizing and popular influence on the state:

"[In the past] the commissions would go and we took up the fight," I say. I say to today's girls, "Before we used to have the time." Because, for example, I think I was talking to them about that stone damn. "There is the struggle," I say. "That's the fight that needs to be fought. And *el pueblo* makes itself respected. You have to go here. You have to go there and do this because that's how you raise consciousness and the Parliament can't be left alone because [the legislators] are chosen in order to legislate. . . . So there are lots of things to do and for that we need a women's organization."

That's why I say four years have already passed since the [return to democracy]. So I say things are taking too long. We should go out. And even though I'm seventy years of age, I would still dare to, participate wherever I can, in any women's group that struggled for these things. Let's go and make a women's organization.

We have SERNAM [Servicio Nacional de la Mujer, the Women's Ministry]. We do have this. But what do they do? You saw how people say that this March 8 [celebration] was a disaster. I think this is a historic date . . . so we could never leave it [behind]. It's a day when promises are renewed, we might say. We remember all that's we've lived through, all we've gained, because that's how it was done before. . . .

So we can't simply let life follow its course. Nor can we just keep still because socialism is at a standstill, has fallen. You may temper it; you may change some things, but the class struggle is going to have to go on. The struggle for better living conditions is what keeps up the human spirit.

Montalva thus pinpointed the efficacy of past forms of struggle, which aimed to raise consciousness among popular sectors and sway the Parliament. In referring to the present, she invoked SERNAM, stressing the illegitimacy of its actions and calling for popular mobilization in order bring the government agency into line.¹⁰

Thus Montalva's positive assessment of the popular-front era and her criticisms of the present proceeded along three axes. First, Montalva clearly believed that there was a socialist code of conduct with distinct gendered moral precepts. In shorthand, Montalva believed that good men were family men. They should not drink or take drugs. They should work. And they should respect women. Women, according to Montalva, should make themselves respected by preserving their sexual purity. Montalva also saw the propagation of this gendered moral code as an important goal of both Communist organizing and state regulation. She thus implicated leftist, class-based organizations as well as the state in efforts to norm gender.

Second, Montalva suggested that the Communist Party and the left more broadly was able to grow and to recruit new members during the popular-front period because they showed common women and men that socialists followed these moral rules. So when she visited the husbands of women she was trying to recruit for the cause, she insisted that she was a morally sound person. Moreover, Montalva believed that the left could and did change the behavior of working-class men and women. "The best thing the social struggle has done is to lift men up out of vice," she said. She thus noted how the left drew from the cultural norms of the working class and how it intervened in working-class communities. Theoretically, we can understand this as a concern with class formation. Clearly, Montalva saw class formation as a gendered process and she perceived the failures of class-based organizations in the 1990s as somehow rooted in a moral shallowness.

Third, Montalva referred to the relation of popular classes to the state--what we might call the process of state formation. This theme emerged not only in her depiction of the relation of women's organizations to SERNAM but also in her call for organizing around drug addiction, in which she portrayed working-class activism as a way of achieving what the woman she had seen on television wanted: normative state intervention. In Montalva's view, the political participation of men and women, and the class-based gender norms that bolstered that participation, helped determine how sensitive the state was to popular demands.

Montalva spoke, then, of the relation between three processes: gender regulation, class formation, and state formation. In her view the success of socialist moralizing in the 1930s and 1940s was linked to the political alignments of the period--to the way socialists related to popular classes and to the state. During the popular-front period and up until 1973, socialists advanced moral principles that regulated and defined proper male and female conduct. These principles helped the left build itself as a class-based community. Moreover, before 1973 the state had supported and supplemented the moral influence of the left so that socialist morality existed alongside state-instigated projects for moral reform in a tense collaboration. The Concertación was, in comparison, insensitive to popular lobbying and unable to control social problems. This failure was a symptom of the changed relation between popular organizations and the state, which was in turn both cause and consequence of the left's relative blindness to critical questions of morality and gender. Montalva contended, in other word, that social problems had surfaced in the 1990s because the left was no longer strong and because the state no longer recognized the left as a legitimate political actor. And she pointed out that the current failure of popular groups and women's organizations to have an impact on the state resulted from Chileans' current turn away from a historical trajectory of struggle.

Gender and the Popular-Front Project

Clearly, Montalva ignored unsavory episodes and idealized the past to strengthen her claims about what should be done in the present. She did not mention the insensitivity of state officials and elected representatives prior to 1973, for example, even though socialist activists of the time doubted

the sympathies of authorities enough to practice a routine vigilance. Nor did Montalva recognize that during the earlier period moral norms were often not heeded. Yet as contemporary documents and my own interviews reveal, men, even socialist men, drank excessively, routinely squandered their salaries in bars and were unfaithful to their wives. Single mothers were plentiful. In fact, during the 1940s reformers both within state agencies and within the left spent considerable energy to rout just such working-class vices. It was very likely the existence of these multi-faceted efforts to prevent or regulate "deviant" behavior, however, that made working-class men and women like Montalva feel that social problems were under control.¹¹ Montalva's historical claims were therefore important not because they were accurate but because they nonetheless revealed what was, for her, distinctive about popular-front Chile.

Significantly, Montalva's characterization of the popular-front project was strikingly similar to the accounts authored by popular-front political elites in the 1940s. Like Montalva, popular-front leaders stressed the beneficial effects of rising state intervention, enhanced discipline among popular sectors, and heightened citizen participation. To overcome the political exclusion and economic backwardness that were the result of oligarchic rule, they argued, the popular fronts needed to stimulate a controlled popular collaboration. Only this kind of joint effort of government and governed would correct the oversight and selfishness of backward-looking dominant classes. Socialists clearly voiced this conviction when Socialist mayor of Santiago Graciela Contreras de Schnake opened a hostel for bootblacks. Contreras' success was due to two forces, they said: "The disciplined organization of *los de abajo* which elevates its members to higher planes on the scale of culture. . . [and] the social conscience of those who govern [and] who exercise authority with an authentic sense of human solidarity."¹²

Popular-front leaders also shared with Montalva a view of increased state intervention, greater citizen involvement, and moralization as explicitly gendered. Hence popular-front leaders frequently insisted that the consolidation of a distinct kind of gender relations was crucial to a popular-front project. In 1938, for instance, popular-front presidential candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda asked:

Why do people say that the Popular Front wants to destroy the family--that family whose regularity affects all those who worship our home--when the only desire of men of the middle class and *el pueblo* is to have a legitimate *compañera* who today participates heroically in the struggle against their misery?

Where there are sickly beings who live in overcrowded conditions--be it in the city or the countryside--united in a common misery, we want to institute a home which will be the basis of an understanding that human solidarity also applies to the destitute of today.¹³ Noting that families could unify "el pueblo," Aguirre Cerda implied that middle- and working-class men could construct solidarity in the face of misery and attempt to alter their class condition by allying with "legitimate companions" and forming a family. Aguirre Cerda also intimated that solidarity could be practiced within the national-popular bloc embodied in the popular-front coalitions as well as within families and social classes. In the speech cited above, Aguirre Cerda not only urged the destitute to form families. He also insinuated that by helping poor Chileans attain a proper family life, popular-front politicians could exercise solidarity. Through popular-front occupation of the state, human cooperation and unity could be enacted on an even larger, national scale.

Furthermore, by turning men into hardworking laborers worthy of higher wages and women into diligent housewives able to tend to the health of their family members, popular-front leaders sought to augment the health of the popular classes and raise their standard of living, to propel national economic development, to guarantee social stability, and to make working-class Chileans into proper citizens. Since they saw the male-headed nuclear family as crucial to the demographic health of the country and the well-being of children, they opposed single motherhood and sex outside marriage. Hence popular-front politicians--and their supporters in the labor, consumer and women's movements as well--justified attempts to increase citizen participation and to proffer material benefits by referring to how disciplined and educated breadwinners and housewives would contribute to national well-being through sexual and social restraint. These widely-held beliefs about the distinct rights and responsibilities of men and women shaped the programs of health, welfare, and labor agencies.¹⁴

Montalva's account of the popular-front era thus closely followed popular-front leaders' perspectives on the conjoined processes of gendered popular discipline, state intervention and popular participation. Although as I suggest in the concluding section of this paper Montalva's historical narrative was ultimately shaped by her present context, the striking similarities between Montalva's formulation and the accounts authored in the 1940s suggests a certain *presence of the past* that cannot be explained simply as a result of present-day demands and desires. Rather, it must be understood also as the outcome of a historical unfolding that limited and shaped the discursive options available to Montalva at the time I interviewed her. To understand Montalva's use of this popular-front discourse, then, we need to explain the initial convergence of popular and elite projects in the 1940s.

Below, I trace that convergence by focusing on socialist views regarding sexuality. Socialists, I suggest, refashioned sexual mores in order to build a popular constituency and cement class solidarity, on the one hand, and intervene in processes of state formation on the other. At the same time, they attempted to reconcile the oftentimes conflicting needs of family members. They thus acted as a kind of bridge between sectors of the working-class and of the political elite and between working-class men and women. A focus on sexuality therefore allows us to see the crucial mediating role played by the left and to understand how and why the popular-front project attracted women and men with diverse needs and desires.

Gender and Sexuality in Socialist Morality

Socialist efforts to build a class-based political community took place in a context of heightened political mobilization in which women of all social classes played an increasingly important role. Beginning around 1935, as the left made concerted efforts to expand its membership and increase its popularity, it sought to recruit more women. This marked a definite turning-point: Communists began to revamp their women's sectionals and Socialists created the Asociación de Mujeres Socialistas (AMS, Socialist Women's Association). Concurrently, feminists formed the

Movimiento pro Emancipación de la Mujer Chilena (MEMCH, Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Women), a broad-based feminist organization that was associated with the popular fronts. Although largely successful, all these organizing efforts among women had to confront the widely-held conviction that public spaces were dangerous for women, that once women left the safety of the family--where they were protected by fathers, or brothers, or husbands--they were sexually vulnerable.¹⁵

In order to make leftist organizations more inviting and less threatening to women, left leaders attempted to reform working-class men. To simplify a rather complicated project, left leaders sought to replace the militant macho class warrior with a disciplined class-conscious family man. They sought to cement working-class solidarity at family picnics and not within the male sociability of bars. Leftists felt that the presence of civilized men within political spaces would encourage women to participate. The presence of women within the left would take the wildly defiant edge off men, making them more open to political negotiation. Communist Ignacia Parada echoed this orientation when in 1993 she boasted that her father did not drink or spend weekends with male friends: "He was a man who dedicated himself only to his organization, his work and his organization. . . . So ours was a very united family. It wasn't dispersed, a family with problems." Like socialist leaders Parada linked class solidarity, family, and proper male deportment.¹⁶

Convincing Chileans that socialist men had been effectively reformed, however, was not easy, since the Chilean Church and its right-wing allies, both of which were virulently anti-communist, portrayed socialist men as being particularly deviant. In a typical anti-communist fashion, a social worker noted in 1935 that male socializing and left politics went hand-in-hand and attributed male vices to "pernicious influences of a communist nature which in uncultured minds produce a disorientation which has nefarious effects on an honorable and tranquil existence." Moreover, much of the anti-popular front propaganda of the Church and the right was aimed at women and it was explicitly sexual. Socialist men, these popular-front detractors claimed, were perverse. At the Catholic girls school Marta Roja attended, for example, the nuns made their pupils pray a rosary for the defeat of popular-front presidential candidate Gabriel González Videla. If González Videla came to power, the nuns told the girls, he would have the nuns raped. These nuns thus drew on and reproduced the belief that socialist men were rapists or sexual abusers--or at the very least advocates of free love.¹⁷ Socialists had to disprove these allegations in order to attract women to the left. This was one reason that socialist leaders encouraged sexual restraint among socialist men.

Left leaders also turned the accusations of the Church and the right on their head, harnessing more conservative sexual mores for their own ends. Capitalists, and not socialists, they claimed, were the real sexual abusers. This idea appeared frequently in left newspapers and in the proletarian fiction of the time. In *Sewell*, a novel about the Braden Copper Company mining camp written by socialist politician Baltasar Castro, the female protagonist suffered a sexual assault at the hands of Mr. Patrick, a North American boss. The novel thus affirmed that capitalists and not communists posed a sexual threat. Castro further presented the Chilean worker as a savior: as a result of Mr.

Patrick's sexual assault, Carmela found the support and protection of her working-class beau, whom she eventually married.¹⁸

The theme of male protection and its anti-capitalist nature was made even clearer in the novel *Carbón*--although in this case it was not a capitalist but rather a treacherous working-class man who undermined the integrity of the working-class. *Carbón*, written by Communist Party member Diego Muñoz, depicted a cohesive--and indeed physically separate--coal-mining community and portrayed norms of sexual propriety as responding to the needs of that collectivity. Uniting to oppose the mining company and win their strike, *Carbón's* protagonists abandoned their homes in the company town and set up an isolated, make-shift campsite on the nearby beach. Fearing that dissent would weaken the community they had (re)founded, the strike committee and its robust Head of Order and Discipline, don Toro, enforced strict disciplinary measures within the beach camp. Thus when the young Meche was sexually accosted by Farías, the strike leaders took the matter into their hands. Although (for some unfortunate and unknown but ultimately fortuitous reason) Meche's father had not defended her and--as Meche's mother reminded the young woman--Meche's refusal to marry had left her vulnerable, the strike committee offered protection. Maclovio, a strike organizer and an admirer of Meche's, immediately concerned himself with the affair. Under instructions from the strike committee, don Toro went looking for Farías and brought him before the assembled committee members, Meche, and her mother. Reyes began the meeting by addressing Farías:

"We are living together," he said, "in a strike that has an enormous significance for everyone. The simple fact that we unanimously decided to live together in an encampment means that, from the first until the last day, here, in Playa Blanca, there must be the most strict mutual respect."

"I have not disrespected anyone!"

"You have disrespected Meche."

"I am free and so is Meche. . . ."

Maclovio lost his cool:

"She is not free!" he yelled. "She is going to marry me! Do you hear? Isn't that right, Meche?"

That was so startling that the young woman responded almost without realizing:

"That's right."

The old woman stood tall, triumphant.

"Yes sir, don Farías!" she exclaimed. "My daughter is not a loose woman! Besides her father and her mother, she has her master, understand that once and for all. Who do you think you are?"¹⁹

Muñoz thus underscored the relation between male sexual protection of women and working-class organization. Reyes was not simply Meche's admirer but also a strike leader.

Socialists thus insisted that political activity, and left political activity in particular, was safe for women: men like Farías were few within the left, they said, and deviant men would be corrected or ostracized. Especially within the Communist Party, this was not empty rhetoric: men who violated socialist sexual mores could be--and were--disciplined. Habitual drunkards or those who showed "degeneration or immorality," the Party statues warned, would be punished. And punished

they were. Party leaders expelled Juan Rojas Serrano, ex-president of the union at the Mapocho nitrate office, from the party "for his corroborated lack of discipline, degeneration in drink and for divulging Party resolutions to provocateur elements." The "licentious" life of the Communist mayor of Iquique brought Party leader Luis Corvalán to the city to investigate accusations and bring the man into line. In addition, militants could be brought before the *comisión de control de cuadros* (cadre control commission), nicknamed the *comisión de control de cuadros y marruecos* (underwear [*cuadros*, underwear and cadre] and fly commission) for its role in regulating Party members' sexual lives.²⁰

In a less punitive vein, leftist organized recreational events that were intended produce cordial and non-eroticized relations between the sexes and thereby promote male (sexual) "respect" for women. Left publications frequently stressed that the left itself was like a great big family. Union halls, they said, were just like family homes.²¹ We look out for our own, leftists implied, and we especially look out for the sexual safety of our daughters. The by-laws of the Socialist Militia instructed adherents to organize parties and dances where militants and family members could amuse themselves in a healthy atmosphere. Repudiating the sexual recklessness into which men might so easily fall, Communist dance organizers frowned at couples who danced too close, moved their shoulders and hips with too much abandon, or even worse, hugged and kissed on the dance floor. The absence of alcohol at these events, promoted in internal publications for party members, was also intended to encourage male sexual restraint. Clearly these were not disorderly and raucous *fiestas*. But even though--or perhaps because--social events instilled the value of social and sexual order, socialists believed that those events attracted adherents. In short, leftists did not frontally oppose prevalent notions of sexual propriety, but articulated them into their own project.²²

Oftentimes, this was not enough to make parents feel at ease. Flor Valenzuela's father was himself a Communist, but when his fifteen year old daughter stayed out until one in the morning postering May Day propaganda, her father gave her a good strapping. Valenzuela tried to stop him by reminding him that she had been out with comrades and that they had looked after her. Still, her father was not convinced that this was enough to ensure her safety. To appease parents like Flor Valenzuela's father, left leaders also tolerated more traditional ways of protecting women. Specifically, in order to get around the objections of zealously overprotective family members they made room for women's parents or husbands at political events. Traditional family-based forms of sexual control could continue within the left: the left was not only *like* a family, it was actually made up of families. Husbands and parents who participated could personally look after their wives and daughters. This kind of family participation was frequent within the left. At dances men and boys were often expected to ask parents for permission to dance with their daughters. Young unmarried women often went to left dances or sporting events and even to meetings with their parents or older siblings. María Pardo's parents made sure her brother went along when Pardo took trips to organize rural workers in the countryside. Pardo, who was thirteen years old at the time, knew that her brother was there to look after her "behind."²³

Not all politically active young women had parents or brothers who were willing to chaperon them. Reputable party members who could act as proxy parents weren't always around either.

Consequently, the very best way to make sure that women and girls were safe was to make sure men behaved. Left leaders made all kinds of efforts to get men to exercise self-restraint. Pardo, for example, relied on her male comrades to control themselves. In fact, because she felt that leftist men would always act respectfully, she felt her brother's presence unnecessary. Surprisingly enough, however, a comrade once tried to rape Pardo when, during an organizing tour, she had stayed in his home. Yet Pardo saw this incident as exceptional and dismissed its importance. "That was the only time a man disrespected me," she said in an interview. "For me that was an exception, something I don't take into consideration because maybe that man was kind of sick, kind of maniacal."²⁴

Part of the reason Pardo could view this event as exceptional was because her would-be rapist was punished. After running out of the man's house, Pardo reported the attempted sexual assault to her friend and comrade Salvador Allende, the same man who would become president of Chile in 1970. That Allende responded by punching the man surely made Pardo feel safe. More generally Pardo counted on the fact that most comrades would respond to the more gentle imprecations found in newspapers and pamphlets and that they did not need to be disciplined physically.²⁵

As this last example reveals, there *was indeed* sexual conflict within the left. Given that men had more power than women, and that not all women accepted the consequences of that imbalance, conflict was inevitable. The social and sexual mores of the left were intended to smooth over such conflict between men and women. So the left's insistence on guarding female virtue was not simply a response to the Catholic right. Nor was it simply a way to placate parents and husbands who wanted to exercise sexual control over their daughters and wives. It was also a way of addressing women's own concerns about male sexual privilege.

A maxim in a Socialist Party newspaper put women's concerns in this way: "Women's resistance is not always a consequence of her virtue, but more probably of her experience."²⁶ The Socialist and Communist women I interviewed were very clear about what their experience told them: women were sexually vulnerable and women who stepped into a male-dominated politics were particularly vulnerable. Their experience also told them that because sexual license implied male sexual prerogative, restraining men was a way of rectifying power imbalances among men and women. Lilian Pérez, for example, remembered her aunts telling her father that she would "lose herself" if she continued in politics. In a manner typical of non-leftists, these aunts believed Pérez might join up in some kind of free love movement. Pérez herself knew that this was not the case, but she was aware of another kind of sexual danger: when she went on organizing tours outside Santiago, she was often the only woman in the room and she often feared her comrades would use sexual violence against her. Like her aunts and many of her male comrades, Pérez believed that she needed protection.²⁷

Yet unlike left leaders and unlike María Pardo who called on Allende to discipline the man who tried to sexually assault her, Pérez protected herself in a different manner: she carried a pistol in her purse, and at least once she came close to using it. Pérez practiced self-defense. Margarita Montalva implicitly advocated self-protection as well when she stated that women ought to *make* themselves respected. While left leaders did not tell Pérez she could not carry a gun, they did not

organize self defense classes for women either. Though the left sought to protect women, then, it did not suggest that women protect themselves. Still, the discourses of sexual purity and male sexual respect formulated within the left gave women some leverage in repudiating and combating sexual violence.²⁸

To summarize, female purity was of critical importance for many working-class women and men and for leftist leaders. The left thus appropriated a more conservative common sense, which was also part of working-class culture, and used it both to combat right-wing propaganda and to build its own constituency. Hence women's sexual purity was important to left leaders because they had to prove to working-class parents, husbands, and Catholics that they too could protect women. The conservative sexual mores of socialists were important to left women too, although for a different reason: because they were aware of the possibility of sexual violence and exploitation. Women who joined leftist organizations could be certain that they were enlisting a movement that considered sexual violence against women immoral.

To the extent that socialist morality elided sexual license and sexual violence and demanded that women remain pure, it undoubtedly limited women. Yet how much it restricted women depended in large part on the degree of control women had over the implementation of sexual norms--and not necessarily on the specific content of moral prescriptions. Insofar as left organizations controlled men sexually in order to open politics to women--and that was an important, if not the only, goal of socialist sexual norms--socialist morality provided women with the possibility of effective participation and a degree of control.

Moreover, the sexual restrictions imposed on women were relative. The left's appropriation of more conservative sexual norms notwithstanding, it had to contend with the prevalence of deviant behavior among women as well as men. By focusing on violence and on non-consensual sex, socialists underscored the evils of extra-marital sex in general. Still, many Chileans continued to subscribe to a more sexually permissive strain within popular culture. Pre-marital sex (as well as impermanent marital unions) were prevalent within the working-class, and in the 1930s and 40s somewhere between 25 and 32 percent of all Chilean children were born out of wedlock--a substantial minority. While leftists tended to see all extra-marital sex as exploitative towards women, not everyone saw it this way. Although this alternative morality was not articulated into a full-blown counter-hegemonic view of sexual relations, it existed and was often tolerated in leftist circles. The memoirs and autobiographies of prominent left leaders reveal that in the 1920s, 30s and 40s, many of them lived with people to whom they were not married. In interviews, I found that many women on the left engaged in premarital sex. These practices were not necessarily hidden.²⁹

Leftists had to find a way of coming to terms with this more permissive sexual outlook. How they did so had much to do with why they took interest in questions of sexuality in the first place. Since left leaders' interest in sexual control had as much to do with building and consolidating the left as with proving its respectability to political elites, left leaders realized that excluding men and women who were sexually disreputable--or even trying to reform them in an overly zealous way--was not the best way to achieve their goals. As a result, left leaders did not consistently exclude less

sexually honorable men and women. Witness for example two single mothers--one a Communist militant, the other a sympathizer--with an averred political conviction in the ideal of free love. According to a horrified social worker who spoke to these women, they clearly associated their sexual and ideological convictions:

In politics, the same ideals can be interpreted differently; while there is a group that acts selflessly, struggling honorably and valiantly for the ideals that they wish to see triumph for the good of the community, there is another group that applies them as it wishes and at its convenience. . . . These women broadcast their communist convictions, ideals that for them were only related to "free love." For them, the political party . . . seems not to have had any ends other than that "ideal" which they believe that they faithfully interpret.³⁰

Although some Chileans associated socialism with a puritanical sexual outlook, others clearly did not.

Unwed Mothers, Left Culture, and the State

As socialists acquired political influence within the popular-front coalitions and positions within the popular-front state, their flexible notions of sexual propriety helped shape compromise politics and state policy. More specifically, socialists helped develop and implement contradictory but therefore elastic state policies that, although adopting conservative sexual norms, also showed tolerance toward more libertine behavior. This dynamic was particularly evident in relation to "the problem of single motherhood," a key policy concern through which the popular fronts sought to regulate sexuality. While generally refusing to vilify single mothers, socialists affirmed that single motherhood should be avoided and that in order to reduce the number of illegitimate children women should be encouraged not to have sex outside of marriage. By adopting this double-edged position, popular-front officials were able to satisfy diverse constituencies. Ultimately, this helped cement popular allegiance to the state.³¹

Members of the Socialist Party were particularly important in the development of state programs that addressed issues of sexuality. During the first popular-front government, Allende was Minister of Health and Welfare and later head of the Caja de Seguro Obligatorio (CSO, Obligatory Insurance Fund), the social security and health care agency for blue-collar workers. Other members of the Socialist Party held key positions in the CSO as well. Together, Allende and his socialist comrades took an active part in developing policies to deal with single mothers and their children--as well as with other sexual problems such as prostitution and venereal disease.

Arguing that sexual promiscuity would destroy national vigor, socialists who devised and executed state policies regarding sexuality justified their actions by suggesting that those actions would strengthen the Chilean nation. This view drew strength from the widely-shared notion--adopted by both the popular fronts and their detractors--that the nuclear, male-headed family was the bedrock of the nation. As one state-employed social worker put it: "The family is the foundation for the constitution of society. The family should be legally organized through civil, monogamous, and

indissoluble marriage. . . ." State publications also made clear the proper roles of family members: "The head of the household provides the money," one state publication told its working-class audience, "the mother distributes it, and the children embellish daily life." Because single motherhood challenged and undermined this normative family model, socialists as well as non-socialists asserted, it was a national security issue.³²

Members of the center, left, and right thus concurred on the perils of single motherhood for the nation. They also agreed that convincing women not to have sex outside marriage was an excellent way of curbing the disturbing problem of single motherhood. Admonishing women not to have sex outside marriage therefore became a widespread practice among state officials, even though it was not an explicit state policy. State-employed physicians and social workers consistently counseled abstinence for the unmarried and fidelity for those who had tied the knot. When unmarried pregnant women visited government health clinics for prenatal care, for example, social workers often lectured them about the merits of abstinence. Public health officials who refused to advise unmarried women on birth control measures further acted on the belief that sex outside of marriage, and not simply single motherhood, was threatening. While this implicit policy clearly restricted women by stigmatizing all sex outside marriage, it may also have validated the efforts of women like Margarita Montalva to enforce male sexual "respect" for women.³³

Even though socialists agreed with non-socialists on the dangers of single motherhood and even though both groups counseled abstinence for single women, conservatives were generally more willing to castigate single mothers and to enforce punitive measures against unmarried women who bore children. For many conservatives, single mothers were permanently tainted by their illegitimate sexual practices. This translated into a certain hostility toward single mothers and conservatives were prone to question single mothers' ability to properly care for their children. For example, social worker Isabel Norambuena, who worked in a government-run health clinic, counseled her colleagues to try to detect single mothers' attitudes towards their pregnancies. María Santelices, another social worker employed in a state-run clinic, spent days trying to "wake the maternal instinct" of a client who was a single mother. Both these social workers assumed that unmarried mothers did not or would not really love their children.³⁴

Socialists rotundly criticized this approach, suggesting instead that single mothers *wanted* to take proper care of their children but that could not because they were poor. In an article that appeared just months before the first popular-front government took power, members of the Socialist Party reproached those who viewed single mothers as "as elements which do not deserve respect" and called for legislation to help single mothers. Single mothers were respectable and deserving, this article argued and they should be helped.³⁵ Socialist politicians thus distanced themselves from the conservative position on single motherhood.

Socialists shifted the focus of discussion in two ways. First, socialists chose to concentrate not on the *cause* of single motherhood, sex outside of marriage, but rather on its alleged *consequence*, poverty. Second, they shifted blame away from single mothers and toward the women's sexual partners and parents, reaffirming a working-class tradition of familial sexual control.

Socialist authorities thus redefined the problem of single motherhood, linking it to a program of class uplift that would be enacted by both popular classes and state officials. Using this two-pronged approach, socialist leaders strengthened the more "autonomous" sexual regulation of working-class and socialist communities while complementing that regulation with state measures aimed at helping those essentially innocent single mothers who could not or would not get support from their families or communities.

Class solidarity and uplift as well as national well-being were thus central to popular-front discourse on single motherhood. "Where there are sickly beings who live in overcrowded conditions," Aguirre Cerda had noted in 1938, ". . . we want to institute a home which will be the basis of an understanding that human solidarity also applies to the destitute of today." A book penned by Allende while he was Minister of Health developed this line of argument and applied it to the question of single motherhood. In that 1939 book Allende stressed that the children of single mothers grew up in poverty and were therefore sickly. This was dangerous, he asserted, because a nation with so much poverty and ill-health could not be a prosperous nation. Allende further characterized illegitimacy, resulting from paternal abandonment, as a *cause* of infant mortality and noted that "abandoned" children weakened the nation by stunting population growth. Only the joint effort of fathers and the national community, Allende went on to suggest, could remedy this situation.³⁶ Allende thus assuaged conservatives by recognizing how single motherhood threatened the nation. At the same time, by claiming that poverty was more important than single motherhood per se, he shifted blame away from unwed mothers and therefore implied that the state might legitimately aid these women. And although he denounced working-class men and parents for failing to protect the sexual virtue of women, he also assured them that they could contribute to the prosperity of country and class by taking on that responsibility.

Linking single motherhood and prostitution, Allende and other socialists underscored the threatening nature of unchecked female sexuality, while insisting on both female victimization and the need for greater working-class protection of women's sexual virtue. In a typical scenario the chain of events that led a woman to prostitute herself began with male seduction, which resulted in pregnancy and dishonor, and then male abandonment and parental disapproval. Hence Allende noted that single mothers were only a step away from prostitution: of 132 registered prostitutes, he wrote in his 1939 book, 21 had left their paternal home because they were pregnant. Yet Allende insisted that parents who supported their "dishonored" daughters, or "seducers" who married their sexual partners, prevented women who had exhibited dangerous behavior from spiraling out of social and sexual control.³⁷

Similarly, in *Vida Sana*, a CSO publication for blue-collar workers, social worker Hilda Quezada described the plight of an innocent young woman who was tricked into having sex, became pregnant, and gave birth. Repudiated by her parents, the woman began to look for employment. Turned away from factories and unable to find work even as a domestic servant, she succumbed to the invitation of a madame and took up prostitution. After telling the tale of this woman's victimization, Quezada confronted the young male worker to whom the article was addressed with his own responsibility for the woman's "fall":

You deny her the possibility of lifting herself up and remaking her life. Through the money you thus give, you further the death of your race. The money of which you deprive your wife and children prepares the terrain so that they themselves, hostage to misery and discouragement, follow the path which I have shown you.

Would you like your daughter or sister to follow this path?

With the same pride with which you respond negatively [to this question], promise yourself, before your daughter's cradle, that you will not contribute, either through your silence or with your money, to the promotion of this evil that sinks other daughters of workers like yourself into opprobrium.³⁸

Removing the stigma attached to prostitution and single motherhood, Quezada suggested that the prostitute was similar to the worker's own female family members. And she beseeched the worker to save his "race," *el pueblo chileno*, by protecting his wife and child from sexual disgrace and economic misery. Hence she clearly linked female sexual virtue with class uplift and placed responsibility not with the woman herself but with working-class men. Like Allende, Quezada drew on a working-class tradition in which class-conscious men were charged with protecting "their" women.

Allende and other leftists nonetheless believed that in cases where neither parents nor partners could be counted on to protect female family members the state should play a proxy role. "The CSO protects single mothers," read a CSO advertisement promoting a program that placed pregnant women in the homes of respectable families. The CSO initiated and bankrolled this program, which it characterized as being "among the most transcendent measures taken by the Caja," in order to supply a "home" for pregnant women who could not count on the support of their lovers or families. To similar ends, diverse state institutions, including the CSO, set up "maternal refuges." In Valparaíso and Viña del Mar, the CSO-run Instituto Madre y Niño (Mother and Child Institute) furnished day care to mothers after they had given birth and taught them sewing in order to provide them with an income-generating skill. Taking up the slack in the Labor Code, refuges took in domestic servants, who did not have the right to maternity leaves and who routinely lost their jobs and became homeless when they got pregnant.³⁹ The CSO, like other state bureaus, also provided single mothers with other kinds of assistance: social workers helped women find employment--usually home-work, domestic service jobs, or laundering--or helped them set up home industries.⁴⁰

Socialists also developed and proposed other forms of state aid that, although aimed more at alleviating poverty than at helping unwed mothers, nonetheless provided significant assistance for women who had children outside of marriage. Allende and other leftists campaigned, for example, for the payment of pre-natal allowances to all pregnant women. Perhaps most important, socialists supported and sought to enlarge maternal health care benefits and subsidies for CSO-insured workers and their children. A startling 40 percent of insured women workers who took advantage of maternity benefits were single mothers!⁴¹

Socialist state officials thus validated the right to state assistance of even "disreputable" mothers, recognizing that with state help these women could avoid poverty even when they had no family to protect them. But although state protection of single mothers undermined the nuclear

male-headed family, legitimating in an incipient way an alternative and more "libertine" perspective on sexuality, state paternalism clearly did not liberate women. The state would, after all, "protect" single mothers--and it would do so only in cases where parents and seducers had abrogated their responsibilities.

Yet especially when compared to conservatives, socialist reformers like Allende brought a certain tolerance to discussions of single motherhood. By shifting debate away from judgments about the sexual practices of single mothers, they drew on a working-class acceptance of sexual informality. They also drew on a socialist program that sought to include rather than exclude single mothers and their children from working-class communities and the Chilean nation. But while socialists avoided punishing or ostracizing dishonorable women, they still advocated familial and state protection of women's sexual virtue, suggesting that single motherhood was indeed dishonorable, a threat to working-class communities and the nation. They consequently appeased the political right by continuing to stress the importance of the male-headed nuclear family to national progress and courted popular supporters by emphasizing the importance of family to working-class solidarity.

Socialist authorities' strategies were thus contradictory in a number of ways. Socialist state officials promoted state protection of single mothers, a policy that potentially undermined family control--and certainly made it easier for some single mothers to survive without the protection of their families--but insisted that family and state regulation were complementary. State intervention would not only help overcome poverty, they insisted, but also build working-class solidarity. Furthermore, even as they positioned single mothers as victims to be succored by both their families and the state, they certainly reinforced the moral authority of women who felt it necessary to demand male sexual "respect."

Popular-front programs dealing with single motherhood were, in short, negotiated and elastic, and hence attractive to numerous Chilean men and women. These programs did not fully displace either working-class sexual practices--in their more libertine or more conservative varieties--or the moral reform efforts of working-class organizations. Nor did they fully undermine the sexual morality of right-wing elites. This is not to say that the sexual mores of the popular-front state were exactly the same as those of either of elites or popular classes, of men or of women. They were not. But there were clear points of convergence between popular-front discourses and those of each of these constituencies. Those convergences laid the groundwork for compromise politics.

Histories and Historiographies

I would like to suggest in concluding that this history of convergence--and more precisely of convergence between popular classes and the state, mediated by socialist organizations--helps explain Margarita Montalva's account of compromise politics. By looking at how gender and sexuality as well as class shaped the complicated negotiations between popular-front officials,

socialist militants, and popular groups, we get a better sense of why Chileans like Montalva have refused to see compromise politics as debilitating. We also begin to see why Montalva's testimony, *today*, replicates so much of the hegemonic discourse of the popular-front era; and why, for Montalva, the pre-1973 era has become a glorious past against which the present is measured.

Comprehending Montalva's evocation of the past is particularly important because her account differs starkly from that of most scholars and political analysts who have written about the compromise state. In contrast to Montalva, the latter have stressed the sacrifices compromise politics implied for working-class Chileans. Academics and leftist intellectuals have criticized compromise politics for failing to deliver economic improvements to popular classes and for neutralizing popular mobilization. Focusing primarily on labor relations, these analyses have stressed that once popular organizations accepted popular-front calls for solidarity and agreed to work from within the political system, they lost autonomy. Scholars in particular have argued that the close relation of trade unions to left political parties--and of left political parties to the state--deprived workers of strong organizations capable of exerting effective pressure. During the 1960s and 1970s this kind of analysis prompted many leftists to advocate a more militant and confrontational politics.⁴²

Montalva did not acknowledge this revisionist interpretation of the popular-front era. And this despite the fact that Montalva realized the contingent and changing nature of historical interpretation. Indeed, during our interview Montalva told me that when trying to convince her nieces to work for the election of Patricio Aylwin, the first Concertación presidential candidate, she insisted that her nieces forget the role played by Aylwin and his Christian Democrat Party in precipitating the 1973 military coup. Montalva told her nieces: "We'll soon see. Many things are going to happen, but we'll see about that later. Right now, our task is to make sure Aylwin is elected." Thus at a particular historical conjuncture, Montalva deemed it necessary to set aside past criticisms of the Christian Democrats. In addition, she recognized that her own participation in Aylwin's electoral campaign would later be interpreted in light of its results. Despite this willingness to reinterpret the past and also despite the existence of an alternative interpretation of compromise politics, Montalva refused to take a critical stance vis-à-vis the socialist politics of the pre-1973 period.⁴³

Of course this refusal was forcefully conditioned by her present-day situation.⁴⁴ Montalva mobilized the past to construct a counter-hegemonic model of left politics and state formation for the 1990s, one that challenged Concertación policy and rhetoric. In so doing, she emphasized the differences between past and present, offering the past as model for an unattractive present. But at the same time, she minimized the differences between the past and the 1990s in order to forefront the feasibility of her model. This evocation of the past as distant but--given the unappealing nature of the present--proximate is evident in her discussion of the drug addict whose mother asked for his arrest and rehabilitation, an episode that alluded to the relation of popular classes to the state. Interestingly enough, in recounting this story, Montalva did not call into question this woman's vision of a benign state that would reform the son at her request. As Montalva well knew--she had said as much at another moment in the interview--the Chilean police were best known for the brutality with which they repressed working-class communities during the military dictatorship and not for either their role in rehabilitation or for helping working-class women like the one on

television. Yet strangely, although Montalva did suggest that the left should organize drug addicts, she did not reject the mother's call for police intervention. Instead, she contextualized the mother's invitation to the police by noting that the woman could not herself handle her son. Hence Montalva presented state action--preferably rehabilitation, but also arrest--as existing alongside--and not necessarily in opposition to--the control of families and popular organizations. In so doing, she produced a politically expedient yet anachronistic view of the present that forced her to explicitly ignore what she knew about the nature of the Chilean state in the 1990s.⁴⁵

What Montalva did, in effect, was to marshal a hegemonic view from the past, a view that she had over the years made her own, to suggest how things ought to be today. Her refusal to fully incorporate an analysis of the changes that had occurred since 1973--a refusal to accept her increasing distance from the centers of power, her now counter-hegemonic position--made her proposals somewhat quixotic. Yet Montalva did not choose to build her political program on the basis of a utopian future or of a pragmatic appraisal of the present--the latter being Chilean political elites' preferred mode of analysis today--but rather on the basis of her own historical experiences. Her past, a strong past, even over-ran the present *as she knew it*. For Montalva, then, the present did not simply define how she saw the past; the past, as she had distilled it over the years, also defined her present use of the past. As she put it, "We [must] remember all that we've lived through, all we've gained, because that's how it was done before. . . . You may change some things, but the class struggle is going to have to go on."

We can, to conclude, better grasp the omissions, elisions, and emphases of Montalva's narrative as well as her dissatisfaction with the moral order of post-Pinochet Chile by examining not only the gendered political project that emerged during the popular-front era but also how gender has figured--or more accurately, failed to figure--in subsequent accounts of the period. On one level, as I hope to have shown in my analysis of the popular-front era, by looking beyond political and economic indicators such as voting patterns and income distribution (indicators that have formed the basis of past scholarly conclusions), we can gain a different understanding of the attractiveness of the popular-front alliance, one that is more attuned to the issues that most mattered to many popular-front supporters. We get a better sense, in other words, of the concrete experiences of the men and women who lived through the popular-front era and a sense of how those experiences might condition, today, their continued attraction to compromise politics. We begin to understand why the popular-front period has become, for Montalva and others, the basis of strong memories.

On another level, Montalva's insistent return to questions of gender and sexuality is more than simply the result of how gender and sexuality functioned to cement hegemony during the years before 1973. Montalva is not simply stuck in the past; nor is she simply reasserting a foundational gender order. Rather, her insistence on gendered moral concerns is also a consequence of the silence regarding gender and sexuality in public analyses of pre-1973 politics. It is in this vacuum that Montalva constructs the past and mobilizes it to present ends. Precisely because gender and sexuality have not been a part of official or elite narratives regarding the compromise state, they become the starting point for her critique of those narratives.

ENDNOTES

1. On military rule and the transition to democracy in Chile see Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic, eds., *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991); Lois Hecht Oppenheim, *Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and the Search for Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Philip D. Oxborn, *Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). For comparative approaches to dictatorship and democracy in Latin America in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s see Paul Drake, *Labor Movements and Dictatorships: The Southern Cone in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). My assertions regarding the prevalence of public debate on moral issues since 1990 are based on observations I made while in Chile during 1988, 1991-1993, and December 1996.

Recently, postcolonial scholars have critiqued the notion of "transition," arguing that it founds a "global modernity" of the West in which postcolonial nations are always found lacking. See Gyan Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Indian Historiography is Good to Think" in *Colonialism and Culture*, ed. Nicholas B. Dirks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 253-388, esp. 377; Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for the 'Indian' Pasts?" *Representations*, no. 37 (Winter 1992): 1-26. While sympathetic to these critiques, I use "transition" as a convenient shorthand for accelerated processes of change.

2. Important works on the 1920-1950 period include Paul Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-1952* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Tomás Moulian, "Violencia, gradualismo y reformas en el desarrollo político chileno," in *Estudios sobre el sistema de partidos en Chile*, ed. Adolfo Aldunate, Angel Flisfisch and Tomás Moulian (Santiago: FLACSO, 1985); Atilio Borón "Movilización política y crisis política en Chile (1920-1970)," *Aportes* 20 (April 1971): 41-69; María Angélica Illanes, *"En el nombre del pueblo, del estado y de la ciencia (. . .)": Historia social de la salud pública, Chile 1880-1973* (Santiago: Colectivo de Atención Primaria, 1993); James Morris, *Elites, Intellectuals, and Consensus: A Study of the Social Question and the Industrial Relations System in Chile* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

Following Moulian, I use the term "popular fronts" and the adjective "popular-front" to designate the various governing coalitions of the 1939-1949 period that were made up of sectors of the center and left, and eventually sectors of the right.

3. Works that explore gender during this period include Illanes; Asunción Lavrín, *Women, Feminism and Social Change in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, 1890-1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, "Working Women of Santiago: Gender and Social Transformation in Urban Chile, 1887-1927" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1995); Thomas Klubock, "Working-Class Masculinity, Middle-Class Morality, and Labor in the Chilean Copper Mines," *Journal of Social History* 30, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 435-463; and the essays in Lorena Godoy et. al., eds., *Disciplina y desacato: Construcción de identidad en Chile, siglos XIX y XX* (Santiago: SUR/CEDEM, 1995).

4. On the compromise state see Moulian, "Violencia"; Borón; Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Julio Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Liliana de Riz, *Sociedad y política en Chile (de Portales a Pinochet)* (Mexico: UNAM, 1979); Drake, *Socialism and Populism*.
5. During 1991-1993, I conducted over thirty-five interviews with socialist activists. On the notion of contrapunctual comparison, which I apply not over space but over time, see Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993).
6. Interview with Margarita Montalva, 28 April 1993. All interviews took place in Santiago. I have used pseudonyms for interviewees.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. On the need for continued popular pressure on political leaders and state officials see, for example, *Mundo Nuevo*, 22 February 1941, 6; *La Voz del Gremio*, April-May 1948, 3. The need to rout vices is discussed in *El Santiago Watt* 3, nos. 38-39 (March-April 1946): 14; interview with Blanca Leiva, 25 March 1993; interview with Clotilde Villarrica, 6 April 1993; and *Vida Sana*, a government propaganda magazine for workers that was published in Valparaíso, Temuco, and Iquique. See also Karin Roseblatt, "Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures, Socialist Politics and the State in Chile, 1920-1950" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996), chapters six and seven. Unless otherwise noted, all periodicals were published in Santiago.
12. *La Crítica*, 4 November 1939, 8.
13. *Pedro Aguirre Cerda*, 27 April 1938, 2.
14. Roseblatt, chapters one and five.
15. On Communist organizing among women interviews with Inés Correa, 23 April 1993 and 28 May 1993; *Juventud en Marcha* (Concepción), 17 April 1937, 1; *Frente Popular* (Valparaíso), 21 August 1937, n.p.; *Alianza Libertadora de la Juventud* (Antofagasta), December 1936, 1, 4; *El Popular* (Antofagasta), 6 October 1938, 2; *El Mensaje Obrero* (Rancagua), 1 May 1939, n.p., 4; *El Organizador*, 1 June 1940. On the AMS and Socialist Party organizing among women see *La Palabra Socialista* (Valdivia) 29 July 1939, 2; *El Socialista* (Puerto Natales), 22 March 1935, n.p.; *Consigna*, 13 July 1935; *Julio Barrenechea* (Temuco), 27 March 1937, 4; *Frente Popular* (Valparaíso), 15 June 1937, n.p.; *Barricada*, first fortnight November 1937, 4; *ibid.*, second fortnight October 1938, 2. On MEMCH see *MEMCH Antología* (n.p., c. 1983); Edda Gaviola et. al.,

Queremos votar en las próximas elecciones: Historia del movimiento femenino chileno 1913-1952 (Santiago: CEDEM, 1986); Corinne Antezana-Pernet "Mobilizing Women in the Popular Front Era: Feminism, Class, and Politics in the Movimiento Pro-Emancipación de la Mujer Chilena (MEMCH), 1935-1950" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Irvine, 1996).

16. On this process see Roseblatt, chapter 7. Interview with Ignacia Parada, 20 April 1993.
17. *Servicio Social* 9, no. 4 (October-December 1935): 306-307. Interview with Marta Roja, 14 June 1993; interview with Isabel Torrealba, 4 June 1993.
18. *Sewell* (Santiago: Ediciones Cultura, 1946), 72-75. See also *Obrero Textil*, 4 August 1937, 1-4; *Juventud en Marcha* (Concepción), 5 June 1937, 3.
19. Diego Muñoz, *Carbón* (Santiago: Editora Austral, 1953). The quotation is on pp. 126-27.
20. Partido Comunista, "Estatutos del Partido Comunista de Chile aprobados por el XII Congreso Nacional celebrado en 1946" (Santiago, n.d.), 7, 26-27. *Chispa* (Iquique), second fortnight March 1939, 5. Luis Corvalán, *Algo de mi vida* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1978), 80. Interview with Inés Correa, 23 April 1993; Partido Comunista, "¡Adelante por el cumplimiento del programa del Frente Popular!: Sesión plenaria del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Chile" (Santiago, c. 1941), 51; *Principios*, no. 33 (March 1944), 26-27. Although the Socialist Party did not punish or correct deviant militants, its statutes demanded that before being admitted to the Party potential militants prove that they led "an honorable public and private life." Partido Socialista, "Declaración de principios, estatutos, y reglamento orgánico del Partido Socialista de Chile" (Santiago, 1947), 19-20.
21. *La Voz del Campo* (Talca), 19 June 1937, 3. *El Fideero*, January 1944, 3. Partido Comunista, "XI Congreso del Partido Comunista de Chile" (Santiago, c. 1940), 16.
22. Partido Socialista, "Reglamento nacional de defensa" (Santiago, 1940), 33. Volodia Teitelboim, *Hijo del salitre* (Santiago: Editora Austral, n.d.), 145; Ricardo Boizard, *Cuatro retratos* (Santiago, n.d.), 98, 110-111; interview with Eduardo Herrera and Irma Salazar, 4 June 1993.
23. Interview with Flor Valenzuela, 5 April 1993; interview with Ignacia Parada, 20 April 1993; interview with Blanca Leiva, 25 March 1993; interview with María Pardo, 21 April 1993.
24. Interview with María Pardo, 21 April 1993.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Tribuna*, c. 1940, 3.
27. Interview with Lilian Pérez, 26 April 1993.
28. *Ibid.*; interview with Margarita Montalva, 28 April 1993.

29. Figures on illegitimate births come from *Estadística Chilena* 18, no. 12 (December 1945): 542; *ibid.* 23, no. 12 (December 1950): 601; Chile, Dirección General de Estadística, *Anuario estadístico, año 1939: Demografía y asistencia social* (Santiago, [1941?]), 18; *Anuario estadístico, año 1940: Demografía y asistencia social* (Santiago, 1942), 19; *Anuario estadístico, año 1945: Demografía y asistencia social* (Santiago, 1948), 14; *Anuario estadístico, año 1950: Demografía y asistencia social* (Santiago, 1954), 15. Interview with Inés Correa, 23 April 1993; Corvalán, *Algo de mi vida*, 93-94.

30. Rosa Navarro Torres, "El aborto como problema social" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Ministerio de Educación, Concepción, 1944), 39.

31. When Chileans referred to single mothers, they meant primarily young unmarried women--and not, for example, widows. This stands in sharp relief to the US, where early state programs for single mothers were aimed principally at widows, whose sexual propriety could not be called into question. See Linda Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

32. Gudelia Seguel Morales, "Madre soltera" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Ministerio de Educación Pública, Temuco, 1946), 11. *Vida Sana* (Valparaíso) 2, nos. 20-21 (January-February 1944): 7.

33. Glasfira Orrego Navarro, "Estudio de los problemas económico-sociales presentados por 50 madres obreras y 50 madres dueñas de casa Centro San Eugenio CSO" (Memoria, [Escuela de Servicio Social de la Beneficencia?], Santiago, 1941), 19; *Servicio Social* 14, no. 1 (January-March 1940): 32; Blanca Urbina Moya, "Proyecciones del servicio social en la industria 'Fábricas Textiles Caupolicán-Chiguayante' S.A." (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Concepción, 1948), 88-90; Aída Sánchez Garrido, "Labor de la asistente social frente al enfermo sífilítico y su familia" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Ministerio de Educación Pública, Concepción, 1945), 26. *Vida Sana* (Valparaíso) 1, no. 5 (September 1942): 8.

34. Isabel Norambuena Lagarde, "El servicio social en la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Junta de Beneficencia, 1943), 19. *Servicio Social* 12, no. 4 (October 1938): 180-181.

35. *Barricada*, second fortnight October 1938, 6.

36. Salvador Allende, *La realidad médico-social chilena (síntesis)* (Santiago, c. 1939), 3, 196, and *passim*.

37. Allende, *Realidad*, 101-102 and *passim*.

38. *Vida Sana* (Valparaíso) 2, nos. 20-21 (January-February 1944): 7.

39. *Rumbo* (June 1940): 79; *Aurora de Chile* (5 June 1939): 17; Graciela Alvarez Pacheco, "El servicio social ante el problema de la madre soltera" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social,

Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1944), 122, 132-33; *Servicio Social* 12, no. 4 (October 1938): 183, 192-93; *Vida Sana* (Valparaíso) 1, no. 4 (August 1942): 5-6; *ibid.* 1, nos. 6-7 (October-November 1942): 3; *ibid.* 2, no. 9 (January 1943): *ibid.* 6; 2, nos. 20-21 (January-February 1944): 5. Domestic servants' specific need for protection is highlighted in the social case presented in *Servicio Social* 11, no. 3 (November 1937): 169, and in *Boletín Médico-Social de la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio*, nos. 117-119 (July-September 1944): 351. The idea of setting up maternal refuges predated the popular fronts, yet before this period the Beneficencia Casa de la Mujer was the only existing refuge. Calls for CSO-run maternal refuges are contained in *Acción Social*, no. 14 (March 1933): 33-34; *ibid.*, no. 32 (November 1934): 66-68; *Boletín Médico-Social de la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio*, no. 22 (March 1936): 95.

40. For cases where social workers found employment for women as laundresses or domestic servants see Delia Arriagada Campos, "Acción del servicio social en la Gota de Leche 'Almirante Villarreal' de Talcahuano" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Ministerio de Educación, Concepción, 1947), 31; *Servicio Social* 12, no. 4 (October 1938): 184-85; Norambuena Lagarde, 266; Rina Schiappacasse Ferretti, "El problema económico de la madre soltera estudiado en el Centro de Defensa del Niño" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Ministerio de Educación Pública, Concepción, 1946), 50.

41. Allende, *Realidad*. According to the *Boletín Médico-Social de la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio*, no. 142 (July 1946): 382, there were 20,136 children of women workers receiving CSO care in 1944. Of these children 42.2 percent were illegitimate. On a national level, only 22.7 percent of children born were illegitimate. Of the women workers receiving pre- and post-natal care, 40.5 percent were single. For figures on illegitimacy among CSO beneficiaries, see also Caja de Seguro Obligatorio, "Campaña antivenérea y defensa de la madre y el niño en la provincia de Tarapacá: Segunda memoria anual, enero a diciembre 1938, presentada por el Dr. Nicolás Taborga" (Iquique, 1939) reproduced in *Boletín Médico-Social de la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio* 6, nos. 60-61 (May-June 1939): 86; Luz Cañas Valenzuela, "Estudio de los problemas que se presentan en la 'Sección Lactantes' del Consultorio No. 3 de la CSO" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Junta de Beneficencia, Santiago, 1941), 72; María Briceño Erazo, "Análisis sobre revisión de 200 fichas de ingreso al Servicio 'Madre y Niño' del Consultorio No. 2 de la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Junta de Beneficencia, Santiago, 1946), 11; Helga Peralta, "La atención materno-infantil en la Caja de Seguro Obligatorio" (Memoria, Escuela de Servicio Social, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1951), 62, 32.

42. For scholarly appraisals see Faúndez; Alan Angell, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974): 85-131. On the shift within left practices and analyses see Moulian; Alfonso Daire, "La política del Partido Comunista desde la post-guerra a la Unidad Popular," in *El Partido Comunista en Chile*, comp. Augusto Varas (Santiago: CESOC/FLACSO, 1988), 141-238; Carmelo Furci, *The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism* (London: Zed Press, 1989); Faúndez; Fernando Casanueva and Manuel Fernández, *El*

Partido Socialista y la lucha de clases en Chile (Santiago: Quimantú, 1973).

For the theoretical underpinnings of a different view of autonomy see Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (New York: Verso, 1990), esp. 171-72; Florencia Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (December 1994).

43. Interview with Margarita Montalva, 28 April 1993.

44. The seminal work is of course T.O. Ranger and E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Traditions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Also useful to my thinking has been David William Cohen, *The Combing of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

45. Interview with Margarita Montalva, 28 April 1993.