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Cabinet Formation in Presidential Regimes:
An Analysis
of 10 Latin American Countries

by

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I. Introduction

Presidents play a pivotal policy-making role in Latin America. Expectations about government performance, therefore, center on the presidents' ability to achieve their policy goals. So the first task awaiting presidents is to choose a strategy to achieve these goals. Typically, Latin American constitutions offer presidents two basic strategies: they can seek their policy goals either through statutes or through executive prerogatives. Intimately linked to this task is the choice of the best means available for the tactical implementation of such strategies. To implement their policy-making strategies, presidents resort to constitutional powers -- the most important of which is their appointment powers -- and extra-constitutional devices (Riggs 1988), such as party, ideology and cooperation agreements. In this paper I will be particularly concerned with how cabinet appointments are used by presidents as a means to carry out their policy-making strategies.

Let me describe the strategies in greater detail. Seeking policy goals by means of statutes means going through the standard legislative process, namely sending a bill to the legislature, and expecting that the latter will approve it, and will convert it into the law of the land. By taking this step presidents are signaling they are willing to heed the views and interests of legislators. Executive prerogatives are all constitutional and para-constitutional practices that allow presidents to act unilaterally regardless of legislators' preferences. For example, going over the heads of legislators by appealing directly to the population in televised speeches is a para-constitutional prerogative presidents have. Negotiating economic policy directly with societal actors, such as unions and business associations is another instance of executive prerogative. Nonetheless, in Latin America executive prerogatives are associated foremost with the issuance of decrees, and for the sake of simplicity and due to the relevance of decrees I will also abide by this view in this text.¹

However, the analysis of presidential policy-making strategies is a difficult exercise because they are hard to observe. Presidents are not in the habit of openly acknowledging how they want to get things done because this would weaken them *vis-à-vis* the opposition and even their closest allies. Yet we can observe how presidents implement their strategies. In this sense, cabinet appointments constitute a privileged site to study presidential strategies. Every time presidents make a cabinet appointment they are signaling to the political system which interests they are willing to please, how they expect to exercise executive power, and how they plan to relate to the other branches of government, particularly the legislative one. As Polsby (1983, 90) puts it for the US system, "In general, the pattern of cabinet appointments a President makes can be informative about what sort of Presidency he means to have."

One of my purposes in this paper is therefore to propose a framework to analyze the relationship between presidential policy-making strategies and patterns of cabinet formation. In this connection, it is important to note that the presidential power to freely appoint and dismiss ministers means that the composition of the cabinet is formally a private reserve of the chief executive. Should presidents use cabinet posts to obtain the approval of statutes, as will be argued below, they are likely to appoint partisan ministers. And in case presidents decide to pursue their policy goals through decrees or other means available, cabinet slots can be filled with technocrats, cronies, or interest group representatives.

This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section I propose a decision-theoretic model of presidential policy-making; in Section III I establish the link between policy-making strategies and cabinet appointments, and

¹ Referenda, in some countries, can also be listed as an executive prerogative (Shugart and Carey 1992, Thibaut forthcoming). However, because this is such an extraordinary legislative mechanism, only under extreme state of affairs its proposition is likely. This is the case when a highly popular president faces a totally uncooperative legislature, or when a president has an intense preference for a particular policy but the legislature is reluctant to comply with the president's will. Under both circumstances, only by taking the issue to the people can presidents have their way. At any rate, referenda are always a very risky option for presidents. In case they are defeated, a referendum can easily be perceived as a vote of no-confidence on their presidency, which, in turn, may seriously hurt them for the rest of their term. It should also be noted that proposition of referenda is the opposite of partisan government. It is rather a typical mechanism of plebiscitarian democracy. The use of this mechanism by presidents is of course affected by constitutional regulations. If a constitution grants the chief executive broad discretion to call for referenda, then presidents are more likely to make use of them. Again, given the extraordinary nature of such policy instrument, I will leave it aside.

elaborate a typology of presidential cabinets; finally, in Section IV a model explaining cabinet formation is proposed. In Section V I provide the criteria for case selection. Section VI proposes three operational indicators for the dependent variable and rules to classify empirical cases of presidential cabinets. Section VII formulates measures for the independent variables. Section VIII appraises the determinants of cabinet composition using ordinary least squares and the probability estimates of cabinet types with ordered probit. Section IX concludes.

II. A DECISION-THEORETIC MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL POLICY-MAKING

The purpose of this section is to provide an explanation of presidential policy-making by means of a decision-theoretic model. This type of model posits a simple calculus of decision-making for a given actor (in this case, the president), and assumes that the latter is faced with choices from a set of available actions, with each action providing a probability of producing each possible outcome (Morrow 1994, 16). The actions I will be dealing with here are presidential choices between statutes and decrees as policy-making strategies. The model further assumes that presidents are rational, in the sense that they will choose the strategy that maximizes their expected utility.

Why a decision-theoretic model and not a game-theoretic one involving the president and the legislature? The justification for using a simpler decision-theoretic model rather than a more complicated game-theoretic one is as follows. Imagine a newly-elected Latin American president planning the course of his administration during the transition period. Assuming that the president knows what he wants to achieve, the preferences of the legislature, and the constitutionally and statutorily constructed limits of his decree power, he can “anticipate” the likely outcome were he to pursue either of two broad strategies: (1) seeking to implement his policy goals via statute; and (2) seeking to implement his policy goals via decree.² Based on his anticipation of the chances of getting a statute through the legislature, and the cost of doing so, his anticipation of the chances of sustaining a decree against a possible challenge in the legislature, and the cost of doing so, and of the value of having a statutory or decree-based implementation of the policy goal, the president makes a decision between the two broad strategies listed above.

In game theory, this result is the so-called Stackelberg-equilibrium. This is the equilibrium solution often applied to model duopoly situations in industries with a dominant firm and a competitive fringe of smaller firms (Rasmusen 1989, 82). According to Rasmusen (1989, 79), “In a two-player duopoly game, the player moving first is the **Stackelberg leader** and the other player is the **Stackelberg follower**. The distinguishing characteristic of a Stackelberg equilibrium is that one player gets to commit himself first” (emphasis in original). In this game, the leader knows how the follower will react to his choice, so he picks the point on the follower’s curve that maximizes his (the leader’s) utility. So the decision-theoretic model that will be developed below can be seen as a simplification of a two-player duopoly game between the president and the legislature in which the former actor Stackelberg-leads the latter one. In this case, we have a duopoly by the executive and legislative branches over legislative policy-making. By proposing a Stackelberg solution to this game, we can safely focus only on the president’s strategies, which will allow us to reduce the analysis, for practical purposes, to a decision-theoretic model of presidential policy-making.

In addition, I posit that presidents are policy maximizers. They desire above all to translate their preferences into policy, that is to say, presidents maximize the probability of implementing their policy goals. I am not concerned with the content of policy, but rather with the chief executive’s ability to get things done. Presidents thus represented only care about whether they get what they want or not in very general terms. Now suppose a president wants to pursue a given policy goal (G). There are two actions: (1) seek a statutory implementation of G (call this S); or (2) seek a decree implementation of G (call this D). The restriction to two discrete choices is to keep the model simple. I am also setting aside the issue whether the legislature approves modified versions of the president’s policy proposals. Furthermore, this model assumes a short time period during which the president can only try either S or D, not both S and D (below I also elaborate a model in which the president tries both). Let us calculate his expected utility from choosing S and D.

² Henceforth I will refer to a “president,” generically speaking, only as “he” because there is no woman in my sample of 57 Latin American presidents.

There are three possible outcomes associated with these actions: (1) G is implemented by statute; (2) G is implemented by decree; and (3) G is not implemented. Each outcome produces a different payoff in terms of increments to the president's utility. U_s is the increment to utility from achieving G via a statute. U_d is the increment to utility from achieving G via a decree. U_n is the increment to utility if G is not implemented. A failure to implement G enforces the status quo. For convenience, I scale the president's preferences so that he values the status quo at zero. Equations 1 and 2 below represent the president's expected utility from taking actions S and D respectively.

$$EU(S) = P_s U_s - C_s \quad (\text{eq. 1})$$

$$EU(D) = P_d U_d - C_d \quad (\text{eq. 2})$$

where:

P_s is the probability that the president's attempt to implement G via statute is successful;

U_s is the increment to utility from achieving G via a statute;

C_s is the cost of seeking a statute;

P_d is the probability that the president's attempt to implement G via decree is successful;

U_d is the increment to utility from achieving G via a decree;

C_d is the cost of seeking a decree.

Thus, for statutes and decrees the expected utility the president obtains is a function of the probability that his attempt to implement G via one of the two strategies is successful, the value he places on each, and the cost incurred by seeking a statute or a decree. The president will choose to initiate a statute when $EU(S) > EU(D)$; and will choose to issue a decree when $EU(D) > EU(S)$. If $EU(S) = EU(D)$, the president is indifferent between statutes and decrees. Below I proceed to theorize on the value of these terms, and to propose explanatory hypotheses of presidential choices of policy-making strategies.

(1) The value of statutes and decrees. Let us assume that U_s and U_d have to do with direct policy utilities only. Thus, the increment added to the president's utility by a statutory implementation of G (U_s) lies in the expected life of the policy. When statutes are passed, they are expected to be in force for a long time. That is, they are sticky policy decisions. The value of decrees (U_d) rests on the timeliness it bestows on policy-making. By issuing a decree, presidents can immediately affect the legislative status quo and move it to the position they want.

(2) The costs of statutes and decrees. In considering costs, I assume, as I do with U_s and U_d , that they are related to direct policy utilities only. Statutes are sticky policy decisions but their legislative approval is hard to get. The costs of seeking a statute thus arise from the "bribes" the president has to pay to secure a majority favorable to his bill. These bribes amount to all kinds of "pork" and patronage the president has to dispense. Of course, other factors affect the costs of statutes, such as personal clashes between the president and party leaders or committee members. Important though such factors can be in some observed circumstances, they are not systematic. Thus, they can be safely discarded without compromising the model.

As for the costs of decrees, if we assume that executive bureaucracies have sufficient capacity and expertise to help presidents issue any kind of decree, which they have, then the costs of decrees tend to be rather low to the point of being insignificant. So decrees are basically a costless decision-making strategy as far as the president's direct policy utilities are concerned.

(3) The probability of implementing G by statute and decree. As for the probabilities, it should first be recalled that equations 1 and 2 assume that a president chooses between initiating a statute or issuing a decree in a short period of time. Thus, under this constraint, it can be safely postulated that $P_s < P_d$. As statutes always take some time to be approved, a president is unlikely to implement his goals via standard legislative procedures if he has to make policy in a short period of time. Assuming a short period for presidential policy-making also lowers U_s and increases U_d . Why should a president place a high value on a long expected life of a statute if he discounts time heavily? Moreover, given that the cost of issuing a decree is basically null, equations 1 and 2 predict that the expected utility of implementing G by decree tends to be larger than the expected utility of implementing G by statute. In summary, if presidents are modeled as making policy under a short time table, we should expect that a decree-based implementation of G dominates a statutory implementation.

However, presidents actually have more time. After all, their fixed terms ensure that they will have at least 4 years (this is the shortest constitutional presidential term in Latin America) to try to achieve their policy goals. A longer time period of decision-making should thus favor statutes over decrees. To check the conditions under which seeking statutes is more likely than decrees, I will build a decision theoretic model of presidential policy-making assuming that presidents have more time. Under this model, presidents have two actions: (1) seek statute first; if that fails, seek decree (call it S); or seek decree first (call it D). There are again three possible outcomes associated with these actions: (1) G is implemented by statute; (2) G is implemented by decree; and (3) G is not implemented. Equations 3 and 4 below represent the president's expected utility from actions S and D respectively.

$$EU(S) = P_s U_s + (1 - P_s) \delta EU(D) - C_s \quad (\text{eq. 3})$$

$$EU(D) = P_d U_d - C_d \quad (\text{eq. 4})$$

Equation 4 is the same as equation 2, so it is not necessary to analyze it again. Equation 3, however, adds to equation 1 the expected utility of decrees [EU(D)] multiplied by the probability of a failed statutory implementation of G [(1 - P_s)] and a coefficient δ (delta). By this equation, the expected utility from a statutory implementation of G [EU(S)] is the sum between the expected increment to utility of a successful implementation of G by statute -- (P_sU_s) + (1 - P_s) δ EU(D) -- minus the cost of seeking a statute (C_s). The coefficient δ (≤ 1) is the weight or time discount rate of the payoff from decrees issued after a failed statutory implementation of G relative to the payoff from decrees issued firstly.

Presidents will seek statutes when the following inequality is satisfied: $EU(S) > EU(D)$. Then, solving for equation 3,

$$P_s U_s + (1 - P_s) \delta EU(D) - C_s > EU(D)$$

With a little algebra, it can be shown that:

$$P_s U_s - C_s > (P_d U_d - C_d) [1 - \delta + \delta P_s] \quad (\text{eq. 5})$$

According to equation 5, seeking statutes is more likely as:

- 1) the value of a statutory implementation of G (U_s) gets larger;
- 2) the time discount rate of the payoff from decrees (δ) tends to 1;
- 3) the probability that the president's attempt to implement G via statute is successful (P_s) gets larger;
- 4) the cost of seeking a statute (C_s) gets smaller;
- 5) the increment to utility from achieving G via a decree (U_d) gets smaller;
- 6) the probability that the president's attempt to implement G via decree is successful (P_d) gets smaller;

7) the cost of seeking a decree (Cd) gets larger.

Now I turn to the factors that determine the values of Us, Ud, Ps, Pd, Cs, Cd, and δ .

I theorize that two factors affect presidential utilities (Us and Ud). Firstly, the effects of constitutional legislative authority granted to presidents have an impact on presidential preferences. If presidents are endowed with extensive legislative powers, they are more likely to place more value on the employment of executive prerogatives than on statutes. Carey and Shugart (1998) identify two types of presidential legislative powers, namely reactive and proactive. Recall that they define reactive powers as "... powers with which the executive can return policy to the reversionary outcome even in the face of legislative preferences for a different outcome." The veto, for example, is a reactive power. Proactive powers are "... powers that enable the executive to extract changes in the status quo that the legislature would not have *initiated* on its own." The decree powers granted to many Latin American presidents is the best example of proactive legislative power. Hence, **the more proactive powers presidents are constitutionally granted, the higher Ud (the value placed on decrees) and the lower Us (the value placed on statutes), ceteris paribus.**

As for Ps and Pd, if a president decides to seek G through a statute, then legislative parties will have a decisive influence on the fate of bills initiated by the chief executive because their passage requires majority approval (or whatever qualified majority specified by the constitution in the case of constitutional amendments) by the assembly. By this logic, the larger the size of the president's legislative party, then the easier the passage of president-initiated statutes. Then, **the larger the presidents' legislative contingent, the higher Ps (the probability of their implementing policy goals by statutes) and the lower Pd (the probability of their implementing policy goals by decree) ceteris paribus.**

Secondly, the distance between the president's policy position and that of the median legislator also has an influence on Ps and Pd. Presidents whose policy positions diverge widely from those of the median legislator are well aware that they are going to have a hard time accomplishing their policy goals through standard legislative procedures. Decrees thus provide such presidents with a higher likelihood of implementing their agendas than statutes. Moreover, given that presidents whose agendas differ markedly from those of the legislature are chosen by the electorate precisely to challenge the political establishment, or so these presidents like to conceive their mandates, they have a penchant to see an extensive use of executive prerogatives as fully legitimized by voters. Thus, I hypothesize that **the larger the distance between the president's policy position and that of the median legislator, the higher Pd (the probability of his implementing policy goals by decree) and the lower Ps (the probability of his implementing policy goals by statutes), ceteris paribus.**

With regard to the cost of statutes, a variable that can be adduced to ascertain its value is legislative fragmentation. Legislative fragmentation is here defined as the number of relevant legislative parties. Higher legislative fragmentation results in higher transaction costs in lawmaking because it increases the number of partisan veto points (Tsebelis 1995). It also increases the number of party combinations that can beat the status quo. This aspect further complicates and slows down the legislative process. Decisions made by fragmented legislatures are therefore marked by policy inconsistency and lack of timeliness. This, in turn, directly affects the costs of statutes because presidents have to pay more bribes to secure majorities. So I surmise that **the higher legislative fragmentation, the higher Cs (the costs of statutes), ceteris paribus.**

One could argue that party discipline also affects the costs of statutes. Majorities are harder to form in legislatures dominated by weakly disciplined parties than in legislatures controlled by tightly disciplined parties. This argument is not completely correct. If parties are weakly disciplined, a minority president can more easily co-opt opposition legislators to form winning majorities. Tight discipline certainly helps majority presidents to pass legislation. However, in the case of minority administrations, tight discipline leads to deadlock, as, for example, in Venezuela (Coppedge 1994b). Because the impact of discipline on lawmaking is not clear, it will not be included in the set of hypotheses.

As for the cost of decrees, as mentioned before, decrees are considered here a costless decision-making strategy as far as the president's direct policy utilities are concerned.

Finally, as for the coefficient δ , as defined previously, it is the time discount rate of the payoff from decrees issued after a failed statutory implementation of G relative to the payoff from decrees issued firstly. That is, it tells us how the passage of time affects the expected utility presidents derive from decrees. As the presidential term elapses, the shorter the time presidents have to make policy. As argued above, decrees dominate statutes when presidents operate under a short time horizon. So the value of δ is a negative function of the elapsing of the presidential term. In the beginning of the presidential term, δ tends to 1. Inserting this value in equation 5, we obtain:

$$PsUs - Cs > (PdUd - Cd)[Ps]$$

As Ps is smaller than 1, then the expected utility from decrees issued after a failed statutory implementation of G is reduced at the beginning of the presidential term. In the end of the presidential term, δ tends to zero. Plugging this value in equation 5, we obtain:

$$PsUs - Cs > (PdUd - Cd)$$

The expected utility from decrees issued after a failed statutory implementation of G is at its maximum at the end of the presidential term. Thus, it can be proposed that **as the presidential term elapses, the higher EU(D) (the expected utility from decrees) and the lower EU(S) (the expected utility from statutes), ceteris paribus.**

From equation 5 and the comparative statics of the five hypotheses fleshed out above, we can identify, in a more formal language, the significance of the institutional structure under which a chief executive operates that Carey and Shugart (1998), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), and Shugart and Carey (1992) have found so important in their studies of comparative presidentialism. The values of Us, Ud, Ps, Pd, and Cs are to a great extent determined by the constitutionally-granted legislative powers of the president and the distribution of power and preferences within the legislature. The coefficient δ sheds more light on Linz's (1994, 17) contention that presidents' "... consciousness that time to carry out a program associated with one's name is limited must have an impact on political style in presidential regimes." The fear of discontinuity in policies and distrust of a potential successor encourage a sense of urgency. δ shows that the sense of urgency referred to by Linz is magnified as the presidential term elapses, and its chief policy consequence is to drive presidents to a decree-based strategy of policy-making.

The decision-theoretic model advanced in this section is geared towards the implementation of one policy goal. Presidents, of course, have multiple goals. The purpose of the model, however, is the deduction of the predominant policy-making strategy chosen by a president given the structural constraints under which he governs. In the next section I endeavor to show how this strategy is associated with the pattern of cabinet appointments.

III. POLICY MAKING STRATEGIES AND CABINET APPOINTMENTS

Once a president is set on a strategy to reach a specific policy goal, the question, then, becomes: what is the best way for its tactical implementation? Here cabinet appointments enter the picture. Cabinet appointments will be viewed as a matter of maximizing presidents' ability to implement policy-making strategies. The decision between a statutory or decree-based implementation of policy goals leads directly to a clear prescription for what kind of cabinet the president should construct: if he has decided to seek mostly statutes, then he should build a partisan cabinet to solidify support in the legislature; if he has decided to seek mostly decrees (and especially if the legislature can overturn decrees only with difficulty), then he can pack his cabinet with cronies, technocrats and others who do not help build support in the legislature but do serve other purposes, such as, for example, to bring policy expertise into the cabinet.

Presidents, however, have a myriad of policy goals. It is safe to assume that when presidents take office they have in mind one major policy goal for each department of their administrations. And for each policy goal, presidents may entertain a different policy-making mechanism. For example, for economic policy a president may seek decrees, but for education policy he may opt for statutes. Thus, to direct the finance ministry a technocrat is appointed, and to lead the education portfolio a legislator is selected. By this logic, we should expect that presidential cabinets will be politically heterogeneous with regard to their ministerial selection patterns. The

absence of collective decision-making in presidential cabinets also favors this heterogeneity. Divided responsibility is the norm in presidential executives (Goodin 1996). Presidents often grant ministers autonomy within the policy jurisdiction of their portfolios to minimize intra-cabinet conflict and maximize their control over each individual minister. The opposite applies to parliamentary regimes: collegiality in cabinet decision-making imposes some degree of congeniality in the selection of ministers and coalition partners (Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994, 313-314).

From the above, it can be argued that the overall composition of a cabinet reflects the mix of policy-making strategies chosen by the president to pursue his multiple goals. Hence, different cabinet types arise from different strategy mixes. The more statutes a president seeks, the more partisan the cabinet. Conversely, the more decrees a president seeks, the less partisan the cabinet. In order to identify the many shades of cabinets that can exist between purely partisan types and its opposite, it is necessary to specify better their defining aspects. This is what I proceed to do below.

The partisanship of a cabinet depends on whether there is an agreement between the president and one or more parties and the criteria applied to select cabinet ministers. Agreements have two components, namely that the composition of the government results from deals negotiated by the president and party leaders, and that those deals are publicly accepted by them. These agreements can assume three forms as regards the number of parties: (1) the president can enter into no agreement with parties; (2) the president can enter into an agreement with only his own party; (3) the president can enter into agreements with more than one party. As for the second variable, there are three criteria of ministerial selection: (1) partisan, (2) nonpartisan, and (3) a mixed partisan and nonpartisan criterion.

In building this typology, my purpose is to identify cabinets with different political accountability patterns. The political accountability of a cabinet is defined by the degree of cooperation between presidents and political parties. Table 1 below summarizes the combination of both variables.

TABLE 1

**Cabinet Type According to
Presidential Agreements with Parties and
Selection Criterion of Cabinet Ministers**

	with parties	no agreement with one party	agreement with more than one party	agreement with more than one party
partisan criterion of ministerial selection		co-optation cabinet	tight single-party cabinet	tight coalition cabinet
mixed criterion of ministerial selection		co-optation cabinet	loose single-party cabinet	loose coalition cabinet
non-partisan criterion of ministerial selection		non-partisan cabinet	(logically not possible)	(logically not possible)

(1) Tight Coalition Cabinet: a combination of an agreement with more than one political party and a partisan selection of ministers constitutes a tight coalition cabinet. **This cabinet reflects a presidential commitment to preponderantly seek a statutory implementation of policy goals.** That is why the chief executive strikes agreements with parties and only selects party politicians to fill cabinet posts. If the president agrees to grant the cabinet broad discretion in the appointment of sub-cabinet officers, then the structure of this cabinet is the closest one can find in a presidential regime to that of coalition cabinets in parliamentary regimes.³ However, it is not the same structure because the president can always remove a minister who rebels against his decisions (Martz 1977, 99). Moreover, given the absence of a no-confidence vote on presidential cabinets, the parties in a tight coalition cabinet have fewer resources to constrain the chief executive than their parliamentary counterparts. Nevertheless, the political accountability of a presidential coalition cabinet is defined by a close relationship between the president and the cabinet parties, and a decentralized decision-making process within the executive branch.

From the president's point of view, the advantages of a coalition cabinet are two: (1) it widens the legislative support of the government, and (2) it maximizes the commitment of parties to the executive agenda. From the parties' perspectives, the advantage of a coalition cabinet lies in the maximization of their policy influence and of their control of political offices.

The disadvantages of such a cabinet for the president are threefold: (1) it may impose heavy agency losses to the president in terms of his authority over the executive branch; (2) it may excessively politicize the bureaucracy, creating the risk of depriving it of the necessary administrative expertise (Geddes 1994); and (3) depending on its degree of ideological heterogeneity, it may induce decision paralysis.

The importance of the second advantage to the president can be emphasized. According to some critics of presidentialism (Cleto Suárez 1982; Lijphart 1992, 1994; Mainwaring 1993) but also to authors sympathetic to this system of government (Shugart and Carey 1992), one of its most serious weaknesses is that it creates strong incentives for parties to break coalitions. Parties often fear that they will bear the electoral costs usually associated with incumbency without enjoying its benefits, which tend to be reaped by the president. Under a tight coalition cabinet, due to the regime of broad executive delegation to coalition partners, those incentives are downgraded. Thus, this cabinet can theoretically raise the payoffs of mutual cooperation between the executive and legislative actors. If the coalition commands a majority, we can also expect that, once intra-coalition policy conflicts have been overcome, it may be very successful in passing its agenda through the legislature.

(2) Tight Single-Party Cabinet: the combination of an agreement with one party and a partisan selection of ministers amounts to a tight single-party cabinet. This can also be considered a type of coalition cabinet, that is, a coalition between the president and his own party. But in order not to create confusion in terminology, let us keep it under a distinct name. Like tight coalition cabinets, **the formation of a tight single-party cabinet signals that the president is abiding by a predominantly statutory implementation of policy goals.** The political accountability pattern of a tight single-party presidential cabinet rests on a close relationship between the president and his party. As to its advantages and disadvantages, on the one hand, it is less prone to policy conflicts than a coalition cabinet. On the other hand, such a cabinet does not increase the legislative support of the executive should the president need to do so. Tight single-party cabinets are not necessarily less constraining to the president than tight coalitions. How constraining a single-party cabinet is depends on the president's own standing in his or her party. If the president is the uncontested leader of his party, then a single-party cabinet will impose few constraints on that president. If presidential leadership is strongly challenged, then a single-party cabinet can be as constraining as a coalition cabinet.

Agreement with parties without a partisan criterion for the selection of ministers is here understood as logically not possible. Following Laver and Shepsle (1990; 1996), the allocation of cabinet posts to party politicians is the only mechanism by which a president can make a credible promise to political parties in order to reach an agreement with them regarding the formation of the government.

³ According to Laver and Schofield (1990, 130), a coalition government in a parliamentary regime is defined by a binding agreement among at least two parties.

(3) Co-optation Cabinet: a failure to reach an agreement with parties and a partisan or mixed selection criteria of cabinet ministers are the characteristics of a **co-optation cabinet**. The presence of party politicians in the president's cabinet does not bind their parties to support the government. The appointment of those party politicians results from private agreements between them and the president, and does not involve their party leaders. That is why the term co-optation is applied. The formation of a co-optation cabinet conveys two signals. First, that **the president's policy-making strategy will heavily downgrade the employment of statutes, and will emphasize the use of all constitutional prerogatives that allow the president to act unilaterally**. If the Constitution, for example, grants the executive decree powers, then decrees will be frequently issued. Second, that to implement the statutory part of his agenda the president wants to keep some contact with parties, but on an *ad hoc* basis, according to the issue at stake. This distant contact allows for some informal cooperation between the president and the parties, but, from the president's standpoint, it should never allow for the reduction of his discretion in running the executive branch.

(4) Loose Coalition Cabinet: if a president strikes a coalition agreement with more than one party but applies a mixed criterion for ministerial selection, we have a loose coalition cabinet. **Underlying this cabinet is a policy-making strategy that relies on statutes to a lesser degree than that of a tight coalition cabinet but to a greater degree than that of a co-optation cabinet**. Such cabinet is still characterized by a close relationship between presidents and parties but, again, to a lesser degree than that of a tight coalition cabinet and to a greater degree than a co-optation cabinet. I use the word "loose" to signify the cabinet is divided between a partisan section and a co-optation one. The latter may include either co-opted politicians or nonpartisan ministers or both, and accounts for the non-statutory side of the president's agenda. The partisan section responds for the statutory side of the agenda.

(5) Loose Single-Party Cabinet: if a president appoints a single-party cabinet but applies a mixed criterion for ministerial selection, we have a loose single-party cabinet. As with loose coalition cabinets, **this cabinet aims to implement a policy agenda that relies on statutes to a lesser degree than that of a tight single-party cabinet but to a greater degree than that of a co-optation cabinet**. This cabinet is nevertheless characterized by a close relationship between the president and his party, but a less intimate one than that of a tight single-party cabinet. The non-partisan section indicates the chief executive wants to insulate part of the cabinet from encroachment by his party to pursue his non-statutory goals. If so, the non-partisan ministries may be staffed with either cronies and policy experts or with co-opted politicians to deal with the non-statutory part of the president's agenda.

(6) Nonpartisan Cabinet: a combination of no agreement with parties with a non-partisan criterion of ministerial selection generates a nonpartisan cabinet. **This cabinet reveals that the chief executive will pursue his goals by means other than standard legislative channels, hence his scant concern with legislative parties**. This statement applies only to elected presidents. A vice president who has to take on the presidency after the removal of an elected president may form a non-partisan cabinet precisely to promote better relations with the legislative branch. This was the case of Ramón Velásquez in Venezuela, designated president by the Congress after the impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez in May 1993.

In short, tight coalition and tight single-party cabinets are the most partisan types, the loose types (whether coalition or single-party) are the second most partisan cabinets, followed by co-optation cabinet, and, obviously, non-partisan cabinets are the least partisan form.

IV. EXPLAINING THE CHOICE OF THE CABINET

If cabinet appointments are a proxy of policy-making strategies, that is to say, if a statutory implementation of policy goals leads to a partisan solution for cabinet formation; and a decree-based policy-making strategy is conducive to less partisan solutions, then the five hypotheses fleshed out in Section II can be entered in the following equation:

$$\text{CAB} = \beta_1\text{POW} + \beta_2\text{PPARTY} + \beta_3\text{DIST} + \beta_4\text{FRAG} + \beta_5\text{ELAP} \quad (\text{eq. 6})$$

where:

CAB is the degree of cabinet partisanship;

POW is the amount of presidential proactive legislative powers;

PPARTY is the size of the president's legislative contingent;

DIST is the distance between the president's policy position and that of the median legislator;

FRAG is the degree of legislative fragmentation;

ELAP is the elapsed time of the presidential term.

Equation 6 captures exogenous variables that bear upon the weight presidents assign to legislative parties in their cabinet formation calculations. These variables hinge on the constitutional distribution of power between presidents and legislatures (**POW**), the partisan and institutional distribution of power and preferences within legislatures (**PPARTY**, **DIST**, and **FRAG**), and on a time factor (**ELAP**). As for its potential analytical purchase, equation 6 helps us, for example, identify the causal mechanisms underlying the prevalence of technocrats (the so-called *técnicos*) in the head of the most important economic ministries at the expense of party politicians observed recently in Latin America (Bresser Pereira, Maravall, and Przeworski 1993; Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattas 1990; Dominguez 1997; O'Donnell 1994; Sola 1991). The rise of technocratic cabinets (or the enlargement of cabinets' cooptation compartment, to speak in the terms of the cabinet typology in Table 1) and their underlying decree-based policy-making style can thus be also explained by the enshrining of decree authority in constitutional texts and the election of presidents with weak party support in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Additionally, given that Latin American democracies all use proportional representation formulas, which boost fragmentation, the central trend relating to cabinet formation promoted by this key variable is towards non-partisan solutions. This expectation squares well with Lijphart's (1992, 19) contention that coalition governments are unlikely under presidentialism, and with Mainwaring's (1993) analysis of the difficulties in combining presidentialism with multipartism.

In summary, the model advanced in this paper allows us not only to deductively come up with propositions about cabinet formation but also organize, in a more formal manner, the literature on comparative presidentialism. The task ahead is to empirically test the model, which I will proceed to do in the next sections.

V. CASE SELECTION

I have taken as cases presidencies of Latin American pure presidential democracies that (1) have witnessed at least two complete presidential terms, and (2) have survived at least ten years in the period between 1945 and 1995. Democracy is here defined as a regime that meets the procedural criteria stipulated by Dahl (1971) and Diamond and Linz (1990). These criteria include free and fair electoral competition for all executive and legislative offices, a high degree of inclusiveness in political recruitment and policy making, and respect for basic civil and political rights. A pure presidential regime is one in which the chief executive freely appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers and assembly and cabinet survival is completely separated (see paper1). By these criteria, 14 regimes pass muster: Argentina (1983-1995), Bolivia (1982-1995), Brazil (1946-1964), Brazil (1985-1995), Colombia (1958-1995), Costa Rica (1953-1995), Chile (1946-1973), Dominican Republic (1978-1995), Ecuador (1979-1995), Guatemala (1945-1954), Honduras (1981-1995), Peru (1980-1992), Uruguay (1985-1995),⁴ and Venezuela (1959-1995).

⁴ It should be noted that between 1952 and 1966 Uruguay had a collegial system of government rather than a presidential one. That is why this period is not included in the list. In the 1966-1973 period Uruguay had a presidential regime.

Unfortunately, data are not available for all Central American countries, and for all the years of all South American countries. Moreover, I have decided to eliminate the period of constitutionally mandated power-sharing in Colombia (the so-called *alternación*, between 1958-1978) because presidents were not free to appoint their cabinets. Over 1958-1978, the composition of the cabinet was constitutionally determined in terms of party affiliation. The president was required to allocate cabinet posts to the two largest parties (Conservative and Liberal) according to their legislative weight (Hartlyn 1988). So under *alternación* Colombia does not qualify as a pure presidential system. The final sample was thus reduced to the following periods of 11 regimes:

- 1) Argentina (1983-1993)
- 2) Bolivia (1982-1993)
- 3) Brazil I (1946-1964)
- 4) Brazil II (1985-1995)
- 5) Chile (1946-1973)
- 6) Colombia (1978-1990)
- 7) Costa Rica (1953-1990)
- 8) Ecuador (1979-1994)
- 9) Peru (1980-1992)
- 10) Uruguay (1985-1995)
- 11) Venezuela (1959-1994)

All the most long-lived systems are included (Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela) as well as the presidential democracies established in the 1980s. Also available in the sample are two regimes that were founded in the first half of this century, and collapsed in the early 1960s (Brazil I) and early 1970s (Chile). Different types of institutional design in terms of party-system format (from extremely fragmented multiparty systems like Brazil II to two-party systems like Costa Rica), and constitutional structure (from the strong presidencies of, for example, Peru and Colombia to the weak presidencies of Venezuela and Uruguay), are found in the sample. In summary, these eleven regimes constitute a representative sample of the universe of pure presidentialism in Latin America.

VI. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MEASURES OF CABINET COMPOSITION AND CHANGE

In this section my goal is to propose indicators of cabinet composition that allow us to *deduce* the type of a cabinet based on its partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios. I also provide the criteria to pin down when a new cabinet is formed.

Cabinet-Party Congruence

In the typology developed in paper 2, the first dimension of a cabinet is whether the president strikes an agreement with party leaders over cabinet appointments. Depending on how well structured such an agreement is, the cabinet may take on the contours either of a tightly partisan or a loosely partisan cabinet. If there is no agreement, the cabinet may be either a co-optation or a non-partisan cabinet. The operational difficulty with this dimension lies in the empirical observation of agreements. One would have to obtain historical and/or newspaper accounts of the negotiations over all appointments made to form a cabinet. This procedure would be too time consuming. Moreover, even if researchers were able to collect accounts of the appointments of ministers, many deals actually cut by presidents and party leaders would go unnoticed because of the secrecy often surrounding political negotiations. They would thus have to make judgment calls to classify some cabinets. Such procedure would often result in *ad hoc* solutions and arbitrariness, which would certainly hurt the classification's reliability.

It is, however, possible to avoid this pitfall by making some assumptions about what constitutes an agreement over cabinet formation, and relying solely on the basic information available on cabinet ministers, namely their party affiliation (if any), appointment and dismissal dates, and the legislative weight of their parties. Thus, I assume that if an agreement over cabinet composition is reached by presidents and parties, the latter receive ministerial portfolios in a measure roughly proportional to their legislative weight. By this logic, proportionality in cabinet shares is the equilibrium⁵ solution for the bargaining problems faced by presidents and parties regarding the division of the executive pie. Actually, students of parliamentary regimes (Browne and Franklin 1973, Budge and Keman 1990, 88-131; Schofield and Laver 1985) have demonstrated empirically that coalition payoffs in Europe are distributed according to the legislative size of parties. However, I am not saying that all partisan presidential cabinets follow the norm of proportionality. The proportionality norm will be here employed as a yardstick to identify tightly partisan cabinets (whether coalition or single-party). Ministerial allocations deviating from proportionality can thus be seen as characteristics of cabinets other than tightly partisan ones. The assumption here is that the more cabinet shares deviate from proportionality, the less partisan the cabinet.

To account for the relationship between cabinet shares and legislative weight, I propose a mathematical indicator called the index of Cabinet-Party Congruence (call it C_g). It is based on the index of disproportionality devised by Rose (1984) to measure the amount of deviation from proportionality between seats and votes that a given election produces. Here ministries and seats take the place of seats and votes. The index's formula is:

$$C_g = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (|S_i - M_i|)$$

where: M_i is the percentage of ministries party i receives *when the cabinet is formed*;

S_i is the percentage of legislative seats party i holds in the total of seats commanded by the parties joining the cabinet *when the cabinet is formed*.

In order to arrive at the congruence rate for a given cabinet, we add up the $|M_i - S_i|$ values for all parties joining the cabinet, whether or not these parties hold legislative seats, and for all ministers, whether party members or not, and then divide the total by two. Subtracting the result from 1 yields the congruence rate. The index varies between 0 (no congruence between ministerial payoffs and legislative seats) and 1, which defines an upper limit of perfect correspondence between cabinet shares and legislative weight. Any departure from this upper limit is detected. To work properly, the index requires that at least one minister be a partisan. If all ministers were non-partisans, the index would yield the value of 0.5, a figure that does not correspond to the concept of non-partisan cabinet. So in the case of a ministerial distribution with no partisans, zero should simply be assigned as its Cabinet-Party Congruence rate.

The values obtained with this index express a relation between the information available to the analyst - the percentage of ministers belonging to a given party and that party's share in the total number of legislative seats nominally commanded by the party labels included in the cabinet. That is to say, C_g measures how the distribution of cabinet posts is roughly weighed vis-à-vis the dispersion of legislative seats across the parties joining the executive. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical case:

⁵ I am using the concept of equilibrium in the technical game-theoretic sense of a Nash equilibrium, that is, a situation in which no actor has an incentive to move unilaterally.

Table 2
Hypothetical Example of How to Calculate Cabinet-Party Congruence

Legislative Parties	Cabinet Shares	Si (%)	Mi (%)	Mi - Si
A = 20 seats B = 35 seats C = 45 seats	2	0.31	0.2	0.11
	6	0.69	0.6	0.09
	Independent	0	0.1	0.1
	Independent	0	0.1	0.1
Total = 100 seats	10 portfolios			0.4

$$\text{Cabinet-Party Congruence} = 1 - 1/2 * 0.4 = 1 - 0.2 = 0.8$$

Table 2 reports a 100-seat legislature divided among three parties, A, B, and C, and a cabinet comprising 10 portfolios. The president allocates 2 portfolios to A, 6 to C, and appoints 2 independent ministers. A and C together command 65 seats, therefore S_a is 0.31 ($=20/65$), S_c is 0.69 ($=45/65$), and the independent ministers each score 0 on S_i . As for the percentage of portfolios (M_i), A has 0.2, C, 0.6, and each independent minister, 0.1. The sum of all $|M_i - S_i|$ values is 0.4; this result divided by 2 gives us 0.2, which subtracted from 1 leaves 0.8. This result tells us that the allocation of portfolios in this cabinet deviates from perfect proportionality, but the correspondence between cabinet shares and legislative seats is still high.

Selection Criteria of Cabinet Ministers

The second dimension of cabinets concerns the criteria employed in the selection of cabinet ministers. This dimension can be operationalized in a straightforward manner by counting the percentage of partisan ministers when the cabinet is formed (call it P_p). Obviously, there are different degrees to which a politician can be a party member, ranging from a legislative party leader or a member of the party's national committee to a mere sympathizer with no active and prominent participation within a party. Given the absence of data that would allow me to distinguish between varying levels of ministers' attachment to a party organization, I am forced to disregard such relevant differences, and rely only on the kind of information provided by my sources, that is, whether a minister is affiliated with any party label. Even if a minister is affiliated with a party that holds no seats in the legislature, I count him or her as a partisan. I am aware that I may be overestimating the degree of partisanship in some cabinets. However, by analyzing cabinets of 11 presidential regimes I expect that this bias will be minimized on the plausible assumption that there is a high correlation between nominally partisan ministers and effectively partisan ones.

Finally, I consider military officers, who are usually appointed for the Defense Ministry in many Latin American countries, as independents. Moreover, in countries where each branch of the armed forces is represented in the cabinet and is headed by a military officer, as in Brazil I and II and Peru, I only include the Army Ministry in my calculations. The reason for this simplification is to avoid overestimation of non-partisan ministers.

Partisan Dispersion of Ministerial Power

The final aspect in the typology of cabinets is the distinction between tight single-party and tight coalition cabinets and between loose single-party and loose coalition cabinets. In principle, a simple count of the number of parties included in the cabinet would suffice to ascertain such distinction, as is done with cabinets in parliamentary regimes. However, this counting rule would certainly overestimate the political weight of parties receiving one or very few cabinet posts. For parliamentary regimes it makes sense counting any party represented in the executive

as another cabinet party no matter how many portfolios it holds because all ministers have a vote in cabinet decisions and their parties can influence the government in no confidence votes. That is to say, in parliamentary regimes any cabinet minister has in principle institutional mechanisms to affect the functioning of the government as a whole. In presidential regimes the opposite obtains. A party may have a minister in the government, but if the president, for whatever reason, decides not to pay heed to this minister, there is simply nothing the former can do to constrain the chief executive other than resign or simply play the figurehead of an administrative department. By this logic, to account for the relevance of cabinet parties one has to assign a heavier weight to parties that control more ministries. The Laakso and Taagepera (1979) index of effective number of parties (N) could be used with cabinet shares in the place of legislative shares. However, the validity of this index would be open to criticism because of the frequent participation of non-partisan ministers in presidential cabinets. For example, if a president allocates half of his cabinet posts to his party and half to non-partisans, how should one plug the latter in the formula? If all independents are bunched together as though they represented a single party, the Laakso and Taagepera index would yield 2.0 as the effective number of cabinet parties, which is an underestimation of the fragmentation of this cabinet.

Fortunately, Taagepera (1997) has recently proposed a solution to this problem by adjusting the Laakso and Taagepera index to calculate the effective number of parties in the presence of lumped data. Recall that $N = 1 / \sum x_i^2$; where x_i is the percent of seats or votes held by the i -th party. This index has become a standard measure in political science because it provides a non-arbitrary criterion to identify the number of relevant parties in political bodies, and is intuitive. The new index proposed by Taagepera uses a formulation of N that avoids detailed calculation of fractional shares:

$$N = P^2 / \sum P_i^2$$

where P_i stands for the number (rather than fractional share) of seats or votes for the i -th party, and P is the total number of seats or valid votes. If there is a residual of R votes or seats lumped as "other," the expression becomes:

$$NIC = P^2 / [f(R) + \sum P_i^2]$$

where $f(R)$ is a function of R to be estimated and the summation extends only over the individually specified parties. One can determine the smallest and largest values $f(R)$ could possibly take for a given R and then calculate the corresponding N. This determines the possible error range for N, and in the absence of other information the average of the extremes might be used.

The largest value of N is obtained when every item in R (votes or seats) belongs to a different party, so that the sum of their squares is $f(R) = 1^2 + 1^2 + \dots = R$. In most cases it is very small compared to the summation of known P_i^2 ; so that we can approximate $f(R) = R$ with $f(R) = 0$.

I will apply NIC to calculate the partisan dispersion of ministerial power from the point of view of the president. P will be the total number of ministerial posts available to a president, and P_i is the number of ministerial posts held by the i -th party. Independent ministers have the function of the residual in NIC. I will assume that each independent minister represents a different party exactly to obtain the largest fractionalization of the cabinet. In other words, I assume that when a president appoints an independent to a cabinet post his goal is to disperse the partisan control of ministerial power. This makes sense for presidential regimes owing to the absence of collective decision-making in the cabinet and to the great autonomy ministers enjoy within the policy jurisdiction of their departments (Rose 1980). Thus there are institutional factors that uphold the assumption that each independent minister represents a different political unit in a presidential cabinet.

The index of partisan dispersion of ministerial power from the perspective of the president (D_p) varies from 1 (when all cabinet posts are allocated to only one party) to the number of cabinet portfolios in the cabinet (when each portfolio is held by a different party or all portfolios are held by independents). For example, suppose a

presidential cabinet with 22 posts. Party A has 8 ministries, party B holds 6, party C is assigned 3 posts, and independent ministers are allocated 5 ministries. The partisan dispersion of ministerial power of this cabinet is:

$$D_p = 22^2/1^2 + 1^2 + 1^2 + 1^2 + 1^2 + 3^2 + 6^2 + 8^2 = 484/5 + 9 + 36 + 64 = 484/114 = 4.28$$

This is a ministerial distribution with an effective number of 4 and a quarter of cabinet parties. If we counted all independents as forming one party, D_p would go down to 3.64, amounting to an underestimation of the partisan dispersion of ministerial power.

Classifying a Cabinet

Having developed the operational indicators of the dimensions defining presidential cabinets, I proceed now to specify the rules for classifying empirical cases of ministerial distributions. First, as Cabinet-Party Congruence (Cg) and Percentage of Partisans (Pp) both vary from 0 to 1, I divide them in quartiles: 0 – 0.25; 0.25 – 0.5; 0.5 – 0.75; and 0.75 – 1.0. For a ministerial distribution to be classified as a tightly partisan cabinet, its scores on both Cg and Pp must be larger than or equal to 0.75. Scores on Cg and Pp smaller than 0.75 and larger than 0.5 place a ministerial distribution under the loosely partisan cabinet category. If a ministerial distribution's scores on Cg and Pp are equal to or smaller than 0.5 and are larger than 0.25, it is considered a co-optation cabinet. If both Cg and Pp values are equal to or larger than 0 and are equal to or smaller than 0.25, the cabinet is a non-partisan one.

Cg is the most important measure to determine the degree of partisanship of a cabinet, and should be looked at first. If a ministerial distribution's score on Cg is not larger than 0.5, we know immediately that it does not constitute a partisan cabinet. Pp thus serves basically to check how tight is a partisan cabinet. If a ministerial distribution's score on Cg is equal to or larger than 0.75 but its score on Pp is smaller than 0.75, then it goes down one step in the cabinet ladder, being classified as a loosely partisan cabinet. The same rule applies elsewhere. For example, if a ministerial distribution's score on Pp is smaller than 0.75 and larger than 0.5, but its score on Cg is equal to or smaller than 0.5, this is a co-optation cabinet.

One could argue that Cg would suffice to classify a cabinet. However, as mentioned above, given that there isn't comprehensive information about how influential the partisan ministers are in their parties, Pp is included to serve the purpose of strengthening the requirements of cabinet partisanship.

Table 3
Rules to Classify Presidential Cabinets According to the Values of Cg, Pp, and Dp

Cabinet Type	Cabinet-Party Congruence (Cg)	Percentage of Partisans (Pp)	Partisan Dispersion of Ministerial Power (Dp)
Tight Coalition	Cg \geq 0.75	Pp \geq 0.75	Dp \geq 2.0
Loose Coalition	0.5 < Cg < 0.75	Pp < 0.75	Dp \geq 2.0
Tight Single-Party	Cg \geq 0.75	Pp \geq 0.75	Dp < 2.0
Loose Single-Party	0.5 < Cg < 0.75	0.5 < Pp < 0.75	Dp < 2.0
Co-optation	0.25 < Cg \leq 0.5	0.25 < Pp \leq 0.5	disregard
Non-partisan	0 \leq Cg \leq 0.25	0 \leq Pp \leq 0.25	disregard

As for the classification of cabinet subtypes (coalition and single-party cabinets and loose coalition and loose single-party cabinets) one has to look at Dp. If a cabinet's score on Dp is equal to or larger than 2.0, the cabinet is either a coalition or a loose coalition. If the score on Dp is smaller than 2.0, the distribution is either tabulated as a single-party or a loose single-party cabinet. Finally, Dp is disregarded in the case of co-optation and non-partisan cabinets.

Table 3 above reports the rules governing the classification of ministerial distributions. These rules are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and provide us with an easily applicable method to deduce the type of a cabinet in any presidential regime.

Cabinet Change

Three criteria are applied to identify a new presidential cabinet:

- (1) the inauguration of a new president;
- (2) a change in the party composition of the cabinet;
- (3) a change of more than 50% in the identity of individual ministers.

The first criterion is obvious. In presidential systems the inauguration of a new president represents a wholesale change in the executive branch because the executive power is vested solely in the head of the state. The second criterion is required because a change in the party composition of the cabinet may affect the values of Cg, Dp, and Pp. And the third is included because as in presidential system individual minister must ultimately run their portfolios according to presidential goals, a major change in the identity of ministers may also represent a major change in the way the president wants to run the executive branch and the way he deals with parties and the legislature. The second and third criteria are used in this paper to identify new cabinets appointed after mid-term elections. Only 5 of the 11 presidential regimes included in the sample have midterm elections, namely Argentina, Brazil I, Brazil II, Chile and Ecuador. If no new cabinet is found after a midterm, I simply compute the scores of the ministerial distribution prevailing in the month following the midterm election on Cg, Pp, and Dp. Table 4 below provides the classification of 57 inauguration cabinets and 18 midterm cabinets.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

It turns out that there are 15 tight coalitions (20.0%), 18 loose coalitions (24.0%), 24 single-party cabinets (32.0%), 2 loose single-party cabinets (2.7%), 8 co-optation cabinets (10.7%), and 8 non-partisan ones (10.7%). These numbers clearly show that there is a great variation in the types of cabinet formed in pure presidential regimes. Interestingly enough, a considerable share, 37.4%, consists of cabinets found only in this system of government, that is, loose coalitions, loose single-party cabinets, and co-optation cabinets. In parliamentary regimes cabinets are either coalition, single-party or non-partisan formations. Loose coalitions and co-optation cabinets thus represent genuinely presidential species of governments.

Table 5
Correlations of Cabinet Composition Measures

	Cabinet-Party Congruence	Percentage of Partisans	Partisan Dispersion of Ministerial Power
Cabinet-Party Congruence	1.00		
Percentage of Partisans	.95	1.00	
Partisan Dispersion of Ministerial Power	-.92	-.89	1.00

N = 75

In addition, Table 5 above provides the correlations of Cg, Pp, and Dp. The coefficients indicate that all three measures are highly associated. The reason is that a cabinet scoring high on Cabinet-Party Congruence is more easily obtained if its percentage of Partisan Ministers is also high. This combination in turn fosters a low partisan dispersion of ministerial power. Conversely, a low score on Pp is likely to decrease Cg, which in turn fosters a low Dp.

VII. OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the previous paper I posited that the president's legislative contingent, presidential legislative powers, the distance between the president's policy position and that of the median legislator, legislative fragmentation, and the elapsing of the presidential term are the key determinants of cabinet partisanship. I proceed now to operationalize these variables.

Presidential Legislative Powers

The operationalization of presidential decree power is straightforward. I will simply use a dummy variable, assigning 1 to presidents constitutionally granted the right to issue decrees that immediately become law, and zero otherwise (call this variable DEGREE). The regimes that accord such powers to their chiefs executives are Brazil II, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.⁶

President's Legislative Contingent

The measure of the president's legislative contingent is simply the percentage of seats held by his party in the lower chamber (call it PPARTY). If a president is not affiliated to any party, his legislative contingent is zero.⁷

Legislative Fragmentation

To measure legislative fragmentation I will use the Laakso and Taagepera index of effective number of legislative parties (call it FRAG), which has become the standard indicator in almost all recent works on electoral and party systems (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, Cox 1997, Jones 1995a, 1995b, Lijphart 1984, 1994, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, Taagepera and Shugart 1989). According to Jones (1995a, 75-

⁶ Data on decree powers were culled from Carey, Amorim Neto and Shugart 1997 and Carey and Shugart (1998).

⁷ The only case posing operational difficulties is Ecuador's president Roldós. In 1978 he was elected the first president of the newly democratic regime on the *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares* (CFP) slate. However, CFP had been led by Ecuador's foremost politician, the ultimate populist Asaad Bucaram, since the early 1960s. On the eve of the 1972 presidential election, Bucaram was regarded the virtual winner of the contest. Dreading this outcome, the military staged a coup of state, and established a dictatorship. This regime soon collapsed, and in 1976 the military agreed to return power to the civilians (Mills 1984, 24). After protracted negotiations, an electoral schedule was set up, convoking a referendum on two constitution proposals to be held in February 1978 and calling congressional and presidential elections for April 1978. Bucaram again emerged as a leading candidate for the national executive, and again raised fears in the barracks. This time the military changed tactics. Instead of a coup, they aligned with the rightist parties, and managed to disqualify Bucaram's candidacy in February 1979 by stipulating the rule that only sons of Ecuadorians could run for president (Mills 1984, 30). Bucaram was the son of a Lebanese. Undaunted by this maneuver, Bucaram nominated his nephew, Jaime Roldós, to replace himself, and kept campaigning as though he were the actual CFP's nominee for the presidency. Roldós ended up the winner of the race, and Bucaram was elected to a congressional seat. Roldós's victory proved to be an ominous result. The newly-elected president strove to assert his autonomy vis-à-vis his political god-father, which soon gave rise to conflicts between them. According to Mills (1984, 36), "Roldós outlined his governmental program together with Hurtado [his vice-president], and began to contact individuals and groups to form his cabinet. On the other hand, Bucaram maneuvered to be elected speaker of Congress, and to form an absolute and reliable legislative majority under his leadership." Bucaram succeeded in both accounts, thus setting the stage for an endless series of executive-legislative impasses that immensely impaired the Roldós presidency. Mills (1984, 37) reports that only 3 of the 29 CFP deputies were loyal to the chief executive. Ultimately, Roldós bolted CFP, and in May 1980 started negotiations with opposition parties (ID and DP) to form a legislative alliance that could countervail the forces led by Bucaram. In light of the complicated story of the Roldós's relationship to the party on whose slate he ran for the presidency, I decided not to assign him the percentage of seats commanded by CFP as his score on PPARTY, but rather only 3 divided by 69 (3 is the number of the Roldós loyalists within CFP as reported by Mills, and 69 is the size of the Ecuadorian Congress).

87) size of the president's party is highly associated with legislative fragmentation.⁸ This may be a source of multicollinearity in the regression equations, and will be properly checked.

The Distance between the President's Policy Position and that of the Median Legislator

Coppedge (1997a; 1997b) has recently made an important contribution to the study of Latin American party systems by analyzing ideological blocs in 166 20th century elections in 11 countries of this region (all the countries studied in this paper plus Mexico) and developing indicators of four party-system characteristics, namely Mean Left-Right Position, Left-Right Polarization, Adjusted Bloc Volatility, and the Effective Number of Blocs.

His method consists of defining criteria for classifying individual parties into blocs or ideological tendencies. Drawing on advice from several country experts and previous efforts to map Latin America party systems, Coppedge establishes classification criteria that capture the most salient aspects of most parties in the 11 countries included in his sample. His classification scheme is based on two major dimensions and several minor ones. The two major dimensions are: (1) the Christian versus Secular conflict inherited from the 19th century; and (2) the Classic Left-Right cleavage, which is divided into right, center-right, center, center-left, and left blocs. He further assumes that these dimensions cross-cut each other, thus yielding 10 blocs ranging from Christian Right to Secular Left. Additionally, parties that could not be classified in left-right terms were classified as either "personalist" or "other" (this category comprises environmental, regional, ethnic, or feminist parties). Finally, parties for which no reliable information was found were classified as "unknown."

In order to find a proxy for the policy position of the median legislator I will employ Coppedge's Mean Left-Right Position (MLRP). MLRP measures how far to the left or the right the average party system was in each election, based on the left-right positions of all the parties and their share of the vote. This indicator assumes that all parties classified left (whether Christian or Secular) are twice as far from the center as parties classified center-left, the same rule applying to rightist parties. The formula of MLRP is:

$$(XR + SR) + .5(XCR + SCR) - .5(XCL + SCL) - (XL + SL)$$

where:

XR = Christian Right	XCL = Christian Center-Left
SR = Secular Right	SCL = Secular Center-Left
XCR = Christian Center-Right	XCL = Christian Center-Left
SCR = Secular Center-Right	SCL = Secular Center-Left

To determine the president's policy position I will also rely on Coppedge's classification. A president's ideological position is assumed to be that of his party (call it PPOL). Therefore, the distance between the president's policy position and that of the median legislator (call it DIST) is given by the following formula:

$$DIST = |PPOL - MLRP|$$

As MLRP varies from -100 and +100, and PPOL can take on the values of -100 (left), -50 (center-left), 0 (center), 50 (center-right), and 100 (right), DIST should thus be the absolute value of the subtraction of MLRP from PPOL. So, for example, if MLRP is 20 (a position situated near the middle of center and center-right), and the president belongs to a center-left party, DIST equals 70. DIST varies from zero, when PPOL and MLRP have

⁸ Data on presidents' legislative contingent and the countries' distribution of lower chamber seats were culled from the chapters in Linz and Valenzuela (1994) and the chapters in Mainwaring and Scully (1995a), and Nohlen (1993) and Proyecto Gobernabilidad CORDES (1997a).

the same value, to 200, when all legislative parties are concentrated on one extreme of the ideological spectrum and the president is affiliated to a party holding no seats located on the opposite pole.⁹

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Elapsing of the Presidential Term

Given that the presidential term elapses only for midterm cabinets, in order to measure this variable I calculate the percentage of the presidential term elapsed after a midterm election (call it ELAPSE). For example, in Argentina the term is 6 years, and there are two midterm elections, one in the second year of the term and another in the fourth. So after the first midterm election, 0.33 of the term has elapsed, and 0.67 after the second one. A similar procedure is employed for the cabinets appointed by vice presidents because when they take on the presidential office it does not mean that a new term begins. Vice presidents complete the term of the president they replace. Their first cabinets, therefore, should not be assigned the value of zero. There are eight cabinets appointed by vice presidents.¹⁰ For example, if a vice president is sworn in the second year of a five year term, his cabinet scores 0.4 on ELAPSE.

VIII. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

To test the hypotheses about the determinants of cabinet partisanship I will employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Ordered Probit will be employed to estimate the probabilities of the appointment of different cabinet types.

⁹ There is, however, an operational difficulty with DIST. How should presidents whose parties are classified either “personalist” or “other” or with no party label be accounted for? First, I assume that presidents affiliated with “personalist” or “other” parties are outsiders of the established party system. Although the very condition of being an outsider provides some leeway for the pursuit of policies and alliances of the most disparate ideological blend, such president has a tendency to implement extremist policies precisely because he was elected to challenge the establishment or so he perceives his mandate. Once established that outsiders are extremists, the next step is to define which side of the ideological spectrum they leaned to during their presidential campaigns. Unfortunately, judgment calls have to be made, with the obvious effect of somewhat tainting measurement validity. I apply this method for six presidents: Brazil I’s Café Filho, Brazil II’s Collor, Chile’s Ibañez, Ecuador’s Roldós, Peru’s Fujimori, and Venezuela’s Caldera II. I consider Café Filho, Collor, Ibañez, and Fujimori to be rightist presidents, and Roldós and Caldera II leftist ones. Café Filho was the vice-mate of Vargas. He took over the presidency after the latter’s suicide in August 1954. Café Filho was affiliated with PSP, a personalist party. In the year preceding Vargas’s suicide, he plotted intensely with UDN, a rightist party, to overturn Vargas. I thus decided to classify Café Filho a rightist. Caldera was one of the founders and main leader of COPEI, a Center-Right party. In early 1993 he bolted COPEI, and was nominated presidential candidate of Convergencia Socialista (Socialist Convergence), classified by Coppedge as a personalist party. Convergencia Socialista, as its label indicates, is a left-leaning party. I thus classified Caldera as a leftist. As for presidents with no party, the procedure I adopt is similar to that for presidents of “personalist” or “other” parties. We can take cues from these presidents’ policy profiles by checking their previous partisan associations. In their bids for the national executive they always rely on some party or party alliance to run their campaigns. I thus establish that the ideological position of the party with which non-partisan presidents were associated the most during their campaigns defines the former’s ideological position. This is the case of Brazil I’s Quadros. In his 1960 presidential campaign he was strongly associated with his main supporting party, the rightist UDN. The last operational difficulty is posed by non-partisan care-taker presidents (either an elected vice-president or a congressionally-designated substitute who takes over the national executive after the impeachment or death of the elected chief executive). I posit that care-taker presidents affiliated with no party often had some party identity in the past. I will use the ideological profile of their past partisan attachments as a proxy for their ideological positions. Brazil II’s Franco and Venezuela’s Velasquez are the cases in point. The former had been affiliated with the centrist PMDB, and the latter with the center-left AD. Finally, I changed the ideological category proposed by Coppedge for the party of Argentina’s president Menem, PJ (Partido Justicialista or Peronist Party). Coppedge classified PJ as “other.” However, the six Argentina experts he consulted were divided about where to locate the PJ. Three rated it a Secular-Center-Right party, two as Secular-Center, and one as “other.” Coppedge opted to classify the Peronist party as “other” throughout its history, and left “... it to other scholars to debate what “other” means.” In this case, I decided to abide by the ratings given by the majority of Argentina scholars, and classified the Peronist party as Secular-Center-Right. At any rate, I believe that even with the problems posed by these 10 presidents DIST is still a valid operational indicator to capture the notion that presidents whose policy positions diverge widely from that of the median legislator have different incentives regarding cabinet formation than presidents whose positions converge toward the median. Table 6 below reports each president’s score on DIST.

¹⁰ The vice presidents are the following. Brazil: Café Filho, Nereu Ramos, Sarney, and Franco; Ecuador: Hurtado.

OLS Analysis

The dependent variable will be operationalized as Cabinet-Party Congruence (Cg) because this is the most relevant of the cabinet measures and the other two are highly correlated with it. As for the direction of the independent variables, below I spell out my five hypotheses, and Table 7 summarizes my expectations about their signs.

- H1: The larger the president’s legislative contingent, the more partisan the cabinet.**
- H2: The constitutional grant of decree powers to the president leads to lower cabinet partisanship.**
- H3: The larger the distance between the president’s policy position and the median legislator, the less partisan the cabinet.**
- H4: The more fragmented a legislature, the less partisan the cabinet.**
- H5: The elapsing of the presidential term leads to lower cabinet partisanship.**

Table 7
Expectations About the Signs of the Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Variable Acronym	Expected Sign of the Variable
Size of the President’s Party	PPARTY	+
Presidential Legislative Powers	DECREE	-
Distance between the President’s Policy Position and that of the Median Legislator	DIST	-
Legislative Fragmentation	FRAG	-
Elapsing of the Presidential Term	ELAPSE	-

Table 8 below reports the results of three models specified to explain Cabinet-Party Congruence. The first model uses all the hypothesized independent variables. **PPARTY**, **DECREE**, and **DIST** were found significant at the 0.01, 0.01, and 0.05 levels respectively in a one-tailed test, and came with the right sign. The coefficients on **FRAG** and **ELAPSE** were not statistically discernible from zero. To check whether **FRAG** and **DIST** have any multicollinearity problems, I ran each of them separately on all the other independent variables. A high adjusted R-squared (.656) was obtained for **FRAG**, indicating the presence of multicollinearity. As expected, **PPARTY** had a highly significant impact on **FRAG**. The correlation between **FRAG** and **PPARTY** is also very high, $-.794$ (see Table 9 below). No multicollinearity problem was found for **DIST**.

[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

I ran a second model without **FRAG** in the right-hand side of the equation. The same results were again obtained. **PPARTY**, **DECREE**, and **DIST** were found significant at the 0.01, 0.01, and 0.05 levels, respectively, in a one-tailed test, and came with the right sign. **ELAPSE** was not found significant. **ELAPSE** was then dropped from a third model. Again, **PPARTY**, **DECREE**, and **DIST** were found significant at the same levels as before.

Significantly, this time their standard errors were smaller than were in the previous two models, thus increasing their significance. The third model also produced a higher coefficient for **PPARTY**, and about the same coefficient for **DECREE** and **DIST** as in the second model. Furthermore, the Adjusted R-squared of the third specification is slightly higher than those of the previous specifications, .609. If one chooses among specifications according to which produces the highest adjusted R-squared, then the last specification is the best.¹¹

TABLE 9 – Correlations of Independent Variables

	PPARTY	DECREE	DIST	FRAG	ELAPSE
PPARTY	1.000				
DECREE	-0.128	1.000			
DIST	-0.660	0.128	1.000		
FRAG	-.794	0.296	0.552	1.000	
ELAPSE	-0.245	-0.076	0.080	0.246	1.000

N = 75

Ordered Probit Results

A new test can be provided with a different specification of the dependent variable, which will be now operationalized as a discrete variable tapping the cabinet types. To evaluate the factors that impinge on the probabilities of the appointment of different cabinet types, I will employ ordered probit analysis. This technique produces maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients measuring the effect of a set of independent variables on the probability that an observation falls into one category of a group of ordered categories. In our case, the categories are cabinet types. However, as there are 6 cabinet types, in order to simplify the analysis, I will cluster the six types in only four categories: (1) tightly partisan cabinets, which include tight coalition and tight single-party cabinets; (2) loosely partisan cabinets (coalition and single-party); (3) co-optation cabinets; and (4) non-partisan cabinets. Ordered probit requires that the space differences between the categories be the same, otherwise its assumptions are violated. My typology of presidential cabinets meets this requirement at least theoretically because each cabinet type covers the same space (a quartile) on an ordinal scale that varies from zero to 1.

The order of the categories is the following. As tightly partisan cabinets are the most partisan forms, they are assigned the value of 4. Loosely partisan cabinets come in second in terms of partisanship. Thus, they are assigned the value of 3. In third come co-optation cabinets, which receive the value of 2. Finally, non-partisan cabinets, the least partisan type, are assigned the value of 1. As for the sign of the independent variables, they are the same as those reported in Table 10 above.

Table 10 below reports the results of three ordered probit models. In the first one, which includes all 5 independent variables, only **PPARTY** and **DECREE** were found significant, the first at the 0.01 level and the second at the 0.1 level, both in a one-tailed test. In the following model **FRAG** was eliminated from the right-hand side of the equation. In this model **PPARTY** and **DECREE** were again the only variables found significant, with the difference that their standard errors were smaller than those in the previous model. The last model drops **FRAG** and **ELAPSE**. **PPARTY** and **DECREE** once more were found to have a significant effect on **Cabinet Type**, and at the same level as in the previous model. The last model, however, produced the smallest standard errors, which makes it the best model.

¹¹ I checked whether the third model had heteroskedasticity problems by running the residuals on the independent variables, and none was found. Also, the three models were run with Percentage of Partisan Ministers as the dependent variable. The

[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]

A good way to interpret the results of the best model is by calculating the probabilities associated with each category relative to a key independent variable. Setting the other independent variables at the means, I calculated the probabilities of the cabinet types for 7 selected values of **PPARTY**. Table 11 below reports the results. For example, for a president whose party commands approximately 5.0% of legislative seats, the probability of his forming a tightly partisan cabinet is only 8.0%, while the probability of his appointing a non-partisan cabinet is 17.2%. Although the probability of forming a loosely partisan cabinet is the highest for this president, 46.6%, the sum of the probabilities of co-optation and non-partisan surpasses that of tightly and loosely partisan cabinets. If the size of the president's party is about 25.0%, the probability of his forming a tightly partisan cabinet jumps to 33.3%, while the probability of a co-optation cabinet falls to 9.1%, and the probability of a non-partisan cabinet plummets to 3.5%.

TABLE 11

Probabilities of a President Appointing Tightly Partisan, Loosely Partisan, Co-optation, and Non-partisan Cabinets According to Selected Sizes of the President's Party

Size of the President's Party	CABINET TYPES			
	Tightly Partisan	Loosely Partisan	Co-optation	Non-partisan
0.0	5.7	40.0	31.4	22.9
5.1	8.0	46.6	28.2	17.2
15.6	18.1	57.3	17.0	7.6
25.4	33.3	54.1	9.1	3.5
35.3	53.1	40.9	4.4	1.6
45.6	72.6	24.7	2.0	0.7
55.8	86.0	12.8	0.9	0.3

Significantly, the loosely partisan category stands the highest probability when **PPARTY** ranges from 0.0% to 25.0%. However, when the president's party commands approximately one third or more of the legislative seats, tightly partisan cabinets become the most likely type, and the probabilities of the other types decline steadily, particularly that of loosely partisan cabinets. This finding suggests that a legislative contingent of one third of lower chamber seats is the threshold above which presidents feel confident enough to make policy through statutes, thus leading them to appoint tightly partisan cabinets. A president whose party holds a little bit more than an absolute majority of seats has a probability of almost 90% of forming a tightly partisan cabinet, while the probability of a loosely partisan cabinet revolves around 10.0%, and those of co-optation and non-partisan cabinets become almost null.

results were basically the same as those found in Table 8 with Cabinet-Party Congruence as the dependent variable.

Table 12 below displays the probabilities of the cabinet types relative to **DECREE**, with the other independent variables set at their means. On the one hand, if a president has the constitutional authority to issue decrees, the category with the highest probability is loosely partisan cabinet, 57.1%, followed by tightly partisan cabinet, with 25.2%, co-optation cabinets with 12.6%, and lastly, non-partisan cabinet, with 5.1%. This means that decree authority is strongly associated with non purely partisan types of cabinets. On the other, if the president does not have decree authority, the cabinet type that stands the highest probability is the tightly partisan category, 57.0%, as expected by the decision-theoretic model developed in section II. The probability of tightly partisan cabinets in this scenario is higher than the sum of the probabilities of the other three categories.

TABLE 12

Probabilities of a President Appointing Tightly Partisan, Loosely Partisan, Co-optation, and Non-partisan Cabinets According to Decree Powers

Decree Powers	CABINET TYPES				
	Tightly Partisan	Loosely Partisan	Co-optation	Non-partisan	
YES	25.2	57.1	12.6	5.1	
NO	57.0	38.0	4.0	1.0	

Significantly, when we switch from presidents with decree authority to presidents without it, the largest difference in the probabilities is observed in the tightly partisan category, an increase of precisely 31.8%. The difference for the loosely partisan type is a decrease of approximately 20.0%, for co-optation cabinet is a decrease of 8.6%, and for non-partisan cabinet, a decrease of 4.1%. These results should be interpreted as an indication that the absence of decree powers strongly constrains presidents to implement their programs by statutes, which, in turn, is conducive to tightly partisan solutions for cabinet formation.

IX. CONCLUSION

This paper attempted to achieve two goals: (1) to propose a deductive and quantitative method to classify and measure the partisan composition of presidential cabinets by focusing on the distribution of ministerial portfolios to parties, and (2) to empirically test five hypotheses regarding the design of cabinets by presidents. A survey of 57 presidencies from 10 countries and 11 presidential regimes showed that there is a substantial variation in the type of cabinets appointed by Latin American presidents. The most significant patterns identified by the statistical analysis performed in section VIII were that the larger the president's party, the higher the partisanship in the cabinet; that presidents endowed with greater constitutional authority to issue decree-laws appoint less partisan cabinets; and that the larger the distance between the president's policy and that of the median legislator, the lower the partisanship in the cabinet.

The first finding is particularly significant because it indicates that only presidents whose parties command a sizeable share of legislative seats have incentives to make policy through standard legislative procedures (statutes), and, therefore, appoint their cabinets accordingly. Such an approach to policy making and government formation is certainly better for the fledgling Latin American democracies because it enhances the role of legislatures and political parties in policy making. Weak presidents (in terms of party support), however, are prone to opt for non-statutory policy making strategies so they can be less dependent on the legislative branch. If they have the constitutional alternative of decrees, they obviously go for it, and this choice is reflected in the composition of their cabinets, often staffed with technocrats and cronies. In the short run, the choice of a non-statutory policy making solution, followed by the appointment of less partisan cabinets, may be optimal for the chief executive. In the long run, however, this pattern of governance may dangerously alienate the legislature,

which is always a risk for political stability and democratic consolidation. Finally, the third finding reveals that more extremist presidents appoint less partisan cabinets. Presidents with such an ideological profile, like presidents with a weak party support, sense that they stand a low chance of passing their agendas through the legislature, which leads them away from statutory policy making strategies and, consequently, closer to less partisan solutions for cabinet formation.

Finally, a normative note is in order. The size of the president's party was found to be the most significant estimator of the probability of forming partisan cabinets, showing that the smaller the size of the president's party, the less likely the formation of this cabinet type. Here we have a strong indictment against presidentialism for it shows that the more presidents need to reach out to parties, the less likely they are to do so.

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Table 4
Classification of the Inauguration and Midterm Cabinets appointed by 57 Latin American Presidents*

Country & President	Cabinet-Party Congruence	Percentage of Partisans	Partisan Dispersion of Ministerial Power	Cabinet Type
<i>Argentina</i>				
Alfonsín 1 st	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
Alfonsín 2 ^{nd*}	0.674	1.000	1.246	loose single-party
Alfonsín 3 ^{rd*}	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
Menem 1 st	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
Menem 2 ^{nd*}	0.675	0.778	2.078	loose coalition
Menem 3 ^{rd*}	0.786	0.889	1.558	tight single-party
<i>Bolivia</i>				
S. Zuazo	0.659	0.833	3.915	loose coalition
P. Estenssoro	0.789	0.789	1.576	tight single-party
P. Zamora	0.924	1.000	2.160	tight coalition
S. de Lozada	0.689	0.700	3.333	loose coalition
<i>Brazil I</i>				
Dutra	0.750	0.750	2.286	tight coalition
Vargas	0.757	0.875	3.200	tight coalition
Café Filho 1 st	0.599	0.667	5.400	loose coalition
Café Filho 2 ^{nd*}	0.619	0.667	6.231	loose coalition
N. Ramos	0.753	0.778	4.765	tight coalition
Kubistscheck 1	0.864	0.889	3.522	tight coalition
Kubistscheck 2 ^{nd*}	0.854	0.889	3.522	tight coalition
J. Quadros	0.673	0.818	6.368	loose coalition
J. Goulart	0.600	0.750	5.143	loose coalition
<i>Brazil II</i>				
Neves	0.691	0.818	2.916	loose coalition
Sarney 1 st	0.864	0.864	2.327	tight coalition
Sarney 2 ^{nd*}	0.864	0.864	2.327	tight coalition
Collor 1 st	0.398	0.400	8.333	co-optation
Collor 2 ^{nd*}	0.320	0.400	8.333	co-optation
Franco	0.698	0.800	7.692	loose coalition
Cardoso	0.543	0.680	6.579	loose coalition
<i>Chile</i>				
Videla 1 st	0.843	0.917	3.272	tight coalition
Videla 2 ^{nd*}	0.684	0.750	6.545	loose coalition
Ibañez 1 ^{st*}	0.298	0.583	10.286	co-optation
Ibañez 2 ^{nd*}	0.335	0.462	8.895	co-optation
Ibañez 3 ^{rd*}	0.154	0.154	11.267	non-partisan
Alessandri 1 st	0.231	0.231	11.267	non-partisan

Alessandri 2 ^{nd*}	0.664	0.769	5.121	loose coalition
Frei 1 st	0.769	0.769	1.641	tight single-party
Frei 2 ^{nd*}	0.769	0.769	1.641	tight single-party
Frei 3 ^{rd*}	0.857	0.929	1.342	tight single-party
Allende 1 st	0.674	1.000	4.900	loose coalition
Allende 2 ^{nd*}	0.760	0.929	4.083	tight coalition

Colombia

Turbay A.	0.942	0.923	2.276	tight coalition
Belisario B.	0.820	0.923	2.276	tight coalition
V. Barco	0.942	0.923	1.171	tight single-party
C. Gaviria	0.885	0.923	2.580	tight coalition

Costa Rica

J. Figueres	0.900	0.900	1.219	tight single-party
M. Jimenez	0.909	0.909	1.198	tight single-party
F. Bolmarcich	0.917	0.917	1.180	tight single-party
J. T. Fernández	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
Figueres	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
D. Quirós	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
R. Carazo	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
L. A. Monge	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party
O. Arias	0.947	0.947	1.111	tight single-party
R. Calderón	1.000	1.000	1.000	tight single-party

Ecuador

Roldós	0.083	0.333	10.286	non-partisan
Hurtado	0.250	0.417	7.200	non-partisan
Febres C. 1 st	0.333	0.333	10.286	co-optation
Febres C. 2 ^{nd*}	0.167	0.167	12.000	non-partisan
Borja 1 st	0.583	0.583	3.429	loose coalition
Borja 2 ^{nd*}	0.417	0.417	4.500	co-optation
Sixto D. 1 ^{st*}	0.071	0.071	14.000	non-partisan
Sixto D. 2 ^{nd*}	0.226	0.214	11.236	non-partisan

Peru

Belaúnde T.	0.759	0.800	2.103	tight coalition
A. García	0.800	0.867	1.531	tight single-party
Fujimori	0.287	0.333	11.842	co-optation

Uruguay

Sanguinetti I	0.733	1.000	1.754	loose coalition
Lacalle	0.873	1.000	1.742	tight single-party
Sanguinetti II	0.816	1.000	2.522	tight coalition

Venezuela

Betancourt	0.689	0.692	5.121	loose coalition
Leoni	0.538	0.538	3.073	loose coalition
Caldera I	0.692	0.692	3.073	loose coalition
Perez I	0.800	0.800	1.531	tight single-party
Campíns	0.840	0.840	1.404	tight single-party
Lusinchi	0.864	0.863	1.330	tight single-party
Perez II	0.583	0.583	2.796	loose coalition
Velasquez	0.150	0.150	15.385	non-partisan
Caldera II	0.462	0.462	6.500	co-optation

Source: Argentina: data provided by Barbara Geddes and Bernhard Thibaut; Bolivia: Mesa Gisbert (1990) and data provided by Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert; Brazil I: Amorim Neto (1991); Brazil II: CPDOC (N.d.); Chile: Valencia Avaria (1986) and data provided by Daniel Kaufman; Colombia: Blanco Bugand *et al* (1991); Costa Rica: data provided by John Carey, Judith Schultz, and Michelle Taylor; Ecuador: Proyecto Gobernabilidad CORDES (1997b); Peru: data provided by Barbara Geddes; Uruguay: data provided by David Altman; Venezuela: Olmos (N.d.), and data provided by Valia Pereira.

*Midterm cabinets are indicated with an asterisk.

Table 6
President's Policy Position (PPOL), Mean Left-Right Position of the Party System (MLRP),
and the Distance between Both (DIST)

President	Year	Party	Ideology	PPOL	MLRP	DIST
Argentina						
Alfonsín	1983	UCR	Secular-Center	0	-1.790	1.790
Alfonsín	1985	UCR	Secular-Center	0	-0.495	0.495
Alfonsín	1987	UCR	Secular-Center	0	0.130	0.130
Menen	1989	PJ	Secular-Center-Right	50	0.405	49.595
Menen	1991	PJ	Secular-Center-Right	50	6.275	43.725
Menen	1993	PJ	Secular-Center-Right	50	2.485	47.515
Bolivia						
S. Zuazo	1982	MNRI	Secular-Center-Left	-50	1.660	51.660
P. Estenssoro	1985	MNR	Secular-Center-Right	50	30.480	19.520
P. Zamora	1989	MIR	Secular-Center-Left	-50	16.380	66.380
S. Lozada	1993	MNR	Secular-Center-Right	50	23.230	26.770
Brazil I						
Dutra	1945	PSD	Secular-Center-Right	50	28.270	21.730
Vargas	1950	PTB	Secular-Center-Left	-50	26.450	76.450
Café Filho	1954	PSP	Personalist (Right)	100	26.450	73.550
Café Filho	1955	PSP	Personalist (Right)	100	27.605	72.395
Nereu Ramos	1955	PSD	Secular-Center-Right	50	27.610	22.395
Kubitscheck	1956	PSD	Secular-Center-Right	50	27.610	22.395
Kubitscheck	1958	PSD	Secular-Center-Right	50	28.250	21.750
J. Quadros	1960	no party	Secular-Right	100	28.250	71.750
J. Goulart	1963	PTB	Secular-Center-Left	-50	20.370	70.370
Brazil II						
Neves	1985	PMDB	Secular-Center	0	38.990	38.985
Sarney	1986	PMDB	Secular-Center	0	38.985	38.985
Sarney	1986	PMDB	Secular-Center	0	17.610	17.610
Collor	1990	PRN	Personalist (Right)	100	17.61	82.39
Collor	1990	PRN	Personalist (Right)	100	9.430	90.570
Franco	1992	no party	Secular-Center	0	9.430	9.430
Cardoso	1995	PSDB	Secular-Center-Left	-50	3.975	53.975
Chile						
Videla	1946	Radical	Secular-Center-Left	-50	8.205	58.205
Videla	1949	Radical	Secular-Center-Left	-50	19.205	69.205
Ibañez	1952	no party	Personalist (Right)	100	19.21	80.795
Ibañez	1953	no party	Personalist (Right)	100	7.910	92.090
Ibañez	1957	no party	Personalist (Right)	100	14.990	85.010
Alessandri	1958	Liberal	Secular-Right	100	14.990	85.010
Alessandri	1961	Liberal	Secular-Right	100	1.440	98.560
Frei	1964	PDC	Christian-Center	0	1.440	1.440
Frei	1965	PDC	Christian-Center	0	-12.995	12.995
Frei	1969	PDC	Christian-Center	0	-20.415	20.415
Allende	1970	Socialista	Secular-Left	-100	-20.415	79.585
Allende	1973	Socialista	Secular-Left	-100	-22.085	77.915

Colombia						
Turbay A.	1978	PL	Secular-Center	0	15.450	15.450
Belisario B.	1982	PC	Christian-Center-Right	50	18.295	31.705
V. Barco	1986	PL	Secular-Center	0	13.275	13.275
C. Gaviria	1990	PL	Secular-Center	0	16.290	16.290
Costa Rica						
J. Figueres	1953	PLN	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-4.335	45.665
M. Jimenez	1958	PUN	Secular-Right	100	0.23	99.77
F. Bolmarcich	1962	PLN	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-13.615	36.385
J. T. Fernández	1966	PUNIF	Christian-Center-Right	50	-2.885	52.885
Figueres	1970	PLN	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-15.190	34.810
D. Quirós	1974	PLN	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-15.105	34.895
R. Carazo	1978	UNIDAD	Christian-Center-Right	50	-5.860	55.860
L. A. Monge	1982	PLN	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-15.965	34.035
O. Arias	1986	PLN	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-6.630	43.370
R. Calderón	1990	PUSC	Christian-Center-Right	50	-0.125	50.125
Ecuador						
Roldós	1979	CFP	Personalist (Left)	-100	8.585	108.585
Hurtado	1981	DP	Secular-Center-Left	-50	8.585	58.585
Febres C.	1984	PSC	Secular-Right	100	-0.555	100.56
Febres C.	1986	PSC	Secular-Right	100	-4.120	104.120
Borja	1988	ID	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-11.14	38.865
Borja	1990	ID	Secular-Center-Left	-50	4.305	54.305
Sixto D.	1992	PUR	Secular-Right	100	30.935	69.065
Sixto D.	1994	PUR	Secular-Right	100	17.825	82.175
Peru						
Belaúnde T.	1980	AP	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-9.190	40.810
Garcia	1985	APRA	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-42.100	7.900
Fujimori	1990	Cambio-90	Personalist (Right)	100	-2.740	102.740
Uruguay						
Sanguinetti I	1985	Colorado	Secular-Center	0	-2.525	2.525
Lacalle	1990	Blanco	Secular-Center-Right	50	-6.300	56.300
Sanguinetti II	1995	Colorado	Secular-Center	0	-17.670	17.670
Venezuela						
Betancourt	1959	AD	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-44.630	5.370
Leoni	1964	AD	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-13.810	36.190
Caldera I	1969	COPEI	Christian-Center-Right	50	-16.265	66.265
Perez I	1974	AD	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-33.495	16.505
Campíns	1979	COPEI	Christian-Center-Right	50	-11.87	61.865
Lusinchi	1984	AD	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-23.030	26.970
Perez II	1989	AD	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-17.020	32.980
Velasquez	1993	no party	Secular-Center-Left	-50	-17.020	32.980
Caldera II	1994	Convergencia	Personalist (Left)	-100	-16.240	83.760

Source: Coppedge (1997a).

TABLE 8 – The Determinants of Cabinet-Party Congruence^a

Dependent Variable: Cabinet-Party Congruence			
Independent Variables	Model		
	1	2	3
CONSTANT	.692* (.132)	.580* (.084)	.576* (.078)
Size of the President's Party (PPARTY)	.603* (.183)	.735* (.135)	.740* (.130)
Decree Powers (DECREE)	-.131* (.044)	-.147* (.042)	-.146* (.041)
Distance between the President's Policy Position and the Median Legislator (DIST)	-.002** (.0009)	-.002** (.0009)	-.002** (.0008)
Legislative Fragmentation (FRAG)		-.019 (.017)	
Elapsing of the Presidential Term (ELAPSE)	.0005 (.071)	-.010 (.071)	
Adjusted R-squared	.604	.603	.609
N of Obs =	75	75	75

^a standard errors are indicated in parentheses.

* $\rho > 0.01$; ** $\rho > 0.05$; *** $\rho > 0.1$

TABLE 10 – Ordered Probit Estimates of Cabinet Type^a

Equation Estimating the Probability of the Appointment of Tightly Partisan Cabinets,
Loosely Partisan Cabinets, Co-optation Cabinets, and Non-partisan Cabinets.

Independent Variables	Model		
	4	5	6
Size of the President's Party (PPARTY)	4.419* (1.433)	4.910* (1.167)	4.947* (1.145)
Decree Powers (DECREE)	-.686*** (.353)	-.761** (.328)	-.756** (.326)
Distance between the President's Policy Position and the Median Legislator (DIST)	-.010 (.007)	-.011 (.007)	-.011 (.007)
Legislative Fragmentation (FRAG)		-.072	
	(.123)		
Elapsing of the Presidential Term (ELAPSE)	.055 (.538)	-.091 (.535)	
Log-Likelihood	-59.442	-59.615	-59.629
<i>N</i> of Obs =	75	75	75

^a standard errors are indicated in parentheses.

* $\rho > 0.01$; ** $\rho > 0.05$; *** $\rho > 0.1$.