

Evolution of the Environmental Movement in Brazil's Amazonia

**Originally Prepared for delivery at the 1998 meeting of the
Latin American Studies Association
The Palmer House- Chicago, Illinois
September 24-26, 1998**

**Joseph J. Domask, Ph.D.
Global Forest Program
World Wildlife Fund
joe.domask@wwfus.org**

1427 28th Street S. Apt. 9
Arlington, VA 22206
703-549-6420
jdomask@erols.com

World Wildlife Fund
1250 24th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
202-778-9572

Introduction

The end of the 1980s marked the beginning of an era of tremendous growth and maturation of Brazil's environmental movement. From its infancy in the early 1980s, the environmental movement has successfully combined forces with various other social movements in Brazil and has helped thrust environmental protection to the forefront of the national agenda and more recently has made substantial contributions to the management of the nation's ecological resources. Although there are still major obstacles to overcome, the progress toward both of these ends has been remarkable in light of the overall situation leading up to the 1990s.

Among the most striking features of Brazil's environmental movement is the extent to which the theme of environmental protection is interwoven with the theme of social development (reducing poverty, inequality, and injustice). The movement in Brazil's case was not an environmental movement per se, but a "socio-environmental" movement. In part, the social and environmental goals are equally important to the various organizations that espouse them, but in part these two goals have been co-sponsored as a strategic alliance among environmental groups on one hand and extractivist organizations, labor groups, and other related interests on the other. Although only loosely and haphazardly coordinated at the national level, these alliances have provided both sides with significantly stronger levels of political and financial leverage in public affairs as well as significantly enhanced capacities to implement projects in the field. This essay focuses on the interwoven themes of environmental protection and socio-economic well-being in Brazil's Amazon region and how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their alliances have evolved over time with respect to these different goals.

The first part of this essay reviews the history of Brazil's environmental movement, with a particular focus on the Amazon region. First comparing the social, political and environmental conditions in Brazil's recent history, the essay moves on to discuss the foundations of the socio-environmental movement in the 1970s and 1980s. The second part of this essay examines maturation phase of the movement in the 1990s in response to the various external and internal events, including the Earth Summit, the G-7 Pilot Program, and Planaflo. The third part of this essay notes that while such rapid

growth and maturation of the movement has been remarkable, there are some new concerns with regard to ability of existing alliances to maintain cohesion and partnerships in the post-Earth Summit years and in an era in which some of the immediate, common threats have already been overcome.

History of the Socio-Environmental Movement *Comparison of Conditions in Recent Years*

By most indicators, the social and political situation in Amazonia in 1998 is a world apart from that of the situation just over a decade ago (1985) when the country was emerging from 20 years of military rule and decades of failed large-scale development projects in the region. In some respects, however, the situation in Amazonia has changed very little since the mid-1980s. Record numbers of fires (including the one that burned an area the size of Belgium in Roraima) and record levels of deforestation persist (averaging 20,086 km² in recent years). Declines in deforestation rates and fires are occasionally registered but they seem to be more closely tied to climatic fluctuations than to the hundreds of millions of dollars invested in environmental protection and sustainable development initiatives in the region.

Social indicators have for the most part remained unacceptable as well. Indian populations continue to be decimated by newly introduced diseases, while peasants, activists, Indians, and even church leaders and government agents are subject to assassinations and constant threats of violence from other interests in the region. In the 1990s, there has been an average of 40-50 murders in land disputes each year.¹ Rule of law often seems non-existent in the vast stretches of Amazonia. Affecting the majority of the inhabitants of the region, however, are not death threats from other individuals but threats to their survival stemming from the lack of opportunities and scarcity of financial resources.

Although relentless environmental destruction and violence against the poor have destroyed any remnants of optimism for many in the region, a progressive wave of change in civil society participation, largely through NGOs, has taken hold and is becoming institutionalized at all levels of social interaction. The number of NGOs of all types in the country has doubled from 2,500 in 1991 to 5,000 in 1993. The number of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) has grown from an estimated 40 in 1980 to an estimated 2,000

¹ This figure, though high, is lower than the 100 or so per year during the 1980s.

by 1998.² These figures mean that there has been a 5000% growth rate since 1980. The estimated combined annual budgets of Brazilian environmental NGOs was \$79 million in 1997.³ The growth in numbers of NGOs only tells a small part of the story of Brazil's advancing environmental movement, but as is discussed below, it is an accurate reflection of the overall progress. Hundreds of millions of dollars each year are now being funneled into Brazil specifically for the purpose of strengthening the institutional capabilities of Brazilian NGOs (BNGOs) and assisting them to carry out projects in the region.⁴ These funds primarily come from international environmental organizations, philanthropic foundations, the World Bank, and Western governments (primarily through the PPG-7).

Formerly an environmental pariah, Brazil now boasts of the world's most environmentally progressive national Constitution (1988) and a number of major national environmental programs (Domask 1997b). In addition, the government has set aside 11% (929,209 km²) of the national territory (more than half of which has yet to be demarcated) for its indigenous population, who make up less 1% of the population. This small percentage of the Brazilian population now has rights to an area equivalent the combined sizes of France and Germany. An additional area of nearly 6% of the nation's territory has been set aside for environmental protection (national parks, ecological stations, extractive reserves, and the like) (MRE 1997). This figure is almost three times greater than the amount of land that was protected in 1985 when the military relinquished power.⁵

Foundations of the Socio-Environmental Movement (Pre-1985) ***Lack of Civil Society and NGO Activity through the Mid-1980s***

Throughout the first three quarters of the 20th century, state-society relations in Brazil have had a strong reputation for being paternalistic and corporatist, with relatively low levels of independent social mobilization. As Alfred Stepan noted, "In historical terms, Brazil has long stood out as the major Latin

² An accurate, official register does not exist. The figures above were reported in one or more of the following publications: Landbim 1988; Hall 1997:68-70; Viola 1997:100; Alves de Carvalho 1998; and Worcman 1990.

³ Converted from Brazilian *reais* at the June 1997 exchange rate of 1.15 *reais* per U.S. dollar. Original figure was from Scharf 1997.

⁴ Bailey and Landbim 1995 reported \$74 million in donations from foreign NGOs to Brazilian NGOs in 1994.

⁵ The increase is from 130,000 km² in 1985 to over 440,000 km² in 1998. The first figure was converted from Guimarães' (1991:166) statistics.

American country where state power has most structured and controlled civil society, especially popular sectors" (1989:xi). In the rural areas of Amazonia and elsewhere in northern Brazil this reputation has been even more notorious. Social mobilization around any issues was a particularly difficult task throughout the military era (1964-1984) during which people were subjected to torture and political imprisonment for organizing popular movements. Added to all of these obstacles was the financial reality: Amazonia is an impoverished region, where the per capita income is less than half of that of the rest of Brazil. The peasant struggles in the region in previous decades were based on the more immediate need to defend against land eviction or against repression from the state or from private groups (de Souza Martins 1990:167). Gradually, some of these obstacles to civil society organization eroded and new conditions (political, social, and ecological) emerged to give civil society a boost. Apart from political liberalization and democratization, the exponential increase in Amazonian deforestation, combined with a great influx of immigrants to the region, helped thrust environmental issues into the agendas of social movements that had been slowly emerging over the decades.

Early NGO Situation: Church CEBs, Rubber Tappers, and Unions

Although some social movements had endured throughout the military era, it was not until the mid-1970s under President Geisel that a policy of political opening — *abertura* — had begun to permit any substantial popular mobilization. During this same period, the Catholic Church, one of the few surviving strongholds of community organization throughout Brazil, had undergone some major changes with respect to its role in society in Latin America. Beginning with the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Catholic Church began to assume a crucial role in promoting social movements throughout Brazil, primarily through widespread expansion of ecclesiastical base communities (CEBs). The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) prioritized a number of key social issues, including human rights, poverty, and agrarian reform. The CEBs in turn promoted these issues by promoting notions of self-help and self-determination at a spiritual level and in physical terms (Alves 1984:73).

To put discourse into action, the Church created a number of special pastoral commissions (including the Pastoral Land Commission) with specifically targeted social issue areas (human rights,

favelas, orphaned children, etc.). Other new social movements, such as the "new unionism" often joined forces with the CEBs, which by 1980 had grown to a number of 80,000 and more than two million members.⁶ These alliances were especially gaining strength in the southern, industrialized parts of Brazil. Luís Inácio da Silva (known as Lula) rapidly became the most well known union leader with his leadership in the historical metal workers strike in São Paulo in 1979. Soon the two-party political system was eliminated in 1979, Lula had created the Workers Party (PT - Partido dos Trabalhadores). That same year, Lula found himself on the other side of the country in the state of Acre to attend a protest rally over the assassination of Wilson Pinheiros, a union leader supporting the rubber tappers.

In the remote state of Acre in 1975, CEBs joined forces with the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) to help local rubber tappers defend their lands from being cleared for pastures by ranchers who were rapidly expanding in the area.⁷ As a result of government incentives for development in the region many ranchers from the South moving quickly into western Amazonia and began to clear the land to gain titles to it and to raise cattle. In Acre, 75% of the state's land was publicly owned in 1971; four years later 80% was privately owned (Hecht 1989:37). In addition to fighting the ranchers in the courts, the rubber tappers adopted the strategy *empates*, which involved using their bodies as a physical barrier so that the clearing crews could not carry out their work. One CONTAG organizer described the struggles between the ranchers and rubber tappers at the time (Keck 1995:413):

The ranchers who came to Acre had already opened up ranches in São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Rondônia, moving north, and they had never met with difficulties. Then they got to the end of the line and they came up against an organized union . . . we were starting to convince public opinion that intensive deforestation is a problem here in the Amazon and is going to be a serious problem for the future. So they decided that the trick was to do something about the leadership, and in 1980 they killed the president of the Brasília union, the most combative one [Wilson Pinheiros].

⁶ Union activity in Amazonia was strong in specific cases, but their overall presence in Amazonia was fairly limited at the end of the 1970s: in Acre and Rondônia, there were only 11 unions with less than 1,500 members, while in all of Amazonas, Acre, Amapá, Rondônia, and Roraima there were only 72 unions. These figures compare to over 4,000 nationally. See Keck 1989.

⁷ Government subsidies and land tenure laws encouraged deforestation by requiring 50% cleared land as proof of productive use. Chaos and fraud in land entitlements were so widespread that documents showed that *more than 100% of the state of Acre had been sold* by 1982.

The presence of Lula (Cardoso's main rival in the 1998 presidential race) and other important supporters, including Chico Mendes, at the rally in protest to Pinheiros' assassination gave the popular struggles in Acre national exposure and served to further strengthen the solidarity of the rubber tappers. Over the following years, the rubber tappers became increasingly organized under the guidance of the Rubber Tappers' Project, spearheaded by Chico Mendes and Mary Allegretti. This work led to the first national meeting of rubber tappers in 1985 and the creation of the National Rubber Tappers Council (CNS). Within a year of its creation, the CNS joined forces with the Union of Indigenous Nations (UNI) to form the Alliance of Forests Peoples (APF). The APF was initially an ideal alliance where both groups (the CNS and UNI) shared a common enemy, the ranchers, and both sought to have lands demarcated for extractive purposes that would not cause any deforestation. Both groups had since made tremendous progress toward these goals and both had moved on to support other struggles against deforestation.

The conflicts during these early years in Acre and elsewhere in Amazonia represented struggles of the poor against the rich, struggles for land rights and agrarian reform, and at a broader level struggles for democracy and social justice, but they had yet to represent a struggle for environmental protection. The CEBs, rubber tappers, labor unions, and the PT fought to protect livelihoods of small producers by preventing further deforestation and in the process they became accidental environmentalists. Eventually, the "real" environmentalists, particularly those from outside the country, caught wind of events surrounding the rubber tappers in 1985 and seized the opportunity to "frame their demands for social justice within an appeal to save the rain forest" (Keck 1995:416). This strategy, as discussed later, turned out to be a remarkably successful one for environmentalists as well rubber tappers.

Between 1980 and 1985 in Amazonia, most of the significant social mobilization around environmental issues could be found in Acre and in neighboring Rondônia, where the Polonoeste program had begun to take its toll on the forests. Elsewhere in Amazonia during this time frame, there was little in terms of social mobilization specifically around environmental issues, but it was an important set of years during which Indians and other small producer communities increasingly organized movements over land issues and struggles against the wealthy land-owning elite. During these years,

there was also an increase in organizations researching agricultural practices and attempting to promote new environmentally friendly methods such as agroforestry. It should be noted that while ENGOs were just beginning to emerge in Amazonia in 1985, there were a number of ENGOs already functioning in southern Brazil. The timeline (Figure 1) in the appendix illustrates the evolution of major events in Brazil's environmental history (upper side of the timelines) from 1980 to 1998 and in the evolution of the socio-environmental movement (lower sides of the timelines).

A few environmental organizations in Brazil existed as far back as the 1950s in the southeastern part of the country including the Rio Grand Association for the Protection of Animals (APRA, 1951) and the Brazilian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature (FBCN), founded in 1958 (Viola 1992). In 1971 Jose Lutzenberger formed the Association for the Protection of the Natural Environment of Rio Grande do Sul (AGAPAN), probably the first major, politically active NGO in the country. A great deal of AGAPAN's attention eventually came to focus on the World Bank funded Polonoroeste Project in Rondônia and the paving of BR-364 in particular. Universities and other research institutes, including Instituto Estudos Amazônicos, Associação Brasileira de Antropologia, and the Centro Ecumênico de Documentação, played an increasingly important role in the early 1980s by documenting the extent of ecological damage and the accelerated pace at which it was occurring (see Table 1 below). As evidence of ecological destruction mounted and public awareness grew, new NGOs formed to address these issues and confront the government.⁸

Increased Environmental Destruction and the NGO Response

The 1980s are often referred to as the “Decade of Destruction” for the rainforests of Brazil. There is no need to rehash the extensive accounts of environmental destruction in the region during this period, but a few highlights are useful in demonstrating how rapidly such destruction occurred and how recently such detrimental incentives were in place. Table 1 highlights a few of the major environmental and social phenomena that began to attract worldwide attention and further provoked the domestic socio-environmental movement.

Table 1. Environmental Degradation and Social Conflict in Amazonia in the 1980s

Activity/Project	Consequences
Livestock Promotion through 1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cattle increased from near zero to more than 5 million in the Amazon region in just 20 years (Moran et al. 1989:329). • Between 1975 and 1986, the government’s “implicit subsidy to the livestock ranches” through SUDAM reached approximately \$1 billion (Elliot 1990; Browder 1988). • These subsidies resulted in the clearing of an estimated 44,000 km².
Polonoroeste Program in Rondônia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total loans for the Polonoroeste Program, including the Rondônia Highway, reached \$445 million (of a total projected \$1.6 billion). • In the state of Rondônia, the total number of cattle herds increased 3000% from 1970 to 1988. • As a result, 27% of Rondônia was deforested.
Greater Carajás Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1982, the World Bank approved \$300 million to fund part of the \$3 billion Greater Carajás Program. • By 1990, 10,000 km² of forests the area were destroyed in the area (de Onis 1992).
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During the 1980s, 1,655 homicides occurred in rural Amazonia. • Between 1978 and 1988, the area of deforestation increased from 2.77% of the Legal Amazon to 6.86% — a 250% increase over 10 years.⁹

With such dramatic evidence of destruction and with the growing international concern over global warming and loss of biodiversity, it became clear that the government development plans were not only failing to achieve their goals and failing to promote socio-economic development but that they were contributing to global environmental problems as well. The emerging socio-environmental movement responded with confrontational and opposition tactics, which agitated the Sarney administration in particular but which also proved to be rather successful considering the momentum of state development programs that were already in place. The alliances that were formed between BNGOs and NGOs from the U.S. and (to a lesser degree) Europe, provided the movements with extra technical support, financial resources, and greatly elevated access to multilateral development bank (MDB) officials and the U.S. Congress, which had significant leverage over the MDBs.

With some important grassroots success in western Amazonia, the first major environmental showdown in the region was brewing in Rondônia, where the government had been implementing the Integrated Development Program for Northwest Brazil — Polonoroeste. In addition to the creation of

⁸ Viola (1992) estimated that 90% of the ENGOs in 1985 were located in the south and southeast of Brazil.

large new agricultural areas for settlers, the Program would also pave a 1,500 km highway (BR-364) through Rondônia and into Acre. A number of U.S. representatives mounted a multifaceted campaign in alliance with Chico Mendes and the CNS to stop the Polonoroeste Project from further funding (Domask 1997a; Kolk 1996). The broad front of domestic and international alliances against the Polonoroeste Program in the mid-1980s was not just an unprecedented event in Brazilian history but it was also an unprecedented event at the global level. Never before had the World Bank or the U.S. Congress undergone such intense pressure from any civil society mobilizations and never before had the World Bank suspended a loan as a result of its environmental impacts. Aside from producing the most tangible result of stopping the loan and preventing even great amounts of environmental destruction, the Polonoroeste experience set a major precedent for social and environmental movements in Brazil.

Table 2 outlines the other major socio-environmental battles in Amazonia. Each region and each case had its own unique actors, protagonists, and outcomes. For the most part, however, they all shared the commonalties of a social-environmental alliance in a showdown against a clear enemy — and in all cases, it was the Brazilian government who was being called on to act to change the situation. In each of the socio-environmental showdowns in Table 2, social actors forged alliances domestically and internationally to confront their antagonists and to fight against further deforestation. In the meantime, in the southern part of the country, the environmental movements also surged in response to critical environmental problems, most notably in the city of Cubatão, which was placed under a state of emergency twice in 1984 due to excessive air pollution. Each of the socio-environmental alliances in Table 2 did succeed in achieving their short-term goals, albeit without some casualties and setbacks.

Table 2. Social Mobilization, Antagonists, and Outcomes

Civil Society Groups*	Antagonist(s)	Event and Outcomes
<u>Acre (1985-86)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rubber Tappers (CNS) • Indians (UNI) • Formed the APF (1996) • Unions • CEBs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cattle ranchers 	Ultimately brought about a national system of extractive reserves within the national system of protected areas. Eventually, 16,000 km ² of Acre were placed under extractive reserves.

⁹ From 152,200 km² to 377,500 km². Figures were derived from INPE's statistics.

Civil Society Groups*	Antagonist(s)	Event and Outcomes
<u>Rondônia (1985-87)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign NGOs • Chico Mendes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World Bank • IDB • Brazilian government • Paving of BR-364 	World Bank loan was suspended in 1985 and IDB loan was suspended in 1987. Both loans were disbursed following new environmental measures.
<u>Pará (1988-89)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kayapó and Xavante Indians • 40 other tribes • UNI and APF • Sting • Anthropologists and environmentalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electronorte (government) • World Bank • Hydroelectric dams 	Altamira Congress was held in 1989 and received press world-wide. ¹⁰ The World Bank canceled the \$500 million loan base on social and environmental factors.
<u>Roraima (1989-90)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yanomami Indians • Anthropologists • Missionaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Garimpeiros</i> • Army high command (concerned with territorial security) 	Over the years, 15% of Yanomami population was wiped out. Goldmining airstrips were blown up by President Collor. The Yanomami had their land demarcated and 45,000 <i>garimpeiros</i> have been evicted.
<u>Rondônia (1993-96)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fórum de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais de Rondônia (35 orgs) • OXFAM • U.S. NGOs (EDF, FOE, WWF) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World Bank's Planaflo 	Complaint filed (1995) to the inspection panel originally elicited little response from the Bank, but eventually concessions were made and an agreement (1996) was reached between NGOs and the Bank.

* The years listed above are only a reference to the heights of these struggles.

In the Acre experience, extractive reserves were incorporated in the national conservation system and some fairly large extractive reserves were created, while in Rondônia two MDB loans were suspended until new measures were protective taken. In Roraima, the struggle dragged out for a while but the Yanomami did succeed in getting a huge reserve demarcated and the majority of goldminers eventually moved out. In Pará, the World Bank loan was blocked and the Altamira Congress received worldwide press coverage, portraying the struggles of the Indians against an unfriendly alliance of the Brazilian government and the World Bank (O'Connor 1997). Before the Altamira Congress, however, the struggles of the people in Amazonia and the plight of the forests had already emerged as one of the world's pressing issues in the media and in international political forums.

Spotlight on the Amazon: 1987-88

Less than two years after the Alliance for Forest Peoples (APF) was formed and the MDB campaign had commenced in the U.S., the international community gave witness to a series of stunning events in Amazonia between 1987 and 1988. Most notably, historically high levels of deforestation were reported during these years. INPE, the government agency responsible for monitoring deforestation, estimated (it turned out to be an incorrect figure) that a staggering figure of 80,000 square kilometers of forests were burned in the Amazon during 1987. This sum was three times more than the average yearly amount and was by far the greatest amount of deforestation reported in history. In the meantime, record numbers of fires blanketed the entire Amazon region with smoke for a period of two weeks in 1987, and air traffic through the region was disrupted. Added to these reports of uncontrolled deforestation were reports that the burning of the Amazonian rainforests alone was contributing to 7% (another inaccurate figure) of world carbon dioxide emissions "and so the destruction of the Amazonian forest came to be considered among public opinion in temperate countries the fundamental cause of climatic changes" (Goldemberg and Durham 1990:23).

One other event seemed to overshadow even the stunning reports of deforestation and global warming: the assassination of Chico Mendes in December 1988. Mendes had already become known worldwide as an "environmental crusader" for his campaign against the ranchers and highway development in western Amazonia. Earlier in the year, he had won a United Nations environmental award for the role he played in protecting the forests.¹¹ Mendes' international notoriety and what he had already come to symbolize had made his assassination a world event. His death was reported on the front pages of newspapers all over the U.S. and Europe. *Time* magazine even likened him to Ghandi. The accumulation of these incidences and reports (accurate and otherwise) of rampant deforestation, global

¹⁰ Brazil's secretary general of the foreign ministry, Flecha de Lima, referred to the Altamira event and the World Bank withholding of the loan as "the greatest international pressure Brazil has lived through in the whole of its history." Quoted by O'Connor (1997:300).

¹¹ For more information on the importance of Chico Mendes and his death see Hecht 1989.

warming, and Mendes' murder not only attracted unprecedented levels of international attention but also reinforced the determination of the socio-environmental movement in Brazil to carry on their struggles.

Maturation of the Socio-Environmental Movement

With some major battles behind them, the Indians, rubber tappers, other extractivist groups, and growing numbers of NGOs were approaching a new era at the end of the 1980s. One of the most significant changes that took place, apart from the creation of the 1988 Constitution,¹² was President Sarney's departure from office and the election of Fernando Collor de Mello — by far the most eco-friendly president to date. Upon taking office, Collor suspended plans to pave BR-364 through to the Peruvian border, blew up *garimpeiro* airplane landing strips in the Yanomami territory, demarcated the massive Yanomami reserve, and initiated a number of other environmental measures (Domask 1997a).

The international scene had also begun to undergo major changes: the World Bank and IDB made important changes in their organizational structures and in their practices with respect to environmental issues; the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was created; the G-7 nations adopted a high profile program for the Brazilian Amazon (PPG-7), and the Earth Summit was held in Brazil. Between 1987 and 1994, the World Bank alone had approved US \$3.3 billion for "environmental projects" in Brazil (EWLA 1995). The 1990 National Environmental Project (PNMA) was the primary institutional strengthening project funded by the Bank. Most of these funds ultimately went into strengthening the capacity of the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA) and into improving land management practices.

With the strengthening and the greening of Brazil's government agencies in the early 1990s, NGOs began to realize that campaigning against government initiatives could no longer be the primary tactic in their efforts to protect the environment. During this new era, NGOs began working more closely in cooperation with state and federal environmental agencies. At the 1994 conference in Belém on Eco-social Diversity and Strategies of Cooperation among NGOs in Amazonia, one of the topics of

¹² See Guimarães (1991:402-409) for a discussion on the greening of Congress and the political processes that helped bring about Brazil's eco-friendly Constitution. Also see Viola 1990:214-217.

conversation was the need of NGOs to move beyond tactics of opposing World Bank and government projects and begin to take more responsibility in designing, implementing, and evaluating them (FASE 1995). Making these steps into the areas of project design and implementation was a major challenge for most NGOs, especially since the majority of them had only been in existence for a few years and most had an annual budget of less than \$50,000. Nevertheless, it was a challenge that many NGOs accepted. Brazilian NGOs matured in this manner through a variety of cooperative initiatives with existing technical/research organizations, foreign NGOs and foundations, Brazilian government agencies, and with the World Bank, the GEF, and PPG-7 agencies. Brazilian NGOs also gained unprecedented access to sources of external funding. One internal military document reported that BNGOs (of all types) had a combined budget of \$8 billion over the 1986-1996 period – most of which came from foreign donations (Monteiro and Luiz 1996).¹³

Brazil NGO Forum and the 1992 Earth Summit

The Earth Summit undoubtedly sparked the forming of many new alliances and had a tremendous impact on the growth and institutional strengthening of the Brazilian socio-environmental movement at large. Besides generating unprecedented environmental awareness among the Brazilian population, it also forced Brazilian NGOs of all types to work together and coordinate their activities and interests under a singular umbrella forum. Hence, in 1990 the Brazilian NGO Forum (Forúm Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento) was created in preparation for the Earth Summit. The first meeting in June only consisted of 40 organizations, but the number grew quickly to 800 by 1991 and to 1,200 by 1992 (Fórum de ONGs Brasileiras 1992). By the time the Summit took place in 1992, there were NGOs representing the widest possible spectrum of social groups (rubber tappers, unions, ENGOs, human rights groups, health organizations, coconut harvesters, fishing organizations, research institutes and so forth). The coordinating body of the NGO Forum is an elected group of NGOs.

¹³ Pro-Nature Foundation (Funatura), the Brazilian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature (FBCN), and SOS Mata Atlântica were among those that worked in close relationship with government agencies (Kolk 1996).

A significant number of the member NGOs have had and continue to have somewhat revolutionary positions and place much of the blame for environmental damage on large corporations, neoliberal policies, global economic structures, and the greed of the wealthy. Other NGOs favored a more conservative position of working on the immediate and technical aspects of conservation within the existing political and economic situation. These issues have become less of a source of conflict among the NGOs in the post-Earth Summit years. However, the issues of inequality, poverty, and agrarian reform continue to be basic themes for a majority of NGOs, environmental and otherwise.

The Forum's more specific priorities in 1998 include finalizing Agenda 21, attaining congressional approval for the long-awaited National System for Conservation Areas (SNUC), and promoting public policies for urban sanitation. The most recent main event sponsored by the Forum was the 1997 Rio+5 conference, where the organizations met to discuss the progress, or lack thereof, toward the goals set by the Earth Summit as outlined in Agenda 21. Their primary criticism was the obvious failure of the Brazilian government to adopt its National Agenda 21. The Forum also seemed to take on a less radical stance with respect to the global economic situation as it related to Brazil's environmental problems" (França 1997).

G-7 Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforests and the GTA

While most of the Brazilian socio-environmental movement was focused on the Earth Summit preparations between 1990 and 1992, a major new initiative for the Amazon region was being planned. The NGOs in Amazonia (as well as a few southern NGOs) found themselves simultaneously involved in two of the world's greatest environmental undertakings in history. This scenario was overwhelming in many respects for the Brazilian NGOs, most of which just sprang up in the previous couple of years and none of which had previously worked together under a singular national coordinating body. The Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforests (PPG-7) was originally set up between the governments of the G-7 countries and the government of Brazil in 1991. The loose collection of NGOs at the time did not have a unified representative institution that would enable their participation (Batmanian 1994). Although the NGO Forum already existed, it was an inappropriate group for a project that had such a

specific regional focus on Amazonian issues. The NGOs working on Amazonian issues had little option but to form a single umbrella agency representative of various groups involved, which would then be responsible for facilitating government relations. As a result the Amazonian Working Group (GTA), now made up of over 30 NGOs, was established in 1992. Three NGO representatives from the GTA joined the eleven-member (Brazilian) coordinating commission of the PPG-7 — a commission which previously lacked any NGO representation.

The GTA overcame some major reservations that it had with the proposed project, especially the exclusionist manner in which it had been designed, and eventually gave its endorsement to the project. However, other ENGOs, including SOPREN and UPAN, denounced the program entirely and refused to participate (Kolk 1996). The NGO Forum, to which the majority of GTA members belong, was also critical of how the PPG-7 negotiations were proceeding. The GTA, nevertheless, sought to keep the program going and work with the opportunities that they had even though the conditions were far from ideal. Some conflict arose between the GTA and NGO Forum over these issues, but they gradually diffused after the funding was approved and implementation began.

Over the years, the GTA has made significant progress as an active entity and as a coordinating body for its member organizations. Its primary goals have been to advance demarcation of Indian reserves and extractive reserves, enforce the integrity of these demarcations, and provide a minimum price system for rubber. The GTA currently represents a wide range of groups including rubber tappers, conservation groups, nut gatherers, coconut cutters, fishing communities, indigenous communities, as well as small farmers and their families. The GTA still uses opposition tactics (letters of protest, Congressional lobbying, and so forth), but it has also been a proactive source of pressure behind various civil society and government programs. Since the implementation of the PPG-7, the GTA and its member organizations have become highly active in contributing to the formulation of public policies as well as to implementing projects at the grassroots level. The dual themes of social and ecological progress have been jointly integrated into nearly every aspect of the policies and their implementation. In terms of public policy participation, the GTA's broadest goal has been to work with the Brazilian government in

implementing Amazon Agenda 21 — a regional component of the National Agenda 21. More specific public policy programs that the GTA has been working to advance include credit programs for small farmers in Amazonia and the 1995 Program to Support Extractive Development (Prodex), which finances extractive reserve subsidies in Amazonia. The GTA also participates in a wide variety of joint government-NGO committees (most of which concern the PPG-7) on public policy in the Amazonia.

Besides these various public affairs committees, the GTA and the PPG-7 have been making progress over the years through the specific component programs of the PPG-7, one of which provides NGOs with grants to implement small-scale approaches to conservation and sustainable development. Several individual GTA members gained experience in supporting the implementation of projects in the field, primarily in association with foreign NGOs, which had contracts with the PPG-7 projects. The Fundação Vitória Amazônica (FVA), for example, is working in partnership with WWF in preparing a management plan for the world's second largest tropical forest park, Jaú National Park (Ramos 1997; Oliveira 1997). Jaú, like every other single park in Amazonia, contains a diverse collection of communities that make their living from farming, fishing, hunting, rubber tapping and so forth. These activities and the residence of these communities in the park is forbidden under Brazilian law, but the WWF-FVA partnership is working with these communities to develop a management plan that will permit them to continue to make their living from the land while protecting the parks resources.

A project similar to this one is being carried out in the Serra do Divisor National Park in Acre through a partnership between SOS Amazônia and The Nature Conservancy. This park, which arguably houses Brazil's greatest concentration of biological diversity, is inhabited primarily by rubber tappers and indigenous communities, both of which have lived in the area for generations. While these different park management strategies are being formulated in Brazil's remote regions, Congressional members in Brasília have been debating over the issue of park inhabitants as incorporated into the pending SNUC. Other GTA member partnerships include projects outside the borders of national parks, but with the same goal of meeting local needs while protecting the environment. In another case, the Woods Hole Research Center has helped to establish the Amazonian Institute for Environmental Research (IPAM) in eastern

Amazonia and has since formed a partnership with this organization to promote agroforestry as an alternative to traditional slash-and-burn agriculture. The list of such socio-environmental partnerships between Brazilian NGOs and foreign NGOs is extensive, and it is clear that most NGOs have gone beyond "bank bashing" and government opposition campaigns in this new era of cooperation. Nevertheless, as the Planaflo case below illustrates, NGOs have not forsaken such tactics; they have simply used them in combination with their new approaches of cooperation.

Planaflo — Rondônia Natural Resource Management Project

In 1992, the World Bank approved \$167 million for the Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project (Planaflo).¹⁴ With co-financing, the project will bring in over \$300 million to improve environmental management practices in the state of Rondônia. More specifically, this project aimed to help undo some past ecological damage from previous development projects in Rondônia that were sponsored by the Brazilian government and by the World Bank, especially the Polonoroeste Program, which failed so miserably in the 1980s. The main components of the project include financing of an "agro-ecological zoning plan" for the entire state and helping local and indigenous peoples harvest native forest products such as rubber and Brazil nuts through the establishment of "extractive reserves" as well as other specifically designated land-usage areas. These initiatives were exactly what NGOs in the area had been lobbying for since the founding of the CNS in 1985.

Despite the positive outward appearance of the plan NGOs remained highly skeptical as a result of their past experiences with the government and the Bank. Rondonian NGOs have been wary of the project and its potential impacts from the initial planning phases. In 1995 more than 20 Brazilian NGOs filed a joint "Request for Inspection" to the World Bank's newly created Inspection Panel. These groups claimed that the Bank has violated several of its own operational directives, policies and procedures related to the forestry policy, wildlands policy, rights of indigenous peoples, and NGO involvement in the

¹⁴ The other World Bank-funded, statewide initiative in Amazonia is Prodeagro in Mato Grosso (southern Amazonia). Prodeagro, unlike Planaflo, covers not only Amazon ecosystems but also part of the massive Pantanal, major agricultural regions, and other ecosystems.

project (OD 14.70). After years of heated debate, these various groups arrived at a consensus plan in June 1996 in which \$22 million would be designated for community initiatives.

National Biodiversity Program (Pronabio), Funbio and Probio

In addition to the positive breakthrough in the negotiations over Planaflo, another positive development took place in 1996 when the GEF — an associated but separately operated organ of the World Bank — approved two grants totaling \$30 million to protect biodiversity in Brazil. The first grant of \$10 million will be used to support Brazil's National Biodiversity Program, Pronabio, through the Project on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, Probio, and particularly toward strengthening an information network and consensus building among the major "stakeholders" of Brazil's national biodiversity.¹⁵ The second GEF grant of \$20 million will support a joint public and private stewardship over Brazilian biodiversity through the National Biological Trust Fund, Funbio, which will be managed by the banking, steel, pulp and paper sectors, along with scientists and one government official. NGOs have already submitted over 70 project proposals to the Ministry of Environment in hopes of acquiring funding to help carry out Pronabio goals.

From the early church-based forms of social mobilization around social inequality and land rights to increasing civic participation in the form of cooperatives and unions, the foundations of the socio-environmental movement were laid in the 1970s and early 1980s. As the struggles for land rights and socio-economic justice increasingly became an issue of defending the forests, protecting the environment emerged as a struggle in its own right. In the decade of destruction, the environmental and social arena consisted of clearly identifiable antagonists and protagonists, and when external environmental interests became aware of these conflicts, they allied themselves with the underdog defenders of the forests. The advancement of democratization combined with a global movement in defense of the Amazon rainforests and its peoples led to the rapid emergence and maturation of the environmental movement in the 1980s and beyond. In the latest chapter of Brazil's socio-environmental movement, some of the old battles against

¹⁵ Vitae Civilis, Instituto Socio Ambiental (ISA), Conservation International (Brazil), ISPN, GTA, IPAM, and AMAZON are the major ENGOs working with the government on these priorities.

developers persist, but the majority of activity has been redirected to proactive participation in the management and stewardship of Brazil's Amazonian rainforest ecosystems.

Challenges to Socio-Environmental Alliances

From any perspective, Brazil's socio-environmental movement has evolved and matured at a remarkably rapid pace. In just over 15 years, environmental issues — the primary concern of a mere 40 NGOs concentrated mostly in southern Brazil — have risen to the forefront of the already crowded national political agenda. The Amazon region in particular, following rapid degradation in the last decade or so, had not only become a major preoccupation of the world community at large, but it has given birth to a whole new network of NGOs, government agencies, development plans, and a wide range of other interests groups and partnerships. The previous section of this essay more or less painted an overwhelmingly positive picture of the progress made to date toward the improvement of socio-environmental conditions and the strengthening of civil society. However, recalling the evidence presented early on in this essay, high rates of deforestation and rural violence persist in Amazonia nearly as intensely as they have over the last 15 years. It remains to be seen whether or not the societal and governmental progress will yield enduring, fundamental changes in the patterns of environmental destruction and social conflict and impoverishment. A key factor in determining whether or not such patterns will be broken is the extent to which Brazilian civil society can sustain the alliances that have been forged across the many interests involved in the sustainable development agenda.

Shared and Diverging Interests

From the perspective of most environmentalists, working in alliance toward the improvement in socio-economic conditions makes sense on many levels. First of all, environmentalists, domestic or foreign, have a moral obligation not to let the poor peoples of Amazonia starve as a result of implementing too many environmental restrictions or excluding them from too many protected areas. Even the more radical foreign NGOs, such as Greenpeace (which now has a Brazilian office) and Rainforest Action Network,

have notably strong socio-economic components (FASE 1995).¹⁶ Another compelling incentive for social and environmental interests to work together is that both sides generally do share many of the same goals and the same adversaries. These goals or adversaries may be very broad in nature, such as the struggle against global economic structures and neoliberal economic policies, but for the most part they are case specific. For both sides, the shared interests have traditionally consisted of shared enemies or antagonists, including the *garimpeiros*, ranchers, loggers, government agencies/projects, MDB projects, and even the whole trend toward unchecked capitalism and free markets. In Acre and Rondônia, the different groups shared the goal of stopping ranchers from clearing more forests, whereas in Pará both sides shared the same goal of protecting the forests from being flooded by the construction of hydroelectric dams. For both sides, habitat protection is a primary goal. ENGOs protect the forests to protect biodiversity, to reduce further contributions to global warming, and to protect their aesthetic value among other reasons. Community organizations and extractivists protect the forests to protect their livelihoods. Beyond these various incentives for cooperation, there are a number of other tactical incentives as well. For example, one side may be in need of financial resources or political leverage at the national level while the other side may be in need of grassroots support for its goals.

As pointed out in a few cases in the earlier sections of this paper (e.g., NGO dissention about PPG-7), this cohesion or alliance of interests has generally been an unsteady and fragile feature of the socio-environmental agenda. However, as external conditions have changed and as the shared antagonists (ranchers, goldminers, government projects, MDB loans, etc.) have often faded in intensity, interests across the socio-environmental alliance have become increasingly divergent and have tended to weaken in many situations. Some examples described below illustrate these recent tendencies toward divergence and dissention as the socio-environmental movement moves into a new phase.

CNS Alliances

The case of Chico Mendes as an environmental crusader and "eco-martyr" is a good place to begin on this subject. For the international community at large Mendes was the ultimate grassroots

¹⁶ Greenpeace, for example, works closely with labor unions and various other grassroots organizations.

environmentalist, fighting as an underdog against powerful ranchers and major development projects in order to save the rainforests. For those who knew the Mendes story in some detail, it was quite clear that he was a union man, a labor leader and inspiring activist, but he "was not an 'ecologist', except in a tactical sense" (de Onis 1992:208). As Keck (1995:418) notes, "labor leaders found it difficult to watch what they saw as a struggle by organized (and unionized) rural folk over land rights being appropriated by environmentalists as a fight to save of the forest." Regardless, the CNS-environmental alliance in this case was fairly strong and effective, due to the fact that the alliance was so specific in nature and consisted of ideal conditions: an intense struggle against a clear enemy with a clear project, and a partnership between a poor grassroots movement on one hand and a powerful and influential collection of foreign NGOs on the other.

In later years, the CNS experienced significant internal dissention as its leadership began to adopt a wider range of interests and broader alliances. In 1992, for example, the CNS formed a closer alliance with the PT and with small farmer interests, which have historically practiced slash-and-burn agriculture, a method that has been responsible for a significant portion of Amazonia's deforestation. These conflicting interests emerged in response to the strengthening of the CNS and are now threatening to weaken the CNS. The CNS eventually experienced "a major clash" and suffered a "permanent rift" with the very NGO (Institute for Amazon Studies) that originally assisted in the founding of the CNS (Hall 1997:112). Even the Alliance of Forest Peoples, which was a partnership between the CNS and the UNI, has become largely ineffective due to insufficient solidarity among the *seringueiros* and the Indians.

More recently, the CNS and a number of other NGOs have also come to odds with another environmental organization over its ambitious efforts. In April 1998, the Brazilian government announced that, in cooperation with World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF) and the World Bank, it would triple the amount of "conservation units" in Amazonia by adding 25 million hectares of new parks and other protected areas by the year 2000.¹⁷ This would increase the amount of protected areas from just over 3% of the Amazon to 10%. To start off this initiative President Cardoso also signed decrees for

three new national parks and one new biological reserve, totaling 600 hectares or 2.4% of the pledge. The World Bank-WWF alliance already pledged \$35 million toward the 10%. This remarkably ambitious initiative to protect the rainforests, however, was not wholeheartedly received by the Brazilian NGO community. The CNS, along with the GTA, the Brazilian NGO Forum, and the Brazilian National Network on Multilateral Financial Institutions circulated a formal letter of concern to the World Bank, WWF, and other concerned groups about this grandiose initiative. The overall thrust of the letter expressed concern that such an initiative should "encompass a broad mosaic of protected areas, including extractive reserves which take into account the rights of traditional populations." As Steven Schwartzman notes (1998), the CNS and other groups were upset that the WWF "PR coup" was carried out without any extractive reserve components and without consulting the consortium of NGOs that have been working under Probio to identify the best places for different types of conservation units. WWF-Brazil circulated a letter of its own in defense of the initiative and partly in criticism of the "letter of concern" sent out by the other NGO representatives. It is somewhat ironic that this level of dissent among these conservation groups is occurring when one considers the fact that WWF-Brazil is a member of the GTA (one of the signatories of the "letter of concern") and that WWF had already provided crucial assistance to the establishment and functioning of two different extractive reserves. Nonetheless, as conservation organizations have grown in power on their own, as ranchers and other antagonists become less of a threat than before, and as the government is increasingly working in cooperation with the environmental movement, the differences in goals among allies has sharpened.

The Worker's Party, the MST, and the Environment

Although the Worker's Party (PT) is not an NGO, it has had close ties with the environmental movement since the very beginning, including Lula's support of the rubber tappers struggles in Acre in 1979. The PT, however, has consistently been in a peculiar position on environmental issues. On one hand, it has a fairly strong alliance with the large number of environmental NGOs that share the PT's view that free market capitalism, globalization, and neoliberal economic policies are among the primary causes

¹⁷ This would increase the percentage of conservation units from 3.49% of Amazonia to 10%.

for environmental degradation in Brazil and globally. On the other hand, the PT is also a staunch supporter of agrarian reform and a supporter of the controversial *Movimento Sem Terra* (MST -- Landless Movement).

The MST is probably the most significant expression of popular mobilization in Brazil but one that has led to new small farmer incursions into forests and even into national parks for agricultural purposes. Overall, MST action has led to the expropriation of more than 8 million hectares of land and the resettling of 140,000 families on 600 different estates, mostly not within protected areas (Hall 1997). In some cases, however, the MST has been responsible for invading protected areas and clearing forests. Two thousand small farmers for example moved into and began to clear land in Iguaçú National Park in 1997 (Berna 1997). The MST leadership has apparently tried to prevent such occurrences since they are damaging to their image and to their alliance with the PT, but nevertheless the landless individuals themselves are not nearly as concerned with the political implications of these actions as much as they are with producing food for their families.

In any case, the PT publicly espouses the view that "environmentalists and the landless [MST] are in favor of the forests, and the landless and the environmentalists are in favor of agrarian reform" (PT 1998). To some extent this statement is true, but as the Iguaçú and similar cases show, there are frequent contradictions, and the MST is gaining a particularly bad reputation.¹⁸ Even more serious incursions (in terms of the type of forests invaded) took place recently in the Mata Atlântica forest, which brought the MST, PT, and environmentalist together to discuss how to prevent such events from being repeated (Parabolicas 1998a). Fortunately for the environmentalists, the MST has conducted most of their land invasions in southern Brazil, where the soil is generally better for farming.¹⁹

¹⁸ In an article in one of Brazil's major papers, one biologist doing field research described the landless invaders of the Iguaçú Park as arrogant, gun-slinging outlaws who killed the animals in front of them and burned down the land (Soulie do Amaral 1997).

¹⁹ One ironic twist to this situation is the fact that the GTA recently made a public announcement that it would adopt tactics similar to that of the MST by invading rural lands, but instead of establishing agricultural plots, it would seek to have these lands turned into extractive reserves. In that way, the forests could be protected while providing a means of living for the extractive communities. Their slogan, according to the secretary general of the GTA, Fábio Vaz, would be "Agrarian Ecological Reform" (Pereira 1998).

One major issue of contention developed between the PT and the MST when the PT Congressman, Gilney Viana, refused to prevent a congressional report on MST involvement in deforestation from going public (Lucena 1998; Gonçalves 1998). The PT, MST and the Land Pastoral Commission (a historical ally of the rubber tappers) had been unsuccessful in preventing Viana from releasing the report, which indicated that 30 percent of Amazonian deforestation was caused by agrarian reform projects. Viana, apparently more of an environmentalist than PT party man, defended his decision saying "Of course land reform is fundamental, but I cannot concur with the environmentally irresponsible fashion it has been made so far." In discussing the PT's current lack of alignment with environmental issues, Viana noted "Sustainable development and responsible land reform have been a part of the party's program since Chico Mende's struggle. Environmentalism has backed off in the PT." The above reports may seem portray an anti-environmental stance on behalf of the PT party, but for the most part the PT has been a significant supporter and campaigner for environmental causes. Recently, for example, in response to President Cardoso's decree that essentially revoked the Environmental Crimes Law (passed earlier in the year), the PT joined forces with the Green Party in an intense campaign against Cardoso's measure. The PT, like the Central Workers Organization (CUT), also has a well-organized National Secretariat for Environment and Development (SMAD).²⁰ However, as the accounts above show, serving the interests of social development and small farmers is often at odds with environmental conservation.

Indians and Environmentalists

One might expect there to be some problems in an alliance between a labor party and environmental groups, but one would be less likely to expect environmentalists to have problems in their alliance with indigenous peoples, who have symbolized even more than the rubber tappers the best possible stewards of the ecosystems that they inhabit. Like the rubber tappers case, the alliance of environmental groups with Indians has been highly successful for the most part. The ENGOs gained far greater international and domestic public support for their efforts through the sympathy that people had

²⁰ In the case of CUT, there is a National Environmental Commission.

for the Indians who shared the cause of preventing deforestation. The Indians for their part gained access to an international media, external financial resources, and the major decision-makers in Washington, D.C. and in Brasília. The Kayapó and Altamira experience exemplify the mutual benefits that can be gained through such an alliance.

Even in this experience, however, there have been some increasingly uneasy relations as some Indian tribes began to cooperate in the predatory exploitation of their territories. The successes of the Kayapó in having their land demarcated and secured has facilitated their ability to reap concessions of 5% of the gross sales earned by miners who have contracted out the land. The environmentalists have thus far been rather quiet on this scenario of Indians profiting from such predatory and polluting forms of resource extraction. Even more alarming to conservation efforts has been the Kayapó practice of permitting the harvesting of mahogany (an endangered species to the extent that presidential decrees have been issued to forbid its harvesting) on their land in exchange for part of the profit. In some cases, they harvest the wood themselves. In 1988, it was estimated that the Kayapó sold \$33 million in mahogany (Economist 1993). The Kayapó have since come under pressure by Brazilian government to restrict their logging activities and for some time it appeared that they had. However, in August 1998, IBAMA, the Federal Police, and FUNAI caught the Kayapó allowing the cutting of mahogany on their territory once again (approximately \$1 million worth) (*Estado de São Paulo* 1998). Other reports of unrelated activities by certain indigenous groups have further damaged their image, one that ENGOs will have a tougher time selling to the public in the future.

Concluding Remarks

Maintaining cohesion among labor unions, conservation groups, indigenous peoples, allied political parties, small farmers, and a multitude of other interests is likely to become increasingly difficult as some of the immediate obstacles and antagonists have been overcome and as Brazil continues to move beyond the stage where it has been the center of the international community's attention. Thus far, the alliances have survived for the most part, but diverging interests are creating some fragile situations.

Environmental groups and small producers (including slash-and-burn farmers) in the past have both been major underdogs in their struggles against financially and politically powerful interests that were often working in concert with government agencies. Under such conditions, an alliance between such groups is a necessary means of survival. With environmental groups now working in cooperation with IBAMA and other government agencies, the environmental groups have less of a need to ally themselves with small producers, especially slash-and-burn farmers, who despite their disadvantageous position, are nonetheless significant contributors to deforestation. The squatters have been receiving assistance from INCRA, the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform. Ironically, INCRA and IBAMA, both of which are government agencies, have found themselves at odds with each other over the resettling of the landless in environmentally sensitive areas (Soulié do Amaral 1997).

In each of the cases of dissension discussed above, the conflicts between the developers and defenders were less intense and less tangible than in the past. Instead, in each of these cases, the defenders of social and environmental issues were in relatively secure positions and were simply trying to maximize the efficiencies of their goal-oriented efforts. Tangible results may be more readily achieved when organizations focus their attentions more narrowly on their targets, but as such targets become narrower, previous alliances with other groups tend to weaken. Fortunately, in the case of Brazil's socio-environmental movement, the different interest groups have for the most part maintained alliances with each other and have continued to support the ideas that social justice, including agrarian reform, is a key component in the struggle to protect the environment. Likewise, the protection of the environment — or more specifically the protection of the Amazonian rainforests — is essential for maintaining the livelihoods and survival of the communities that live in the forests.

Bibliography


- Allegretti, Mary Helena. 1990. "Extractive Reserves: An Alternative for Reconciling Development and Environmental Conservation in Amazonia." In *Alternatives to Deforestation: Steps Toward sustainable Use of the Amazon Rain Forest*, ed. Anthony B. Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Alves de Carvalho, Cristina. 1993. "As ONGs e a Educação Ambiental no Brasil," *Techoje*, October.
- Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. 1984. "Grassroots Organizations, Trade Unions, and the Church: A Challenge to the Controlled *Abertura* in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 40(1).
- Bailey, Michael and Leilah Landbim. 1995. *Agencias Internacionais Não Governamentais de Desenvolvimento Atuando no Brasil: Cadastro*. Rio de Janeiro: ISER; Recife (PE): OXFAM.
- Barbosa da Almeida, Mauro. 1993. "The Creation of the Alto Jurua Extractive Reserve: Conflicts and Alternatives for Conservation – Brazil." FAO Forests, Trees and People Programme. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
- Batmanian, Garo J. 1994. "The Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforests." *International Environmental Affairs* 6(1):3-13.
- _____. 1998. "Clarification Regarding Project to Create New Conservation Units in the Amazon." Open letter, disseminated electronically, 7 July.
- Bensusan, Nurit and Analuce Freitas. 1998. "Faltou Democracia ou Seriedade?" *Journal do Meio Ambiente*, March.
- Berna, Vilmar. 1997. "ONGs de Combate, ONGs de Profissionais e os Eco-Oportunistas." *Journal do Meio Ambiente*, September.
- Berna, Vilmar. 1997. "Reforma Agrária, Sim. EmParques Nacionais, Não!" *Journal do Meio Ambiente*, June.
- Bosch, Margarita. 1997. "NGOs and Development in Brazil: Roles and Responsibilities in a 'New World Order'." In *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?* Edited by David Hulme and Michael Edwards. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Botelho, Vera Lúcia. 1992. "Desenvolvimento e meio ambiente na Amazônia e as populações locais: O caso dos pequenos produtores rurais." In *Ecologia, Ciência e Política*. Edited by Mirian Goldenberg. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan.
- Browder, John O. 1988. "The Social Costs of Rain Forest Destruction: A Critique and Economic Analysis of the Hamburger Debate." *Interciencia* 13(3):115-120
- Cleary, David. 1991. "The Brazilian Rainforest: Politics, Finance, Mining and the Environment." Special Report 2100. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Cavanagh, Sheila M. and Molly C. Bolte. 1995. "Accountability, Sovereignty, and Credibility in Brazilian Amazonia: NGOs as New Players." In *State and Local Policymaking in Brazil*. State and Local Policymaking in Brazil Policy Research Project. Austin: University of Texas.
- Carneiro da Cunha, Manuela. 1989. "Native Realpolitik." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 23(1):19-22.
- de Onis, Juan. 1992. *The Green Cathedral*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- de Souza Martins, José. 1990. "Rural Social Movements." In *The Future of Amazonia: Destruction or Sustainable Development?* Edited by David Goodman and Anthony Hall. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Domask, Joseph J. 1997a. *A Holistic Systems Approach to International Environmental Politics and IR Theory: A Case Study of Brazil and Amazonia*. Doctoral dissertation, University of Miami.
- _____. 1997b. "Quest for Power Saves Trees Too." *Hemisphere* 8(1):10-16.
- Earth Council. 1997. "National Consultation Process of Brazilian NGOs and Social Movements for the RIO+5 Forum." Earth Council. <http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/>
- Economist, The. 1993. "The Savage Can Also be Ignoble." *The Economist*, vol. 327 (June) p. 54.
- Elliot, Nicholas. 1990. "Subsidizing Deforestation." *Economic Notes*, no. 30. An occasional publication of the Libertarian Alliance. London.
- Environment Watch: Latin America (EWLA). 1995. "World Bank Gives Priority to Environmental Projects in Brazil." January, p. 9
- Estado de São Paulo*. 1998a. "Os índios e a exploração." 13 August.
- _____. 1998b. "Sem-terra dizem que não desmatam." 6 February.
- FASE. 1995. Anais do Encontro Internacional de Trabalho: Diversidade Ecosocial e Estratégias de Cooperação entre ONGs na Amazônia. Rio de Janeiro: FASE; Belém: FAOR.
- Fearnside, Philip M. 1993. "Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia: The Effect of Populations and Land Tenure," *Ambio* 22(8):537-545.
- Fórum de ONGs Brasileiras. 1992. *Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento: Uma Visão das ONGs e dos Movimentos Sociais Brasileiros*. Rio de Janeiro: Fórum de ONGs Brasileiras,
- França, Martha San Juan. 1997. "ONGs propõem combate ao desperdício." *Folha de São Paulo*, 15 March.
- Garrison, John W. II. 1993. "UNCED and the Greening of Brazilian NGOs." *Grassroots Development* 17(1).
- Ghon, Maria da Gloria Macondes. 1997. "Os Sem Terra, ONGs e Cidadania." São Paulo: Cortez Editor.
- Goldemberg, José and Eunice Ribeiro Durham. 1990. "Amazônia and National Sovereignty." *International Environmental Affairs* 2(1).
- Gonçalves, Marco Antônio. 1998. "Relatório parlamentar acirra divergências entre ambientalistas e agraristas." *Parabólicas* no. 38, April.
- Guimarães, Roberto. 1991. *The Ecopolitics of Development in the Third World: Politics and Environment in Brazil*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishing.
- Hall, Anthony L. 1989. *Developing Amazonia: Deforestation and Social Conflict in Brazil's Carajás Programme*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- _____. 1997. *Sustaining Amazonia: Grassroots Action for Productive Conservation*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Hecht, Susanna B. 1989. "Murder at the Margins of the World." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 23(1):36-38.
- Hecht, Susanna B. and Alexander Cockburn. 1989. *The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of the Amazon*. New York: Verso Press.

- Hunter, David. N.d. "The PLANAFLORO Claim: Lessons from the Second World Bank Inspection Panel Claim." Center for International Environmental Law. Instituto Socioambiental. 1998. "MST X Atlântica." *Parabólicas*, no. 36.
- Keck, Margaret E. 1989. "The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition." In *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*. Edited by Alfred Stepan. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Keck, Margaret E. 1995. "Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber Tappers of Acre." *Comparative Politics* 27(4).
- Kolk, Ans. 1996. *Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs, and the Brazilian Amazon*. Utrecht, Netherlands: International Books.
- Landbim, Leilah, org. 1988. *Sem Fins Lucrativos: As Organizações Não Governamentais no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Estudos da Religião.
- Lucena, Eliana. 1998. "Contra Tudo e Contra Todos." *Jornal do Brasil*, 22 March.
- Mahar, Dennis. 1988. "Government Policies and Deforestation in Brazil's Amazon Region." World Bank Environment Department Working Paper no. 7. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE). 1997. "Environment - Brazil." Retrieved in March 1997 from URL <http://www.mre.gov.br/ndsg/textos/meiamb-i.htm>.
- Ministério do Meio Ambiente, dos Recursos Hídricos e da Amazônia Legal (MMA). n.d. "Environment in Brazil." <http://www.mma.gov.br/ingles/GAB/asin/amb-i.html>.
- _____. 1997. "O Que o Brasileiro Pensa Sobre o Meio Ambiente, Desenvolvimento e Sustentabilidade." "Valores da Sociedade Brasileira em Relação ao Meio Ambiente." <http://www.mma.gov.br/port/SE/pesquisa/apresent.html>.
- Monteiro, Tânia and Edson Luiz. 1996. "Militares temem ação de ONGs na Amazônia." *Estado de São Paulo*, 15 December.
- Moreira Alves, Maria Helena. 1984. "Grassroots Organizations, Trade Unions, and the Church: A Challenge to the Controlled *Abertura* in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 11(1): 73-102.
- Nepstad, Daniel C. 1998. "Report from the Amazon." The Woods Hole Research Center. May.
- O'Connor, Geoffrey. 1997. *Amazon Journal: Dispatches from a Vanishing Frontier*. New York: Dutton.
- Oliveira, Regina. 1997. "Gênero, Participação Comunitária e Conservação: O Caso do PNJ." Environment Section, Latin American Studies Association.
- Parabólicas. 1998a. "MST X Mata Atlântica." *Parabólicas* no. 36 (January).
- _____. 1998b. "Para antropóloga, ambientalistas e agraristas perseguem o mesmo objetivo." *Parabólicas* no. 42 (August).
- Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). 1998. "Tirando as cascas de banana colocadas pela imprensa reacionária." *Boletim Semanal da Secretaria Agrária Nacional do PT*, 1(46): March 14 to 20.
- Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), Secretaria Nacional de Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento (SMAD). N.d. "Uma Agenda 21 do PT para um Brasil Sustentável."
- _____. 1998. *Agenda Amazônia 21: Propostas para Programa Lula 98.* Third version, 19 July.

- Pereira, Pablo. 1998. "Amazônia vive reforma agrária ecológica." *Estado de Sao Paulo*, 15 February.
- Posey, Darrell A. 1989. "From Warclubs to Words." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 23(1):13-18.
- Ramos, Adriana. 1998. "Gestão da unidade de conservação será em parceira com ONG." *Parablicas* (May).
- Reuters Limited. 1998. "Rubber-Tappers Urge World Bank to Review Amazon Plan." Reuters, 29 May,
- Rodrigues, Maria Guadalupe. 1993. "Movimento ambiental e ativismo político: Um estudo de caso da campanha contra os bancos multilaterais de desenvolvido." *Contexto Internacional* 15(2):215-234.
- Sant'Anna, Lourival. 1998a. "Área de Reserva Era Região de Extrativismo." *Estado de São Paulo*, 19 July.
- _____. 1998b. "Brasil Destina 11% do Território aos Índios." *Estado de São Paulo*. 19 July.
- Scharf, Regina. 1997. "Números Incertos." *Observatório da Imprensa*, 5 October.
- Smeraldi, Roberto. 1997. "Florestas protegidas - de quem?" *Estado de São Paulo*, 17 December.
- Soulié do Amaral, Carlos. 1997. "Militantes do MST destroem fauna e floresta no PR." *Estado de São Paulo*, 7 October.
- Schwartzman, Steve. 1997. "Environmental and Social Issues in the Amazon and the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Government." *EDF Urgent Action*, 12 March.
- _____. 1998. Author's personal communication. 8 September.
- Stepan, Alfred ed. 1989. *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Toni, Dilermando. 1993. "Os índios e a soberania nacional." *Classe Operaria* 69(109):5-9.
- Viola, Eduardo J. 1990. "A degradação sócio-ambiental e a emergência dos movimentos ecológicos na América Latina." In *Classes e Movimentos Sociais na América Latina*, ed. Sônia Larangeira. São Paulo: Editora Hucitec.
- _____. 1992. "O movimento ambientalista no Brasil (1971-1991): Da denúncia e conscientização pública para a institucionalização sustentável." In *Ecologia, Ciência e Política*. Edited by Mirian Goldenberg. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan.
- _____. 1997. "The Environmental Movement in Brazil: Institutionalization, Sustainable Development, and Crisis of Governance Since 1987." In *Latin American Environmental Policy in International Perspective*. Edited by Gordon J. MacDonald, Daniel L. Nielson, and Marc A. Stern. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Worcman, Nira Broner. 1990. "Brazil's Thriving Environmental Movement." *Technology Review* 93(7).
- World Wildlife Fund – Brasil. 1998. "Brasil Vai Proteger 10 % da Amazônia até o Ano 2000." Website Notícias. <http://www.wwf.org.br/>

Figure 1. Timeline of Events in Brazil's Environmental Movement (Amazonia)*



* Items above the timelines refer to general events, while items below the timelines concern events related to social mobilization.