

**LATIN AMERICAN NGOS AND GOVERNMENTS:
COALITION-BUILDING AT UN CONFERENCES
ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WOMEN**

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The backdrop for [Latin America] in the 1990s is one of economic progress in many countries of the region, accompanied by the persistence and intensification of serious problems of poverty and extreme poverty, aggravated by the debt crisis, structural adjustment programmes and social backwardness.

In the political sphere, the 1990s have witnessed a renewed emphasis on democratic principles, the concept of citizenship and individual rights, accompanied by the emergence of new social actors, efforts at consensus-building and a growing questioning of political leaders.

-- Regional Programme of Action for the Women of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995-2001¹

In the current world context, Latin America occupies a unique, bridging position across many international divides. Politically, it shares a recent authoritarian past with many countries, especially those of the South. However, its recent democratic transitions are joining it to the community of primarily Northern democratic nations. Economically, the region is also in transition. By many indicators, it remains mired in severe poverty, inequality, and structural inefficiencies. Yet while Latin America has seen some economic improvements in the 1990s, other regions of the world face even more daunting challenges. Socially, regional values continue to be a hybrid of traditional and modern ideas from every world region. As a result of the region's bridging nature, the different positions taken by Latin American actors on international issues are especially important in current international relations debates, both in international political fora and in academic circles.

In this paper, we compare the ways that Latin American non-governmental organizations (NGOs)² and governments have participated in recent UN issue conferences in order to explore their respective positions on global debates. The three conferences are the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Earth Summit, or Rio Conference), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992; the World Conference on Human Rights (WCHR, or Vienna

Conference), held in Vienna in 1993; and the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW, or Beijing Conference), held in Beijing in 1995.³ The conferences were convened to discuss issues of global concern, yet governments and NGOs also used the conferences to express and advocate differences in values and approach on questions of political principle, cultural values, and economic needs. We use the experiences of Latin American participants at these UN issue conferences to address two distinct international relations debates.

First, while we agree with theorists of global civil society that non-governmental actors pose significant challenges to the traditional state-centrism of international politics [Lipschutz, 1992 #484; Shaw, 1994 #483; Wapner, 1995 #482], the universality of non-governmental participation has been more often asserted than demonstrated. In the interest of theoretical precision, our purpose in this paper is to assess whether Latin American participation in international arenas reinforces traditional divides between state and society in global politics or transforms state-society relations in ways compatible with the concept of global civil society. [See Clark, 1998 #480].

Second, we speak to recent debates about Latin American foreign policy, which question whether there *is* a common Latin American foreign policy, and which themes it might stress. In terms of the global division of North and South, Latin America has been traditionally considered one of the stalwarts of the South in international politics. The region was the birthplace of dependency theory [Cardoso, 1969 #485], which brought the dichotomy of developed and underdeveloped into academic discourse while Latin Americans helped raise Southern claims for a new international economic order and non-alignment with the Cold War superpowers.

Yet Latin America's unique condition among Southern countries is to be the hemispheric neighbor of the United States, giving it a permanent relationship with the flagship of the North. In

the creation and early years of the United Nations, the United States was able to count on Latin America as a secure voting bloc in support of its initiatives [Lowenthal, 1990 #487:29; Bethell, 1991 #488:59]. A recent review of Latin American foreign policy notes that researchers on the subject still take US hegemony as an assumed determinant of regional international relations [Hoy, 1998 #486:107]. To what extent does Latin American participation at the 1990s UN world conferences match the claim of hemispheric hegemony? How well does it fit with a vision of the world as divided into North and South? In asking these questions, we provide a much-needed expansion of the types of actors considered important to foreign policy matters. Because of their increasing participation in regional political debates, we analyze the perspectives brought to bear on these issues by Latin American NGOs as well as governments.

We find that Latin American NGOs are an active part of a global civil society; as with other global non-governmental actors, their participation sometimes is cooperative with regional governments and sometimes centers on building alliances with non-regional NGOs. Similarly, Latin American governments make common cause with their regional counterparts and their NGOs on some issues, especially economic ones, while dividing across the region on others. In the conclusion, we present these patterns of interaction and debates over meanings in greater detail, and reflect on the extent to which traditional political boundaries are changing.

The Latin American Region

As part of the preparatory process for each conference, regional meetings were held that brought together NGOs and governments. For the environmental conference, numerous regional consultations took place during the three years leading up to the conference, although there was no single conference that united regional governmental and non-governmental participants. Prior to the human rights conference, governments and NGOs met at San José, Costa Rica, 18-22

January 1993. In preparation for the conference on women, the Latin Americans met in Mar de Plata, Argentina, 20-25 September 1994. NGOs and governments each drew up their own official statements at those meetings.

Latin American NGOs and governments participating in all three issue conferences wrote regional documents that spoke of a broadly shared backdrop of shared regional conditions. The opening quote highlights two of the most common themes: recent democratization and continuing economic problems. Since Latin American participants routinely used these conditions to frame their positions and actions on global issues the two themes merit a brief discussion here.

Only four of twenty Latin American countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela) passed through the 1970s holding competitive elections without direct military rule, and several of the four violated more stringent definitions of democracy. By 1998, in contrast, the proportions were reversed, with most countries of the region having met that minimal liberal democratic standard for a decade or more. But once again, more stringent definitions of democracy that focus on full citizenship and an extensive array of rights are still often unmet. All three of the regional governmental issue statements reflect the new regional commitment to liberal democracy, although the environmental preparations stress the significant achievements, the human rights preparations lament the lingering lack of achievement, and the women's preparations (above) merely note the aim.⁴ Whatever the level of regional democratic achievement, the newness of this shared collective aim and its existence do distinguish Latin America from other world regions.

For Latin American NGOs, recent democratization processes at home also have helped shape their identity and priorities as international actors. In all three issue areas, Latin American NGOs and social movements began to organize under and in opposition to authoritarian rule.

This marked the actions and attitudes of the groups profoundly, not least in their shared ambivalence towards cooperation with the state [Escobar, 1992 #490; Alvarez, 1998 #491; Jaquette, 1994 #512]. Although this is not an uncommon trait among non-governmental actors in general, the degree to which it affects groups in the region is higher due to their history of state repression. Democratization has alleviated their distrust to some degree, particularly where NGOs have been incorporated into the government themselves or had success at advancing their agenda through democratic channels. Nonetheless, the slow pace of reforms and the ambiguous nature of current Latin American democracy have produced an ongoing NGO debate in the region about how autonomous they should be from their governments. As discussed below, regional NGO statements tended to decry the incompleteness of democracy at home, although in practice NGOs also cooperated with their governments at the conferences.

Latin American NGOs and governments alike spoke with one voice on many regional economic conditions. Latin Americans raised the issues of poverty, debt, economic crisis, and global inequity in all conferences, along with issue-specific themes like the lack of sustainability of regional development, the right to development, and the need to reconceive development through a gender perspective. It is interesting to note that none of the regional documents acknowledge that only a few Latin American countries rank among the poorest countries globally, while several countries and most of the individuals who represented the region would fall into a global middle class.

On the basis of these shared regional experiences and priorities, Latin Americans -- NGOs and governments -- sometimes participated in unified ways at the three issue conferences. At all the conferences, participants explicitly worked to translate general conference themes into regional versions. In regional preparations for the UNCED, a group of eminent Latin American

environmentalists wrote a regional response, *Our Own Agenda*, [*Nuestra Propia Agenda*] [Muñoz, 1992 #489:82-113] to a major UN report on the global environment, *Our Common Future* [World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 #492]. Both governments and NGOs debated this regional response, using it as a point of departure for their positions on the conference. Latin American women held their own strategy conference for the Vienna human rights conference entitled *Our Own* [*La Nuestra*]: *Analysis and Strategies for Women's Human Rights*.⁵ For the women's conference, the regional NGO Forum translated Beijing's themes of equality, development and peace into regional versions: democratization, poverty and structural adjustment, and violence.⁶ The sections on each conference that follow trace more concrete strategies used by both governments and NGOs to interact with each other throughout the conferences. Among some of the common strategies governments used to reach out to NGOs are official consultations, including NGOs on official delegations, and special briefing sessions for NGOs. NGOs, in turn, used various lobbying strategies to reach their governments and regularly responded to governmental positions.

At the same time, Latin American NGOs and governments were divided on many issues. Substantively, regional NGOs were quicker to embrace the universal norms under discussion than were their governments. This was perhaps clearest at the Beijing conference, where Latin American women confronted regional governments that supported a regional Catholic culture limiting women's rights. In addition, compared with their governments, NGOs at Rio and Vienna used much stronger language in favor of a new model of sustainable development and for universal human rights, respectively. The antagonistic relations among Latin American participants also had their roots in regional procedural patterns. The discussions below show that the ambiguities of regional democratization made many NGOs critical of their governments' slow

progress toward fuller democratization, and hesitant to directly engage them in international debates. Meanwhile, some national government bureaucracies in the region still resisted NGO participation and influence.

In the context of those different understandings of the conferences= substantive issues, regional NGOs in particular allied with non-regional participants and especially with other NGOs rather than with their own governments. The NGO alliances were forged within the region, but also with both Southern and Northern NGOs. In their heavy reliance on networking with other NGOs, and in the turn that many of those networks took away from relying on governmental action to resolve global issues, we see some signs of a more international order which breaks away from old divides between North and South centered on nation-states. We return to a discussion of such global implications in the conclusion, after examining each conference in turn.

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992

Latin American environmental NGOs show tremendous variety in both the content and the form of their mobilizations [Christen, forthcoming #493]. Some, more properly called social movements, are volunteer grassroots organizations with few resources beyond their capacity to mobilize the population. At the other extreme are environmental foundations with professional scientific staff and comparatively large budgets. Their substantive focuses vary in similar ways, from the region's famous rainforests to its infamous urban pollution. While some national-level organizations had strong international links to Northern NGOs and their greater resources before the UNCED process, there were few regular contacts among environmental NGOs within the Latin American region. The UNCED process substantially contributed to any regional integration that now exists, not only by providing activists with fora to meet each other, but also by spurring

(and in some cases, funding) regional environmental organizations to acquire the kinds of modern telecommunications technology which make global networking possible.

Regional Preparations

Latin American NGOs joined in a number of networks and conferences with each other throughout the UNCED process. Early NGO participation was rarely representative of the entire region, and somewhat accidental. Over time, the attendance became more representative, as participants in the earlier preparatory meetings both organized environmentalists nationally and made efforts to include participants from more countries. Perhaps because of this unsystematic origin, Latin American environmentalists never developed comprehensive networks or statements that spoke for the region as a whole, although they developed characteristic patterns of participation.

Governmental preparations also were oriented around the global preparatory process, rather than a regional one. Only two documents summarize the Latin American governments' joint positions in preparation for the UNCED. The earliest, *Our Own Agenda* (discussed above), was written by a group of Latin American environmental notables. The Latin American document emphasizes the complementarity, and not the commonality, of global environmental conditions. It highlights the role of poverty, and its root cause in foreign debt, as creating distinct Latin American environmental problems and solutions. This report presages the positions most Latin American governments would take throughout the UNCED preparations and proceedings, and laid a foundation for governmental alliances with the G77.⁷

Sixteen South American environmental NGOs and one Norwegian one met in Santiago, Chile, on October 23-27, 1989, to discuss *Our Own Agenda* and formulate a non-governmental response. The final document of that NGO meeting does not openly challenge the governmental

report, but uses stronger language to criticize existing development models, calling them **Adestructive and perverse** rather than **Adefective**.⁸ The NGO document also agrees with *Our Own Agenda* (85) that sustainable development requires **Aparticipatory democratic regimes**, which guarantee the creativity and control of society.⁹ A final outcome of the meeting was the creation of the South American Ecological Action Alliance, which continued to coordinate Latin American NGO positions throughout the UNCED proceedings.

Latin American governments endorsed *Our Own Agenda* at their regional preparatory meeting for the UNCED in March, 1991.¹⁰ At this meeting, Latin American governmental officials reiterated the importance of economic and social problems in their region, and stressed the need for Northern resources. They also stressed technological solutions (on concessional terms) and affirmed free trade over environmental conditionality.¹¹ In this document, Latin American governments nodded to the role of NGOs in preparing for and helping to implement the Conference agreements, perhaps influenced by the UNCED guidelines for national preparations that recommended broad consultations.¹²

NGOs in the growing Alliance voiced stronger, negative responses to their governments at this stage in the regional discussions. Even before the governmental meeting, participants in the Alliance issued a statement noting that Latin American governments had shown little capacity to implement previous UN agreements or their own legislation, prompting the NGOs to turn to a more extensive role for themselves in resolving environmental problems. They developed a strategy of action that prioritized alliances between Latin American NGOs and citizens and NGOs from all over the world. Strategies for relations with their governments, in contrast, were to prioritize independence, while maintaining a constant dialogue.¹³ The Alliance participants followed this strategy when they issued a statement agreeing with Mexican NGOs that they should reject **Athe**

joke of a >dialogue=@ at the March, 1991 governmental meeting and its Tlatelco Agreement.¹⁴

The Global Conference Process

In the actual conference negotiations, Latin American governments spoke up on several common issues.¹⁵ As noted above, Latin American governments were usually squarely in the mainstream of G77 positions on the centrality of poverty and development issues in their analysis of environmental issues. Latin Americans also uniformly opposed the export of hazardous wastes from the North to the South. Several Latin American governments (Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Nicaragua) also spoke repeatedly for linkages between biotechnology and biodiversity. A related theme was the Latin Americans= insistence on controlling and benefitting from their own biodiversity and natural resources.

Latin American governments also took opposing sides on several issues. Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile opposed the G77 (and other Latin American governmental) proposals on financial arrangements. The first three lobbied early and hard for a Global Environmental Facility under the control of the World Bank, the institutional arrangement preferred by the United States and other Northern countries. The Mexicans, in particular, seemed determined to step over the North/South divide. Mexican ambassador Mateos was quoted as saying &North-South confrontation is a thing of the past,@ as he reported ongoing talks between Mexico and the US about their UNCED positions.¹⁶

Argentina also stood out with unusually strong positions for the region on ozone depletion and population issues. Sited near the South Pole, Argentina joined with North Polar Canada to push for stronger efforts to preserve the ozone layer.¹⁷ Argentina eventually made a written reservation to the final UNCED Document, Agenda 21, underlining its concern about climate change.¹⁸ Ecuador, Saudi Arabia, Ivory Coast, and the Vatican joined Argentina on pro-natalist

population policies, with strong disagreement from NGOs.¹⁹ Argentina did not make any reservations on this issue, although it was unable to change language giving men and women the right to choose the number and spacing of their children.

Finally, Latin American governments were divided on the institutional arrangements to follow the UNCED. Mexico once again sided with the US (and France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Morocco, and Benin) in favor of creating a new Commission on Sustainable Development.²⁰ Argentina, with Britain, Japan, India, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Austria, favored ECOSOC as the institution with oversight capabilities; they argued that a separate Commission would be weak and sectorialize environmental issues.²¹ Nonetheless, negotiators eventually decided to create the new Commission [Clark, 1998 #494].

Latin American NGOs took a variety of stances toward their governments= negotiating positions. Central American NGOs had begun coordinating their activities in September 1991, in parallel to similar coordination by the governments of the region. They played a very active role in preparing their national environmental reports, with the Costa Rican NGO Neotropica writing its entire country report.²² During the Fourth PrepCom,²³ an assortment of NGOs from Central America and the Andean region formed networks to better lobby Latin American governments. They worked to develop common positions on biodiversity, climate change, poverty, financial mechanisms, debt, and the Earth Charter.²⁴ These lobbying NGOs worked closely with their governments, as well as with other NGOs engaged in lobbying on the official conference agenda. Global NGO networks worked on a biodiversity conservation strategy, recommendations on forest principles, and transnational corporations.

At the same time, many other Latin American NGOs took a critical stance toward much of the conference agenda, which was originally oriented around primarily physical categories such as

soil and the atmosphere. They charged that the narrow, technical orientation of the governmental agenda made it difficult to raise more fundamental kinds of issues that cut across its categories. These included underlying models of production and trade, the role of multinational corporations, and debt. At the Fourth PrepCom, a number of NGOs signed onto an open letter to governments which applauded the conference's focus on environmental protection, but cautioned that this required revision of the current economic model, which is based on continuous growth of production and consumption and an unjust division of income between rich and poor countries and rich and poor people.²⁵ In conclusion, they cautioned that, "The environment and natural resources will not be protected and development will not be sustained if these conditions are not fulfilled."²⁵ Many participants in the early South American Alliance joined similar protests, reflecting their dissatisfaction with the pace and content of the governmental negotiations. Some of the protests, as with this letter, were nominally addressed to governments. But they were quite different in tone from the lobbyists' more measured input, and were designed more as press releases than as negotiation documents. The protests allowed for networking with like-minded organizations of the South, such as the Third World Network, NGONET, and SONED (Southern Networks for Development), as well as with more radical Northern organizations.

Not surprisingly, Latin American NGOs drew a variety of conclusions about the openness of their national governments to their participation. The lobbyists tended to stress areas of congruence with their national governments. Dr. Roberto Troya of Ecuador's *Fundación Natura* observed, "The official delegates of each country and the national NGOs may have distinct focuses, but we come from the same region."²⁶ Maria Eugenia Bustamante, an NGO member of the Venezuelan UNCED planning committee, concurred: "In the close collaboration between NGOs and the government, Venezuela is an exemplar of the popular participation they are

discussing in the sessions of PrepCom 4.²⁷ In contrast, the more critical NGOs were frustrated by both their fellow NGOs and their national governments. A report of Latin American NGO networkers at the Fourth PrepCom complains first that only 19 people attended their first meeting because too many NGOs were investing all of their energy in the governmental processes instead of the parallel process, which is really our event.²⁸ The report also notes that while official delegates came to address their group, they stayed only a short time and in response to questions about the official position, argued that there wasn't time to give a detailed explanation, but we should be assured that this group of official delegates was progressive and they would raise sustainable development policies for the governments we were worried about.²⁸

In summary, the most common issue raised by Latin Americans at the UNCED -- the only issue raised by both governments and NGOs -- was the emphasis on poverty, debt, and lack of development in the region, and the corollary argument that environmental problems could not be resolved without also addressing these development issues. Both governments and NGOs singled out this issue in their final analyses of the UNCED, concluding that it had not been adequately addressed. Sixteen of twenty Latin American heads of state made statements at the summit segment of the conference; only Uruguay and Costa Rica failed to stress the importance of regional poverty in addressing environmental issues.

Uruguay and Costa Rica were also distinguished in the solutions they proposed, highlighting legal strategies. The rest of the Latin American heads of state stressed technical and economic solutions to their environmental and poverty problems, notably fairer trade, environmental technology granted on concessional terms, and new financial resources. Several South American countries justified their demands on the North in terms of the concept of ecological debt. Only Cuba's Fidel Castro cast his statement in terms of a wholesale attack on

consumer societies, in terms comparable to those of many NGOs. While several of the leaders noted that their countries had not paid enough attention to the environmental impacts of their economic production, none of the leaders suggested that his or her own country's economic model needed substantial revision. The Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayan leaders all credited NGOs as one of the driving forces behind the conference, but none of the Latin American leaders at the summit spoke of an NGO role beyond it.²⁹

The final statement of the NGO Global Forum, or NGO parallel conference to the governmental conference, echoed the Latin American NGO position, which criticized the official conference for insufficient attention to models of development. In the words of the People's Earth Declaration,

The urgency of our commitment is heightened by the choice of the world's political leaders in the official deliberations of the Earth Summit to neglect many of the most fundamental causes of the accelerating ecological and social devastation of our planet. While they engage in the fine tuning of an economic system that serves the short term interests of the few at the expense of the many, the leadership for more fundamental change has fallen by default to the organizations and movements of civil society. We accept this challenge.³⁰

As this declaration makes clear, the poverty-based critique of the UNCED both served to unite and to divide NGOs and governments, in Latin America and globally. Beneath the uniting concern of poverty, governments and NGOs continued to differ on the kinds of measures needed to overcome poverty. For many Latin American governments, a quantitative increase in resources in the region was enough to address poverty, while the NGOs generally argued for qualitative changes in the development model as well.

The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 1993

The human rights NGOs occupied a potentially antagonistic position vis-a-vis their own

regional governments because in most cases their own governments had recently been, or still were, the perpetrators of large-scale human rights abuses. As their countries had emerged from common experiences of governmental repression, regional federations had formed; for example, Service, Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ-AL), an NGO whose purposes include, but are not limited to, the promotion of human rights concerns, and the Latin American Federation of Associations of Relatives of Disappeared Detainees (FEDEFAM), a regional organization of national-level groups. Some national-level NGOs also had independent international links. Argentina's Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, for example, had formed relationships with external nongovernmental human rights organizations during Argentina's most recent period of military rule from 1976-83. These kinds of NGOs had a good deal of experience working with other international actors, inside and outside of the UN structure, and they played a networking role in Latin American NGOs' organizing for the Vienna conference. The pursuit of justice and the elimination of impunity for past human rights violations were high on their shared agenda. The newer, smaller NGOs, some formed to demand further protections for indigenous, women, and the disabled under their current governments, had less exposure to international forums. Amnesty International (AI) and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), two of the larger international human rights NGOs, also sent representatives to the regional conference. As an indicator of the integration that had taken place between Latin American and global NGOs in the past two decades or so, however, the representatives sent by AI and the ICJ were themselves Latin Americans, many with considerable UN experience, who held staff positions in the global organizations. Some Latin American NGOs participating in the Vienna process, such as SERPAJ-AL and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, had previous UN conference experience, having attended the UNCED conference.

Regional Preparations

The regional preparatory meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean took place 18-22 January 1993, in San José, Costa Rica. Governments and NGOs met separately, and the NGOs also submitted materials to the governmental conference. They met after the African regional meeting and the third global PrepCom, but before the governments and NGOs of the Asian region met. At that stage in the overall preparatory process for Vienna, it was already clear that the arrangements and the agenda for the upcoming World Conference would be highly contested by some governments. While the African regional meeting had not quite discarded the tradition that all human rights are universally valid and always applicable, the governments there had come out strongly for the importance of economic development and the need to consider it in evaluations of human rights. A group of Asian and African governments, predictably some that had come in for recent UN scrutiny for poor human rights performances, had indicated that they would question the universal applicability of the concept of human rights. Thus, the Latin American meeting took place with most participants -- governments and NGOs -- fully aware that the potential for movement away from universal ideals, and away from further deepening of international accountability mechanisms for human rights, could either be heightened or moderated as a result of events in San José.

The Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, based in San José, conducted an orientation session³¹ for NGOs the day before the opening of the regional preparatory meeting. At that session, NGOs coordinated lobbying strategies [Azzam, 1993 #496:93]. Jointly and individually, the NGOs prepared detailed, analytical statements that were entered into the conference record.³² The NGOs forthrightly invoked the linkages among differing conceptions of human rights. Looking back to the Rio summit and forward to the Vienna and Beijing

conferences, they stressed the need for better protection of all forms of rights, including the rights of women and environmental considerations.³³ They criticized neoliberal economic models not just for marginalizing some social groups and concentrating wealth, but also for harm to the environment.³⁴ From their own governments, they wanted stronger domestic implementation of international human rights commitments, as well as measures to counter impunity for past violations. They also criticized militarism as an obstacle to full realization of human rights, emphasizing that armed forces should submit to civilian authorities at all times and that the judicial measures of habeas corpus should be upheld even during states of siege.

The NGOs placed other demands on Northern governments. They wanted *developed* governments to work toward closing the developed/developing country gap and emphasized the North's obligation by quoting from the Proclamation of Tehran, issued 25 years earlier at the UN's only previous world conference on human rights. Sandwiched between the African and Asian regional meetings, the Latin American NGOs stood up for the importance of implementing the historical consensus for universal human rights. But they also pushed for expansion of the meaning of those rights in light of the North's impact on the region's economic, social, and cultural history.

The debate among governments at San José centered on democratization and resource issues, such as the right to development and Latin America's history of unequal economic relations with the North [Azzam, 1993 #496:93]. In that respect, they were open to expanded conceptions of human rights while retaining an emphasis on implementing democratic reforms that could be considered consistent with the Western understanding of human rights. They also were receptive to further guarantees of protection for vulnerable social groups.

The government declaration did not diverge widely from the positions advocated by

NGOs, articulating less heated versions of the same arguments. For example, Aimpunity@ appears only in a list of obstacles to human rights.³⁵ The governments emphasized support for international human rights mechanisms, but were quieter about their own responsibilities to investigate and prosecute abuses. Instead, they recognized that Arupture of the democratic order threatens human rights in the country concerned.³⁶

Unlike their NGO counterparts, governments protested human rights-related sanctions: Awhen democratic Governments are making determined efforts to resolve their human rights problems, such problems should not be used for political ends or as a condition for extending assistance or socio-economic cooperation.³⁷ Their characterization of Aobstacles to the observance of human rights,@ which was one of the agenda items, emphasized the international economic and political obstacles, with only a nod to domestic failings such as Athe lack of genuinely independent systems of justice.³⁸ The San José statement did not include any version of the phrase Anational and regional particularities,@ which the other regional governmental statements used as a veiled questioning of universalism, but instead emphasized international cooperation.

The Latin American governments met with NGO representatives during the San José conference. As a result of the NGO organizing and lobbying at San José, the governments incorporated some of the NGOs= points in the final statement. In particular, the government references to the UN High Commissioner, the need for strengthening the UN Centre for Human Rights, and the mentions of the need to protect vulnerable groups can be traced to NGO input [Azzam, 1993 #496:93]. The role of NGOs in the protection or advancement of human rights was not mentioned at all in the final governmental statement coming out of San José, however. The governments supported new requests for resources to be devoted to human rights at the

international level, along with newly inclusive rhetoric. But the issue of dealing with past violations was muted by the Latin American governments.

The Global Conference Process

Although they submitted statements, not as many regional and local NGOs attended the global PrepComs as had attended the regional conference. For example, only 60 NGOs in total attended the Fourth PrepCom, although 160 attended the San José meeting.³⁹ Still, as experienced international actors in their own right and experienced collaborators with northern NGOs, Latin American NGOs used their chances for input at the general PrepComs to take principled general stands rather than simply to flag parochial interests. Even though in some respects their concerns had expanded beyond the old issues of torture and other threats to physical integrity, toward greater attention to the rights of the poor, women, the disabled, and indigenous peoples, the Latin American NGOs wanted to maintain external pressure upon the governments of their own region to investigate and punish the perpetrators of past violence.

Of the registered NGOs participating at Vienna, 236 out of 1529 organizations came from Latin America.⁴⁰ The NGO Forum met in the three days preceding the official conference. During the Forum, the Joint Planning Committee, which had officially facilitated overall NGO participation during the preparatory process, was reorganized to reflect stronger regional representation, and renamed the Liaison Committee [Azzam, 1993 #496:97]. The Latin American NGOs carried their regional concerns to Vienna. With the Asian NGOs, they were also the strongest advocates of maintaining a universal perspective on human rights.

The most striking manifestation of the Latin American perspective was the combination of support for universal conceptions of human rights in tandem with an opposition to external intervention, particularly from the United States. Those resentments came to a head when U.S.

President Jimmy Carter addressed the NGO Forum at Vienna. He had championed human rights in U.S. foreign policy, but the Latin Americans remembered that U.S. security concerns in Latin America had often trumped U.S. human rights rhetoric by aiding or abetting authoritarian governments in their region. Carter was shouted down and had to abandon the rostrum.

The NGOs at Vienna established topical working groups. Five had been planned, and five more were established at the Forum, indicating that all of the attending NGOs were not satisfied with the available options. One of the spontaneously established working groups addressed the issue of military forces and human rights, including specific forms of repression such as disappearances and torture. It also addressed impunity, a main concern of the Latin American NGOs.⁴¹ Latin American NGOs appended an addendum to the final NGO statement because the Forum had not had time to deal with all of their concerns. Their statement did not mention Latin America in particular, but it did offer a detailed analysis of the way that the legacy of North-South economic inequality contributes to human rights violations of all kinds: Grave violations of human rights still occur; in past decades dictatorial regimes were mainly responsible, but in recent years they have been witnessed in restrictive neo-liberal democracies under new forms of authoritarianism engendering corruption, violence and impunity, characteristically appearing with harsh adjustment policies.⁴²

Given the contests over the composition of the final document at Vienna, the Latin Americans occupied a pivotal position. Latin American governments had emerged from colonial rule before the UN was founded; thus, unlike many Asian and African countries, they were charter members of the UN and had helped to draw up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the same time, however, they were also protective of the old governmental norms of territorial

integrity and sovereign non-intervention that imposed potential obstacles to human rights monitoring.

There is little evidence, though, that the Latin American governments became *kingmakers* as a result of straddling the North-South divide. Journalistic and academic accounts of the conference are curiously silent about the positions of the Latin American governments. Latin Americans did not join the vocal opposition to internationally applicable concepts of human rights articulated by Asian and African governments, yet neither did they associate themselves publicly with the strongly universalist positions of the Western governments, led by the United States. Among the statements of governments on the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, only Argentina and Chile are represented from the Latin American region. The Chilean delegate gives a surprisingly blunt statement indicating regrets at governments' role in limiting the procedures and substance of achievements at the conference. Despite the importance of public opinion in favor of human rights, notes the Chilean delegate, the work was done *in private*, almost in secret. Why? I, for one, do not have an answer. Chile would have favored decisions to establish more concrete protections for human rights, he says, but *in forgiveness*, in the name of my delegation and in my own name, for not having been efficient enough in our efforts to achieve [them].⁴³

The Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995

Virginia Vargas, a coordinator of the regional NGO preparatory process, argues that in the last few decades the women's movement in Latin America has moved from a stance of confrontation to one of negotiation vis-à-vis government [Vargas Valente, 1996 #497:45]. As the region has democratized, women have gained some access to political decision making.

However, because many women's rights activists have found that democratization is slow in extending to gender relations, they do not trust that government is sufficiently committed to their cause. Another key aspect of the movement's recent history is the development of its regional consciousness and integration, particularly fostered by the feminist "Encuentros" or meetings held every few years for the last two decades [NGO Forum on Women, 1995 #504:14; Sternbach, 1992 #498]. International links have also grown from former exiles' experiences in Europe and the US during the decades of repression, as well as women's more recent participation in UN world conferences from the mid-70s to the 1990s.

Regional Preparations

Women in civil society disagreed over the extent to which they were willing to ally themselves with their governments during the conference preparations. Many NGO members and independent feminists cooperated with governmental women's agencies in the national-level assessments of women's status [Faccio, 1995 #499:4; Ramírez, 1995 #500:8; Alvarez, 1998 #468:303]. But others were deeply concerned about the potential for state cooptation [Aguila, 1995 #501:15-16].⁴⁴ Meanwhile, for the first time in preparation for a UN women's conference, a region-wide, nongovernmental preparatory process also took place. It roughly followed the regional organizing strategy disseminated by the UN-based NGO coordinating committee for Beijing [NGO Forum on Women, 1995 #504:9-10]. "Focal points" in each country coordinated non-governmental evaluations of the status of women, the results of which were gathered first in six sub-regional meetings, and then brought to the NGO forum of the official regional preparatory meeting in Mar de Plata, Argentina in September 1994. Thematic networks also organized cross-nationally [Vargas Valente, 1996 #497:45, fn.2].

Due to the controversial history of the US Agency for International Development (AID)'s

activities in the region, many women's groups debated over whether or not to accept the funding proffered by the agency, which had been made financially responsible for much of the NGO regional preparatory process. This debate was especially heated in the active women's movement in Brazil, where AID funding was eventually turned down. Organizers in other countries decided it was high time the US gave money for a worthy cause, and took AID up on its offer. And even the Brazilians found alternative external funding; their *Articulation* organizing group was supported by \$40,000 from the Ford foundation, as well as by UNIFEM [Mello, 1994 #502:28-29; Sant'Anna, 1994 #503:5-6].

Twelve hundred people attended the NGO parallel forum to the regional preparatory meeting [NGO Forum on Women, 1995 #504:95], where Vargas's inauguration speech set the tone of the discussions. A central goal of the nongovernmental organizing was insuring the widest possible representation. *ANGOs* and *women's movements* were equally welcomed, and usually both invoked. This drew attention to women's different organizing approaches, which were the subject of considerable debate [Alvarez, 1998 #468308]. Vargas repeatedly stressed the participation of women in all their diversity. Her goal for an inclusive global movement of women was to seek *equity in order to develop differences*. While Beijing was seen not as an end in itself but a way to strengthen women's movements, Vargas also noted that intervention in governmental negotiations was crucial.⁴⁵

The goals of diverse participation and governmental influence were not united at Mar de Plata. The emphasis on hearing different women's voices **B** from indigenous peasants to Catholic activists **B** resulted in contentious discussions throughout the workshops and plenaries. Moreover, due to their sense that the dominant Argentine political party was too tightly controlling the NGO parallel conference, a group of independent Argentine feminists, along with

activists from Bolivia and Mexico, held their own, parallel-to-the-parallel forum with a set of meetings off-site. The result of the expression of differences was that little attention was paid to lobbying governments. This oversight could not be wholly blamed on the dynamics of the regional meeting; only one of the three documents prepared for general discussion at the conference mentioned lobbying strategies directly.

A broad reading of the issues introduced at the official meeting shows a set of preoccupations similar to those of NGOs. The regional document focused on eight priority areas, including gender equity, development with a gender perspective, poverty elimination, women's equitable participation in decision making in public and private life, human rights/peace/violence, shared family responsibilities, recognition of cultural plurality, and international support and cooperation.⁴⁶ Moreover, the document mentioned throughout the role of both NGOs and women's movements in achieving gender equity.⁴⁷ The language and emphases of regional NGO documents were often stronger or more precisely targeted, but overall agreement was evident.

However, nine governments B almost half of those participating B indicated their reluctance to go along with language that the majority of NGO representatives supported: challenges to gender relations that were perceived as contravening Catholic doctrine, including sex education, women's reproductive rights, recognizing abortion as a public health problem, and alternative family structures.⁴⁸ In contrast, Latin American NGOs indicated their opposition to the position of the Vatican and its allies on these issues by suggesting that the whole conference reconsider the fact that the Holy See holds governmental rather than nongovernmental status at the UN [NGO Forum on Women, 1995 #504:88].

The Global Conference Process

By the time of the Beijing conference, Latin American activists, particularly regional

leaders, were more focused on lobbying their governments. They had become mobilized by the overall exclusion of NGOs at the Fourth Prepcom in March, 1995 [Valdés, 1995 #505; Clark, 1998 #480:17-19], and the bracketing of language that they supported in the final document, the Platform for Action. Increased participation in North American feminist-controlled global mega-networks also helped to bring Latin American perspectives to global organizing, as well as orient Latin American activists to the lobbying process [Alvarez, 1998 #468:310; NGO Forum on Women, 1995 #504:14; Vargas Valente, 1996 #497:54].

As the conference approached, women focused on the makeup of the official delegations. Feminists in Guatemala, Argentina, and Paraguay objected to the appointment to their delegations of Catholic activists focused on a traditional gender agenda [Asturias, 1995 #506:2; Amado, 1995 #507:3; Rodríguez A., 1995 #508:5]. But overall, their protests met with success, and NGO representatives participated in the official delegations of the majority of Latin American nations [NGO Forum on Women, 1995 #504:15; Alvarez, 1998 #468:303].

At Beijing, Latin America (and the Caribbean) accounted for 5% of those attending the NGO Forum at Huairou, and 147 NGOs were accredited to the official conference (8.2%).⁴⁹ As had become apparent from preparatory organizing, there was a general division between those who came to lobby governments, and those who came to network amongst fellow activists.

It was in the Latin American and Caribbean tent one of several regional tents at the NGO Forum where those particularly identified as movement activists aired objections to lobbying. One observer reported on skeptical activists who felt that we are conforming to their rules. We moved very quickly from consciousness-raising groups to NGOs, and wondered to whom NGOs are accountable [Alvarez, 1998 #468:312-313]. The distance between the site of the official conference and NGO Forum (at least an hour by bus) exacerbated the different

orientations of the participants. For either effective networking or effective lobbying, participants essentially had to choose a site for the day.⁵⁰ But particular leaders made a great effort to be in two places at once, giving regular reports on the official conference back at the regional tent.

As a result of such efforts, the closing declaration from the tent (9/8/95) combined women's preoccupations.⁵¹ It celebrated the vast efforts, both historical and current, that made possible the actions taken at Beijing, particularly the growing emphasis on negotiation or lobbying. It also defended a progressive gender agenda against the attacks of conservative and fundamentalist forces that sought to roll back gains from UN conferences such as Vienna and Cairo. In response, women had a very concrete proposal: **Put the Vatican in Brackets** as it had done to so much of the Platform for Action they supported.

The techniques used at the official conference to solicit governmental response straddled the divisions between the participants. The lobbyists found allies in many of the delegations [Navarro, 1995 #509; Hernández Carballido, 1995 #513:4]. One official delegate who came from an NGO named this new sort of **female** participation: **gossips** (*mujeres del chisme*) who assembled to discuss the platform regularly [León, 1995 #514]. But those accredited to the official conference also took more direct action, particularly around the issue of economics, which they found neglected. After she gave only the opening sentences of her prepared speech to the governmental plenary, Virginia Vargas unfurled a banner displaying the following words: **Transparency** **New Resources** **Economic Justice**. Holding it, she stood in silence for the rest of her allotted time. In another incident, Latin American activists took over the central escalators in the conference center, holding placards reading **Economic Justice Now!** [**Justicia Economica Ya!**] and chanting **Jus-tice!** **Jus-tice!** Such demonstrations were strictly forbidden on UN premises.

As at the regional meeting, many governments' plenary speeches thanked civil society groups for their input in organizing towards Beijing, or recognized their contributions at the national level. But their positions on issues continued to differ, and diverge from NGOs'.

In terms of the impact of economic policies, government representatives from Ecuador, Venezuela, Honduras, Haiti, and Cuba used their plenary speeches to point to the problems stemming from structural adjustment, and/or the insensitivity of the first world to the third world's economic problems.⁵² Madame Lise-Marie DeJean, Haitian Minister for the Feminine Condition and Women's Rights, described how "the application of structural adjustment measures has exacerbated the social distances and the polarization of socioeconomic sectors. As a consequence, women have had to accelerate the rhythm of their work without augmenting their revenue. There has followed a weakening of the process of democratization"⁵³ Other governments drew attention to the problem of poverty in the region, but did not overtly question development policies promoted by first world governments and international and regional multilateral lending institutions.

In their perspectives on gender relations, Latin American governments continued in the same vein as the regional conference. Some joined with "fundamentalist" Islamic governments in opposing women's control over their bodies, alternative family structures, and the rights of sexual minorities. This was illustrated by the often amusing, yet deadly serious debate over the use of the word "gender." During the preparatory process, the Vatican objected to the feminist usage of the word gender, which makes a distinction between biological sex and the roles, expectations, and actions of socialized men and women. Such a definition challenges the complementary roles fixed by church doctrine, as well as opens the door to different sexual orientations. The Archbishop of Tegucigalpa and President of the Latin American Episcopal Conference, Oscar

Rodríguez, went as far as to assert that the goal of Beijing was to force society to accept five types of gender: masculine, feminine, lesbian, homosexual and transsexual [quoted in Franco, 1998 #511:282]. At the final PrepCom Honduras took the lead in insisting that gender be bracketed throughout the Platform for Action, pending a satisfactory definition.⁵⁴ Mysteriously, when Spanish-speaking delegates arrived in Beijing, they found their version of the Platform for Action substituted asex for gender all the way through.

While this mistake and the conflict over the term were resolved in favor of keeping gender in the document, the larger debate continued throughout the conference. Plenary statements from Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina, and Platform for Action reservations from the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru affirmed that life begins at conception.⁵⁵ A plenary statement from Chile and reservations from Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela opposed legalizing abortion and/or using it as a method of family planning. In the Platform for Action negotiations Peru and Guatemala insisted women leaders be also referred to as mothers.⁵⁶ Argentina and Ecuador objected to language giving women the right to control their fertility because it would be conferring new rights upon women.⁵⁷ In reservations, Argentina and Peru defined the family as based on the relationship between a man and a woman; Paraguay and Guatemala declared gender to refer to both sexes; and Peru held that asexual rights only applied to heterosexual relationships.

Thus, taking the entire Beijing process into account, Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru followed the Vatican line and opposed the ideas of their own NGOs to some extent. On the other hand, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay were either supportive or silent on such issues.⁵⁸

Conclusions

Having analyzed Latin American participation in the various UN conference processes, we are now able to return to our initial questions. What has the behavior of actors in this bridging region revealed about the current state of political boundaries? To what extent are Latin Americans a part of the transformations in international state-society relations implied by the concept of global civil society? Do Latin Americans participate in international debates as the South, as a junior partner to the United States, or in ways which challenge regional foreign policy patterns?

In answer to the first question, we find Latin Americans to be active participants in the formation of a new global civil society. Many NGO representatives agreed to support governmental efforts at the conferences, helping to write national reports, actively lobbying governments at regional and international meetings, and even participating as official delegates. Governments were mildly appreciative of NGO efforts, occasionally mentioning their role in implementing final agreements. But other NGOs turned to each other, creating networks among global citizens and bypassing the governmental framework. While environmental NGOs found common cause most easily with others from the global South, historical developments guided human rights and women's NGOs to cooperate with their Northern counterparts.

While the new plurality of international actors from the region supports the arguments of global civil society theorists, it is less clear that the multiple actors have reached consensus on new global values and solutions, however. An examination of issues reveals certain common understandings along with a growing difference of perspectives. In general, governments would often present a list of concerns similar to that of NGOs, albeit less transformatory in tone and demands. In particular, NGOs and governments alike stressed the need to address the economic

issues of debt, poverty, and development. However, NGOs tended to be more critical of global market-based remedies to economic crisis, while particular governments crossed the North/South divide to support Northern initiatives. Governments tempered their advocacy of universal rights, particularly women's rights, through sovereign or cultural concerns B although here again, some governments allied themselves with less traditionalist Northern countries on these issues. NGOs as a whole were much more supportive of universal rights. But they still maintained the distinction between the need for real implementation of global rights principles and resistance to external intervention.

Our study thus shows that in contemporary Latin America, certain state/society boundaries are being transformed. NGOs are increasingly finding ways to influence their governments through international institutions, sometimes pursuing issues that are difficult to address in the national context. NGOs are also finding allies from different world regions, NGOs and governments alike, to support positions that their own governments are unwilling to advocate. The extent to which NGOs attempt to ally with their own governments seems, logically, to depend on how much NGOs believe that governments can have an impact on the problems at hand. For example, as rights issues are often dependent on governmental action, women's and human rights NGOs maybe more inclined to insert themselves in the governmental process.

The answer to the second question posed in this paper is that issue characteristics are important for predicting the geographic alliances of Latin Americans. None of their participation, however, supports the claim of simple United States hegemony over the foreign policy choices of the region on these issues -- even on the aspects of these issues most closely related to security concerns.

Latin American governmental participants most consistently took ASouthern@positions on economic issues at all three conferences. Since economic issues dominated the environmental conference, but were less prominent at the conferences on human rights and women, this meant that only in Rio did most Latin Americans decisively line up with the G-77 as a whole. Even at Rio, however, several Latin American countries agreed with the United States and Northern countries on some funding issues, breaking from other Southern countries.

On non-economic issues, the North/South divide is a poor guide for characterizing Latin American governmental positions. At Vienna, regional governments were willing to quietly endorse universal human rights, a position that caused Latin Americans to break with other Southern regions. At Beijing, Latin American governments were clearly making their own way between the Vatican, domestic NGO influence, and other pressures that had little to do with North/South divisions. And even at Rio, on non-economic issues Latin American governments were divided in their priorities and positions. At all the conferences, governmental delegations found common ground on numerous issues with governments outside the region and outside the South.

Beneath specific positions, there is some evidence that Latin American governments continue to think in defensive terms often associated with the South. Especially at Rio and Vienna, they expressed resentment over international efforts to implement norms for matters they considered internal, especially when international sanctions were threatened. At the same two conferences, at least some Latin American governments indulged in debates over where to place the blame for regional failures to meet new standards on the environment and human rights, preferring to blame international and Northern rather than internal forces. Nonetheless, these kinds of sovereignty claims are not limited to countries of the South [Clark, 1998 #494].

Finally, the role of NGOs at the three conferences also questions any simple global division between North and South. Both at home and in these international fora, Latin American citizen participation occupies a mixed position. Citizen participation is neither as routine as it is in many countries of the North, nor as circumscribed as it is in many Southern countries. Latin American NGOs themselves protect some of their separation from their governments. The content of their participation is also mixed. On certain issues, they stand with their governments and other governments of the South; on many others, they build alliances instead with other NGOs, of both the North and South.

Through the lens of Latin American participation at global issue conferences, then, the final image that emerges is that of a world of considerable complexity. Important regional changes -- themselves with global dimensions -- feed back into the international system in ways which only partially reconstruct existing divisions and categories. Divisions between state and society, and North and South, are bridged in the region, but not fundamentally transformed.

Endnotes

¹ UN Document E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.3: ARegional Programme of Action for the Women of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995-2001 from the Sixth Regional Conference on the Integration of Women into the Economic and Social Development of Latin America and the Caribbean, Mar de Plata, Argentina, 20 to 25 September 1994.

² In this paper, we use the label NGOs as a shorthand to designate what is in fact a wide array of non-governmental actors. In the Rio and Beijing conference processes, non-governmental participants from Latin America insisted on referring to themselves as ANGOs and social movements, and we recognize the distinctions between these kinds of actors, as well as between them and interest groups. Nonetheless, we use the NGO label not only as shorthand, but also because it is the United Nations label for any non-governmental actors which participate in its processes.

³ [Co-author] observed the Vienna NGO Forum; the NGO Forum of the Latin American Regional Preparatory Meeting at Mar de Plata, Argentina; and the Beijing Conference, both the NGO Forum and the official meetings. She attended the Beijing Conference as an accredited NGO representative. [Co-author] observed four preparatory meetings of the Brazilian NGO Forum for UNCED in 1990 and 1991; a Latin America NGO preparatory Forum sponsored by Friends of the Earth in Sao Paulo, Brazil; and the official and parallel meetings of the Fourth UNCED PrepCom.

⁴ For the UNCED, the relevant document is the Tlatelco Platform, AFinal Document of the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Developmentwritten in Mexico City, March 4-7, 1991, and published in Muñoz (1992:118-127). For the WCHR, it is UN Document A/CONF.157/LACRM/15 (A/CONF.157/PC/58), 11 February 1993: AFinal Declaration of the Regional meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Conference on Human Rights.

⁵ See UN Document A/CONF.157/PC/42/Add.1 of 1 June 1993, AReport on Other Meetings and Activities, para. 120, entitled, ALa Nuestra: Analysis and Strategies for Women's Human Rights, (San José, 3-5 December 1992), pp. 25-9.

⁶ Virginia Vargas, ADiscurso de Inaguración, Foro de ONGs B Mar de Plata. Unpublished Mimeo, n.d.

⁷ The Group of 77, or G-77, is an organization of Southern countries that emerged in the 1970s as a bloc to put Southern development concerns on the international agenda. At all three conferences discussed here, the G-77 operated as a more-or-less unified coalition of well over 100 states.

⁸ *Our Own Agenda: 85. Acuerdos de Las Vertientes*, (NGO CDROM, Santiago, Chile, October 23-27, 1989), Point 1. This CD-ROM, compiled by the Third World Institute in Uruguay, contains approximately 30,000 pages of primary NGO documents pertaining to the Rio Conference. It is cited below as NGO CDROM. Where possible, dates and pages cited are from the original documents. All translations are by authors.

⁹ Quote from *Acuerdos de Las Vertientes*, Point 3.

¹⁰ The Tlatelco Platform, in (Muñoz 1992), 118-127.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Points 9-14.

¹² *Ibid.*, Point 19. The UN guidelines appear in A/CONF.151/PC8.

¹³ AEncuentro de los Andes/Taller del Cono Sur, (NGO CDROM, São Paulo, Brazil, February 26-27, 1991): Sections 2 and 9.

¹⁴ *Acuerdo de los Andes*, (NGO CDROM, Las Leñas, Argentina, April 14-20, 1991): 1.

¹⁵ This summary is based on analysis of several NGO newspapers which provided daily coverage of the governmental

negotiations. See *CrossCurrents* and *Earth Summit Bulletin* (NGO CDROM).

¹⁶ *CrossCurrents* PC2(4), (April 3-5, 1991): 1.

¹⁷ *CrossCurrents* PC4(8), (March 26-29, 1992): 5.

¹⁸ *Report of the UNCED*, Vol. II, (NY: United Nations, 1992): 20. No other Latin American countries submitted written reservations, which allow a participating state to express formal dissent from specific parts of official international agreements, to the Conference Proceedings.

¹⁹ *CrossCurrents* PC4(7), (March 23-25, 1992): 10.

²⁰ *CrossCurrents* PC4(9), (March 30-April 1, 1992): 4.

²¹ *Earth Summit Bulletin* 4(20), (March 27, 1992): 2.

²² *CrossCurrents* PC3(5), (August 21-22, 1991): 14 .

²³ PrepComs (Preparatory Committee meetings) are global in scope and focus on drafting conference documents.

²⁴ *CrossCurrents* PC4(3), (March 9-11, 1992): 20.

²⁵ ^ASave UNCED: an urgent message to governments@ (NGO CDROM, New York, March 12, 1992).

²⁶ Cited in *CrossCurrents*, PC4(7), (March 23-25, 1992): 12.

²⁷ *CrossCurrents* PC4(7), (March 23-25): 12.

²⁸ ^AActa de las Reuniones del Foro Paralelo de la UNCED Celebrada entre los Grupos Latinoamericanos y del Caribe,@ (New York: Mimeo, March 15, 1992). The report also admits that the official delegates had little time to give their positions, since too many NGOs had talked for too long.

²⁹ *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, Vols. II and III, (New York: United Nations, 1992). The missing heads of state were those of Venezuela (whose president was not allowed by the Senate to leave the country), El Salvador, Ecuador, and Panama.

³⁰ ^APeople's Earth Declaration,@ (NGO CDROM, Rio de Janeiro, June, 1992): 1.

³¹ ^ANGO-Newsletter Number 2,@ February 1993, Prepared by the Joint NGO Planning Committee, in Nowak (1994: 212).

³² A/CONF.157/PC/72, Annex I, ^ARecommendations and Proposals Submitted by the Non-Governmental Organizations Present in San Jose.@"

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 7-8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁵ ^AFinal Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Conference on Human Rights,@ in UN Document A/CONF.157/LACRM/15 of 11 February 1993, ^AReport of the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Conference on Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 18-22 January 1993,@ item 10.

³⁶ San José Declaration, item 5.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, item 12.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, item 10.

³⁹ Compare UN Document A/CONF.157/LACRM/INF.1, 5 February 1993, *World Conference on Human Rights, Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean San Jose, Costa Rica, 18-22 January 1993, List of Attendance*, pp. 12-23, with the figure of 60 quoted by Azzam (1993:95).

⁴⁰ Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, *Statistics on NGO-participation in the World Conference on Human Rights*, in *ANGO-Newsletter Number 4* (July 1993), reprinted in Nowak (1994:224).

⁴¹ UN Document A/CONF.157/7 of 14 June 1993, *Written Report by the General Rapporteur, Manfred Nowak*, as adopted by the Final Plenary Session of the NGO-Forum, reprinted in Nowak (1994:77-95).

⁴² UN Document A/CONF.157/7/Add.1, *Addendum 1 to the Final Report of the NGO-Forum*, Preamble, para. 4, reprinted in Nowak (1994:95).

⁴³ *Declaración de la delegación de Chile*, Statement made upon the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, nd, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Online at <<http://www.unhchr.ch/htm./menu5/d/statmnt/chile.htm> >

⁴⁴ The broader debate over autonomy would preoccupy participants at the regional feminist Encuentro held in November of 1995.

⁴⁵ Vargas, *Discurso de Inauguración*.

⁴⁶ UN Document E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.3, *Regional Programme of Action for the Women of Latin America and the Caribbean*.

⁴⁷ The extent to which women's organizations were incorporated was well illustrated by one of the strategic actions to enhance power-sharing:
A172. Promoting recognition of and respect for the autonomy of women's movements and non-governmental organizations, and raising the awareness of other organizations of civil society so that they incorporate the gender approach and use equitable procedures for distributing posts; and systematizing processes of consultation with non-governmental organizations and women's organizations in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies that support women.

⁴⁸ Ecuador took seven reservations, Argentina six, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru five, Nicaragua and Honduras four, and Venezuela one.

⁴⁹ NGO Forum (1995:16); calculations based on *List of Accredited Non-Governmental Organizations Who Were Represented at the Fourth World Conference on Women*. Online at <gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/unconfs/women/ngo/attendee>. The most came from Argentina (19), Mexico (18), and Peru and Brazil (15). Chile sent ten and Cuba, Bolivia and Colombia nine, Uruguay eight, Venezuela six, the Dominican Republic five, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador four, Guatemala three, Honduras and Nicaragua two, and Haiti and Panama one. By rough estimation, most of the accredited NGOs were focused on women's rights and/or women's movement (34) or research (34). Work-related groups numbered 14. There were eight family planning groups, seven working on human rights, six focused on the family and representing foundations, five indigenous/peasant women's groups, four in the areas of health, civic participation, Catholicism, and organizing among poor women, three focused on the environment, two each on gay/lesbian rights, anti-violence, and right-to-life, and one disabled, Afro-Latin, and youth group.

⁵⁰ Even before the official conference started, those who planned to lobby were often busy at their Beijing hotels planning strategy, or devoted their on-site Forum time to it.

⁵¹ Indigenous women presented their own declaration to the official plenary, much of which focused on general demands of indigenous peoples, such as the international and national recognition and protection of their particular rights, and increased allotment of development resources.

⁵² Government Plenary Statements can be found online at
<gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/unconfs/women/conf/gov/>

⁵³ Discours de Madame Lise-Marie DeJean, Ministre a la Condition Feminine et aux Droits de la Femme, 12 Septembre 1995, Quatrieme Conference Mondiale sur la Femme, Beijing, Chine, 4 au 15 Septembre, 1995. Online at
<gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/unconfs/women/conf/gov/950913173935>

⁵⁴ *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 14(5), (3 April 1995).

⁵⁵ Platform for Action reservations can be found following the Platform for Action (Document 127) in *The United Nations and the Advancement of Women, 1945-1996* (New York: UN DPI, 1996), 723-735.

⁵⁶ *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 14(15), (9 September 1995).

⁵⁷ *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 14(12), (6 September 1995).

⁵⁸ Not all governmental positions were consistent. In the only appearance of a head of state at the FWCW, Peruvian President Fujimori defended his progressive birth control policies against the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which he saw reacting in a disproportionate manner by trying to prevent the Peruvian State from carrying out a modern and rational policy of family planning. (Unofficial Translation from Spanish Original Speech Given by the President of the Republic of Peru, H.E. Alberto Fujimori, Before the IV World Conference on Women, September 15, 1995, Beijing, China. Online at <gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/unconfs/women/conf/gov/950915131946>