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Emerging social  
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Evaluation of perceived successes  
and dilemmas

Solomon Ojo

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## Abstract

Essentially, the importance of social movements in any organized and even non-organized settings cannot be underestimated. A number of social movements have actually emerged all over the world, with specific aims and objectives. Social movements are seen as organized groups, usually agitating for equality, better living conditions for people, justice, political representation, etc. In Nigeria today, there are more than one hundred social movements that have emerged to address a number of issues that are pertinent for the survival, growth and development of human lives and the protection of property. Specifically, in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the roles being played daily by the newly-emerged social movements addressing the core issues of underdevelopment, resource control, environmental protection and political marginalization cannot be underestimated. A number of approaches are being employed to drive home their demands by the newly-emerged social movements. However, this study is meant to evaluate perceived successes and dilemmas among members and leaders of some selected social movements, and to investigate the influence of personal characteristics, personality characteristics and environmental factors. A total of 72 participants (members and leaders) of social movements participated in the study with 60 (83.3 percent) males and 12 (16.7 percent) females. The study was a survey which utilized ex-post facto design. Questionnaire format was employed for data collection and statistical analysis of multiple regression and descriptive statistics were employed in analyzing the collected data.

The results revealed that personal characteristics (gender, age, educational status, family background, marital status, religion, and faith) showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements [ $F(7, 64) = 3.69, P < .05; R^2 = .29$ ]. The results revealed also that personality characteristics (extraversion, conscientiousness, openness to experience, agreeableness, and neuroticism) showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes [ $F(5, 66) = 6.62, P < .05; R^2 = .33$ ]. Also, the results revealed that the environmental factors (degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from Governmental institutions, level of agitations in the movements, and degree of group cohesiveness in the movements) showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes [ $F(4, 67) = 3.03, P < .05; R^2 = .15$ ]. The results revealed further that personal factors showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [ $F(7, 64) = 2.81, P < .05; R^2 = .24$ ]. Similarly, personality characteristics showed significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [ $F(5, 66) = 6.66, P < .05$ ]. However, the results revealed that the environmental factors did not show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [ $F(4, 67) = 1.31, P > .05; R^2 = .07$ ].

The results were extensively discussed. And it was established that some personal factors, personality characteristics and environmental factors are relevant in the understanding of evaluation of successes among leaders and members of social movements. Also, the results established that some personal factors and personality characteristics are important in the evaluation of dilemmas among leaders and members of social movements.

**Keywords:** Social Movements, Perceived Successes, Perceived Dilemmas, Niger Delta Region, Nigeria, Leaders, Members.

## Introduction

The issue of social movements has attracted marked attention from international scholars. In Nigeria today, social movements are highly prevalent and fight for one just cause or another. However, this issue of social movements cannot be properly understood without considering its historical background around the world. For example, “throughout the history of the United States, social movements have been a staple in the maturation of the country. Prior to the industrial revolution and development of the modern nation-state, insurgents organized within a small geographic area and pressed for change using idiosyncratic tactics. However, a number of broad social changes transformed the way people pursue collective action. From middle class white women’s desire to be included in the American political process in the nineteenth century came the Women’s Suffrage movement. The insurgence of a generation of African Americans who felt they had inalienable rights that deserved to be acknowledged by their government led to the 1960s Civil Rights movement” (Bostic, 2007).

It is on record also that as early as the years of the American Revolution, the sophisticated mobilization of the American people showed the characteristics of a modern social movement (Bostic, 2007). For instance, women in Philadelphia were found to have proposed the creation of a national women’s organizational movement to raise money for the troops and to have refused to use British tea and fabrics. Women helped to ignite one of the earliest nonprofit organizations in the history of the nation, the “Daughters of Liberty” (which continues today). Women organized mass spinning bees for wartime clothes making, conducted national boycotts, and some women even disguised themselves as men and fought in the army (Evans 1989: 49, cited in Bostic, 2007).

Essentially, according to sociologist Doug McAdam in his political process model (cited in Bostic, 2007), a social movement is a continuous phenomenon that thrives on the ability of the progressive community to capitalize on political opportunities and translate such opportunities into social change. For example, the Settlement House movement in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century served as an aspect of a larger Anti-poverty movement. The settlement houses focused on various social services, such as unemployment, childcare, and city sanitary regulations (Boyer, Clifford, and Sandra, 1998, 424, cited in Bostic, 2007). The federal government has adopted some portions of the settlement house movement’s agenda as public works, while many of the poverty related issues that Jane Addams and her peers fought for still exist and are being pursued by current nonprofit agencies (Bostic, 2007). Similarly, the social movement has also been coined as a group of people with a common ideology who try to achieve certain general goals together (<http://www.wordweboonline.com/en/SOCIALMOVEMENT>). With this definition, it is clear that a social movement is usually about achieving commonly desired outcomes.

According to Gläser (2004), one of the problems in understanding social movements as collectivities is that such an understanding implies a notion of membership. Membership in social movements has proven to be one of its most elusive features. As early as 1957, Turner and Killian (1957:246, cited in Gläser, 2004) attributed an “indefinite and shifting membership” to social movements. This feature has been confirmed repeatedly (Gläser, 2004). Neidhart and Rucht (1991; 451, cited in Gläser, 2004) note that considering that movements do not have clear membership criteria and that, consequently, the difference between inside and outside is necessarily vague, is important to distinguish the following categories with respect to the movement’s adherents: i) core activists (which in turn could be subdivided into movement leaders, staff, transitory teams, etc.), ii) participant contributors, and iii) sympathizers. Essentially, Neidhart and Rucht (1991:451, cited in Gläser, 2004) clearly emphasize not to consider contributors and sympathizers as part of a movement. In a much clearer analysis, Della Porta and Diana (1999:17, cited in Gläser, 2004) go one step further in stating that “(s)trictly speaking, social movements do not have members, but participants”. The interpretation is of course at odds with treating social movements as a specific collectivity, which hints to the core problem of the discussion about membership. It is difficult to imagine a collectivity whose membership can be theoretically described but not completely empirically identified (Gläser, 2004). In line with this, Stoecker (1995:113, cited in Gläser, 2004) believes that a social movement consists of people who participate in demonstrations and identify themselves as involved in the movement.

Another important factor associated with social movements is the issue of identity. Essentially, Gläser (2004) stresses that the collective identity of a social movement is ascribed a decisive role in the movement’s formation, persistence and effectiveness. Accordingly, the construction of a collective identity is seen as an ongoing process that occurs in the interactions among members of the social movement, as well as between the social movement and its environment (eg Melucci, 1988: 342-343, cited in Gläser, 2004). Additionally, it is emphasized that, at least for some members, participation in a social movement (and thereby sharing its identity) is not a means but an end in itself (Gamson, 1992:56, cited in Gläser, 2004). Gläser (2004) therefore notes that these statements indicate a strong link between identity and membership. In support of this, Diani (1992, cited in Gläser, 2004) highlights that collective identity plays an essential role in defining the boundaries of social movement and that only those actors, sharing the same beliefs and sense of belonging can be considered part of a social movement.

In Nigeria today, a number of social movements have come up in their bid to draw national and international attention to a number of social, economic and political injustices. The movements include the Environmental Rights Action/ Friends of the Earth, Nigeria (ERA/FOEN), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Niger Delta Wetlands Centre (NDWC), Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organization (ND-HERO), Ijaw Council for Human Rights (ICHR), the Niger Delta Focus (NDF), the Women Initiatives Network (WINET), African Environmental Action Network (EANET-Africa), Niger Delta Oil Producing Communities Development Organization (NIDOPCODO), Anpez Centre for Environment and Development (ACFED) and Niger Delta Peace Coalition (NDPC). These are just a few of the environmental, human rights and civil society organizations in the region (Onduku, 2003).

In view of the development of social movements in the Niger delta region and the resulting unrest and expression of the feelings of neglect by the people, a new body meant to bring about peace in the region, known as Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), was established by the Federal Government of Nigeria. By simple analysis, the Niger Delta is said to be a region that sustains

much oil exploration and exploitation by the agents of western economic powers. The Niger Delta basin is considered the mainstay of the Nigerian economy for its significantly high level of oil reserves. The region is also naturally endowed with viable deposits of hydrocarbon and gas reserves (Onduku, 2003).

The Niger Delta remains crucial to the Nigerian economy. The oil and gas that sustain the nation are produced in the region and its adjacent continental shelf. In recent years, the region has grown into a huge complex enigma that is difficult to explain even by the most informed analysis (Naanen, 2004). Accordingly, this developed situation, which is an amalgam of ethnic conflicts, youth restiveness, insurrection and brazen criminality, has taken the form of ferocious internal wars (Naanen, 2004).

Historically, the Niger Delta has always produced some of the major impulses that define Nigerian history, led by palm oil in the 19th and first half of the 20th century and crude oil thereafter (Naanen, 2004). Accordingly, the European scramble for protected oil markets in the region led ultimately to the creation of the Nigerian state by the British at the beginning of the 20th century. In the late 1960s, the state thus created was threatened by secession, which resulted in a thirty-month civil war. This conflict was critically linked to the Delta. Naturally, since the 1990s, oil-related turmoil in the region has repeatedly threatened to unravel the cohesion of the Nigerian state (Naanen, 2004).

Also, another scramble for Niger Delta oil is going on among Western economies. The importance of African (Niger Delta) oil to the US economy, following the formidable challenges to American supremacy in the Middle East, is now well known (Naanen, 2004). The discovery of oil in the Niger region has aggravated its revolutionary tendency. The early 1990s marked a watershed in the Niger Delta struggle with the outbreak of the Ogoni revolution (Naanen, 2004). Accordingly, like savanna fire, a new phase of the struggle rapidly spread to the other parts of the Niger Delta. But lacking the kind of disciplined leadership that the Ogoni have, MOSOP (Mobilization for the survival of the Ogoni People), which has kept the resistance relatively non-violent from the Ogoni side, the struggle was made to assume a radical dimension elsewhere in the Niger Delta. At this stage, the demands of the Niger Delta people revolved mainly around the core issues of underdevelopment, resources control, environmental protection and political marginalization (Naanen, 2004).

It was observed that the oil economy was generating a rapid momentum of its own as cheap oil money had a pervasive and corrupting effect in politics. The military and its civilian clientele (the "militariat", according to Ibeanu, cited in Naanen, 2004) accumulated fantastic personal wealth at the expense of national development. Control of oil-bearing land and controlled access to the transnational oil companies (TNOCS) became highly lucrative, generating intra and inter-communal conflict (Naanen, 2004). According to Naanen, ethnicity and local platforms for prosecuting the struggle for a share of the oil wealth, whereby large numbers of unemployed youths, alienated by their own social condition, which provided crack troops of the ethnic-based conflicts. Clearly, every major ethnic movement had its own youth wing, popularly known as "ethnic militias", and in certain situations they served as the military arm of these movements. A good example is the Ijaw National congress (IYC), and the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) for MOSOP (Naanen, 2004).

Additionally, it is observed that having defended their ethnic and local communities with military forces, the youth discovered their own power and potential and as such were inspired and at the same alienated by the enrichment, through oil money, of the elite and their very elders. Thus the youth now went on to seize power from their elders in various localities. In Ogoni, insurgent youth forced into exile those chiefs they perceived to oppose the interests of the Ogoni people. In other places, youth put to death community leaders they deemed to



have misappropriated compensation or project funds from all the oil companies (Naanen, 2004). In essence, it is observed that for most community leaders, the fear of the young became the beginning of wisdom. Accordingly, village chiefs involved in power struggles against their opponents, especially over the control of oil funds, allied themselves with community's youth groups. The youth power has therefore been mostly exercised in relation to oil companies and regarding projects involving money in the communities (Naanen, 2004). Along this line of revelations, in order for the youths to obtain legitimate or illegitimate shares of oil money, they occupied oil production facilities and oil company premises and took oil workers hostage. In some cases, in recent times, they have killed these hostages. In April 2004, five seized oil workers including Americans were brutally murdered while negotiations for their release were still going on. The warlords and their private armies sustain themselves on a variety of oil-related sources, including what amounts to protection payments from oil companies and other corporate bodies (Naanen, 2004).

To a considerable extent, the geographical location of the Niger Delta and its resources determine the traditional occupation of the people: fishing and farming. But politics is the major issue the Niger Delta (Onduku, 2003). This is mainly due to the prolonged neglect of the people's welfare by the Federal Government of Nigeria and the nonchalant attitude of the oil multinationals (Onduku, 2003). The people of the Niger Delta believe that they have no substantial benefit to show for their sacrifices, despite being the "goose that laid the golden egg" the economic success that underpins the unity of the Nigerian State. They also believe they are now at that stage in history when they must put into practice an old proverb of them which states that "anyone who takes what belongs to a child and raises his/her hand up; when he gets tired he must put down his hand and the child will take his objects back (what belongs to him)" (Nwoka, 2000, cited in Onduku, 2003).

However, security forces have always responded to demands put forward by the people of the Niger Delta in a brutal manner: many of the locals have been maimed, women have been raped and many have met untimely deaths (Onduku, 2003). Local villages like Odi, Opia-Ikenyan, Okerenkoko and Ogoniland have been destroyed by the Nigerian military through the use of excessive force in counter insurgency measures (Onduku, 2003). Aside from this, Onduku notes that there is prevailing tension in the region. Specifically, according to Onduku, travels across the three core states of the Niger Delta –Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers States– revealed how the instability in the region has translated into violent political, socioeconomic, ethnic and communal conflicts. In the urban cities in particular, there has been a resurgence of the ethnic animosities leading to considerable violence and destruction. For example, in Warri, the commercial nerve centre of Delta State, a crisis erupted in March 1997 involving the three ethnic groups in the city: the Itsekiris versus the Ijaws on one side, and the Itsekiris versus the Urhobos on the other. The conflict revolved mainly around issues of political representation, land, political justice and social contract. The root cause of the crisis was the change of the seat of local government headquarters from Ogbeloh (an Ijaw community) to Ogidigben (an Itsekiri community) in 1997. Although the discord amongst the various groups has been traced back to the formations left behind by some of the early national political leaders, the people had over the years lived together, inter-married and peacefully participated in various local endeavors (Onduku, 2003).

Today, the security situation has compelled most of the oil companies to move to Port-Harcourt, which is a relatively safer city for oil business in the area. Most companies now employ their own security units (Onduku, 2003). For instance, Shell in Nigeria has a special arm of the Nigeria Police Force, trained by the national police force but funded and paid by the multinational

company. The riots of January/February 2003 were attributed to the maneuvers in the party primaries of the ruling political party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which is the major party amongst the 30 registered political parties that participated in the April 2003 elections (Onduku, 2003). Many attributed the disturbances to the perceived delineation of new political boundaries in Warri-South Local Government Area as part of the exercises of the state electoral body –the Delta State Independent Electoral Commission– because of perceived political imbalance by some of the ethnic groups in the local council area. The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) is the leading peoples' organization at the forefront of the struggle for resource control and environmental justice in the Niger Delta. It was formed on December 11, 1998 with the issuance of the Kaiama Declaration that revealed the unabated damage to the environment due to uncontrolled exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas, which in turn has led to numerous oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, the opening up of forests for loggers, indiscriminate canalization, flooding, land subsistence, coastal erosion, earth tremors, etc (Onduku, 2003).

The Kaiama Declaration generated massive controversy and led to the massacre of hundreds of Ijaw youths in the hands of the security agents (Onduku, 2003). Despite being labelled as one of the most volatile military groups in the region, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) has continued to intervene to prevent the involvement of some youth groups in sea-piracy activities in the riverine communities, an activity which still prevails especially in the Bomadi Local Government Area which is the axis of the region (Onduku, 2003). The group had in the past intervened in the release of expatriate staff of the oil companies that had been made hostages, kidnapped and hijacked by armed youths in the region. Such activities have been labelled as an anti-Ijaw struggle geared towards self-determination and resource control. Therefore, the IYC has consistently taken their campaigns to the rural communities, government and the oil multinationals (Onduku, 2003).

In another dimension, social movements have also been identified in Latin America. Notably, the last two decades have seen an upsurge of Latin American social movements challenging the neoliberal paradigm and the governments that impose it. Movements such as the indigenous mobilization against water privatizations of CONAIE in Ecuador, the *cocaleros* and mobilization against water privatization and gas pipeline investments in Bolivia, the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the landless rural workers of the MST in Brazil, Afro Colombians resisting displacement in a region coveted by investors, and the *piquetero* eruptions of workers and the urban poor in the wake of Argentina's financial crisis confront the region's political and economic systems (Stahler-Sholk, Vandem and Kuecker, 2007).

For example, with reference to Brazil, aside from the identified social movement known as the landless rural workers of the Movimento Sem Terra or MST noted above, another social movement that is very well known in Brazil is the national grassroots consumer movement. Weingarten (2008) stresses clearly that, of all Latin American countries, only Brazil has a national grassroots consumer movement. Accordingly, being a long-time observer of Brazil, he has been interested in the social movements that have grown there since the late 1970s that have voiced the aspirations of ordinary Brazilians. Weingarten (2008) notes that he lived in Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the military government had been at its most repressive stage and any political activity outside narrowly defined channels was outlawed and prohibited. In his analysis, with the military government being found to have loosened its grip in the late 1970s, social movements such as the Liberation Theology's Base communities, the Indigenous Peoples' Defense of the Amazon Rainforest, the Movement to Protect Street Children and others started to appear across the large and diverse country.

Weingarten highlights that he first heard about the consumer movement in Brazil unexpectedly one afternoon while he was listening to a national public radio program about consumerism in Sao Paulo, Brazil, called "Wacko Radio". Several months later he read an article by Judi Chamber in which she mentioned meeting Brazilian "users" at a conference in Europe (Brazilian consumers call themselves "users"). Weingarten expresses that he called Judi in Boston to see if she had any information on Brazilian users, which she kindly gave to Weingarten. The name was that of the user spokesperson known as Graca Fernandez, based in Rio de Janeiro. Weingarten contacted Graca Fernandez and they had a discussion on some important issues regarding the movement's plans to close mental asylums in Brazil.

Further, the growth and development of social movements in Asia cannot be undermined. For example, in Indonesia, Moniaga (2004) highlights that for decades the indigenous peoples of Indonesia had been engaged in low profile struggles against the loss of their rights and pride due to State policies, laws and activities. They started to organize themselves in 1999. Accordingly, more than 200 representatives of indigenous peoples from all over the country gathered in the first congress of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (Kongress Masyarakat Adat Nusantara I, or AMAN I). The congress was originally initiated by Aliansi, Masyarakat Adat Kalimantan Barat / Indigenous Peoples Alliance of West Kalimantan (Aman Kalbar), Jaringan Kerja Pemetan Partisipatif / Participatory Mapping Network (JAPHAMA) and Indigenous People Organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) network (Moniaga, 2004). Moniaga further notes that the congress held in the heart of Jakarta gained large media coverage and resulted in the establishment of Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) or AMAN.

In her analysis, prior to the congress, she showed that many indigenous people had been struggling to save their lands and lives. Many were said to stand up firmly against companies and local authorities taking over their lands, some struggled in quiet ways. In a much clearer analysis, Moniaga highlights how a number of struggles have been against P. T. Inti Indorayan Utama (now called P. T. Toba Lestari), who was granted permits to clear the forest and develop timber plantation for its pulp and paper mill. In the same way, ten women led by Nai Sinta pioneered the struggle in defending their ancestral lands. The land was found to have been secretly transferred to P.T. Inti Indorayan Utama through forged signatories. In another case, youth and elders of Dayak Simpang Inketapang District, West Kalimantan, resisted a palm oil plantation development and logging concession on their customary lands. Similarly, Kalimantan the Dayak Bentians, who are known for their knowledge and skill in rattan cultivation, struggled against logging companies which planned to cut down their forests and run their rattan gardens (Moniaga, 2004).

However, in his own analysis, Brahm (2006) notes that social movements have become a prominent part of politics around the world. However, they tend to have better chances of success in democratic systems; globalization provides opportunities for groups living under dictatorships to still put pressure on their government (Schultz, 1998). The democratization of communication media has both facilitated finding compatriots with similar interests, as well as allowing movements to spread their message and generate pressure for action. The Internet, in particular, has become a powerful mobilizing tool (Brett, 2005).

Groups utilizing online direct action use such tactics as cyber petitions, virtual protests, virtual sit-ins, virtual blockades, gripe sites, email bombs, web hacks, and computer viruses. Movements often use the same tactics they use offline, like petitions, not due to their effectiveness, but because they are familiar (Meikle, 2002, cited in Brahm, 2006). Scholars have also been interested in examining what factors make movements more successful (Giugni, 1998, cited

in Brahm, 2006). Accordingly, Brahm (2006) notes that “success” is difficult to define as movement activists often have no consensus on this issue themselves. However, looking at 53 American groups that challenged the status quo between 1800 and 1945, Gamson in *The Strategy of Social Protest* found that groups were more successful if they were single-issue oriented, used selective incentives, used violence and/or disruptive tactics, and their organization was more bureaucratized, centralized, and not divided into factions. In addition, he finds that exogenous political crises can have significant effects, both positive and negative. Recent studies have also turned to consider how the broader environment affects the prospects for social movement success (Giugni, 1998, cited in Brahm, 2006).

Further, it is noted that some social movement scholars have decried the discipline’s obsession with being scientific at the expense of producing research that is of use to social movement activists. They are interested in “insight into the practices and experiences of organizers, into how collective and personal commitment can be sustained, into relationships between day to day activism and “long-range vision”, into problems of intra-movement contention, organizational rigidity and democracy, etc” (Flacks, 2004). Movement activists are interested in insights from the academic community, but often do not find anything useful (Douglas & Chris, 2005, cited in Brahm, 2006).

From another point of view, much attention has been focused on framing social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988, cited in Brahm, 2006). In particular, many have looked at how social movements can effectively frame issues to bring about change (Benford and Snow, 2000, cited in Brahm, 2006). Injustice frames have been particularly common (Gamson, 1992b, cited in Brahm, 2006). In some movements, such as religious, self-help, or identity-based movements, the injustice dimension may be less significant (Benford and Snow, 2000, cited in Brahm, 2006). “Only a handful of collective action frames have been identified as being sufficiently broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility, and cultural resonance to function as master frames” (Benford and Snow, 2000, cited in Brahm, 2006), namely rights frames (Valocchi, 1996, cited in Brahm, 2006), choice frames (Davies, 1999, cited in Brahm, 2006), injustice frames (Carroll and Ratner, 1996a, cited in Brahm, 2006), environmental justice frames (Cable and Shriver, 1995, cited in Brahm, 2006), culturally pluralist frames (Berbrier, 1998, cited in Brahm, 2006), sexual terrorism frames (Jenness and Broad, 1994, cited in Brahm, 2006), oppositional frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes 1993, cited in Brahm, 2006), hegemonic frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993, cited in Brahm, 2006) and a “return to Democracy” frame (Noonan, 1995, cited in Brahm, 2006). The movement literature has also examined how movement activists utilize “boundary framing” (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994, cited in Brahm, 2006) or “adversarial framing” (Gamson, 1995, cited in Brahm, 2006).

Specifically, in relation to Nigeria, Ikelegbe (2005, cited in Ojo, forthcoming) notes that the Niger Delta region has been embroiled in resistance against the Nigerian State and the multinational oil companies (the capitalists), and that the region is generally restive, with pockets of insurrection and armed rebellion. It is on record that decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and State neglect have led to impoverished, marginalized and exploited citizenry which after more than two decades produced youth-led resistance (Ikelegbe, 2005, cited in Ojo, forthcoming). The multinational corporations operating in the region include Chevron, Texaco, Exxon-Mobil, Total, Agip, SPDC, ELF and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). And, it is on record that there are over 600 oil fields, 5,284 onshore and offshore oil wells, 10 Export Terminals, 275 flow stations, 4 refineries and liquefied national gas projects (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, 2007:5, cited in Nwaodike and Ebiefa, 2009).

Research also suggests that social movement identification of problems and causes restricts the range of solutions and strategies deemed possible by the group (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992, cited in Brahm, 2006). Social movements appear to have little influence over the media organizations which cover themselves or their assertions (Entman & Rojecki, 1993, cited in Brahm, 2006). Giugni (1998) highlights that early studies have been found to deal with the effectiveness of disruptive and violent action, and with the role of several organizational variables for movement success. Furthermore, Giugni emphasizes that scholars have begun to analyze movement outcome in their political context by looking at the role of public opinion, allies and State structures.

### Theoretical Considerations

A number of theoretical considerations have been offered to the understanding of the social movement. Essentially, according to Bostic (2007), studies of social movements have taken various forms and offered many explanations for the genesis and eventual decline of American movements. The definition of social movement that was utilized for this project was based in part on three social movement models. First, there is the classical model of social movements, which argues that social change is the result of a systematic “strain” on the social infrastructure of the political system. Hence, the commotion associated with the “strain” is transformed into feelings of anxiety, frustration, and hostility that lead to the emergence of a social movement (McAdam, 1982: 9). Secondly, the resource mobilization model argues that social movements are the result of the number of “social resources” that are accessible to “unorganized but aggrieved groups, thus making it possible to launch an organized demand for change” (ibid. 211). Although both models offer valid points about the cause of social movements neither one offers a complete analysis of the American social movement.

The third model is McAdam’s political process model of the American Civil Rights movement and addresses the political and the sociological factors that neither the classical nor resource mobilization models focus on. The political process model is based on the assumption that political members reflect an abiding “conservatism” in order to substantiate political power. This conservatism encourages political members to “resist changes that would threaten their current realization of their interests even more than they seek changes which would enhance their interests” (ibid, 38). Unlike the classical model, the political process model relies on the notion that a social movement is a continuous phenomenon that thrives on the interplay of four factors:

- Emergence of broad socioeconomic processes that expand the capacity for more political opportunities over an extended period of time.
- “Readiness” of the indigenous organizations when the political opportunities become available.
- Emergence of a collective consciousness among the challenging groups that encourage the belief that the movement is leading in a successful direction.
- Ability to win the support of external groups in order to broaden the opposition against the conservative political structure (ibid, 40).

In specific terms, the emergence, rising rate and militancy of the social movements in the Niger Delta region have been much associated with age-long

oil and gas exploration and exploitation which have consequently created a huge wealth for the existing multi-national corporations operating in the region and even the government, whose revenue earnings are no less than US\$20 million a day. Yet, the people whose resources are explored and exploited have been made to suffer untold hardship. This has consequently led to different forms and degrees of conflict in the region. This led Ikelegbe (2005), a scholar, to view the ongoing conflict in his paper as "Economy of Conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria". In this note, Ikelegbe puts forward a number of theoretical analyses to explain the ongoing crisis in the region. It is observed that the incidence of primary commodity exports and specifically mineral wealth in states has been found to be associated with conflict and the occurrence and duration of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1998: 568–569; Mwanasali 2000: 145; De Soysa 2000: 123–124, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). As such, this has been related first to the acute struggle for the control of resources, which is said to have increased vulnerability to conflict, violence and war. The struggle by rulers, counter elites and merchants for access to such resources (for accumulation and political consolidation through the patrimony) has indicated increasing appropriation and privatization through exclusive contracts with foreign firms, corruption, external and indigenous commercial networks, emerging challenges from the excluded and ensuing conflicts and violence. This point has been underscored by the fact that these wars tend to be fought by State actors and the hitherto excluded or claimants to the resources and can be regarded as contests over power and wealth (Breytenbach n.d.: 6, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Several conflicts in resource-rich states are usually characterized by a violent scramble to control natural resources (Reno 2003: 45, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). This has led to the characterization of several wars, such as those in Angola, Sudan, Zaire (DRC), Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the form of resource wars, rebellion and insurgencies. It has been identified that in some places where these conflicts have occurred, both rulers and warlords have hired private security companies from different countries, such as the Ukraine and South Africa, to offer security assistance in exchange for privileged resource access (Mair 2003: 13, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005).

The second element underlining the economy of war theory is that greed for economic gains, or what is termed as economics of war, has been identified to be the primary drive or motivation for resistance and war (Reno 1997; Collier 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001: 2. cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). More specifically, there is a triumph of greed over grievance in the causation of conflicts (Reno 2003: 45. cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Here, rebellion and violence are seen as instruments deployed to accumulate in the circumstance of economic crisis and decline and an opportunity to loot and illegally trade in primary commodities and minerals (Allen 1999: 372, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005).

Although, this has been underscored by the fact that the pattern, trend and tone of most conflicts and wars tends to indicate a concentration around resource-rich regions of countries. For example, in a country like Liberia, rival factions were found to have been struggling to control the main diamond and gold producing areas (Ellis 1998: 157, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Keen's analysis (2003: 67, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005) notes that the pitched battles in the Sierra Leonean war, though rare, occurred mainly in the diamond rich areas. In Liberia and DRC, personal militia and armed networks were underpinned by the struggle for control of external commerce and social and trade networks (Ellis 1998: 161, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Rebels, warlords and insurgents are known to struggle for control through external commercial networks, illegal trading and violence (Nafziger & Auvinen 2002: 158, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005).

The third element is that the realities of conflict, violence and war in resource-rich regions have involved profiting by rulers, warlords and traders

(Nafziger and Auvinen 2002: 159, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Violence, as Ellis (1998: 157) depicted in Liberia, can become a form of business rather than an instrument for furthering any coherent ideological or even ethnic interest.

The fourth element is that wars and conflicts in Africa have in recent times had a considerable involvement of mercantilists, who have capitalized on the profits of scarce resources (Breytenbach n.d., cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Here, mercantilists such as foreign mining and mineral exploiting companies have usually partnered and taken sides with State or the non-State actors in order to obtain access to participate in formal or informal trading and in legal or illegal exploration. Several companies, foreign commercial interests and private military companies supported rebels and government forces in Sierra Leone (Breytenbach n.d.: 7, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). It is on record that French and Lebanese commercial interests won concessions of minerals and forest products from rebels in exchange for vital credit and equipment (Richard n.d.: 143, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Ellis (1998: 164, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005) is said to bring to the limelight the fact that there were sophisticated deals, specialist operators, professional import and export traders and African, American, Asian, European and Middle Eastern Companies in the war economy of Liberia.

The fifth element has been that warlords usually characterize African insurgencies, rebellion and wars. These warlords, according to Breytenbach (n.d.: 7, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005), are to a point more interested in resource capture and in maintaining a territory for resource exploitation. Warlords have been known to impose quasi-taxes on mineral resource exploitation and trade (Mair 2003: 12–13, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005). Also, warlords and insurgents, particularly, thrive on illegal international trading and export of looted minerals and timber through foreign firms and agents, as was the case in Angola, Liberia, Congo, Kinshasa and Sierra Leone (Reno 1993; 1996, cited in Ikelegbe, 2005).

However, it is now very clear how different actors, such as operators of multinational corporations, warlords, insurgents and many others, benefit immensely from crises. This is presently the case in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. This study is informed on the need to actually evaluate perceived successes and dilemmas among selected leaders and members of some selected social movements in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, examining the contributions of personal factors, personality characteristics, and environmental factors. It is expected that these factors should be able to provide an empirical understanding to the assessment of successes and dilemmas among leaders and members of these social movements. It is hypothesized therefore that personal factors (gender, age, educational status, marital status, family background, belief in religion and religion) will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among leaders and members of social movements. It is also hypothesized that personality characteristics (extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness) will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes. It is also hypothesized that environmental factors (degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, degree of group cohesiveness in the movement and level of agitation in the movement) will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes. It is further hypothesized that personal factors will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas. It is further hypothesized that personality characteristics will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas. It is finally hypothesized that environmental factors will show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas.

## METHODS

### Design

This study was a survey, which utilized ex-post facto design. The design was found appropriate because the author of the study was not involved in variable manipulation. This was so because the variables being measured were already in existence in the study areas and among the study participants. The studied independent variables were personal factors (ie gender, age, educational status, marital status, family background, religion, and belief in religion); personality characteristics (ie extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness) and environmental factors (ie degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, degree of group cohesiveness in the movement, and level of agitation in the movement). The study dependent variables were perceived successes (ie perceived successes resulting from agitation in the region and perceived general indicators of success) and perceived dilemmas.

### Setting

The study data were collected across the three states (ie Delta State, Rivers State and Bayelsa State) that make up the Niger Delta region. Some identified communities in each of the states were approached for data collection. In all, a total of four communities were selected, thereby making up a total of twelve communities across the three selected states of the Niger Delta Region.

### Participants

A total of 72 members of different social movements participated in the study as participants. Their socio-demographic characteristics are shown in table 1 below:

**Table 1. Socio-Demographic (Personal) characteristics of the participants for the study**

Variables	N	%
<b>Gender:</b>		
Male	60	83.2
Female	12	16.7
<b>Marital Status:</b>		
Never Married	24	33.3
Married	42	58.3
Divorced	1	1.4
Separated	3	4.2
Widowed	2	2.8
<b>Educational Status:</b>		
No formal Education	4	5.6
Primary School Certificate Holders	4	5.6
Secondary School Certificate Holders	10	13.9
<b>Ordinary National Diploma/National</b>		
Certificate of Education Holders	18	25.0
Higher National Diploma Holders	14	19.4



Variables	N	%
<b>Ordinary National Diploma/National</b>		
First Degree Holders	10	13.9
Post-graduate Diploma Holders	6	8.3
Masters Degree Holders	2	2.8
PhD Holders	4	5.6
<b>Religion:</b>		
Christianity	40	55.6
Islam	3	4.2
Traditional Religion	29	40.3
<b>Degree of support for movement activities from local indigenes:</b>		
Low	23	31.9
High	49	68.1
<b>Position in the movement:</b>		
Ordinary Members	54	75.0
Executive Members	18	25.0
<b>Level of Agitations for movement goals and activities:</b>		
Low	20	27.8
Average	30	41.7
High	22	30.6
<b>State of Origin:</b>		
Bayelsa State	18	25.0
Rivers State	23	31.9
Delta State	31	43.1
<b>Degree of Group cohesiveness in the movement:</b>		
Low	12	16.7
Average	37	51.4
High	23	31.9
<b>Family Background:</b>		
Monogamous Background	44	61.1
Polygamous Background	28	38.9
<b>Belief in Religion:</b>		
No	32	44.4
Yes	40	55.6
$X_{age} =$	32.39	Minimum age= 17 y
$SD_{age} =$	7.11	Maximum age= 48 y
N =	72	

## Instruments

Questionnaire format was utilized for data collection in the study. The questionnaire was made up of four sections, namely Section A (personal/socio-demographic characteristics scale), Section B (the Big Five personality inventory), Section C (perceived successes in the region subscale, and perceived general indicators of success subscale), and Section D (perceived dilemmas scale).

Section A was designed to assess socio-demographic/personal characteristics of the study participants. The measured socio-demographic characteristics included gender, age, marital status, educational status, family background,

state of origin, religion, belief in religion, etc). Also, measured in Section A of the questionnaire were: degree of support for movement activities from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions for movement activities, degree of group cohesiveness in the movement goals and activities, and position in the movement.

Section C of the questionnaire was designed to assess perceived successes. Therefore, the perceived successes scale was made of two other subscales, namely perceived successes resulting from the agitations subscale, and perceived general indicators of success. The perceived successes resulting from the agitations subscale was a seven-item scale, developed and designed by the author of this study. The scale items were drawn from in-depth interviews with some selected indigenes of the three states that made up the Niger Delta region. Originally, the scale items were fifteen but through content validity conducted on the fifteen items, the experts' judgments got the 15 items reduced to 11 items. Further, based on item analysis of the remaining 11 items, the items got reduced finally to 7 items, with the least item-total correlation being 0.61.

The perceived general indicators of success subscale was developed and designed by the author of the study based on literature search (see Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*). Accordingly, Gamson, in *The Strategy of Social Protest*, found that groups were more successful if they were single-issue oriented, used selective incentives, used violence and/or disruptive tactics, and their organization was more bureaucratized, centralized and not divided into factions. The perceived general indicator of the success subscale was made to have seven items, reflecting the issues raised by Gamson for successful groups.

In general, the two subscales which made up the perceived successes scale were made to have a response format likened after Likert-type format, ranging between "strongly agree" (5), "agree" (4), "undecided" (3), "disagree" (D) and "strongly disagree" (1). High scores in the scale indicate high perceived successes while low scores in the scale indicate low perceived successes.

Section D of the questionnaire was meant to measure perceived dilemmas (ie challenges and failures). The scale items were developed and designed by the author of the study through a number of procedures. Firstly items were generated through literature search (see Onduku, 2003, Naanen, 2004, Moniaga, 2004, and Weingarten, 2008) and through in-depth interviews with some indigenes. The generated items were subjected to content validity (ie through the use of experts' judgments). Further, the resulting pool of items from experts judgments were subjected to item analysis.

Essentially, the scale was originally a twenty-item scale, developed, designed and based on literature search and in-depth interviews. While the scale items were subjected to expert judgments in order to establish the content validity, the scale items got reduced to 16 items. Therefore, based on the item analysis conducted on the 16 items, the items got reduced to 13 items with the least item-total correlation being 0.56.

## Procedure

The study is an attempt to assess measures of success and dilemmas in relation to newly-emerged social movements in Niger Delta region in Nigeria. The study was targeted at the Niger Delta region. The core Niger Delta states are Bayelsa State, Delta State and Rivers State. In the year 2000, former President Olusegun Obasanjo's regime expanded the definition of Niger Delta region by incorporating some other states, including Abia State, Edo State, Imo State, Cross-River state, Akwa-Ibom state, and Ondo State (see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger\\_Delta](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Delta)). However, for the purpose of this study, only the core Niger Delta states (ie Bayelsa State, Delta State and Delta State) were used.

Selected communities in each of the states were approached for data collection. Essentially, data collection was made possible with the assistance of some residents in each of the communities, who assisted actively in distributing the questionnaires to their fellow brothers and sisters, who are members of the new social movements in Niger Delta region. In all, four communities were selected randomly in each state, thereby making up a total of twelve communities for the three states in the Niger Delta region.

A total of 180 copies of the questionnaire were produced and distributed across the selected communities in the three states, with 60 copies of the questionnaire meant for each state. These copies were distributed as follows: 15 copies for each community, across the four communities.

In order to encourage the study participants to respond to the questionnaire items freely, they were asked not to include their names or the names of the social movement they belonged to. Essentially, the participants were asked to respond to the questionnaire items as sincerely as possible, and they were assured that their responses would be treated with utmost confidentiality.

In all, out of the 180 copies of the questionnaire, only 93 copies could be retrieved with the assistance of some residents-turned-research assistants while the remaining 87 copies could not be retrieved. Out of the 93 copies, only 72 were deemed fit and usable for data entry and analysis. The remaining 21 copies could not be used because some of the participants failed to indicate their gender or age or some other personal characteristics, while some other participants filled the questionnaire poorly in general.

The study lasted four weeks and three days.

### Statistical analysis

The study utilized both the descriptive and inferential statistics. The descriptive statistics were meant to obtain some summary information on some data such as mean ( $\bar{X}$ ), standard deviation ( $\sigma$ ), percentages (%) and frequency. The inferential statistics were meant to test the stated hypotheses. Basically, multiple regressions were employed for testing the hypotheses. Specifically, the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 10.0 was utilized for data entry and data analysis.

### Results

The results of the study are presented below. The results are presented in descriptive and inferential form.

**Table 2. Descriptive statistics showing responses to perceived successes in the Niger Delta Region**

S/N	Our agitations in the region have led to the following	SA	A	UN	D	SD	X	N
1	Creating awareness that social justice can promote the needed peace in the region	5 (6.9%)	15 (20.8%)	14 (19.4%)	20 (21.8%)	18 25%	2.57	72
2	Creation of some commissions by governments such as oil, Mineral producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992, now being replaced by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000	-	23 (31.9%)	1 (1.4%)	30 (41.7%)	18 (25%)	2.40	72
3	Creation of new state, such as Bayelsa state, from the old Rivers State.	3 (4.2%)	36 (50%)	-	20 (27.8%)	13 (18.1%)	2.94	72
4	Creation of Niger Delta University in Bayelsa State	9 (12.5)	20 (27.8%)	10 (13.9%)	19 (26.4%)	14 (19.4%)	2.88	72

S/N	Our agitations in the region have led to the following	SA	A	UN	D	SD	X	N
5	Overseas educational training for some selected brilliant students in the region in different areas of specialization	5 (6.9%)	19 (26.4%)	16 (22.2%)	13 (18.1%)	19 (26.4%)	2.69	72
6	Election of Sons and Daughters to some coveted federal positions, such as the election of Dr. Jonathan Goodluck as the nation's Vice President	6 (8.3%)	25 (34.7%)	-	34 (47.2%)	7 (9.7%)	2.85	72
7	Governmental institutions at both the federal level and state level and even local level are now paying serious attention to the new social movements/ethnic militias in the region	16 (22.2%)	15 (20.8%)	11 (15.3%)	21 (29.8%)	9 (12.5%)	3.1	72

Note: "SA"= strongly agree, "A"= agree, "UN"= undecided, "D"= disagree, "SD"= strongly disagree, "X"= mean, "SD"= standard deviation

**Table 3. Descriptive statistics showing responses to perceived general indicators of success of any movement**

S/N	Social movements can succeed with the following strategies	SA	A	UN	D	SD	X	SD
1	Single issue struggle/ orientation	10 (13.9%)	29 (40.3%)	-	12 (16.7%)	21 (29.2%)	2.93	72
2	Using selective incentives	2 (2.8%)	30 (41.7%)	2 (2.8%)	14 (19.4%)	24 (33.3%)	2.61	72
3	High level of bureaucracy in the movement	3 (4.2%)	21 (29.2%)	-	32 (44.4%)	16 (22.2%)	2.49	72
4	High level of centralization	17 (23.6%)	23 (31.9%)	4 (5.6%)	12 (16.7%)	16 (22.2%)	3.18	72
5	Absence of factions	3 (4.2%)	19 (26.4%)	11 (15.3%)	12 (16.7%)	27 (37.5%)	2.43	72
6	Using violence and/or destructive tactics	5 (6.9%)	26 (36.1%)	8 (11.1%)	20 (27.8%)	13 (18.1%)	2.86	72
7	Receiving adequate support from her immediate environments	3 (4.2%)	37 (51.4%)	-	21 (29.2%)	11 (15.1%)	3.00	72

Note: "SA"= strongly agree, "A"= agree, "UN"= undecided, "D"= disagree, "SD"= strongly disagree, "X"= mean, "SD"= standard deviation

**Table 4. Descriptive statistics showing responses to perceived measures of dilemmas being experienced by social movements in the region**

S/N	Our agitations are underscored by the following	SA	A	UN	D	SD	X	N
1	Insincerity in the implementation of true federalism in Nigeria	9 (12.5%)	33 (45.8%)	13 (18.1%)	8 (11.1%)	9 (12.5%)	3.35	72
2	Inability to control one's own destiny in one's local environment	6 (8.3%)	21 (29.2%)	9 (12.5%)	36 (50%)	-	2.96	72
3	Federal government not being serious in alleviating people's suffering and anger, other than shifting blames	1 (1.4%)	38 (52.8%)	12 (16.7%)	10 (13.9%)	11 (15.3%)	3.11	72
4	Opportunists are using the crises in the region to make a profit by hostage-taking and robbing banks	12 (16.7%)	36 (50%)	12 (16.7%)	5 (6.9%)	7 (9.7%)	3.50	72
5	Easy avenue for the corrupt government officials to loot, by hiding behind the excuse of "paying for hostage release" to steal from the public	8 (11.1%)	41 (56.9%)	2 (2.8%)	15 (20.8%)	6 (8.3%)	3.42	72
6	Some members of our movements are greedy and selfish	32 (44.4%)	9 (12.5%)	2 (2.8%)	17 (23.6%)	12 (16.7%)	3.13	72
7	Rising rate of poverty in the region	30 (41.7%)	14 (19.4%)	9 (12.5%)	14 (19.4%)	5 (6.9%)	2.97	72
8	Rising poor standards of living among the people of the region	36 (50%)	17 (23.6%)	4 (5.6%)	8 (11.1%)	7 (9.7%)	3.05	72

S/N	Our agitations are underscored by the following	SA	A	UN	D	SD	X	N
9.	Rising rate of other selfish groups in the name of fighting for justice	26 (36.1%)	14 (19.4%)	3 (4.2%)	18 (25.0%)	11 (15.3%)	3.19	72
10.	Practical neglect by governments in improving the people's living conditions despite billions of dollars being made in the area	8 (11.1%)	23 (31.9%)	12 (16.7%)	10 (13.9%)	19 (26.4%)	2.88	72
11.	Corruption among government officials in the region	34 (47.2%)	16 (22.2%)	5 (6.9%)	11 (15.3%)	6 (8.3%)	3.60	72
12.	People in the region are still suffering from environmental degradation and pollution through oil spillage and gas flaring	33 (45.8%)	17 (23.6%)	-	13 (18.1%)	9 (12.5%)	3.50	72
13.	Tidal waves spread spilled oil through the mangroves and on to farmlands rendering them infertile	30 (41.7%)	26 (36.1%)	2 (2.8%)	6 (8.3%)	8 (11.1%)	3.89	72

Note: "SA"= strongly agree, "A"= agree, "UN"= undecided, "D"= disagree, "SD"= strongly disagree, "X"= mean, "SD"= standard deviation

## Hypotheses testing

### Hypothesis One

This hypothesis propounded that personal characteristics (gender, age, educational status, marital status, family background, belief in religion, and religion) would show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements. The hypothesis was tested by multiple regression and the result is shown on table 5 below.

**Table 5. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived successes by personal characteristics**

Predictors	$\beta$	t	P	F	P	R <sup>2</sup>
Gender	-.49	-4.35	<.05			
Age	-.08	-.74	>.05			
Marital Status	.11	.94	>.05			
Educational Status	-.04	-.40	>.05	3.69	<.05	.29
Family background	.13	1.12	>.05			
Belief in religion	.28	2.53	<.05			
Religion	-.09	-.76	>.05			

Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance

The results in table 5 above clearly revealed that personal characteristics showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes [F (7, 64) = 3.69,  $p < .05$ ; R<sup>2</sup> = .29]. The results clearly revealed further that gender ( $\beta = -.49$ ,  $t = -4.35$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and belief in religion ( $\beta = .28$ ,  $t = 2.53$ ,  $p < .05$ ) showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively. However, the results revealed that age ( $\beta = -.03$ ,  $t = -.74$ ,  $p > .05$ ), marital Status ( $\beta = .11$ ,  $t = .94$ ,  $p > .05$ ), educational background ( $\beta = -.04$ ,  $t = -.40$ ,  $p > .05$ ), family background ( $\beta = .13$ ,  $t = 1.12$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and religion ( $\beta = -.09$ ,  $t = -.76$ ,  $p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. Therefore, hypothesis one was partially supported by the findings of the study.

### Hypothesis Two

This hypothesis propounded that personality characteristics (extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness) would show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. The hypothesis was also tested by multiple regressions. Table 6 shows the results clearly.

**Table 6. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived successes by personality characteristics**

Predictors	$\beta$	t	P	F	P	R <sup>2</sup>
Openness to experience	.41	3.47	<.05			
Conscientiousness	.38	3.03	<.05			
Extraversion	.40	3.27	<.05	6.62	<.05	.33
Agreeableness	.00	.01	>.05			
Neuroticism	.18	1.50	>.05			

Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance

The results in table 6 revealed that personality characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived successes among leaders and members of social movements [F (5, 66) = 6.62,  $p < .05$ ;  $R^2 = .33$ ]. Further, personality characteristics of openness to experience ( $\beta = .41$ ,  $t = 3.47$ ,  $p < .05$ ), conscientiousness ( $\beta = .38$ ,  $t = 3.03$ ,  $p < .05$ ), and extraversion ( $\beta = .40$ ,  $t = 3.27$ ,  $p < .05$ ) showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively. However, only personality characteristics of agreeableness ( $\beta = .00$ ,  $t = .01$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and neuroticism ( $\beta = .18$ ,  $t = 1.50$ ,  $p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. Therefore, hypothesis two was partially supported by the study findings.

### Hypothesis Three

This hypothesis propounded that environmental factors (degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, degree of group cohesiveness in the movement and level of agitation in the movement) would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements. The hypothesis was tested by multiple regressions. The result is shown in table 7 below.

**Table 7. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived successes by the environmental factors**

Predictors	$\beta$	t	P	F	P	R <sup>2</sup>
Degree of support from local indigenes	.18	1.53	>.05			
Degree of support from governmental institutions	-.14	-1.21	>.05			
Level of agitation in the movement	-.27	-2.24	<.05	3.03	<.05	.15
Degree of group cohesiveness in the movement	.15	1.24	>.05			

Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance

The results in table 7 above revealed that the environmental factors showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes [F (4, 67) = 3.03,  $p < .05$ ;  $R^2 = .15$ ]. Also, the results revealed that the level of agitation in the movements showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes. However, the results revealed that the degree of support from local indigenes ( $\beta = .18$ ,  $t = 1.53$ ,  $p > .05$ ), degree of support from governmental institutions ( $\beta = -.14$ ,  $t = 1.21$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and degree of group cohesiveness in the movement ( $\beta = .15$ ,  $t = 1.24$ ,  $p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes respectively. Therefore, hypothesis three was partially supported by the study findings.

### Hypothesis Four

This hypothesis propounded that personal characteristics would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and members of social movements. The hypothesis was tested also by multiple regressions. The result is shown in table 8 below.

**Table 8. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas by personal characteristics**

Predictors	$\beta$	t	P	F	P	R <sup>2</sup>
Gender	.01	.06	>.05			
Age	.14	1.27	>.05			
Marital Status	-.04	-.35	>.05			
Educational Status	.41	3.62	<.05	2.81	<.05	.24
Family Background	-.17	-1.37	>.05			
Belief in Religion	.04	.35	>.05			
Religion	.16	-1.38	>.05			

Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance

The results in table 8 above revealed that the personal characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [ $F(7, 64) = 2.81, p < .05; R^2 = .24$ ]. The results revealed further only the personal characteristic concerning educational status ( $\beta = .41, t = 3.62, p < .05$ ) showed significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. However, the results clearly revealed that gender ( $\beta = .01, t = .06, p > .05$ ), age ( $\beta = .14, t = 1.27, p > .05$ ), marital status ( $\beta = -.04, t = .35, p > .05$ ), family background ( $\beta = -.17, t = -1.37, p > .05$ ), belief in religion ( $\beta = .04, t = .35, p > .05$ ) and religion ( $\beta = .16, t = -1.38, p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas respectively. Therefore, hypothesis four was also partially supported by the study findings.

### Hypothesis Five

This hypothesis propounded that personality characteristics would show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and members of social movements. The hypothesis was tested by multiple regressions. The result is shown in table 9 below.

**Table 9. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas by personality characteristics**

Predictors	$\beta$	t	P	F	P	R <sup>2</sup>
Openness to experience	-.00	-.02	>.05			
Conscientiousness	.19	1.49	>.05			
Extraversion	.08	.59	>.05	6.66	<.05	.34
Agreeableness	.57	4.29	<.05			
Neuroticism	-.05	-.38	>.05			

Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance

The results in table 9 clearly revealed that the personality characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and members of social movements ( $F(5, 66) = 6.66, p < .05; R^2 = .34$ ). The results revealed very clearly that only personality characteristics of agreeableness ( $\beta = .57, t = 4.29,$

$p < .05$ ) showed significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. The results, however, revealed that openness to experience ( $\beta = -.00$ ,  $t = -.02$ ,  $p > .05$ ), conscientiousness ( $\beta = -1.9$ ,  $t = 1.49$ ,  $p > .05$ ) extraversion ( $\beta = .08$ ,  $t = .59$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and neuroticism ( $\beta = -.05$ ,  $t = -.38$ ,  $p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas respectively. Therefore, hypothesis five was partially supported by the study results.

### Hypothesis Six

This hypothesis propounded that environmental factors would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among leaders and members of social movements. The hypothesis was tested also by multiple regressions. The result is shown in table 10 below.

**Table 10. A summary table of multiple regression showing the independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas by the environmental factors**

Predictors	$\beta$	t	P	F	P	R <sup>2</sup>
Degree of support from local indigenes	.15	1.21	>.05	1.31	>.05	.07
Degree of support from governmental institutions	-.17	-1.40	>.05			
Level of agitation in the movement	-.00	-.02	>.05			
Degree of group cohesiveness in the movement	-.17	1.38	>.05			

Note: < .05 indicates significance; >.05 indicates non-significance

The results in table 10 above clearly revealed that the environmental factors did not show significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas [ $F(4, 67) = 1.31$ ,  $p > .05$ ;  $R^2 = .07$ ]. The results, however, revealed that degree of support from local indigenes ( $\beta = -.15$ ,  $t = 1.21$ ,  $p > .05$ ), degree of support from governmental institutions ( $\beta = -.17$ ,  $t = -1.40$ ,  $p > .05$ ), level of agitations in the movement ( $\beta = -.00$ ,  $t = -.02$ ,  $p > .05$ ) and degree of cohesiveness in the movement ( $\beta = -.17$ ,  $t = -1.38$ ,  $p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. Therefore, it was made clear, based on the results in table 10, that hypothesis six was not supported by the study findings.

### Discussion

This study was meant to investigate perceived successes and dilemmas of some new social movements in the Niger Delta region. The study investigated empirically the influence of personal characteristics, personality characteristics and environmental factors on perceived successes and dilemmas among leaders and members of some selected social movements. The study was actually a survey which measured the study variables with the use of a questionnaire. Six hypotheses were tested in the study, using multiple regressions to test the stated hypotheses.

Based on the results shown in tables 2 through 4, reflecting on the descriptive statistics of responses to perceived successes (successes based on agitations and indicators of successful movements) and perceived dilemmas, it was revealed clearly that the study participants responded differently. For example, based on results in table 2, it was clearly revealed that more study participants indicated that "governmental institutions at both the federal level, state level and even local level are now paying serious attention to the newly-



emerged social movements/ethnic militias in the region, with 22.2 percent of the participants indicating “strongly agree”; 20.8 percent indicating “agree”; 15.3 percent indicating “undecided”; 29.8 percent indicating “disagree” while 12.5 percent indicating “strongly disagree”. Similarly, as regards results in table 3, for example, it was revealed that more study participants indicated that a “high level of centralization” is one of the indicators of successful social movements, with 23.6 percent of the study participants indicating “strongly agree”; 31.9% indicating “agree”; 5.6 percent indicating “undecided”; 16.7 percent indicating “disagree” while 22.2 percent indicated “strongly disagree”. Also, based on table 4, for example, it was clearly revealed that more study participants expressed that their agitations in the region have been a dilemma due to the fact that they have provided an “easy avenue for the corrupt government officials to steal from the public by hiding behind excuse of ‘paying for hostage release’”, with 11.1 percent of the study participants indicating “strongly agree”; 56.9 percent indicating “agree”, 2.8 percent indicating “undecided”; 20.8 percent indicating “disagree”, while 8.3 percent indicated “strongly disagree”.

Hypothesis one, which propounded that personal characteristics (gender, age, educational status, marital status, family background, belief in religion, and religion) would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements was partially supported by the study results. The results clearly showed that personal characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived successes, with 29 percent of the variance in perceived successes being accounted for by the personal characteristics. The results further revealed that only gender and belief in religion showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively. However, other personal characteristics (ie age, educational status, marital status, family background and religion) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively.

The results, as shown in table 5, revealed that some personal characteristics are relevant in perceived successes among leaders and members of social movements. Clearly, the results showed that, as regards gender, females reported more perceived successes than males. Similarly, as regards belief in religion, members and leaders of social movements with a strong belief in religion reported more perceived successes than members and leaders with not-so-strong belief in religion. Additionally, other personal characteristics, such as age, marital status, educational status, religion and family background, were found not to have a significantly independent role on perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements.

Hypothesis two, which propounded that personality characteristics (extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness) would show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, was partially supported by the study results. The results clearly revealed that personality characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived successes, with 33 percent of the variance in perceived successes being accounted for by the personality characteristics. Similarly, the personality characteristics of openness to experience ( $\beta = .41, t = 3.47, p < .05$ ), conscientiousness ( $\beta = -.38, t = 3.03, p < .05$ ) and extraversion ( $\beta = .40, t = 3.27, p < .05$ ) showed significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively. However, the results made it clear that personality characteristics of agreeableness ( $\beta = -.00, t = .01, p > .05$ ) and neuroticism ( $\beta = .18, t = 1.50, p > .05$ ) did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived successes, respectively.

Based on the results described above, it was made clear that personality characteristics are relevant in perceived successes of agitations and expectations among members and leaders of social movements while all the considered personality characteristics were shown to have significantly joint prediction of

perceived successes, personality characteristics of openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion were shown to have, respectively, significantly independent prediction of perceived successes.

Hypothesis three, which propounded that environmental factors (degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, level of agitations in the movement and degree of group cohesiveness in the movement) would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived successes among members and leaders of social movements was partially supported by study results. The results, specifically, revealed that the environmental factors have a significantly joint prediction of perceived successes, with 15 percent of the variance in perceived successes being accounted for by the environmental factors. Similarly, only the environmental factor of degree of group cohesiveness in the movement was found to have a significantly independent prediction of perceived successes.

It was made clear, however, that degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support and degree of group cohesiveness in the movement were found not to have a significantly independent prediction of perceived successes.

Hypothesis four, which propounded that personal characteristics would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of the social movement, was supported partially by the study results. Essentially, the obtained results revealed that the personal characteristics showed significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas, with 24 percent of the variance in perceived dilemmas being accounted for the considered personal characteristics. The results, specifically, revealed that only personal characteristic of educational status showed significantly independent predicted of perceived dilemmas. However, other personal characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, educational status, family background, belief in religion, and religion did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas, respectively.

In a clearer analysis, the results above portrayed that the personal characteristics could jointly explain perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements but only the personal characteristics of educational status could significantly and independently explain perceived dilemmas. This clearly portrayed that members and leaders of social movements with higher educational status reported more perceived dilemmas than members and leaders of social movements with lower educational status.

Further, hypothesis five, which propounded that personality characteristics would show significantly joint and independent prediction of perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements, was found also partially supported by the study results. In the first place, the results portrayed clearly that the personality characteristics showed significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas, with 34 percent of the variance in perceived dilemmas being responsible for the personality characteristics. Similarly, the results revealed that only the personality characteristic of agreeableness had significantly shown independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. However, the results vividly revealed that personality characteristics of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion and neuroticism did not show significantly independent prediction of perceived dilemmas, respectively.

In a way, the results described above depicted that, somehow, personality characteristics could jointly provide a good explanation for the understanding of perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements, but the personality characteristic of agreeableness was found to provide an independent explanation for the understanding of perceived dilemmas. This means that members and leaders of social movements who showed high agreeableness

reported more perceived dilemmas than members and leaders who showed low agreeableness.

Hypothesis six, which propounded that environmental factors would show significantly independent and joint prediction of perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements, was not supported by the study results in any way. First, the results clearly depicted that the environmental factors did not show significantly joint prediction of perceived dilemmas. Also, the results revealed that none of the environmental factors (ie degree of support from local indigenes, degree of support from governmental institutions, level of agitations in the movements and degree of group cohesiveness in the movements) significantly show independent prediction of perceived dilemmas. This now portrays that the environmental factors did not influence perceived dilemmas among members and leaders of social movements.

## **Conclusion**

Today, it is very clear that the newly-emerged social movements in the Niger Delta region and the government at the three tier levels, particularly the Federal Government, have not had a good relationship. Onduku (2003) once expresses that the relationship between social movements in the Niger Delta region has been and remained one of mutual distrust. It is on record that the people of the region want a future for their unborn children and therefore are demanding a better deal, particularly for being an oil-rich region. And it is so unfortunate that the government wants to continue to maintain absolute control of the resources from the region while the multinationals strive for profit maximization by parleying with the State (Onduku, 2003). All of this has led to the continuing emergence of social movements, some of which are violent and whose members are ready to lay down their lives to get what they want. However, it is clear now that the way members and leaders of social movements assess success or dilemma is closely related to a number of factors, which include their personality, personal features and even some environmental factors. This suggests that members and leaders of social movements do take stock of their successes and even challenges. It is positive that our social movements still continue to agitate for resource control, environmental sanitation, job creation etc, even in the face of the newly-introduced Amnesty Programme for repenting militants, which suggests that more is needed to please militants. They may actually want a different way of life, but there should be an element of trust in the newly-introduced Amnesty Programme, which became effective on August 16, 2009.

## **Implications/Recommendations**

The study findings have shown the relevance of personal factors, personality characteristics and environmental factors to the understanding of evaluation of perceived successes and dilemmas among leaders and members of social movements. In a way, these findings have clearly shown that what leaders and members of social movements see as a measure of success or dilemmas can be explained by their personal factors, personality characteristics and even environmental factors. Therefore, if it is necessary to really assess success or dilemmas as regards the agitation started by social movements, then efforts must be made to look into their personal make-up, personality make-up or, better still, the environmental views of the leaders and members of the social movements.

Above all, efforts should be made to ensure the practice of true federalism, which will make the Niger Delta Region start benefiting from good governance

in Nigeria. On this note, it is on record that there is need to "...collectively call for the reintroduction of the revenue allocation principle as practiced in the past and as expressed in the Independence Constitution of 1964 which, according to them, was the condition under which the federal units agreed to come together as a nation. They also demand a review of the current 13 percent derivation formula, which is considered insignificant and cannot redress the devastation in the Niger Delta Region" (Onduku, 2003). Also, a number of these social movements wanted the existing multinational corporations in the region to relocate their administrative headquarters to their areas of operation in the Niger Delta Region. I want to believe that if this is done, more opportunities will be available for the Niger Delta people, such as job opportunities, long-lasting infrastructural developments, genuine environmental sanitation of the already-polluted environment, genuine provision of needed social amenities and much more.

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